东亚美元本位、浮动恐惧和原罪

概要亚洲金融危机以前 ,包括中国在内的东亚国家———除了日本———都把本国的货币与美元挂钩。为了避免进一步的混乱 ,国际货币基金组织曾建议这些国家的汇率应该进一步自由浮动。可是 ,我们的分析表明 ,到目前为止 ,美元在东亚国家的货币篮子里依然占据绝对比重 ,也就是说 ,东亚国家的汇率制度基本上又回到了危机以前。到 2 0 0 2年 ,每一个东亚国家货币对美元的每日波幅已经非常微小 ,以至于可以忽略不计。同时 ,大多数东亚国家迅速积累了作为“战争基金”的官方外汇储备 ,这预示着汇率稳定将从每日延续到每月和每个季度。从“原罪”(…     

The 1997 Asian Currency Crisis,Financial Linkages,and the Monetary Policy of Japan

The evidence is examined that excessively liberal monetary policy by the Bank of Japan, before and after the financial collapse of Japan in 1992, may have led other East Asian economies into “over‐borrowing” and speculative investments, prior to the currency crisis in 1997–98. The authors test for cointegration and Granger causality between Japanese money supply M1 and the domestic investment of eight East Asian economies and Australia. US and German money supplies are also used as a benchmark. There is strong evidence that there are long‐ and short‐run causal relationships between the Japanese money supply and the domestic investment of the Asian crisis‐inflicted economies prior to 1997.     

Changing patterns of Asian currencies’ co-movement with the US dollar and the Chinese renminbi: Evidence from a wavelet multiresolution analysis

We extend the Frankel–Wei approach by using wavelet analysis to evaluate the relative importance of the dollar and the renminbi as anchor currencies at different time scales. We find that Asian currencies’ co-movement with the dollar weakened after the global financial crisis, while that with the renminbi strengthened particularly after China introduced a new exchange rate management system in 2015. The evidence suggests that emerging Asian economies have recently attached more importance to the renminbi as an anchor in exchange rate management.     

TOWARD A REGIONAL EXCHANGE RATE REGIME IN EAST ASIA

Abstract.  Deepening market-driven economic integration in East Asia makes intraregional exchange rate across the region increasingly desirable and necessary. The paper suggests that East Asia's emerging economies begin to choose a currency basket as a monetary policy anchor to enable all East Asian currencies to collectively appreciate vis-à-vis the US dollar, while maintaining intraregional rate stability, in the event of surges of capital inflows or a rapid unwinding of global payments imbalances. Following this initial step, East Asia may agree on more rigid intraregional exchange rate stabilization schemes through, for example, an Asian Snake or an Asian Exchange Rate Mechanism.     

Optimum currency areas and the European experience

Across nations or regions, the debate on optimum exchange rate cum monetary policies is not yet resolved on three levels. First is the optimum domain of fixed exchange rates versus keeping them flexible. Second is the subordinate debate on whether one needs full monetary union (as in continental Europe) to secure an optimum currency area's internal domain; or, whether virtually fixed exchange rates — where national currencies remain in circulation — can be sufficient. Third is whether a regional grouping of economies with close trade ties (as in East Asia) gain by collectively pegging to an outside currency such as the US dollar. Using an axiomatic approach, which limits the set of cross‐country financial claims to what is feasible, I analyse how best to both share and reduce macroeconomic risks on these three levels. JEL classification: F31, F36.     

Exchange rate volatility and the role of regional currency linkages: the ASEAN case

As the economies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have moved towards closer economic ties and trade integration in recent years, the establishment of exchange rate stability is becoming an important regional policy concern, particularly in the wake of the Asian currency crisis of 1997. This paper examines the exchange rate volatility of the currencies of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand between 1974 and 1999. Using variance decomposition (VDC) methods and impulse response functions, which are VAR-related estimation techniques, the study also investigates the regional currency linkages which may have played a role in transmitting exchange rate fluctuations. The results indicate that, in spite of the adoption of the crawling peg exchange regime following the breakup of the Bretton Woods system, all of the five ASEAN currencies experienced volatility, with the Indonesian rupiah posting the highest volatility level. The switch to de facto pegging against the US dollar in the mid-1980s helped to stabilize all ASEAN currencies with the exception of the Malaysian ringgit. Each of the five currencies became more susceptible to instabilities in other ASEAN currencies in the post-1985 period. Consistent with the experience of the Asian currency crisis, the Thai baht was the main channel through which regional currency fluctuations were transmitted.     

Relation-based versus Rule-based Governance: an Explanation of the East Asian Miracle and Asian Crisis

The paper aims to establish a theory of relation‐based governance to explain both the “East Asian miracle” and the Asian crisis. The author first defines “relation” and “relation‐based governance” in terms of information and enforcement, and then analyzes the nature and dynamics of relation‐based governance, comparing its benefits and costs with that of “rule‐based governance” in terms of observability/verifiability, commitment, and transaction costs. The theory is applied to examine a particular relation‐based governance system—the Japanese model—to explain both the East Asian miracle and the Asian crisis. The framework provides foundations for studies of East Asian catching‐up and economic development in general.     

SYNCHRONIZATION OF ECONOMIC SHOCKS BETWEEN GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AND UNITED STATES,EUROPE, JAPAN,AND OIL MARKET: CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME†

Using a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) with block exogeneity, this study examines the impacts of external shocks originating from the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the oil market as well as those of the regional shocks, on the oil‐rich countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), viewed as a prospective monetary union. It takes into account the implications of the shock impacts for selecting an appropriate common exchange rate arrangement. The SVAR variance decomposition and impulse response analyses strongly underscore the relative impacts of the global shocks over the regional ones. The findings imply that the world's two major currencies, the U.S. dollar and the euro, should figure highly in a GCC's common basket of currencies. Accordingly, a transitional movement to a more flexible exchange rate arrangement such as a basket peg may be desirable for these trade‐dependent economies in the long run, as is argued in the optimal currency literature for developing countries. (JEL E52, O52, C22)     

Export growth slowdown and currency crisis: the Malaysian experience

A slowdown in export growth occurred in all East Asian economies that were affected by the Asian currency crisis. Misaligned exchange rates have been widely cited as a cause of the slowdown. In the Malaysian context at least a vulnerability to the downturn in the electronic cycle could also be a major factor leading to poor export performance. Using the US/yen dollar rate as a proxy for exchange rate misalignment and US total new orders for electronics as a proxy for global electronics demand, cointegration analysis was used to establish the likely causes of a slowdown in Malaysia's export performance. Empirical results suggest that a unique long-run relationship exists between all three variables. The policy implications of these results including exchange rate monitoring and export diversification are discussed in the conclusion.     

Exchange Rate Populism

East Asian and Latin American economies present opposite exchange rate electoral cycles: exchange rates tend to be more depreciated before and appreciated after elections among East Asian economies, while the opposite is true in Latin America. We propose an explanation for these empirical findings where the driving force of the opposite exchange rate populism in these two regions is their difference in the relative size of tradable and non‐tradable sectors, coupled with the distributive effect of exchange rates. In a setup where policy‐makers differ in their preference bias toward non‐tradable and tradable sectors, the exchange rate is used a noisy signal of the incumbent's type in an uncertain economic environment. The mechanism behind the cycle is engendered by the incumbent trying to signal he is median voter's type, biasing his policy in favor of the majority of the population before elections.     

Exchange rate volatility and exports from East Asian countries to Japan and the USA

The purpose of this article is to investigate the impact of exchange rate volatility on exports in four East Asian countries (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Thailand). Specifically, this article aims at determining whether the bilateral real exchange rate volatility between an East Asian country and its trading partner negatively affects the exports of the East Asian country. Considering the dominant roles of the USA and Japan as trading partners of those East Asian countries, this article focuses on the quarterly export volumes of East Asian countries to the US and Japan for the period from 1981 to 2004. Except for the case of Hong Kong's exports to Japan, cointegration tests and estimations of error correction models indicate exchange rate volatility has negative impacts on exports either in the short-run or in the long-run, or both. On the other hand, the real GDP of importing countries and depreciation of real bilateral exchange rates turn out, in general, to have positive effects. Of special interest is the finding that the impact of the exchange rate volatility does not show any stylized differences depending on whether the importing country is Japan or the USA, even though dollar invoicing dominates in East Asia.     

The purchasing power parity of Southeast Asian currencies: A time-varying coefficient approach

The economies of Southeast Asia have undergone several structural changes, including the Asian currency crisis, during the post-Bretton Woods era. We use a time-varying coefficient cointegration model to test for purchasing power parity (PPP) of Southeast Asian currencies and to track changes in purchasing power relationships over time. The main empirical findings are as follows. First, the stability of the relationship between exchange rates and price differentials is strongly rejected. Second, a major structural change occurs at the outbreak of the Asian currency crisis in 1997. Third, when the cointegration vector is allowed to vary with time, we find evidence of a cointegration relationship for four countries in terms of the US dollar and for four countries in terms of the Japanese yen. Therefore, it seems unlikely that Southeast Asian currencies form a “yen bloc.”     

Monetary Integration in East Asia: Evidence from Real Effective Exchange Rates

This paper investigates the feasibility of forming a monetary union in East Asia by examining the cointegration and causality of the real effective exchange rates of local currencies. A “pentagon” group of five countries is found—South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia—which may have potential for success for further monetary integration. Singapore is loosely tied to this group. The Greater China area—China, Hong Kong and Taiwan—does not show any significant degree of integration either internally or externally. Neither a yen bloc nor a US dollar bloc is forming in East Asia.     

Convergence of interest rates around the Pacific Rim

This article applies the panel data unit root tests provided by Im, Pesaran and Shin (Discussion paper, 1997) to examine the interest rate convergence of small-open Asian countries with major financial centres. With monthly data from 1988:1 to 1997:6, it was found that the nominal interest rates of these countries converge to the US rates rather than to Japan's. This finding is consistent with the view that the monetary authorities of non-Japan Asian economies pegged their exchange rates overwhelmingly to the dollar rather than the yen before the financial crisis of 1997.     

VEHICLE CURRENCY*

Historically, the world economy has been dominated by a single currency accepted in the exchange of goods and assets among countries. In recent decades, the U.S. dollar has played this role. The dollar acts as a “vehicle currency” in the sense that agents in nondollar economies will generally engage in currency trade indirectly using the U.S. dollar instead of using direct bilateral trade among their own currencies. A vehicle currency is desirable when there are transactions costs of exchange. This article constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model of a vehicle currency. We explore the nature of the efficiency gains arising from a vehicle currency and show how it depends on the total number of currencies in existence, the size of the vehicle currency economy, and the monetary policy followed by the vehicle currency’s government. We find that there can be significant welfare gains to a vehicle currency in a system of many independent currencies. But these gains are asymmetrically weighted toward the residents of the vehicle currency country. The survival of a vehicle currency places natural limits on the monetary policy of the vehicle currency country.     

The exchange rate regime in Asia: From crisis to crisis

Prior to the Asian financial crisis, most Asian exchange rates were de facto pegged to the US Dollar. During the crisis, many economies experienced a brief period of extreme flexibility. A ‘fear of floating’ gave reduced flexibility when the crisis subsided, but flexibility after the crisis was greater than that seen prior to the crisis. Contrary to the idea of a durable Bretton Woods II arrangement, Asia then went on to slowly raise flexibility and reduce the role for the US dollar. When the period from April 2008 to December 2009 is compared against periods of high inflexibility, from January 1991 to November 1991 and October 1995 to March 1997, the increase in flexibility is economically and statistically significant. This paper proposes a new measure of dollar pegging, the “Bretton Woods II Score”. We find that Asia has been slowly moving away from a Bretton Woods II arrangement.     

Exchange rates,central bank news and the zero lower bound*

The zero lower bound (ZLB) may restrict the responsiveness of exchange rates to news. A proxy for central bank communication is added as a determinant in a model of exchange rate movements. Two reserve currencies, the British pound and euro, and two currencies of small open economies, the Canadian dollar and Swedish krona, are examined. Reserve currencies are more vulnerable to the ZLB constraint, while the currencies of small open economies become more responsive to foreign central bank announcements. Certain unconventional monetary policy announcements were found to significantly impact exchange rates at the ZLB.     

Business Cycle Co‐movement between Australia and East Asia

This article analyses business cycle co‐movement between Australia and 10 major economies in the East‐Asian region by using two measures: concordance indices and correlation coefficients. The results from the concordance index suggest that Australia's business cycle is becoming increasingly synchronised with those in East Asia, particularly with China and Japan. The correlation coefficients of gross domestic product (GDP) growth and the deviation of real GDP from its trend between Australia and its East‐Asian neighbours are also significantly higher since 2000, relative to the correlation coefficients found for the 1990s. The growing importance of East Asia in Australia's economic future implies that the risks facing the economy have changed and Australia needs to engage in more macroeconomic policy dialogues with its neighbouring economies to improve their policy responses.     

Dynamic linkages between exchange rates and stock prices: Evidence from East Asian markets

This study examines dynamic linkages between exchange rates and stock prices for seven East Asian countries, including Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, for the period January 1988 to October 1998. Our empirical results show a significant causal relation from exchange rates to stock prices for Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand before the 1997 Asian financial crisis. We also find a causal relation from the equity market to the foreign exchange market for Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore. Further, while no country shows a significant causality from stock prices to exchange rates during the Asian crisis, a causal relation from exchange rates to stock prices is found for all countries except Malaysia. Our findings are robust with respect to various testing methods used, including Granger causality tests, a variance decomposition analysis, and an impulse response analysis. Our findings also indicate that the linkages vary across economies with respect to exchange rate regimes, the trade size, the degree of capital control, and the size of equity market.     

THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIME AND THE VOLATILITY OF EXCHANGE RATES BEFORE AND AFTER THE ASIAN CRISIS: A COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS*

This paper carries out a counterfactual analysis of the impact of alternative exchange rate regimes on the volatility of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) and the bilateral rate against the US dollar for nine East Asian countries, both before and after the Asian financial crisis. Our hypothetical regimes include a unilateral basket peg (UBP), a common basket peg (CBP) and a hard peg against the $US, but in contrast to previous counterfactual exercises which compute the weights for effective exchange rates on the basis of simple bloc aggregates, we apply a more disaggregated methodology using a larger number of trade partners and utilise ARCH/GARCH techniques to better capture the time‐varying characteristics of volatility. Our results suggest that a UBP would minimise effective exchange rate volatility for all countries both before and after the crisis and provides the highest regime gains compared to actual. Although the gains for a CBP are always less than those for a UBP the absolute differences between the two regimes appear to be small. In terms of bilateral exchange rates against the dollar the gains from a UBP or CBP could also be quite significant for the non‐dollar peggers, especially post‐crisis, since a fall in effective instability would be accompanied by a fall in bilateral instability.