Computer-Assisted International Negotiation: A Tool for Research and Practice

This article describes a web-based computer-assisted tool for diagnosing progress in international negotiation. Following a discussion of the need for such a tool, we provide the research sources for its development, present the model on which it is based, describe how it works, and present the results of attempts to validate its diagnoses with case materials. Focusing on flexibility in negotiation, the program consists of questions divided into five categories: issues, parties, delegations, situation, and process. The questions track to variables shown in published studies to influence flexibility. Answers to the questions are processed according to algorithms that include weights derived from the results of a statistical meta-analysis of bargaining studies. An example of the question-answer format and computations leading to the diagnoses are provided. A help function that provides advice for resolving impasses is also described. Strong correspondences between diagnoses generated by the program and actual outcomes obtained in a number of cases attest to the validity of the approach. The article concludes with ideas for further development stimulated by the web-based version of the program.     

The Third Vote Experiment: Enhancing Policy Representation of a Student Parliament

Since voters are often swayed more by the personal image of politicians than by party manifestos, they may cast votes that are in opposition to their policy preferences. This results in the election of representatives who do not correspond exactly to the voters’ own views. An alternative voting procedure to avoid this type of election failure is prompted by the approach implemented in internet voting advice applications, like the German Wahl-O-Mat, which asks the user a number of questions on topical policy issues; the computer program, drawing on all the parties’ answers, finds for the user the best-matching party, the second-best-matching party, etc. Under the proposed alternative election method, the voters cast no direct votes. Rather, they are asked about their preferences on the policy issues as declared in the party manifestos (Introduce nationwide minimum wage? Yes/No; Introduce a speed limit on the motorways? Yes/No, etc.), which reveals the balance of public opinion on each issue. These embedded referenda measure the degree to which the parties’ policies match the preferences of the electorate. The parliament seats are then distributed among the parties in proportion to their indices of popularity (the average percentage of the population represented on all the issues) and universality (frequency in representing a majority). This paper reports on an experimental application of this method during the election of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology Student Parliament on July 4–8, 2016. The experiment shows that the alternative election method can increase the representativeness of the Student Parliament. We also discuss some traits and bottlenecks of the method that should be taken into account when preparing elections.     

Efficient Multi-Attribute Negotiation with Incomplete Information

Multi-attribute negotiation is an important mechanism for distributed decision makers to reach agreements in real-world situations. It allows the possibility of reaching “win-win” solutions for both parties, who trade off different attributes in a solution. Existing research on multi-attribute negotiations has mainly focused on the situations when negotiation parties have complete information about each other's preference. This paper presents a model with incomplete information, while considering Pareto-efficiency and computational efficiency. A non-biased mediator, who applies query learning to maintain near Pareto-efficiency without heavy computation, is adopted in the model. In addition, the mediating mechanism proposed in the model overcomes the difficulty of preference elicitation which usually arises in the preliminary step of a multi-attribute negotiation. Our model also reduces the negotiation complexity by decomposing the original n-dimensional negotiation space into a sequence of negotiation base lines. Agents can negotiate upon a base line with rather simple strategies. The experimental results show that near Pareto-efficient agreements can be reached effectively.     

跨文化商务谈判中应该注意的一些问题

随着中国对外合作关系的深入发展，中国公司面临的跨国谈判也在日益增加。由于跨国谈判的谈判方都是由来自不同国家和化背景的人组成的，在谈判过程中谈判各利益方就会不可避免地遇到许多单化谈判中不会遇到的挑战。这篇论从7个方面探讨了在跨国谈判中谈判利益方应该注意的一些问题．以推动谈判过程中双赢协议的达成。这7个方面包括谈判前的准备工作、谈判中的化问题以及谈判时的一些细节问题。     

Qualitative One-to-Many Multi-Issue Negotiation: Approximating the QVA

When there is one buyer interested in obtaining a service from one of a set of sellers, multi-attribute or multi-issue auctions can ensure an allocation that is efficient. Even when there is no transferable utility (e.g., money), a recent qualitative version of the Vickrey auction may be used, the QVA, to obtain a Pareto-efficient outcome where the best seller wins. However, auctions generally require that the preferences of at least one party participating in the auction are publicly known, while often making this information public is costly, undesirable, or even impossible. It would therefore be useful to have a method that does not impose such a requirement, but is still able to approximate the outcome of such an auction. The main question addressed here is whether the Pareto-efficient best-seller outcome in multi-issue settings without transferable utility (such as determined by the QVA) can be reasonably approximated by multi-bilateral closed negotiation between a buyer and multiple sellers. In these closed negotiations parties do not reveal their preferences explicitly, but make alternating offers. The main idea is to have multiple rounds of such negotiations. We study three different variants of such a protocol: one that restricts the set of allowed offers for both the buyer and the seller, one where the winning offer is announced after every round, and one where the sellers are only told whether they have won or not after every round. It is shown experimentally that this protocol enables agents that can learn preferences to obtain agreements that approximate the Pareto-efficient best-seller outcome as defined by the auction mechanism. We also show that the strategy that exploits such a learning capability in negotiation is robust against and dominates a Zero Intelligence strategy. It thus follows that the requirement to publicly announce preferences can be removed when negotiating parties are equipped with the proper learning capabilities and negotiate using the proposed multi-round multi-bilateral negotiation protocol.     

Negotiation Support for Multi-Party Resource Allocation: Developing Recommendation for Decreasing Transportation-Related Air Pollution in Budapest

Decisions about how to allocate scarce resources among potential programs are common sources of conflict in both public and private life. This paper describes a case in which negotiation support was provided for a five-member task force trying to reach agreement about how to allocate limited resources among programs designed to improve the air quality in Budapest, Hungary. The intervention consisted of a series of facilitated decision conferences, plus individual interviews. The task force eventually reached agreement about a recommended package of 15 air quality management programs costing 1,500 million Hungarian forints. The research makes four significant contributions. First, it demonstrated that resource allocation models provide a useful framework for understanding and facilitating multi-party negotiation processes. Second, because resource allocation models were elicited individually for each group member before building a single group model, it was possible to analyze the five-dimensional feasible settlement space (i.e., the joint distribution of benefits for each task member for all possible resource allocation packages). Third, several innovative applications of analytical techniques (i.e., Pareto-efficiency analyses, numerical and graphical analyses of feasible settlement spaces and efficient frontiers, and analyses of task force members' investment progressions) served to improve understanding of disagreements within the group and to evaluate the quality of potential resource allocation packages. Fourth, changes in individual preferences and group agreement were assessed over time. Group members appeared to change substantially and their level of agreement to increase markedly over time.     

Perceived Relative Power and its Influence on Negotiations

In an experimental study, we investigate perceived relative power in negotiations and its effect on the distribution of resources and the integrativeness of agreements. We contrast perceived relative power with the objective individual level measure of power often used in past research: the parties alternatives to a negotiated agreement. We found that alternatives affected the distribution of outcomes, while perceived relative power and alternatives affected the integrativeness of outcomes. We found that negotiating pairs who perceived a smaller difference in relative power reached agreements of greater integrativeness than pairs who perceived a greater power difference, even after controlling for alternatives and aspirations. We explore the implications of treating power in negotiations as a perceived and relational construct.     

从博弈论看商务谈判僵局的本质和处理

商务谈判中的僵局是谈判双方都不愿看到但又不得不面对的难题。只有了解了商务谈判僵局产生的本质才能够更好地处理好谈判中的僵局。从博弈论的角度,对商务谈判僵局的本质进行了分析,指出在挖掘共同利益的过程中既可以寻求到瓜分共同利益的有效途径,又可寻找到共同利益与个体利益实现的最佳结合点。     

欧盟贸易协定谈判机制研究

国际协定是欧盟法律体系的重要组成部分。与贸易有关的国际协定,包括贸易协定、合作协定以及联系协定等,也是欧盟贸易政策的重要组成部分。本文通过介绍欧盟贸易协定谈判权的法理依据、各参与主体的法律地位和作用、参与主体内部及之间的权力平衡关系,分析和研究了欧盟贸易协定谈判机制,以利于进一步了解欧盟法律和贸易政策,也有益于发展中欧贸易关系。     

Market Alternatives, Third Party Intervention, and Third Party Informedness in Negotiation

Negotiation is one possible mechanism for setting transfer prices when no unique transfer price is obviously correct, allowing divisional managers to run their divisions with some degree of autonomy. This study examines the effects of market alternatives, third party intervention and third party informedness in transfer pricing negotiation.Experiment 1 examined the effects of market alternatives in a fully crossed design of buyer and seller's Best Alternatives To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) at four levels (no, low, medium, or high). Experiment 2 examined the effects of third party intervention with reference to role (binding vs. nonbinding) and informedness (informed vs. uninformed).Results of Experiment 1 indicated that both the existence and level of market alternatives affected reservation prices, expected profits, aspiration levels, and individual profits. Dyads with unequal BATNAs did not obtain higher joint profits than those with equal BATNAs, while dyads with unequal BATNAs distributed profits more unevenly between negotiators than dyads with equal BATNAs. Results of Experiment 2 indicated that only making the third party's role binding had an effect on joint profits. However, the presence of a third party and both the role and informedness manipulations affected resource distribution.     

The Secretary Problem Revisited - The Group Decision-Making Perspective

We consider a decision situation where there is an initial set of alternatives that may be augmented, a variant of the problem known in the literature as the "secretary problem". We focus the discussion on the special case of group decision-making, where a group or committee is charged with the responsibility of negotiating the decision. We investigate situations of explicitly stated (multiple) criteria and the simpler situation of no such stated criteria. The former case includes the congenial, the mixed, and the uncongenial cases, where the individuals agree on the direction of all, some, or none of the criteria, respectively. We offer a framework within which a group of individuals can be supported in such a decision process. In the case of explicit criteria, we provide the decision-makers with probability information of the likelihood of finding more preferred alternatives provided the initial set of alternatives is expanded. The framework is tested using a simulated real-world choice situation.     

项目融资中的资信增强技术及其案例分析

资信增强作为项目投融资风险管理的重要手段和金融创新在国内外项目融资活动中得到了广泛的运用。使用资信增强手段可以提升信用等级较低的交易方在某一具体交易中的资信,增加交易对方的信心并促进融资的顺利完成。在项目融资中进行资信增强的不同方法并对改革开放以来国内的有关案例和做法进行分析,使之能对融资实务操作者有所启发     

Ethics, Deception and Labor Negotiation

There has been widespread emphasis on the importance of trust amongst parties to the employment relationship, associated with a call for increased "integrative bargaining". Trust is bound up with ethical action, but there has been some debate about the ethics of deception in bargaining. Because it is possible for cooperative bargainers to be exploited, some writers contend that deceptive behavior is ethical and established practice. There are several problems about that view. It is questionable how clear and uniform such a practice has been. An appearance of deceptive bluffing can often be explained as exchange of genuine concessions. Recent trends have seen increased devolution of bargaining from professionals to non-professionals, which dilutes any shared understandings there have been in the past, while practices that do exist may not be freely or voluntarily accepted and the existence of such practices is not enough to compensate for inequalities of power and skill. It is questionable to what extent bluffing and deception are necessary for self-defense. There other techniques available by which parties can guard themselves against exploitation.     

Does party identification associate with consumer preferences? Analyzing Finnish consumers in 2009 and 2014

This article examines the association between Finn's political orientation and preferences regarding hedonistic and mundane consumer activities. Data derived from national‐level surveys collected in Finland in 2009 (n=1,202) and 2014 (n=1,351) suggests that political party identification is an important predictor of perceived consumption, even after controlling for the effects of key socio‐demographic factors. In general, supporters of the right‐wing National Coalition Party consider themselves as high‐level consumers more often than the supporters of other political parties do. The results also show that there have been very few temporal changes in the association between party identification and consumption preferences. The effect of party identification is stronger for hedonistic activities than for mundane activities. It is argued that political party identification has similar impact on individual's consumer preferences as other lifestyle and social network factors have. The findings offer us new possibilities for further research addressing consumer activities, and other behavioural correlates of political orientation.     

树政绩当为民

我们党一再强调,领导干部要树立正确的政绩观。干部的政绩观正确与否,影响深远,意义重大。树立正确的政绩观,领导干部才能提高党的执政能力、执政水平,巩固党的执政地位,真正体现“立党为公、执政为民”的本质要求。因此说,树政绩,当为民;为民,当树政绩。     

Ethical Decision Making Using the Analytic Hierarchy Process

Ethical dilemmas require evaluation of alternatives in light of conflicting principles. Because of the difficulty of making and defending such complex decisions, we may compromise the quality of our ethical decisions and debates. We need a methodology that combines the weighted effects of multiple ethical guidelines on the issue at hand. This paper describes how the Analytic Hierarchy Process can help us improve ethical decision making.     

Relationship, Contribution, and Resource Constrains: Determinants of Distributive Justice in Individual Preferences and Negotiated Agreements

This laboratory study investigated the impact of relationship, relative levels of perceived contribution, and resource constraints on individuals' allocation preferences and dyads' negotiated allocations. Dyads of female undergraduates – either strangers or roommates – were given performance feedback that one member produced the majority of the resources available to the dyad; the members of the dyad faced relatively scarce or abundant resources. Subjects indicated their individual allocation preferences and then negotiated the distribution of resources as a pair. Results indicate that all three factors are important predictors of the norms of distributive justice met by the individually preferred and dyadically negotiated allocations. Results also suggest that the degree of agreement between the norms implied by individually preferred allocations and dyadic agreements affect strangers' satisfaction with outcomes to a greater extent than roommates'.     

Negotiation processes,Evolutionary Systems Design,and NEGOTIATOR

A negotiation accord is often the result of an intense, laborious, and evolutionary negotiation process. During this process, disputing parties are confronted with goal, judgment, and outcome conflict. This article demonstrates the utility of a conflict resolution framework—Evolutionary Systems Design (ESD)—by using a Negotiation Support System. ESD seeks to guide negotiators to move their individual goals and judgments in such a way as to enhance the chance of achieving a common solution. As illustrated by the use of NEGOTIATOR, a multiattribute utility negotiation support system, we argue that computer mediation can prove to be an effective means to implement the ESD framework.     

Cross-Cultural Difference's Impact on International Business Negotiation

Cross-culture is the most important character of international business negotiation, just because of this difference in culture caused some cultural clash or conflict in international business negotiation, and most of the negotiation ended up in failure because of this. So to know about both party's cultural background,avoid some conflicts caused by cultural difference is critical to a successful international business negotiation. This article begins with cultural difference, talk about the cultural difference's impact on international business negotiation,give some examples to show that the understanding of cultural difference is important in international business negotiation. At the end, the article tell us that when we are negotiating we must take well care about cultural difference, know different culture, choose the best plan and strategy, so we can well understand each other, each other's advantage and disadvantage to gain win-win cooperation.     

But you promised! Managing consumers’ psychological contracts

In management literature, a psychological contract generally refers to an employee's beliefs about the reciprocal obligations that exist between him or her and an organization. Legal contracts, on the other hand, are agreements that create obligations between the parties that are enforceable by law. Psychological contracts are different from legal contracts in that they are characterized by the belief that both parties have entered into a set of mutual obligations. While marketing scholars and practitioners have largely overlooked the notion of psychological contracts, this article argues that a firm's customers might view the promises they believe a firm has made to them as psychological contracts. Psychological contracts are as relevant to marketing as they are to management. This article expands the notion of psychological contracts to marketing relationships and outlines internal and external strategies firms can employ to manage psychological contracts more effectively.