Flexible Labor Regulations and Informality in Egypt

Do more flexible labor market regulations reduce informal employment in formal firms? This paper examines the effects of changes in labor regulations on the incidence of formal employment. Using the case of Egypt, we study the effects of the introduction of more flexible labor regulations in 2003 on the probability that non‐contractual workers will be granted a formal employment contract. To identify the effect of the law and control for potential confounding factors, we use a difference‐in‐difference estimator that measures the difference in the pre‐ and post‐law probability of obtaining a formal contract across a treatment group of non‐contractual workers initially employed in formal firms and a comparison group of non‐contractual workers initially employed in informal firms. The latter serve as a useful comparison group since informal firms are unlikely to formalize as a result of the law, so that the only way their workers can become formal is to move to another firm. Our findings show that the passage of the new labor law did in fact increase the probability of transitioning to formal employment for non‐contractual workers employed in formal firms by about 3–3.5 percentage points, or the equivalent of at least a fifth of informal workers in formal firms.     

Structural Change,Expanding Informality and Labor Productivity Growth in Russia

Strong growth, intensive structural change, and expanding informality have characterized many developing and emerging economies in recent decades. Yet most empirical investigations into the relationship between structural change and productivity growth overlook informality. This paper includes the informal sector in an analysis of the effects of structural changes in the Russian economy on aggregate labor productivity growth. Using a newly developed dataset for 34 industries covering the period 1995–2012 and applying three alternative approaches, aggregate labor productivity growth is decomposed into intra-industry and inter-industry contributions. All three approaches show that the overall contribution of structural change is growth enhancing, significant, and decreasing over time. Labor reallocation from the formal sector to the informal sector tends to reduce growth through the extension of informal activities with low productivity levels. Sectoral labor reallocation effects are found to be highly sensitive to the methods applied.     

Migration,Transfers and Child Labor

We examine agricultural child labor in the context of emigration, transfers and the ability to hire outside labor. We start by developing a theoretical background and show how hiring labor from outside the household and transfers to the household might induce a reduction in children's working hours. Analysis using Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) data on the Kagera region in Tanzania lend support to the hypothesis that both emigration and remittances reduce child labor.     

Malnutrition and Child Labor

In pre‐industrial and developing economies, it is common to find (i) entire families, including children, working together in family farms or urban factories; and (ii) a positive link between a person's consumption and her productivity. This paper argues that there is a natural reason for the concurrence of (i) and (ii). As a rule, households are characterized by intra‐household altruism: an increase in the income of an individual increases the consumption of all household members. Hence, when an employer pays an adult worker a high wage to enhance her productivity, part of it ends up augmenting her children's consumption and productivity. One way for the employer to prevent this leakage and internalize the externality is to employ the children as well. This explains the higher incidence of family labor in poor societies where (ii) is more likely to be true.     

Informality,enforcement and growth

This paper develops a two-sector growth model with formal and informal sectors for an economy that cares about redistribution and illustrates its relationship with the enforcement level. The technology gap and labour rigidity explicate the duality. The state can tax the formal sector to subsidise informal income and finance public infrastructure. Alternatively, enforcement, which is costly and corresponds to a variety of discrete components from the security of property rights and integrity of contracts to control of corruptions, can be chosen to favour the formal sector and discourage the informal sector. It is observed that weaker enforcement required to accommodate some degree of informality, which releases tax burden from the formal sector needed for redistribution, can accelerate growth rate. However, sufficiently weaker enforcement dampens the formal sector expansion and growth rate. The growth rate registers an inverted-U shaped relationship against the enforcement level. The optimum enforcement can, however, be higher without formal labour union and subsidisation. This must be higher for welfare maximisation than that of growth rate, especially when the consumer cares about the quality of enforcement.     

Filial Obligations and Child Labor

The model presented here reproduces the empirical fact that poorer countries show a higher incidence of child labor and time‐intensive care of retired parents, whereas richer countries have negligible child labor and people indulge in money‐intensive care of the old. For that purpose, the effect of social norms of filial obligations on child labor and schooling decisions is analyzed. It is shown that norms of filial obligations are sustainable as an equilibrium in the intergenerational game. Widely discussed contracting problems à la Becker, which allegedly explain underinvestment in schooling by poor households, are thus solved. However, this alone does not induce the elimination of child labor. Technological parameters and relative returns to schooling also play a fundamental role.     

Child Gender,Intergenerational Kinship and Parental Labor Market Outcomes

This paper provides new evidence of the effects of child gender on parental labor market outcomes. Using data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey, I document a son premium on the intensive margin of parental labor supply in two‐parent families with one child. Parents with a newborn to a 6‐year‐old son have higher labor supply than parents with a daughter in the same age group. A further examination indicates that boys are likely to have better access to grandparent‐provided childcare than girls owing to grandson preference, and this allows parents with a preschool‐aged son to work more. The intensification of market work associated with having a son may affect economic outcomes over the lifecycle of parents through labor market attachment. This paper thus sheds light on the important distributional effects of family ties and culture on economic outcomes.     

Communication Cost,Skilled-Unskilled Wage,and Informality

Journal of Quantitative Economics - This paper establishes an interesting link between informality and time zone differences in a general equilibrium trade model for small open economy. Trading...     

Informality,innovation, and aggregate productivity growth

This paper investigates how the costs of innovation in the formal sector temper or magnify the impacts of traditional policy levers such as taxation on sectoral choice. I embed a decision whether to operate formally or informally into a richer, general equilibrium model. Formal firms are subject to taxation, but they can improve their productivity through process innovation. Informal firms can potentially avoid taxation, and their productivity is determined by productivity growth in the formal sector. I find that changing tax rates from 50% to 60% decreases formal‐sector participation by 20.9%; however, this percentage falls by 10% when the cost of innovation is lower in the formal sector. The model also illustrates how changes in tax policy affect total factor productivity growth by limiting both the number of formal‐sector firms and the intensity of innovation. These results indicate a potential mechanism to induce firms to operate formally or mitigate harmful impacts of necessary tax changes.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Child Labor

Empirical evidence suggests that use of child labor as domestic help has increased significantly in recent years although the overall incidence of child labor across the globe has declined satisfactorily. This should draw the attention of economists and policymakers because domestic child labor is considered as exploitative and in many cases hazardous. This paper purports to explain this apparently perplexing finding theoretically in terms of a three‐sector general equilibrium model with a nontraded sector where only child labor is used to render services to the richer section of the society. The analysis shows how FDI‐led economic growth increases the size of the services sector although it lowers the overall incidence of child labor in the economy and improves the welfare of the poor families that supply child labor. Finally, a composite policy has been recommended that can deal with all three aspects favorably.     

Informality and mobility

Informality is a defining characteristic of labour markets in developing and transition countries. This paper analyzes patterns of mobility across different forms of formal and informal employment in Russia. Using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey household panel we estimate a dynamic multinomial logit model with individual heterogeneity and correct for the initial conditions problem. Simulations show that structural state dependence is weak and that transition rates from informal to formal employment are not lower than from non-employment. These results lend support to the integrated view of the labour market.     

Vertically Linked Industries,Product Quality and Minimum Quality Standards

This paper extends the seminal model of vertical product differentiation by Ronnen (1991) to a two‐tier supply chain. While Ronnen considers the duopoly case, we add a vertical structure such that each downstream firm procures an input from a monopolistic upstream supplier. While simultaneous up‐ and downstream regulation in the form of a minimum quality standard restores Ronnen's findings, if only one firm is regulated in the vertical chain, a free‐rider effect results: all the bargaining power is given to the non‐regulated member of the chain, which uses it to free‐ride on the pressure exerted by the regulator onto the other member.     

Trade Sanctions and the Incidence of Child Labor

The purpose of this paper is to develop an imperfect competition model of a small open developing country to analyze the effects of trade sanctions on the incidence of child labor. We show that a uniform tariff levied by the developed countries on imports produced with the help of child labor is a failure in terms of reducing child labor. A more effective course of action would be a firm‐specific tariff where the tariff rate varies with the amount of child labor incorporated in a single good. While such an instrument reduces child labor, however, it worsens the children’s well‐being due to lower income and consumption. Contrary to expectations, the entrepreneurs in the developing countries, supposedly the main beneficiaries of child labor, are better off under trade sanctions as they realize higher profits.     

Informality: Causes,consequences and policy responses

A stylized prediction of the development economics discourse is that informality will disappear with development, and yet in the last 20 years conventional measures of informality, far from declining, have either remained stagnant or have actually increased. This includes countries such as India where economic growth has been at historically high levels. What exactly is informality and what are its magnitudes and trends? What are the causes of informality and why is it not decreasing as predicted by standard theories of development? What are the consequences for inclusive economic growth of a large and increasing informal sector? What are feasible and desirable policy responses to informality? These are the questions that motivate this broad based overview of informality. The questions will be addressed based on recent and ongoing research on India and globally.     

Information and Communications Technology,Agricultural Profitability and Child Labor in Rural Peru

We estimate the impact of access to information and communications technology on agricultural profitability and child labor among isolated rural villages in Peru. We exploit the timing of an intervention that provided at least one public (satellite) payphone to villages that did not previously have communications services. Using a village‐level panel, we show that agricultural profitability increased by 19.7%. Moreover, this positive income effect translated into an increase in the likelihood of children being dedicated only to school and a reduction in the likelihood of child labor equivalent to 17 and 16 percentage points respectively.     

出口产品质量、出口关系存续与增长

本文检验了我国企业出口产品质量提升对企业出口关系存续及其增长率的影响。研究结果表明:企业出口产品质量升级有利于企业出口关系的存续,并能够提升其出口增长率。稳健性检验显示,更换产品质量测算方法、样本区间、计量方法等并不影响本文基本结论,且在考虑了内生性问题后,本文基本结论依然不变。从影响机制来看,产品质量升级通过增强消费者偏好提高了企业出口关系存续概率,通过增强消费者偏好以及提高出口价格促进了出口增长率提升;同时,产品质量升级还通过提高企业出口关系存活概率进一步促进了企业出口增长率的提升。最后,异质性检验结果显示,出口产品质量提高对外资企业和出口到高收入国家的企业出口关系存续的积极影响较大,而对私营企业和出口到低收入国家的出口增长率的积极影响较大。     

Exploitation of Child Labor and the Dynamics of Debt Bondage

This paper is concerned with the institution of debt bondage and child labor employment in the context of an agrarian economy with overlapping generations. The model explores the principal-agent interaction between landlords and tenants, and identifies a set of reasons why households put children to work in response to the need to service outstanding debts, only to realize that child labor work is exploited, and households are made strictly worse off in general equilibrium. Debt bondage in one generation is further shown to leave spillover effects, and contribute to the cycle of debt, bonded child labor and poverty across generations. In this context, the effectiveness of trade sanctions as a policy response to bonded child labor is evaluated. Contrary to expectations, a trade ban can set off a sequence of increasing indebtedness among agrarian households that offset the intended (static) disincentives to employ child labor.     

Informality,public employment and employment protection in developing countries

This paper proposes an equilibrium matching model for developing countries’ labor markets where the interaction between public, formal private and informal private sectors are taken into account. Theoretical analysis shows that gains from reforms aiming at liberalizing formal labor markets can be annulled by shifts in the public sector employment and wage policies. Since the public sector accounts for a substantial share of employment in developing countries, this approach is crucial to understand the main labor market outcomes of such economies. Wages offered by the public sector increase the outside option value of the workers during the bargaining processes in the formal and informal sectors. It becomes more profitable for workers to search on-the-job, in order to move to these more attractive and more stable types of jobs. The public sector therefore acts as an additional tax for the formal private firms. Using data on workers’ flows from Egypt, we show empirically and theoretically that the liberalization of labor markets plays against informal employment by increasing the profitability, and hence job creations, of formal jobs. The latter effect is however dampened or even sometimes nullified by the increase of the offered wages in the public sector observed at the same time.