Statistical Discrimination and Gender Wage Gap: A Model

In this paper, I extend the model in Coate and Loury (CL) (1993) to show how statistical discrimination by employers can help create gender wage gap for men and women with equal earning potentials. Given that employers do not perfectly observe a worker’s skill type and partly rely on the average skills level of his (her) peers for inference purpose, employers’ differential treatment of male and female workers can create different skill-investment incentives for them, which in turn justify employers’ discrimination in the first place. The second result of this paper which is not possible within the original CL framework is that I point to the possibility that there exist circumstances under which the gender wage gap can not be eliminated without the formerly advantaged sex being negatively affected.     

职业分割、性别歧视与工资差距

文章通过"晒工费"网络平台提供的调查数据,利用Appleton分解方法对我国城镇职工的性别工资差距进行了分解.结果表明,受教育程度、工作年限等人力资本水平对男女工贵差异有显著的影响,而且我国劳动力市场上存在一定的职业性别分割.分解数据显示,职业内工资差异与职业闻工资差异分别为22.5%和15.7%,即存在比较严重的纵向和横向性别职业隔离.此外,分析结果还揭示了职业性别歧视是导致城市男女工资差异的主要原因.     

中国城市劳动力市场上的性别工资差异

本文描述了中国城市劳动力市场上男女在行业获得和工资上的差异,并且用计量方法对工资差异进行了分解。分解结果表明,男女工资差异主要由同类行业内工资差异引起,而由于两者行业分布不同而带来的工资差异不大;歧视是造成性别之间的工资差异的主要原因,人力资本所起的作用很小。由此,缩小行业内的工资差异,消除对女性的歧视,是缩小工资性别差异的重要途径。     

Gender, Labor Markets and Welfare States

Books reviewed:
Review of Gender and the Labor Market: Econometric Evidence of Obstacles to Achieving Gender Equality , edited by Siv Gustafsson and Danièle Meulders; and Gender and the Welfare State: Care, Work and Welfare in Europe and the USA , by Mary Daly and Katherine Rake Reviewed by Martha MacDonald     

International Trade and Gender Wage Discrimination: Evidence from East Asia

The paper explores how competition from international trade affects gender wage discrimination in two open economies. According to neoclassical theory, if discrimination is costly, then increased industry competitiveness from international trade lessens the incentive for employers to discriminate against women. This effect should be stronger in concentrated sectors, where employers can use excess profits to cover the costs of discrimination. Alternatively, increased international trade may reduce women's bargaining power to achieve wage gains. Results for Taiwan and Korea indicate that, in contrast to neoclassical theory, competition from foreign trade in concentrated industries is positively associated with wage discrimination against women.     

Capacity-constrained Collusive Price Discrimination in the Informal Rural Credit Markets of Nepal

The author tests two alternative models of price determination in informal rural credit markets, using LSMS data from Nepal. Strong support is found for a capacity-constrained collusive oligopoly model, where lenders have full information about actual borrowers and charge heterogeneous interest rates. Only marginal support is found for a competitive cost-pricing model with imperfect information. Interest rates vary with the observable characteristics of caste, installment period, and geographical region; and they decrease as village lending capacity increases up to a certain level. Interest rates do not depend on risk related variables such as land value and loan size.     

劳动力市场性别歧视行为分析

性别歧视是劳动力市场一种常见的行为,表现在两性就业、工资、职业安排、劳动保障和发展机会等方面程度不同的差别.然而,以经济学的逻辑,不同性别的报酬或职业差异本身并不能作为歧视的充分证明,因为,教育水平、年龄、工作经验和工时数量等很多因素都决定生产率的特征,甚至这种差异还可能来自两性对从事市场或家务劳动的不同选择.一个人在劳动力市场上的价值取决于影响其边际劳动生产率的所有供给和需求因素,如果与生产率无关的因素在劳动力市场上取得了正的或负的价值,才可能导致歧视.理性地认识性别歧视和对其原因进行剖析,有助于女性劳动者对提高自己禀赋资源以获得更高产生率的深刻理解.     

代际支持、女性劳动供给与中国性别工资差异收敛−基于性别分工的视角

我国"男主外、女主内"的性别分工观念年深日久,但相比世界很多国家,女性劳动参与率反而很高、性别工资差异也较低,中国文化中长期承袭着父辈对子女代际支持的传统可能是缓解女性劳动供给约束的重要动因.文章构建考虑父辈代际支持的家庭劳动供给模型,利用中国家庭追踪调查数据(CFPS),分析了父辈时间支持和经济支持对子女,特别是女性劳动力的劳动供给和工资收入的影响与机制.研究发现,父辈的时间支持明显缓解女性劳动参与的时间约束,提高其劳动供给和工资收入,但没有发现对男性有显著影响,故有利于性别工资差异收敛;而父辈的经济支持均未发现对子女的劳动参与和工资收入有显著影响.此外,对城乡进行区分后发现,父辈时间支持对城镇女性的作用比农村女性更强.文章的研究有助于加深对我国劳动力市场中女性劳动供给行为和性别工资收敛性的理解,对进一步完善劳动就业制度也有一定启示.     

Gender,Class, and Caste Schisms in Affirmative Action Policies: The Curious Case of India's Women's Reservation Bill

Following the introduction of economic liberalization policies in 1991, India has registered steady gains in terms of conventional economic indices such as external trade, investment inflows, and foreign exchange reserves. However, globalization has also caused the feminization of poverty. To counter this trend of marginalization of women, it is necessary to address the gender imbalance in decision-making positions. A Constitutional Amendment Bill seeking 33 percent reservation for women in parliament and state legislatures has, however, been scuttled by three successive governments since 1996, even while each party swears by its commitment to gender equity. The reasons for this curious schism showcase a classic example of gender-class-caste alignments and divisions, under political compulsions. This paper examines this ongoing gender-caste-class imbroglio, in the context of Indian affirmative action policies (economic, social, political), which have generated "backlash" reactions.     

社会排斥与劳动力市场分割——以性别歧视为例

劳动力市场因其社会性与制度性因素至少被分割成主要和次要两个层次,较之主要市场.次要市场的就业条件差、待遇低和发展机会少.女性劳动者因其社会性别角色的定位,往往被排斥在次要劳动力市场,就业困难且频遭歧视.社会性别排斥是劳动力市场分割的"借口",而分割的劳动力市场又强化了社会性别的排斥程度,如果没有相关的约束,这个恶性循环机制难以规避.正如商品和资本市场,在劳动力市场中,一方改进的代价是另一方的受损,无论如何效率和福利都没有实现最优,存在着改进的必要.本文深刻剖析社会排斥与中国劳动力市场分割的原因及危害,为政策和制度的建立提供理论研究的依据.     

市场歧视对城镇地区性别工资差距的影响

本文使用基于分位数回归的反事实分析方法研究了中国城镇地区的性别工资差距问题,发现了以下三个结论:第一,性别工资差距在工资分布不同位置上存在不对称现象。从横截面数据来看,在工资分布顶端性别工资差距较小,在工资分布末端性别工资差距较大。从时序数据来看,在工资分布顶端性别工资差距越来越小,在工资分布末端性别工资差距越来越大。第二,性别工资差距在横截面数据上表现出不对称现象的原因是,女性在工资分布顶端受到的歧视程度低,在末端受到的歧视程度高。第三,性别工资差距在工资分布末端越来越大的原因是,女性受到的歧视程度越来越高;在工资分布顶端越来越小的原因是,男性和女性个人特征方面(如受教育水平)的差别越来越小。     

Gender Inequalities in Labor Market Outcomes of Informal Caregivers near Retirement Age in Urban China

ABSTRACT

This study examines the impacts of unpaid family care on labor supply and earnings of women and men near retirement age in urban China. Using the 2011 China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) and ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable approaches, it finds that grandchild care is negatively associated with both women's and men's labor force participation, while there are no effects for eldercare. For women caregivers, caring for grandchildren substantially lowers paid labor hours compared to noncaregivers. No significant relationships are found between eldercare and paid labor hours of women workers. For men workers, neither grandchild care nor eldercare is significantly associated with labor hours. The study also finds no statistically significant relationships between grandchild care and labor earnings for either women or men. Eldercare, however, is positively associated with the earnings of men workers.     

家族企业中的歧视现象 --作为非正式治理机制的歧视

歧视现象普遍存在于家族企业，本文认为，歧视是家族企业在正式治理机制弱化情况下实施的一种非正式治理机制。家族企业扩张和管理的复杂化，要求雇佣高能力的外部代理人开展专业化分工，但是，现有的正式治理机制难以抑制外部代理人的寻租行为，过高的代理成本阻碍了分工的深入。业主会利用家族代理人和外部代理人共享的“准私人信息”，以及代理人之间信息租金的不同分布，根据血亲关系和私人关系在不同代理人之间实施歧视，通过给与家族代理人优厚待遇，达到抽取外部代理人的信息租金，降低代理成本的目的。     

不同期限类型劳动合同的工资决定机制及差异——基于中国家庭住户收入调查数据的经验研究

文章利用2002年住户收入调查(CHIP)数据对我国不同期限类型劳动合同的工资决定机制及工资差异进行了经验研究。结果发现,长期劳动合同与短期劳动合同的工资差异符合补偿性工资差别理论,企业对没有签订劳动合同的员工存在工资歧视。排除特征因素和选择性因素,长期劳动合同工的工资比短期劳动合同工低42.84%,比无劳动合同员工高29.6%。文章研究表明:短期劳动合同没有对生产率表现出显著的负面影响,提升劳动合同签订率是比限制短期劳动合同使用更为合适的劳动政策。     

贸易开放与性别工资差距

本文在不完全竞争市场环境下,建立贸易开放和性别工资差距的数理模型。在理论分析的基础之上,本文运用2002年中国家庭住户收入项目调查数据(CHIP)进行实证分析。在控制了年龄、婚姻状况和受教育年限等个体层面和人均GDP等城市层面的工资影响因素情形下,得出结论:贸易开放在总体上拉大了性别工资差距;贸易开放缩小了高技能劳动力的性别工资差距,拉大了低技能劳动力的性别工资差距。从某种意义上说,女性弱势群体更容易被排除在贸易开放的利益之外。因此,提高女性的受教育程度,并为之提供相应的制度保障具有尤为重要的政策含义。     

性别收入差异及性别歧视的变化

性别歧视带来的性别收入差异一直备受关注。文章基于吉林省1990-2010年间三期妇女地位的调研数据分析了吉林省的性别工资差异问题,并运用Oaxaca-Blinder对性别收入差距进行了分解。文章对20年间吉林省的性别收入差异进行了横向和纵向的分析,实证研究得到如下结论:性别分割是我国劳动力市场上一直存在的一种现象,性别收入差距总体趋势在扩大;个体特征差异能够在一定程度上解释性别收入差异,现阶段性别收入差异在很大程度上是由于劳动者本身的人力资本水平引起的,是正常合理的范围;歧视仍然是造成性别收入差距的一个原因,女性在获得教育的机会上还是比男性要低,而且女性很难进入到高收入行业和职业,使得在教育方面女性仍然处于不利地位。但是经过20年的发展,对女性的歧视逐步减弱。     

Minimum Wage Compliance and the Labor Demand Curve

Contrary to the traditional analysis of the employment effects of the minimum wage setting, the author shows that if compliance is contingent upon enforcement, complying with the minimum wage law involves a leftward shift of the labor demand curve rather than an upward movement along the curve. Furthermore, the labor demand curve will shift leftward with enforcement even if enforcement is insufficient to ensure compliance, becoming vertical when the options of compliance and noncompliance are equally attractive. Hence, it is not paying the statutory minimum wage that brings about a reduction in employment down to the full-compliance level but enforcement that, if sufficiently high, induces that same reduction in employment, even if the employer is still noncomplying with the minimum wage law.