Work Effort, Moderation in Expulsion, and Illegal Migration

Illegal migrants supply a valuable productive input: effort. But their status as illegals means that these migrants face a strictly positive probability of expulsion. A return to their country of origin entails reduced earnings when the wage at origin is lower than the wage at destination. This prospect induces illegal migrants to exert more work effort than comparable workers who face no such prospect. The lower the probable, alternative earnings, the harsher the penalty that illegal migrants will be subjected to upon their return, for a given probability of expulsion, and the higher the level of effort they will exert at destination. While the home‐country wage that awaits the illegal migrants upon their return is exogenous to the host country, the probability of their return is not. Given the home‐country wage, a higher probability of expulsion will induce illegal migrants to supply more effort. Hence, different combinations of probabilities of expulsion and home‐country wages yield the same level of effort. Thus, variation in the extent to which receiving countries undertake measures aimed at apprehending and expelling illegal migrants can be attributed not to characteristics of the illegal migrants themselves but to a feature that pertains to the illegal migrants’ country of origin.     

Intentions to Return of Clandestine Migrants: The Perverse Effect of Illegality on Skills

In this paper we show that highly skilled clandestine migrants are more likely to return home than migrants with low or no skills when illegality causes "skill waste", i.e. when illegality reduces the rate of return of individual capabilities (i.e. skills and human capital) in the country of destination. In a simple life-cycle framework, illegality is modeled as a tax on skills that reduces the opportunity cost of returning home particularly for the highly skilled. This proposition is tested on a sample of apprehended immigrants that unlawfully crossed the Italian borders in 2003. The estimation confirms that the intention to return to the home country is more likely for highly skilled illegal immigrants. The empirical results of this paper attenuate the common wisdom on the return decisions of legal migrants, according to which low-skill individuals are more likely to go back home (mainly because of negative self-selection).     

Pane e Cioccolata: The Impact of Native Attitudes on Return Migration

This paper addresses the link between native attitudes and return migration. We exploit the variation in xenophobia using information on media consumption by migrants in Italy. A widely documented crime provides a quasi‐experimental setting to identify the impact of Italian attitudes on migrants’ settlement intentions. Our results suggest a significant effect of anti‐immigrant attitudes on the intended duration of stay in the host country. The impact is more pronounced for low‐skilled migrants, which has consequences for how migration affects the long‐run convergence between sending and destination countries.     

International immigration and economic welfare in an efficiency wage model: The co-existence case of both legal and illegal foreign workers

Abstract. In the developed countries some native workers are unemployed while there exist illegal unskilled (legal skilled) foreign workers who are complementary to (substitutable for) natives and their wages are usually lower than (equal to) that of natives. Reflecting this situation, we introduce two types of immigrant in an efficiency wage model. It is shown that domestic government should exclude illegal foreign workers but welcome legal ones if the total number of illegal immigrants is small enough and well controlled. On the other hand, legal immigration should be restricted if the flood of illegal immigration is out of control.     

The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress

We compare the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970s. Standard trade theory suggests that trade reforms that lower barriers to goods from less skilled‐labor abundant countries and migration reforms that lower barriers to low‐skilled migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low‐skilled U.S. workers while benefiting high‐skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled‐labor abundant districts are more likely to support trade and migration reforms that benefit high‐skilled workers. Still, important differences exist: Democrats are less supportive of trade reforms than Republicans, while the opposite is true for migration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape votes on migration, but not on trade.     

ILLEGAL MIGRANTS, TOURISM AND WELFARE: A TRADE THEORETIC APPROACH

Abstract.  Many countries receive illegal migrants but are reluctant to accept them due to possible negative externalities. We provide a rationale for not policing illegal migration by linking it to the tourism industry. By paying illegal migrants less than local workers, the relative price of the non-traded goods is shown to be lower than it would be in the absence of such workers. An expansion in tourist trade, under certain intensity conditions, necessarily raises resident welfare and employment. This tourist boom necessarily lowers the welfare of the illegal migrants. It is established that an increase in tourism increases the supply of illegal migrants.     

Are migrants more skilled than non‐migrants? Repeat,return, and same‐employer migrants

Abstract.  I examine the determinants of inter‐state migration of adults within western Germany, using the German Socio‐Economic Panel from 1984–2000. Migrants who do not change employers represent one‐fifth of all migrants and have higher education and pre‐move wages than non‐migrants. Skilled workers thus have a low‐cost migration avenue that has not been considered in the previous literature. Other migrants are heterogeneous and not unambiguously more skilled than non‐migrants. I confirm that long‐distance migrants are more skilled than short‐distance migrants, as predicted by theory, and I show that return migrants are a mix of successes and failures. Most repeat migration is return migration. JEL classification: J6     

The case against eliminating large denomination bills

When large denomination bills are preferred in illegal activities, what is the optimal policy response? We construct a dual currency model where illegal activity can be reduced by modifying the payment environment. In our model, legal (goods) traders are indifferent between small and large bills, but illegal (goods) traders face a lower transaction cost of using large bills in comparison to small bills because it is easier to conceal. We show that eliminating large bills can reduce illegal trade and its associated social cost. However, this pooling equilibrium is sub-optimal because the government can collect more seigniorage by allowing illegal traders to use large bills with a lower rate of return. When the transaction cost of using small bills for illegal traders is sufficiently large, a separating equilibrium, where legal traders use small bills and illegal traders use large bills, can maximize welfare by making an implicit transfer from the illegal traders to the legal traders.     

Illegal Migration, Border Enforcement, and Growth

This paper analyzes the economic consequences of illegal migrants in the context of a model of trade and growth. In the model, capital and domestic labor are mobile sectors while illegal migrants are sector-specific. These assumptions give rise to a production possibility curve (with migrants) that lies partially inside the zero migration production possibility frontier. It is this feature of the model which generates ambiguous results regarding the relation betweendomestic welfare, illegal migrants, and enforcement. The steady-state growth path with migrants may lie above or below the balanced growth path without migrants.     

Labour migration as a way to escape from employment vulnerability? Evidence from the European Union

Free Movement of people is a fundamental principle of the European Union (EU). In a context of strong divergence in employment and working conditions among EU member states, migration can be seen as a way to increase employment opportunities but also to escape from poor working conditions at home. In this article, we focus on the possible influence of employment vulnerability by comparing its individual level among migrants and native workers in EU countries. We implement propensity score matching methods using data from the European Social Survey (2008) and indexes of employment vulnerability proposed by Bazillier et al. (2014). Overall, we show that migrants face the same level of employment vulnerability than natives, all other things being equal. But there are strong differences by skill-level. Low-skilled migrants have a lower level of vulnerability mainly because of a lower level of employer vulnerability while high-skilled migrants face a higher level of vulnerability, because of a higher level of job vulnerability.     

Congestion and Optimal Immigration Policy

This paper presents a model to explain the stylized fact that many countries have a low ratio of migrants in their population while some countries have a high ratio of migrants. Immigration improves the income of the domestic residents, but migrants also increase the congestion of public services. If migrants are unskilled and therefore pay low taxes, and the government does not limit access to these services, then the welfare of the domestic residents decreases with the number of migrants. Visa auctions can lower the cost of immigration control and substitute legal migrants for illegal migrants. If the government decides to limit the access of migrants to public services, immigration control becomes unnecessary and the optimal number of migrants can be very large.     

ECONOMY‐WIDE EFFECTS OF REDUCING ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS IN U.S. EMPLOYMENT

We use an economy‐wide model to analyze the effects of three broad programs to reduce illegal immigrants in U.S. employment: tighter border security; taxes on employers; and vigorous prosecution of employers. After looking at macroeconomic industry and occupational effects, we decompose the welfare effect for legal residents into six parts covering changes in: producer surplus and illegal wage rates; skilled employment opportunities for natives; aggregate capital; aggregate legal employment; the terms of trade; and public expenditure. The type of program matters. Our analysis suggests a prima facie case in favor of taxes on employers. (JEL J61, C68)     

Migration and pension

"Migration has important implications for the financial soundness of the pension system.... While it is common sense to expect that young migrants, even if low-skilled, can help society pay the benefits to the currently elderly, it may nevertheless be reasonable to argue that these migrants would adversely affect current young since, after all, the migrants are net beneficiaries of the welfare state. In contrast to the adverse effects of low skilled migration in a static model, [the authors] show that in a Samuelsonian overlapping generations model...migration is a Pareto-improving measure. All the existing income (low and high) and age (young and old) groups living at the time of the migrant's arrival would be better off."     

A Model of Smuggling and Trafficking of Illegal Immigrants with a Host Country Policy

This paper deals with illegal immigration via two distinct activities—smuggling and trafficking of workers. A destination–source model determines economic pay‐offs and a standard labor market policy works as a deterrent. Tax paid by legal unskilled workers at the destination is determined endogenously and it finances inland monitoring against illegal immigration, holding the border patrol at a given level. The tax also finances unemployment benefit to legal workers at the destination. The number of immigrant smugglers and traffickers is also determined endogenously along with employer penalty and market wage for illegal immigrants. Higher unemployment benefits may reduce illegal wages, raise traffickers’ rent and reduce flow of illegal immigrants from the source countries.     

A Remark on Color‐Blind Affirmative Action

Faced with legal challenges to explicitly race‐contingent admissions policies, elite educational institutions have turned to criteria that meet diversity goals without being formally contingent on applicant identity. We establish that under weak conditions that apply generically, such color‐blind affirmative action policies must be nonmonotone, in the sense that within each social group, some students with lower scores are admitted while others with higher scores are denied. In addition, we argue that blind rules can generate greater disparities in mean scores across groups conditional on acceptance than would arise if explicitly race‐contingent policies were permitted.     

An economic analysis of remittance of unskilled migration on skilled–unskilled wage inequality in labor host region

The present paper establishes a two-sector general equilibrium model and conduct the comparative static approach to investigate the impact exerted by an increase in the remittance rate of the unskilled migrants on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in the labor host region. We find that the unskilled migrants increase their remittance rate to the labor outsourcing regions that will decrease the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in the labor host region.     

Investment and interruption: effects of the US experience on the earnings of return migrants in Mexico

Migration is widely viewed as an investment in human capital. However, due to the imperfect transferability of skills and knowledge across countries, migration trips are also career interruptions, especially for return migrants who may meanwhile experience depreciation of home country-specific skills. This article demonstrates that migration experience increases return migrants’ earnings in the home country on the condition that the migration stay is sufficiently long and mostly uninterrupted. Employing the revised human capital earnings function, the empirical study shows that only a barely interrupted US experience longer than five years, regardless of the legal status of the migration trips, predicts higher earnings of male return migrants in Mexico than comparable non-migrants. Robust findings emerge controlling for unobserved individual \]acteristics or using instrumental variables to deal with the self-selection and endogeneity. Short migration stays in the US and frequent traveling provide return migrants no wage premium in Mexico.     

International inequality in subjective well‐being: An exploration with the Gallup World Poll

In this paper we compute inequality measures over the distribution of a subjective well‐being variable constructed from a life satisfaction question included in the Gallup World Poll in almost all countries in the world. We argue that inequality in subjective well‐being may be a better proxy for the degree of unfairness in a society than income inequality. We find evidence that inequality in subjective well‐being has an inverse‐U relationship with per capita GDP , but it is monotonically decreasing with respect to mean subjective well‐being. We argue that this difference might be associated to inequality aversion in the space of utility.     

Migration outflows and optimal migration policy: rules versus discretion

We study the effects of more open borders on return migration and show that migrants are more likely to return to the origin country when migration rules are softened, because this implies that they could more easily re-migrate if return migration is unsuccessful. As a result, softening migration rules leads to lower net inflows than is generally acknowledged. We show that if government follows rules to shape the optimal migration policy, it will choose more open “borders” than were its behaviour to be discretionary. However, this requires an appropriate commitment technology. We show that electoral accountability may be a solution to the commitment problem. As a matter of fact, observed softer immigration rules in western countries suggest the effectiveness of such a mechanism.     

The propensity to return: Theory and evidence for the Italian brain drain

Return migration is the positive counterpart of the brain drain. The effects of the brain drain in Italy could be negative: this paper shows that highly skilled migrants decide not to return to their native country.