Fiscal policy,rent seeking,and growth under electoral uncertainty: theory and evidence from the OECD

Abstract. We construct a general equilibrium model of economic growth and optimally chosen fiscal policy, in which individuals compete with each other for a share of government spending and two political parties alternate in power according to exogenous electoral uncertainty. The main prediction is that uncertainty about remaining in power results in increased fiscal spending, which in turn distorts incentives by pushing individuals away from productive work to rent‐seeking activities; then, distorted incentives hurt growth. This scenario receives empirical support in a dataset of 25 OECD countries over the period 1982–96. In particular, uncertainty about remaining in power leads to larger government shares in GDP, which in turn exert an adverse effect on the ICRG index measuring incentives and this is bad for growth.     

Political participation and entrepreneurial initial public offerings in China

This paper examines the economic consequences of political participation by entrepreneurs in China. Using unique data on political participation and initial public offerings by entrepreneurial firms, we find that firms controlled by entrepreneurs who participate in politics exhibit superior post-IPO performance. We also find that firms characterized by political participation are subject to less underpricing. Furthermore, the superior performance is concentrated among firms that operate in an environment characterized by rich rent-seeking opportunities instead of abundant business opportunities, suggesting that political participation is facilitating rent seeking rather than serving simply as a proxy for political recognition for entrepreneurship.     

What Makes Firms Competitive? States,Markets, and Organisational Embeddedness in Competitive Firm Restructuring in Postsocialist Economies

The prevailing transitions literature suggests that dynamic firms in postsocialist economies are the result of macroinstitutional reforms leading to the making of markets. This article builds on work in comparative political economy and economic sociology to show that the degree of competitive behaviour of postsocialist firms is determined not by the existence of general market institutions alone but by the kinds of organisational allies firms possess and the kinds of markets they compete in. Using firm survey data across 28 postsocialist economies, the article examines the determinants of competitive restructuring by firms, including product innovation, standards upgrade, financial transparency, and investments in research and development. The article confirms insights from comparative political economy which suggest that dynamic enterprise sectors emerge when governance is effective. However, at the firm level, the article finds that transnational ties and supportive policy environments are most significant in the making of dynamic postsocialist enterprises. The article also highlights important regional variation in firm behaviour and discusses the relationship between institutional frameworks, organisational embeddedness, and firm restructuring in postsocialist economies.     

Education,Rent seeking and the Curse of Natural Resources

Empirical evidence suggests that natural resources breed corruption and reduce educational attainments, dampening economic growth. The theoretical literature has treated these two channels separately, with natural resources affecting growth either through human capital or corruption. In this article, we argue that education and corruption are jointly determined and depend on the endowment of natural resources. Natural resources affect the incentives to invest in education and rent seeking that in turn affect growth. Whether natural resources stimulate growth or induce a poverty‐trap crucially depends on inequality in access to education and political participation, as well as on the cost of political participation. For lower inequality and higher cost of political participation, a high‐growth and a poverty‐trap equilibrium coexist even with abundant natural resources.     

SEEKING RENT IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR

Rent seeking within the vast informal segment of the developing world is a relatively under‐explored topic in the interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment gets affected by economic reforms targeted for the formal sector is rarely discussed in the literature. This paper fills the gap. We identify conditions under which economic reform in the formal segment will increase the rate of corruption or rent seeking in the informal sector and raise the pay‐off for those involved in rent‐seeking activities. When the formal sector contracts due to reforms, rent seeking in the informal sector may increase and lower the level of welfare unconditionally. Economic reforms may increase corruption instead of reducing it, unlike standard conjectures.     

政治关联、制度环境与家族企业创新绩效

基于社会情感财富理论,以2012-2015年中国A股上市家族企业为研究样本,从研发投入与研发产出两个方面实证检验政治关联对家族企业创新绩效的影响,以及制度环境对该影响关系的调节作用。实证结果表明,无论是从研发投入还是研发产出看,政治关联都与家族企业创新绩效显著负相关,而好的制度环境则会削弱政治关联对家族企业创新绩效的抑制作用。家族企业应该权衡社会情感财富损益及政治关联得失而避免企业战略短期导向,政府则应为家族企业创新及其绩效提升营造良好的金融、法制、经营等制度环境,减少政治寻租空间。     

Rent Seeking for Pure Public Goods: Wealth and Group's Size Heterogeneity

We study how between‐group wealth and size asymmetries affect aggregate rent‐seeking efforts when two groups compete for the allocation of a pure public good. Unlike with previous analyses on between‐group asymmetries, we measure the utility cost of rent‐seeking in terms of the loss in private consumption an individual faces when contributing to this activity. Our main result is that fewer between‐group asymmetries do not necessarily imply greater aggregate rent‐seeking efforts. The result is at odds with the commonly held notion that the more homogeneous the contestants in a static rent‐seeking model, the greater the aggregate rent‐seeking efforts.     

A theory of return‐seeking firms

We introduce a theory of return‐seeking firms to study the differences between this and profit‐maximising models. A return‐seeking objective takes into account the opportunity cost of each additional resource input to a firm's production as being a potential capital input choice in an alternative project. We find that firm supply curves cease to exist in perfectly competitive markets, that supply curves may slope up as well as down, that economies of scale are necessary for any production to occur and that firms always produce on a decreasing portion of their cost curve.     

Government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with rent‐seeking

We explore the relationship between government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with human capital and an unproductive capital which facilitates rent‐seeking. With exogenous as well as endogenous time discounting, we find a non‐monotonic relationship between the size of government and economic growth. We find that with very high (low) discounting, there is a unique low (high) growth equilibrium, regardless of the size of government. For the intermediate range of discounting, there are multiple equilibria and the growth outcome depends on the size of government. With endogenous time discounting, the growth outcome is path dependent and depends on the level of inherited human capital. However, there is only one stable growth regime and the economy endogenously switches to it. When the institutional constraints on rent‐seeking are not extremely high, the stable regime is the one in which there is a high‐growth equilibrium for a smaller size of the government and for larger size, both the high‐growth and the low‐growth equilibrium coexist. When the institutional constraints on rent‐seeking are extremely high, there exists only a unique high‐growth equilibrium irrespective of the size of government. Furthermore, economies with bigger size of the government and/or with poor quality institutions will take longer to endogenously switch to this stable growth regime.     

TRADE POLICY AND MARKET POWER: FIRM‐LEVEL EVIDENCE

This article identifies the effect of trade policy on market power through new data and a new identification strategy. We identify market power by observing how exporting firms price discriminate across markets following variations in bilateral exchange rates. Pricing‐to‐market is prevalent in all countries in our sample, even among small firms, although it is increasing in firm size. More importantly, we find that the effect of nontariff measures (NTMs) is not isomorphic to that of tariffs. Whereas tariffs reduce the market power of foreign firms through rent‐shifting effects, NTMs reinforce the market power of nonexiting firms, domestic and foreign alike.     

WINNER-HELP-LOSER GROUP FORMATION IN RENT-SEEKING CONTESTS*

We define a winner-help-loser group in a rent-seeking contest as follows: (a) the member players compete noncooperatively to win the rent, and (b) if a member player wins the rent, he helps the losing member players according to the previously written agreement. We demonstrate that one and only one winner-help-loser group is formed voluntarily. One important consequence of such group formation is that rent dissipation is small relative to individual rent seeking. Therefore, such group formation decreases the social cost associated with rent seeking and thus decreases the economic inefficiency of rent seeking.     

Tax competition, rent-seeking and fiscal decentralization

The present paper provides a basis for evaluating fiscal decentralization of expenditure and tax responsibilities, by encompassing the literature on tax competition and rent seeking. Both tax and rent seeking competitions are conceived of as being wasteful and self-defeating. We find that rent-seeking activities account for political distortions which may be mitigated in the process of fiscal decentralization, while tax competition results in economic distortions associated with decentralization. Welfare evaluation should be based on the balance of the political gain and the economic cost.     

Political Competition Between Countries and Economic Growth

Political competition between European countries has been viewed as being a stimulus to the innovation process and part of the reason why Europe was the first region of the world to experience sustained growth. Countries that fell behind their rivals technologically and economically became more vulnerable to exploitation. In this way, the presence of rival states provided added incentive to innovate. This paper uses a simple model of conflict between countries to study the role of political competition in economic growth. The governments of each country are threatened politically by innovation and, hence, face a trade‐off between the stability of their regime and keeping up with their rivals. The model shows that “institutional spillovers,” such as a decrease in the level of rent‐seeking in one country, can affect growth in a competing country. Thus, political fragmentation can be growth enhancing as it can result in more political competition.     

The impact of bargaining on markets with price takers: Too many bargainers spoil the broth

In this paper we study how bargainers impact on markets in which firms set a list price to sell to those consumers who take prices as given. The list price acts as an outside option for the bargainers, so the higher the list price, the more the firms can extract from bargainers. We find that an increase in the proportion of consumers seeking to bargain can lower consumer surplus overall, even though new bargainers receive a lower price. The reason is that the list price for those who do not bargain and the bargained prices for those who were already bargaining rise: sellers have a greater incentive to make the bargainers’ outside option less attractive, reducing the incentive to compete for price takers. Competition Authority exhortations to bargain can therefore be misplaced. We also consider the implications for optimal seller bargaining.     

Bargaining with Rent Seekers

Consider a rent‐seeking game, which has government bargain with firms over dividing the rents. In period 1, each firm can invest to increase the probability that the rent will appear. In period 2, the parties bargain. In equilibrium, though firms will invest more than the socially optimal level, rent‐seeking expenditures may be low. Firms that collude to restrict investment maximize joint profits by investing at a positive, non‐infinitesimal level, and restrict investment even if the cost of rent‐seeking effort is zero.     

Has Nguyen Phu Trong's Leadership Curbed Economic Reform? Economic Reform Trends in Vietnam

This paper argues how the features of Vietnam's political‐administrative system and their recent changes have affected economic reform, particularly reform of state‐owned enterprises. After the 12th Party Congress in 2016, the Party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong's administration has seemed to exaggerate its conservative and totalitarian‐looking rule in the political arena. In contrast, the economic reform policies introduced by Trong's administration seem more transformative and progressive. This paper suggests that this contradiction must indicate changes in the policies relating to the state management of economic entities and/or a disguised form of reform to retain state influence over economic management, both of which tend to end up with pervasive rent‐seeking practices.     

转轨体制、租金机制与企业的性质——兼论中国转型经济增长的“微观基础”

本文引入"潜产权"概念和租金机制来构造转型经济增长的"微观基础"。笔者从体制转轨和法律缺失两个转型背景下发现"潜产权"普遍存在,这些"潜产权"介入企业,从而改变了企业的性质。随后,通过企业这个微观主体,本文揭示了转轨体制对经济发生作用的内在逻辑,为"透视"转型期中国经济的三大"异常"特征提供了一个统一的理论解释。     

Rent Seeking with Politically Contestable Rights to Tariff‐rate Import Quotas**

This paper analyzes rent seeking for agricultural import quotas and the associated waste of resources when politically contestable licenses are allocated to either or both importers and exporters. In a two‐stage simultaneous contest where firms seek rent for licenses and then bargain over the import/export price, it is shown that (1) rents are not dissipated completely because of uncertainty in allocation of “rights,” (2) the dissipation ratio increases if the country with a more competitive contest increases the probability of establishing licenses, (3) rent seeking may cause the market structure to change, (4) less rent is dissipated in the case of pre‐existing market power, and (5) allocation of multiple licenses decreases rent‐seeking outlays.     

RESOURCE CURSE,POLITICAL ENTRY,AND DEADWEIGHT COSTS

A simple model of political entry in a two‐sector economy is developed to analyze the effects of natural resource wealth on economic policy, political development, and civil insurrection. The model emphasizes the role of political entry and deadweight costs of taxation on the joint determination of these economic and political outcomes. Contrary to popular belief, my model shows that natural resource abundance is an economic blessing even in a rent‐seeking society, although resource dependence can be negatively associated with economic performance. In a contested political market, dictators care about popular support and hence resource wealth can help reduce the deadweight cost of taxation (and hence the cost of public good provision). On the other hand, natural resource wealth can be a political curse, because it encourages political entry and hence it induces incumbent dictators to run more repressive regimes. With constant returns counterinsurgent technology, however, the equilibrium number of insurgents is independent of the size of resource wealth. The onset of civil war, therefore, depends on the counterinsurgent technology and whether the costs of entry deterrence are affected by resource wealth. This helps clarify the two seemingly contradictory hypotheses that “resource wealth enhances regime durability” and “resource wealth fuels conflict.”     

INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE‐CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE‐ENTRY OLIGOPOLY

This study is a theoretical examination of whether employee‐controlled firms (ECFs) enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market excessively or insufficiently, from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The excess entry theorem is well known in oligopoly theory. According to this theorem, a greater number of profit‐maximizing firms enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market than is optimal for welfare maximization. We demonstrate the possibility that insufficient entry arises when ECFs compete in a free‐entry market. In particular, we show that if both the demand and cost functions are convex, insufficient ECF entry necessarily occurs. Our results suggest that competition among firms seeking purposes other than profit might lead to insufficient entry because differences in competing firms’ objectives affect the intensity of market competition.