Income splitting among the self-employed

Abstract .  Under individual taxation with progressive marginal tax rates, households in which the distribution of income is unequal benefit from attributing income to the lower income household member. Self-employment provides greater potential to 'split' income in this way because of the absence of a third party reporting income. Using the Canadian experience as a case study, this paper develops a unique estimator of the incidence of illegal income splitting among self-employed couples. The results suggest that the incidence of income splitting among self-employed men in Canada is non-trivial; but no evidence is found that self-employed women attribute income to their spouses.     

Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?*

This paper concerns optimal nonlinear labor income taxation in an economy with union wage setting and endogenous hours of work. The purpose is to study the determinants of tax progression. We show that the optimal degree of progression of the labor income tax depends on the extent to which the government can influence the wage rate via tax policy as well as on its ability to redistribute income across individuals. In addition, the argument for progressive labor income taxation depends on whether hours of work are chosen by the employed themselves or the union.     

Optimal Social Insurance with Linear Income Taxation*

We study optimal social insurance aimed at insuring disability risk in the presence of linear income taxation. Optimal disability insurance benefits rise with previous earnings. Optimal insurance is incomplete even though disability risks are exogenous and verifiable so that moral hazard in disability insurance is absent. Imperfect insurance is optimal because it encourages workers to insure themselves against disability by working and saving more, thereby alleviating the distortionary impact of the redistributive income tax on labor supply and savings.     

Taxation In The Two‐Sector Neoclassical Growth Model With Sector‐Specific Externalities And Endogenous Labour Supply*

This paper examines the long‐run impacts of selective (or sector‐specific) commodity, payroll, and profit taxes in a two‐sector endogenous growth model with sector‐specific production externalities, in which one sector produces consumption goods and the other produces investment goods. The novelty of the model is that it allows not only for endogenous labour supply but also for the intersectoral allocation of resources, which may together lead to indeterminacy. We analytically show that the stability properties of the long‐run equilibrium critically affect the long‐run effects of these selective taxes, which may reverse the standard results of the growth effects of distortionary taxes.     

Age‐related Optimal Income Taxation*

In most countries, average income varies with age. In this paper we investigate if and how it is possible to enhance the redistributive mechanism by relating tax payments to age. Using an OLG model where some individuals are low skilled all their life while others are low skilled when young but high skilled when old, we first show how an age dependent optimal income tax can Pareto improve upon an age independent income tax. We then characterize the optimal age dependent income tax. A tax on interest income is part of the optimal tax structure.     

Fertility,Taxation and Family Policy*

Historically, there is clear evidence of an inverse relationship between female labour supply and fertility. However, the relationship across countries is now positive. Countries like Germany and Italy, with the lowest fertility, also have the lowest female participation rates. This paper analyses the extent to which this can be explained by public policy, in particular taxation and the system of child support. The results suggest that countries which have individual rather than joint taxation, and which support families through child care facilities rather than child payments, are likely to have both higher female labour supply and higher fertility.     

Optimal income taxation when couples have endogenous bargaining power

This study examines the optimal income taxation for a two-earner household, where the couple bargains over their private goods consumption and time allocation between work and leisure. In the model, bargaining power is determined endogenously by the income gap between the two earners. Conventional studies have shown that the higher income tax rate should be imposed on the individual with the smaller wage elasticity, typically the individual with the higher productivity. In contrast to conventional argument, this study shows that the optimal tax rate on the household member with the higher productivity is lower than that of the individual with the lower productivity if the required tax revenue is relatively small and the influence of the gender income gap on the power balance of the couple is moderate. This is because such a tax structure encourages the labor supply of the individual with the higher productivity to mitigate the decrease in the household’s consumption induced by income taxation.     

Income Shifting within a Dual Income Tax System: Evidence from the Finnish Tax Reform of 1993*

Dual income tax systems can suffer from income that shifts from progressively taxed labour income to capital income, which is taxed at a lower, flat rate. This paper empirically examines the 1993 Finnish dual income tax reform, which radically reduced the marginal tax rates on capital income for some, but not all, taxpayers. We measure how overall taxable income and the relative shares of capital income and labour income reacted to the reform. We find that the reform led to a small positive impact on overall taxable income, but part of the positive response was probably offset by income shifting among the self‐employed.     

The Marginal Propensity to Earn and Consume out of Unearned Income: Evidence Using an Unusually Large Cash Grant Reform*

In this paper, we use the rapid introduction of an unconditional cash grant (child support) in South Africa to estimate the marginal propensity to consume and earn out of unearned income. We find that the marginal propensity to earn is about ?0.3 and that the marginal propensity to consume is about 0.7. Nothing of the grant appears to be saved; if anything, households dissave against future grant payments. The marginal propensities estimated here are similar to those reported in comparable papers using US data. However, they stand in contrast to some results on conditional cash transfers in other developing countries.     

Conspicuous Leisure: Optimal Income Taxation When Both Relative Consumption and Relative Leisure Matter*

In previous studies on public policy under relative‐consumption concerns, leisure comparisons have been ignored. In this paper, we consider a two‐type optimal non‐linear income tax model, in which people care about both their relative consumption and their relative leisure. Increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax rates for both ability types, whereas leisure positionality has an offsetting role. However, this offsetting role is not symmetric; concern about relative leisure implies a progressive income tax component (i.e., a component that is larger for the high‐ability type than for the low‐ability type). Leisure positionality does not modify the policy rule for public‐good provision.     

Using Copulas to Model Switching Regimes with an Application to Child Labour*

The copula approach to econometric modelling involves the specification of the separate components of the joint distribution of the random variables of interest: models built for each margin are bound together using a copula function. In this paper, the copula approach is used to construct models for switching regimes. The construct is illustrated by fitting a wage earnings model for child workers in the early 1900s, with regimes governed according to literacy. The results improve on earlier modelling efforts by Poirier and Tobias (2003), finding that a child worker may on average expect a reduction in earnings from being literate.     

Labour Supply,Life Satisfaction,and the (Dis)Utility of Work*

In economic theory, it is typically assumed that there is a “disutility of labour”. However, empirical research on subjective well‐being has consistently shown that unemployed people are less happy than employed people, even after taking income differences into account. In this paper, we attempt to reconcile both findings. We show that happiness and work hours exhibit an inverse U‐shaped relation – working longer raises the level of happiness, as long as the total working time is not too long. Hence, working can be beneficial for happiness and, at the same time, it can exert a disutility at the margin.     

Optimal Taxation of Risky Human Capital*

In a two‐period life‐cycle model with ex ante homogeneous households, earnings risk, and a general earnings function, we derive the optimal linear labor tax rate and optimal linear education subsidies. The optimal income tax trades off social insurance against incentives to work. Education subsidies are not used for social insurance, but they are only targeted at offsetting the distortions of the labor tax and internalizing a fiscal externality. Both optimal education subsidies and tax rates increase if labor and education are more complementary, because education subsidies indirectly lower labor tax distortions by stimulating labor supply. Optimal education subsidies (taxes) also correct non‐tax distortions arising from missing insurance markets. Education subsidies internalize a positive (negative) fiscal externality if there is underinvestment (overinvestment) in education because of risk. Education policy unambiguously allows for more social insurance if education is a risky activity. However, if education hedges against labor‐market risk, optimal tax rates could be lower than in the case without education subsidies.     

Optimal Taxation of Bequests in a Model with Initial Wealth*

We formulate an optimal‐taxation model where parents leave bequests to their descendants for altruistic reasons. In contrast to the standard model, individuals differ not only in earning abilities, but also in initial (inherited) wealth. In this model, a redistributive motive for an inheritance tax – which is equivalent to a uniform tax on all expenditures – arises, given that initial wealth increases with earning abilities. The introduction of the inheritance tax either increases intertemporal social welfare or has an ambiguous effect, depending on whether the external effect related to altruism is accounted for in the social objective.     

The fiscal impact of high-skilled emigration: Flows of Indians to the U.S.

What are the fiscal consequences of high-skilled emigration for source countries? This paper develops methodologies for inferring these consequences and applies them to the recent sizable emigration of high-skilled workers from India to the U.S. This wave of emigration from India to the U.S. is shown to be unusually concentrated amongst the prime-age work force, the highly educated and high earners. In order to calculate the fiscal losses associated with these emigrants, estimates of their counterfactual earnings distributions are generated using two distinct methods and integrated with a model of the Indian fiscal system to calculate fiscal consequences. Conservative estimates indicate that the annual net fiscal impact to India of high-skilled emigration to the U.S. is one-half of 1% of gross national income (or 2.5% of total fiscal revenues). The sensitivity of these results to the method of predicting counterfactual incomes and the implications of these estimates for other developing countries is discussed in detail.     

Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings without commitment

When a government is unable to commit to its future tax policies, information about taxpayers' characteristics revealed by their behavior may be used to extract more taxes from them in the future. We examine the implications of this ratchet effect for the design of redistributive income and savings tax policies in a two‐period model with two types of individuals who only differ in their skill levels. When commitment is not possible, it may be optimal to separate, pool, or partially pool different types in period one. The nature of the distortions to labor supplies and savings are investigated for each of these three regimes. The identification of the optimal regime is investigated numerically.     

Assimilation to a Welfare State: Labor Market Performance and Use of Social Benefits by Immigrants to Finland*

This paper documents the economic performance of immigrants in a country characterized by an extensive welfare state and a short immigration history. Upon arrival, immigrants to Finland have substantially lower employment rates than comparable natives. While they experience rapid employment growth, only men from OECD countries catch up with natives. Despite the persisting employment and earnings differences between non‐OECD immigrants and natives, the differences in income transfers disappear in roughly 20 years. The immigrant–native employment gaps are larger in Finland than in Australia, Canada, or the US.     

Temporary Disability Insurance and Labor Supply: Evidence from a Natural Experiment*

Most developed countries have compulsory insurance programs for temporary disability, that is, cash benefits for non‐work‐related sickness. Despite the economic significance of these programs, little is known about their effects on work absenteeism or labor supply. We exploit a policy reform that consisted of the abolishment of a waiting day together with an increase of cash benefits for short sick leaves. We find that the total number of days of sickness absence was reduced by the reform, which is likely due to the fact that the abolishment of the waiting period made it less costly for workers to be absent for short periods.     

The end of the flat tax experiment in Slovakia: An evaluation using behavioural microsimulation in a dynamic macroeconomic framework

The paper introduces a new way of linking microsimulation models with dynamic general equilibrium frameworks to obtain an evaluation of the impact of detailed tax and benefit measures on the aggregate economy. In the approach presented in this paper, income heterogeneity interacts with the macro-economy via aggregated individual labour supply decisions which influence, and are influenced by, the dynamic evolution of the real wage rate. The method involves a reduced-form representation of the information flow between the macroeconomic and microeconomic blocks. The practical usefulness of the approach is demonstrated by evaluating actual and hypothetical tax reforms that involve abandoning the flat tax system in Slovakia. A hypothetical move to a highly progressive tax structure is shown to generate some employment gains but is associated with a drop in aggregate income and tax revenue.     

The Long‐Run History of Income Inequality in Denmark

We use historical publications and micro data from tax returns to construct internationally comparable estimates of the development in income inequality in Denmark over the last 140 years. The study shows that income inequality and top income shares have declined during several distinct phases in between periods of stability. Furthermore, the quality of the Danish data allows us to analyse not only the development in top income shares but also broader inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient. These analyses show that top income shares are a good proxy for the underlying development in inequality.