Perceived risks and choices in entrepreneurs' new venture decisions

Though risk plays a central role in most entrepreneurial decision making, little empirical research has explicitly examined how the elements of risk, risk perceptions, and entrepreneurs' propensities to take risks influence choices among potentially risky entrepreneurial ventures. This experimental study asked a sample of entrepreneurs leading America's fastest growing firms to make choices among a series of hypothetical new ventures. The results indicate that such choices are influenced by the risks inherent in the new ventures, as evidenced by the pattern of outcomes anticipated in each venture, the entrepreneurs' differing perceptions of those risks, and differences in their personal propensities to take risks.The subjects in our sample of entrepreneurs tended not to choose ventures having a high degree of variability in their pattern of anticipated outcomes. This avoidance of outcome variability suggests that the sensitivity analyses commonly prescribed for examining new venture attractiveness may inhibit risk taking, and may deter potential investors from investing in their firms. New approaches to assessing and presenting new venture risk, other than the traditional best case/expected case/worst case approach, may be advisable, as well as sufficiently through market research to provide evidence of the degree to which market acceptance is likely for the venture's products or services.We also found an effect of differences in risk propensities among entrepreneurs on their new venture choices. This effect suggests not only that entrepreneurs should be wary of any biases they bring to their new venture decisions, but that prospective investors should consider the degree to which entrepreneurs in whom they choose to invest are well-matched to the investors' own risk-taking propensities.Finally, while our sample of entrepreneurs tended to shun high levels of variability in their new venture choices, they appeared willing to accept a considerable degree of hazard, or possible downside, in their new venture choices, presumably in pursuit of potentially significant gains. Entrepreneurs are advised to seek a clear understanding of the downside entailed in their proposed ventures, and develop strategies to mitigate the likelihood of adverse outcomes. Thus they will not jeopardize chances for near term success and attracting support of investors and others in later stages of the venture or in subsequent ventures.Our research did not attempt to examine how our subjects' choices would have played out in terms of performance, but the apparent biases which entrepreneurs' risk propensities bring to their assessment of proposed new ventures is a potentially important issue that merits further scrutiny. On one hand, such biases may lead to patterns of suboptimal decisions. On the other hand, our results suggest that investors should entrust their new venture investments to entrepreneurs whose risk propensities (and perhaps other personal characteristics) best match the needs of both the opportunity at hand and the investor's objectives. As many venture capitalists attest, the management of a proposed new venture should lie at the heart of their investment decision.     

Start‐up Motivations and Growth Intentions of Minority Nascent Entrepreneurs

Firm growth is widely considered to be a measure of success for entrepreneurial businesses. Data indicate that there are systematic differences between minority and nonminority‐owned firms with respect to growth. Black entrepreneurs are 50 percent more likely to engage in start‐up activities than white entrepreneurs, however, black‐owned firms are smaller and less profitable than their white‐owned counterparts. Following the effort–performance–outcome–logic of expectancy theory and using data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), our paper investigates the differences between black and white entrepreneurs' motivations to start and intentions to grow a new venture. Findings indicate that there are significant differences in motivations between black and white entrepreneurs both in starting and in their intentions to grow the new venture. Implications for future research are discussed.     

The entrepreneur's search for capital

The popular media have been inundated with stories of the spectacular success of start-up companies whose very existence, let alone their meteoric growth, would not have been possible without the infusion of venture capital. By comparison, there is a dearth of scientific research on the topic of venture capital. In this article we take a systematic look at entrepreneurs in search of risk capital. This inquiry is based upon five data bases including surveys of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. We have tracked 193 ventures which were denied venture capital, surveyed 179 new high-technology companies in Northern California, and reviewed the Dun & Bradstreet credit reports of 145 new ventures in California in SIC codes related to the high tech sector with follow-up interviews of 86 of these 145 start-ups.     

Venture capitalists' decision criteria in new venture evaluation

What criteria do venture capitalists use to make venture investment decisions? The criteria venture capitalists use to make their venture investment decisions are of interest for several reasons. First, venture capitalists are conspicuously successful in their investment decisions. The success rate of venture capital-backed ventures is significantly higher than the success rate of new ventures generally (Dorsey 1979: Davis and Stetson 1984). A better understanding of the criteria used could lead to a better understanding of the reasons for this success.Second, a better understanding of the criteria for successful new ventures could lead to an improvement in the success rate of new ventures. Although there is no clear agreement on the precise rate, the failure rate among new ventures is generally viewed as significantly higher than the average failure rate (Dun and Bradstreet 1984; Van de Ven 1980; Shapero 1981).Finally, venture capitalists' investment criteria are of enormous import to entrepreneurs seeking venture funding. Such entrepreneurs require a significant infusion of capital in order to grow their businesses, and knowledge of the criteria sought by venture capitalists can aid entrepreneurs in gaining the necessary financing.This study attempts to uncover the criteria used by venture capitalists through semistructured interviews and verbal protocol analysis of venture capitalists' evaluations of actual venture proposals. Sixteen verbal protocols—in which the participants “think aloud” as they review business proposals— were made of venture capitalists' venture evaluation decisions.The findings of this study suggest that venture capitalists screen and assess business proposals very rapidly: the subjects in this study reached a GO/NO-GO decision in an average of less than six minutes on initial screening and less than 21 minutes on proposal assessment. In venture capitalists' initial proposal screening, key criteria identified include fit with the venture firm's lending guidelines and the long-term growth and profitability of the industry in which the proposed business will operate. In the second stage of proposal assessment, the source of the business proposal also played a major role in the venture capitalists' interest in the plan, with proposals previously reviewed by persons known and trusted by the venture capitalist receiving a high level of interest.In addition to the specific criteria identified and how they were used in reaching GO/NO-GO decisions, the findings of this study also were surprising for the lack of importance venture capitalists attached to the entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team and the strategy of the proposed venture during these early stages of the venture evaluation process.     

The Corridor Principle

This article discusses how many entrepreneurs create multiple ventures, and thereby apparently lengthen the duration of their entrepreneurial careers. A new concept, called the Corridor Principle, is proposed as a possible explanation of the multiple venture phenomenon. The Corridor Principle states that the mere act of starting a venture enables entrepreneurs to see other venture opportunities they could neither see nor take advantage of until they had started their initial venture.The Corridor Principle presents an alternative model to the linear single venture career model, embodied by such celebrity entrepreneurs as Ray Kroc of MacDonald' s and Kenneth Olsen of Digital Equipment Corp. Six hypotheses test expectations about the timing and duration of entrepreneurial careers, as well as the relationship between entrepreneurial career length and the creation of multiple ventures.The findings strongly support: • the position that entrepreneurship is a dynamic, multi-venture process for a great many entrepreneurs the rule, rather than the exception. • the existence of a positive correlation between finding at least a second venture and realizing a longer entrepreneurial career. Though there are a variety of explanations for this, and the patterns include both sequential and overlapping ventures, the net effect of creating multiple ventures appears to produce a longer entrepreneurial career. • the position that significant numbers of entrepreneurs create their second venture very early in their entrepreneurial careers especially when contrasted to the group of ex-entrepreneurs, who create multiple ventures (if at all) at a slower rate and later in their careers.Overall, these observations reinforce the notion of the Corridor Principle. Though who can and cannot take advantage of the Corridor Principle is not entirely revealed by the data, some indication exists that an entrepreneurs ability to use Corridor Principle strategy to prolong his or her career is related both to age at startup, and to conscious anticipation and preparation for an entrepreneurial career.The main implications for entrepreneurship practitioners, advisors, researchers, teachers and students are these: Whether studying the entrepreneurial process or planning to start an entrepreneurial career, a long-term view should be taken, one that includes the likely possibility of multiple ventures. The minimum economic returns of earlier ventures can be lower than previously thought if these ventures provide entry to subsequent ventures that possess higher (more acceptable) returns to the entrepreneur. The evidence thus far available indicates that the creation of subsequent ventures occurs relatively quickly when corridors of opportunity become visible and attainable after earlier ventures are established. The likelihood of career failure, as opposed to venture failure, may be lowered if one selects earlier ventures based on their potential to reveal follow-on-venture opportunities that the entrepreneur can investigate and possibly pursue.     

Explaining the formation of international new ventures: The limits of theories from international business research

International new ventures (INVs) represent a growing and important type of start-up. An INV is defined as a business organization that, from inception, seeks to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries (Oviatt and McDougall 1994). Their increasing prevalence and important role in international competition indicates a need for greater understanding of these new ventures (Oviatt and McDougall 1994).Logitech, as described in a case study by Alahuhta (1990), is a vivid example of an INV. Its founders were from two different countries and had a global vision for the company from its inception. The venture, which produces peripheral devices for personal computers, established headquarters in both Switzerland and the U.S. Manufacturing and R&D were split between the U.S. and Switzerland, and then quickly spread to Taiwan and Ireland. The venture's first commercial contract was with a Japanese company.Using 24 case studies of INVs, we found that their formation process is not explained by existing theories from the field of international business. Specifically, neither monopolistic advantage theory, product cycle theory, stage theory of internationalization, oligopolistic reaction theory, nor internalization theory can explain the formation process of INVs. These theories fail because they assume that firms become international long after they have been formed, and they therefore highlight large, mature firms. They also focus too much on the firm level and largely ignore the individual and small group level of analysis (i.e., the entrepreneur and his or her network of business alliances).We propose that an explanation for the formation process of INVs must answer three questions: (1) who are the founders of INVs? (2) why do these entrepreneurs choose to compete internationally rather than just in their home countries? and (3) what form do their international business activities take?Who are the founders of INVs? We argue that founders of INVs are individuals who see opportunities from establishing ventures that operate across national borders. They are “alert” to the possibilities of combining resources from different national markets because of the competencies (networks, knowledge, and background) that they have developed from their earlier activities. Following the logic of the resource-based view of the firm, we argue that the possession of these competencies is not matched by other entrepreneurs. Only the entrepreneur possessing these competencies is able to combine a particular set of resources across national borders and form a given INV.Why do these entrepreneurs choose to compete internationally rather than just in their home countries? The founders of INVs recognize they must create international business competencies from the time of venture formation. Otherwise, the venture may become path-dependent on the development of domestic competencies and the entrepreneur will find it difficult to change strategic direction when international expansion eventually becomes necessary. As the founder of one INV explained, “The advantage of starting internationally is that you establish an international spirit from the very beginning” (Mamis 1989:38).What form do their international business activities take? Founders of INVs prefer to use hybrid structures (i.e., strategic alliances and networks) for their international activities as a way to overcome the usual poverty of resources at the time of start-up.This study has important implications for the practice of management. In financing decisions relating to INVs, venture capitalists and other venture financiers should look for entrepreneurs who have a global vision, international business competence, and an established international network. When entrepreneurs start INVs they should create hybrid structures to preserve scarce resources. Finally, given the path-dependence of competence development, founders of new ventures should consider whether establishing a domestic new venture with plans to later internationalize will be as successful a strategy as establishing a new venture that is international from inception.     

Gender Characterizations in Entrepreneurship: A Multi‐Level Investigation of Sex‐Role Stereotypes about High‐Growth,Commercial, and Social Entrepreneurs

The purpose of this study is to cast new light on possible gender biases in implicit theories people hold about various forms of entrepreneurial activity. Using social role theory, we delve into sex‐role stereotypes associated with high‐ and low‐growth entrepreneurship and commercial and social entrepreneurship. Predictions were tested with an experimental design using both a between‐subject design to capture group‐level stereotypes and a within‐subject design to capture individual‐level stereotypes. Findings reveal that commercial and high‐growth entrepreneurs are perceived as more similar to men than to women and higher on agency than communality. Conversely, low‐growth entrepreneurs are perceived as more similar to women than men, and higher on communality than agency. Social entrepreneurs are uniquely perceived as similar to both men and women, though they are also considered higher on agency than communality. Interestingly, female, but not male respondents, perceive some overlap between the feminine gender role and high‐growth and commercial entrepreneurship. Notably, those higher on modern sexism perceive less overlap between entrepreneurship and femininity. Taken together, our results suggest that commercial high‐growth entrepreneurship is most strongly male‐typed, which is likely to be problematic for women (and non‐traditional men) wanting to start growth‐oriented ventures. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.     

Does money matter?: Wealth attainment as the motive for initiating growth-oriented technology ventures

The desire to attain personal wealth has long been regarded as the foremost motive for entrepreneurship. Other goals and values, however, may also contribute to entrepreneurial motivation. Thus, the extent to which money matters relative to other motives is an empirical question. In this study we examine the role of wealth as the motive for the decision to found new ventures. Three focal questions guide our research: 1) does money matter more relative to other decision dimensions in deciding to start a new high-technology venture? 2) does money matter more to entrepreneurs compared to non-entrepreneurs? and 3) does money matter in absolute terms, that is, does a decision model that focuses solely on the motive of wealth attainment parsimoniously predict entrepreneurs' start-up decisions?We conducted in-depth interviews with 51 entrepreneurs and a control group of 28 senior managers who decided not to start ventures (non-entrepreneurs) in the high-technology industry in British Columbia to address our research questions. The motives we examined are wealth attainment and an aggregate of other dimensions identified by entrepreneurs and managers. We considered three components of values: participants' ratings of the importance of various decision dimensions, their rating of the salience of these dimensions, and their satisfaction with prior levels of attainment on those decision dimensions. We assessed beliefs as participants' perceived probability of attaining their desired level of a particular decision dimension in each of three alternatives: the position held at the time the venture decision was made, the venture itself, and the next best career alternative at that time. The data were analyzed to compare entrepreneurs' values and beliefs regarding wealth with an aggregate of other decision dimensions (our relative hypotheses), and with those of non-entrepreneurs (our comparative hypotheses).Our findings do not support the common perception that money is the only, or even the most important, motive for entrepreneurs' decisions to start new ventures. Wealth attainment was significantly less important to entrepreneurs relative to an aggregate of 10 other decision dimensions, and entrepreneurs did not rate wealth as any more important than did non-entrepreneurs. Non-entrepreneurs rated wealth as no more important than other motives. Wealth attainment was also significantly less salient to entrepreneurs' decisions to venture than were other motives. Non-entrepreneurs reported that wealth was significantly more salient to their decision against founding a venture than other dimensions. In fact, non-entrepreneurs rated wealth attainment as significantly more salient to their decision against founding than entrepreneurs rated it for their decision to proceed with starting a high-technology business. A significant number of entrepreneurs started businesses even when they believed that doing so offered them a lower probability of obtaining their most desired level of wealth than did one of their other alternatives.Satisfaction ratings and stated beliefs also dispute classical predictions. Just prior to making the decision to venture, the entrepreneurs in our study were as satisfied with wealth as they were with other decision dimensions. The non-entrepreneurs were actually more satisfied with wealth attainment than with other dimensions. A comparison of the groups revealed no difference in satisfaction with wealth attainment levels. Entrepreneurs did believe that their chances of attaining their desired level of wealth were much greater through founding a new high-technology venture than through their other alternatives. This difference in beliefs, however, was not significantly greater than their optimistic beliefs about chances of attaining desired levels of other dimensions. It was significantly higher compared to the non-entrepreneurs' belief difference measures for wealth. In fact, the entrepreneurs' stated beliefs regarding the chances of attaining their desired levels of all dimensions were higher than those of the non-entrepreneurs, suggesting that entrepreneurs were simply more optimistic at the time of their decision than non-entrepreneurs.Salience findings suggest that these optimistic beliefs about wealth did not motivate the founding decision alone.We can distinguish those people who successfully started ventures by their regard for wealth as a less salient factor, and their beliefs in higher chances of a venture producing monetary and other returns. Other motives, such as innovation, vision, independence, and challenge were more important and much more salient to this sample of entrepreneurs.Our findings have implications for practice, teaching, and research. Venture capitalists who partially base their assessment of entrepreneurs on the extent to which they are motivated to make a great deal of money may benefit from reconsideration of this criterion. We have evidence of one group of high-technology entrepreneurs who achieved success without placing much decision weight on attainment of personal wealth. Nascent entrepreneurs and those who teach entrepreneurship can use this empirical finding to argue two main points: 1) not all entrepreneurs found a business for personal wealth reasons, and 2) one need not be motivated by personal wealth attainment to be a successful entrepreneur. Similarly, theoretical models that assume money is the primary motive for entrepreneurial activity require re-examination. Future research in entrepreneurship should focus less on wealth attainment and more on other motives for the venturing decision. A multiple-attribute decision model may be able to more fully explain venturing decisions.     

Why Hurry? The Slow Process of High Growth in Women‐Owned Businesses in a Resource‐Scarce Context

This article critically uncovers how embeddedness within a resource‐scarce context influences high‐growth women’s entrepreneurship. Research suggests that though highly embedded women entrepreneurs can easily access resources and attain legitimacy, resulting in high‐growth businesses, they can also become locked into existing systems that constrain their growth development paths. Using 16 qualitative cases developed in Cameroon, we unpack and resolve this paradox by analyzing how entrepreneurial path creation by women entrepreneurs enables the realization of growth aspirations. Implications for initiatives to support high‐growth women’s entrepreneurship in resource‐scarce contexts are critically examined.     

What happens to international new ventures beyond start-up: An exploratory study

Since its inception, research in international entrepreneurship has focused mainly on how and why international new ventures internationalize early on. To date, there has been hardly any research regarding the issue of continuing corporate growth in such ventures beyond their start-up phase or initial internationalization. Theoretically, we ground our study within the dynamic capabilities view of the firm and through an inductive theory building research explore how and whether international new ventures made-it beyond the start-up phase, aiming to generate early theoretical constructs to guide international entrepreneurship research in this substantive area. Grounded in data, we develop the following constructs related to made-it points: strategic experimentation, tensions in organizational gestalt, and legitimacy lies. To get to a made-it point, entrepreneurs experiment with their venture at several levels: organizational, business model, and operational. These experimentation efforts are fueled by tensions that exist in the organizational gestalt, such as ownership structure, business proposition to the market, and product development process. To legitimate themselves and their venture in the stakeholders’ eyes, entrepreneurs may tell legitimacy lies. We maintain that international new ventures do not reach a made-it point if they only manage to develop substantive capabilities to produce desired outputs at various levels within the venture but fail to create dynamic capabilities to change and reconfigure existing substantive capabilities.     

Planning and the Entrepreneur: A Longitudinal Examination of Nascent Entrepreneurs in Sweden

We studied 623 nascent entrepreneurs during a six‐year period, examining how their planning decisions impact venture‐level performance. Our study is unique in that we tracked nascent ventures, examining their planning behavior, including changes to plans. Relying on the theory of legitimacy, this paper adds to the scholarly debate over the merits of business planning by examining, longitudinally, the impact of planning during a six‐year period, accounting for both pre‐emergent nascent activity and post‐emergent success factors. We found that neither formal planning nor changes in the business plan increased venture‐level performance over the six‐year study period.     

Exit, stage left why entrepreneurs end their entrepreneurial careers before retirement

This article examines the process of entrepreneurship from a different perspective. It considers evidence not only about practicing entrepreneurs but also about ex-entrepreneurs: individuals who have ended their entrepreneurial pursuits to work for someone else.Why entrepreneurs ended their entrepreneurial careers is understood by examining not only their expressed reasons for leaving, but also by observing how they exited, when they exited, and who exited compared to who remained.The study's findings are tentative. They are published now because they have important implications for potential entrepreneurs, for practicing entrepreneurs, and for those working with entrepreneurs either directly or indirectly (e.g., policymakers) who must make important decisions before more evidence is available .Overall, the findings indicate that a high-risk profile exists that distinguishes ex-entrepreneurs, particularly those with brief careers, from “more seasoned” entrepreneurs who have experienced longer lives as entrepreneurs.Perhaps the most important implication is that early-career start-ups may be better than previously thought. Preexisting profiles of the “ideal entrepreneurs” place them in their mid- to late thirties at the time of venture start up. But this start-up age (and older ages) were highly correlated in this study with very short, aborted careers compared to practicing entrepreneurs and ex-entrepreneurs who started earlier.A second implication is related to the first: those who started earlier were able to do a better job of anticipating their future entrepreneurial pursuits than were those who started later, mainly because they were sensitized to entrepreneurship as a career possibility at a much earlier age. Early planning for an entrepreneurial career is correlated with longer careers not just because they start earlier but because they last longer.A third implication is the need to scale down the scope (and risk) of the first venture. Such venture “downsizing” can lessen financial requirements while also giving new entrepreneurs the flexibility to start another, often better, venture after they get into business and learn about new opportunities, contacts, and skills that they could not foresee or develop before starting their first ventures.A fourth implication reinforces existing notions about the relative perils of the first few years of an entrepreneurial career. Survival rates increase considerably after the completion of the second year and the probability of a long career rises substantially after the sixth year of entrepreneurial life.A final implication is that the overall costs, risks, and dangers of entrepreneuring have been overstated. Career exit rates are much lower than venture exit rates. Relatively few ex-entrepreneurs apparently suffered truly catastrophic career exits, at least to the extent that they felt that their careers had been very unrewarding and that they had ruled out ever entrepreneuring again.     

Venture capitalist governance and value added in four countries

The rapid internationalization of markets for venture capital is expanding the funding alternatives available to entrepreneurs. For venture capital firms, this trend spells intensified competition in markets already at or past saturation. At issue for both entrepreneurs and venture capital firms is how and when venture capitalists (VCs) can provide meaningful oversight and add value to their portfolio companies beyond the provision of capital. An important way VCs add value beyond the money they provide is through their close relationships with the managers of their portfolio companies. Whereas some VCs take a very hands-off approach to oversight, others become deeply involved in the development of their portfolio companies.Utilizing surveys of VCs in the United States and the three largest markets in Europe (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France), we examined the determinants of interaction between VCs and CEOs, the roles VCs assume, and VCs' perceptions of how much value they add through these roles. We examined the strategic, interpersonal, and networking roles through which VCs are involved in their portfolio companies, and we analyzed how successful such efforts were. By so doing we were able to shed light on how and when VCs in four major markets expend their greatest effort to provide oversight and value-added assistance to their investment companies.Consistent with prior empirical work, we found that VCs saw strategic involvement as their most important role, i.e., providing financial and business advice and functioning as a sounding board. They rated their interpersonal roles (as mentor and confidant to CEOs) as next in value.Finally, they rated their networking roles (i.e., as contacts to other firms and professionals) as third most important. These ratings were consistent across all four markets. VCs in the United States and the United Kingdom were the most involved in their ventures, and they added the most value. VCs in France were the least involved and added the least value; VCs in France appeared to be least like others in terms of what factors drove their efforts. Our theoretical models explained a greater proportion of variance in governance and value added in the United States than elsewhere. Clear patterns of behavior emerged that reflect the manner in which different markets operate. Among the European markets, practices in the United Kingdom appear to be most like that in the United States.Determinants of Governance (Face-to-Face Interaction)We operationalized VC governance or monitoring of ventures as the amount of face-to-face interaction VCs had with venture CEOs. We found some evidence that VCs increase monitoring in response to agency risks, but the results were mixed. Lack of experience on the part of CEOs did not prompt significant additional monitoring as had been predicted. A more potent determinant was how long the VC-CEO pairs worked together; longer relationships mitigated agency concerns and reduced monitoring. Contrary to expectations, perceived business risk in the form of VCs' satisfaction with recent venture performance had little impact on face-to-face interaction. Monitoring was greatest in early stage ventures, indicating that VCs respond to high uncertainty by increased information exchange with CEOs. We measured two types of VC experience and found different patterns for the two. Generally speaking, VCs with greater experience in the venture capital industry required less interaction with CEOs, whereas VCs with greater experience in the portfolio company's industry interacted more frequently with CEOs than did VCs without such experience.Determinants of Value AddedWe argued that VCs would most add value to ventures when the venture lacked resources or faced perceived business risks, when the task environment was highly uncertain, and when VCs had great investing and operating experience. Contrary to expectations, VCs added most value to those ventures already performing well. As we had predicted, VCs did add relatively more value when uncertainty was high: e.g., for ventures in the earliest stages and for ventures pursuing innovation strategies. Finally, we found that VCs with operating experience in the venture's focal industry added significantly more value than those with less industry-specific experience. These results are consistent with anecdotal evidence that entrepreneurs have a strong preference for VCs with similar backgrounds as their own. We found no evidence that experience in the venture capital industry contributed significantly to value added. Together, these results suggest that investigations of the social as well as economic dimensions of venture building may prove a fruitful avenue for future study. Overall, the results showed that value-added is strongly related to the amount of face-to-face interaction between VC-CEO pairs and to the number of hours VCs put in on each individual venture.Implications for Venture CapitalistsThe competition for attractive investments is heating up as economies become more globalized. Thus, the pressure on venture capital firms to operate both efficiently and effectively is also likely to build. It is as yet unclear whether the recent trend toward later stage, safer investments will continue, and how those venture capital firms following this path can differentiate themselves from other sources of capital. Venture capital firms that are able to choose the appropriate bases for determining governance effort and the appropriate roles for delivering added value to their portfolio companies will be those most likely to survive.In the largest, most robust markets (i.e., the United States and the United Kingdom), more effort is expended by venture capitalists to deliver something of value beyond the money. This suggests that the tradeoff preferred by those succeeding is to be more rather than less involved in their investments. Our results indicate that VCs clearly economize on the time they devote to involvement in their portfolio companies. However, our results also indicate that they do this at the great peril of producing value insufficient to justify the cost of their product.Implications for EntrepreneursOur findings provide two important insights for entrepreneurs. First, they show that where and when they obtain venture capital is likely to have an impact on the extent and nature of effort delivered by their venture capital investors. It appears that on average entrepreneurs receiving venture capital in the United States and the United Kingdom will be more closely monitored and will receive more value-adding effort from their VCs than will those in France or the Netherlands. Needless to say, entrepreneurs should consider their preferences for level and type of involvement from their investors as they consider their choice of partners. In France, for example, VCs put great emphasis on their financial role in comparison with other roles, but they contribute much less than VCs elswhere via other strategic, interpersonal, and networking roles.The second key implication of our findings is that entrepreneurs may be able to gauge what roles VCs will see as most important, when VCs are more or less apt to become involved in their companies, and when they believe they can most add value. Such knowledge may help CEOs anticipate VC activity, be aware of the parameters of VCs' preferences, communicate their own preferences, and negotiate the timing and extent of interaction. For example, although our results indicate that geographic distance significantly limits face-to-face interaction, it appears to have less impact on the amount of value added.Implications for ResearchersMuch more can be learned about the relative efficiency and effectiveness of alternative governance arrangements. Little is known about how formal structures such as contract covenants and board control work in conjunction with informal oversight and interaction. Even less is known about how value is added and how it is best measured. Although this study took a step toward developing a model of the circumstances under which value is added, the theory and its operationalization await further development.     

Cognitive biases,risk perception,and venture formation: How individuals decide to start companies

Despite the high risk involved, thousands of individuals decide to start ventures. Past research, however, has found that entrepreneurs do not have a high-risk propensity, that is, a great willingness to knowingly take risks. This study, therefore, explores how individuals cope with the risks inherent in their decisions, and suggests that entrepreneurs may not perceive the riskiness of starting ventures.The study's findings suggest that risk perceptions may differ because certain types of cognitive biases lead individuals to perceive less risk. Cognitive biases are common types of mental shortcuts used to make judgments. This study examines three cognitive biases that previous research has suggested may lower risk perception. The first, overconfidence, refers to the failure to know the limits of one's knowledge. The second bias tested, the illusion of control, occurs when individuals overemphasize the extent to which their skill can increase performance in situations where chance plays a large part and skill is not necessarily the deciding factor. Because the individuals believe that they can control largely uncontrollable events, they also think they can accurately predict the outcome of the events. Finally, the third bias, the belief in the law of small numbers occurs when an individual uses a limited number of informational inputs (a small sample of information) to draw firm conclusions.This study's sample consisted of 191 students pursuing a Masters of Business Administration. The students' responses to a survey based on a case study regarding a decision to start a venture were examined. The survey included questions about the students' willingness to start the venture, their perception of the venture's riskiness, and the extent to which they exhibited cognitive biases in their decision processes.The study's findings tentatively suggest that individuals start ventures because they do not perceive the risks involved, and not because they knowingly accept high levels of risks. The belief in the law of small numbers lowered an individual's perceptions of a venture's riskiness, suggesting that some individuals draw firm conclusions from small samples. An illusion of control also decreased risk perception, suggesting that individuals starting ventures might not acknowledge that certain tasks, important to the venture's success, are beyond their control.Some argue that biases might be associated with venture failure. If this is the case, the very processes that increase the likelihood of starting a venture may actually decrease performance. Entrepreneurs may choose to minimize their biases by soliciting and paying heed to the advice of outsiders, or by using group decision-making techniques, such as devil's advocacy or dialectical inquiry.Others, however, suggest that early in the decision process, biases may be beneficial because they lower risk perception, which allows entrepreneurs to generate the commitment needed for success. Even if this is true, entrepreneurs should still institute processes to increase learning so the venture can adjust to unfolding realities and avoid any damage caused by initial misperceptions. Similarly, entrepreneurs need adequate safety nets in case their biases lead them to encounter unforeseen difficulties. The potential positive and negative effects of biases and perceiving low levels of risk suggest the importance of exploring this area further.     

Industry environments and new venture formations in U.S. manufacturing: A conceptual and empirical analysis of demand determinants

Through integration of theoretical perspectives from Austrian economics, industrial organization economics, and organizational theory, this study builds and examines empirically a model of the demand determinants of new venture formations in manufacturing industries. Austrian economics and other writings on market disequilibrium imply that the dynamics of industries create market opportunities that are available to economic actors. The greater the changes occurring in an industry, the greater the opportunities created, and the further the market is moved from an equilibrium state. Entrepreneurship is viewed as the process of seizing opportunities through combinations of productive inputs. The more available market opportunities in an industry, the greater is the potential for entrepreneurial activity and, more specifically, new venture formations. Entry barriers constrain the formation of new ventures by prohibiting new ventures from taking advantage of available emerging opportunities. The inertial properties of existing firms constrain their ability to move toward these opportunities and thereby increase the potential for new ventures to exploit these market opportunities.The empirical analysis utilizes the Small Business Administration's U.S. Establishment and Enterprise Microdata file to test the model on a large sample of U.S. manufacturing industries. Results indicate that dynamic industries have greater new venture formations. More specifically, new venture formations are associated with industry growth, the dynamism of industry niches, and technological development. Moreover, entry barriers were found to strongly constrain rates of new venture formations. Industry capital requirements, concentration, and excess capacity were all related negatively to the formation of new ventures. The hypothesized positive relationship between industry-level measures of organizational inertia and new venture formations was also borne out in the empirical analysis. New venture formations were related positively to the extent of vertical integration in an industry as well as to the failure of incumbent firms to invest in new capital.Overall, the independent variables explained more than 50% of the variance in rates of new venture formations in manufacturing industries. The results support an Austrian perspective on entrepreneurship and imply that demand factors and industry structural variables are important determinants of new venture creations.The results imply that dynamic industries should spawn new ventures, and industries with high sales growth, changing consumer preferences, and rapid technological change should exhibit high rates of venture formations. For potential entrepreneurs, the model presented herein might be a useful guide to focus their venture activities. Entrepreneurs who can spot the fundamental sources of market change can exploit their knowledge for economic gain. Yet, there are a number of difficulties in suggesting that the model presented herein could be directly applied by entrepreneurs. First, it is always easier to estimate the dynamics of an industry post hoc than it is ex ante. For example, whereas it is simple to catalogue the technological change that occurred in an industry over time, it is another matter to predict the nature of future technological developments. Second, entrepreneurial opportunity can persist only if other potential economic actors do not know of the presence of the opportunity or cannot act upon it. Any model that gains acceptance as a means of predicting the presence of opportunities would, through its widespread usage, neutralize those opportunities for economic profit. Nonetheless, entrepreneurs who have that unique capability to spot industry dynamics and associated profit opportunities where others do not will gain from that ability.     

The entrepreneur's mode of entry: Business takeover or new venture start?

We extend the well-known occupational choice model of entrepreneurship by analyzing the mode of entry. Individuals can become entrepreneurs by taking over established businesses or starting up new ventures from scratch. We argue that the new venture creation mode is associated with higher levels of schooling whereas managerial experience, new venture start-up capital requirements and industry level risk promote the takeover mode. A sample of data on entrepreneurs from The Netherlands provides broad support for these hypotheses, and also bears out a prediction that entrepreneurs whose parents run a family firm tend to invest the least in schooling. We go on to discuss the implications for researchers, entrepreneurs and public policy makers.     

Venture capitalists and serial entrepreneurs

Habitual entrepreneurship is receiving growing attention, much of which has focused on entrepreneurs who have started more than one venture. This paper examines the importance of habitual entrepreneurs to the venture capital industry, with particular emphasis on those who have exited from an initial investment in the venture capitalist's portfolio, termed serial entrepreneurs. As venture capital markets mature, increasing numbers of entrepreneurs are likely to exit from their initial enterprises, creating a pool of entrepreneurs with the potential for embarking on subsequent ventures. Venture capitalists making investments may invest both in entrepreneurs starting new ventures and those who purchase a venture through a management buy-out or buy-in. On this wider basis, the paper develops a classification of types of serial venture. A number of issues are raised for venture capitalists, notably the relative attractiveness of reinvesting in exited entrepreneurs and the policy they adopt in tracking and assessing such individuals.The paper addresses venture capitalists' perspectives on investing in serial entrepreneurs based on a representative sample of 55 UK venture capitalists (a response rate of 48.7%, and a follow-up survey of those who had more extensive experience of serial entrepreneurs (23 respondents). The results of the survey show that despite a strong preference for using an entrepreneur who had played a major role in a previous venture, the extent to which exiting entrepreneurs are funded from their own portfolio again is limited, though there is more extensive use of such individuals in a consultancy capacity. In screening entrepreneurs exiting from previous ventures for subsequent investments, venture capitalists scored attributes relating to commercial awareness, experience in a particular sector, and personal ambition of the entrepreneur most highly.Venture capitalists do make extensive use of serial entrepreneurs who have exited from other venture capitalists' portfolios, primarily to lead management buy-ins. Indications from the survey are that venture capitalists rarely assess entrepreneurs formally at the time of exit and that it is unusual to maintain formal links with entrepreneurs after they have exited. These apparent shortcomings suggest that perhaps investment opportunities are being missed. Those venture capitalists preferring serial entrepreneurs generally had a larger volume of funds under investment and were rather older than those venture capitalists who do not prefer to use serial entrepreneurs, reflecting the possibility that longer established venture capitalists have had more opportunity and experience in relation to second-time entrepreneurs.Investment appraisal factors were subject to a principal components analysis to identify underlying dimensions/relationships between them. With respect to the general investment appraisal factors, five factors were identified. Two factors were related to track record; one of these reflected ownership experience, while the other represented management experience. The third factor was related to personal attributes such as age, knowledge, and family background. The fourth factor represented links to the funding institution, and the final factor (a single variable factor) concerned financial commitment. The principal components analysis for screening factors on management buy-ins produced a single factor comprising all variables. These factors were then subject to a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with preference for use of a serial entrepreneur as the independent variable. The results suggest that there are significant differences between venture capitalists who prefer serial entrepreneurs and those who do not in respect to their business ownership experience, the length of their entrepreneurial careers, and the number of their previous ventures.The results of the study have implications for practitioners. First, the findings emphasize the importance of not considering previous venture experience in isolation but in the context of other key investment criteria. Second, the lack of strongly greater performance from serial, versus novice, entrepreneurs further emphasizes the care to be taken in assessing experienced entrepreneurs. Third, the relatively low degree of formal and rigorous post-exit assessment and monitoring by venture capitalists suggests that important opportunities to invest in experienced entrepreneurs may be missed.     

Giving up the hats? Entrepreneurs' role transitions and venture growth

At the start of a venture, most entrepreneurs wear many hats. However, entrepreneurs often cannot remain involved in every aspect of the venture process, and so they face important decisions about which roles to give up, which roles to retain, and which new roles to adopt. For many, this process is particularly difficult as roles represent more than just something entrepreneurs do but also an important part of who they are (role identities). Through an inductive field study, this research reveals how and why entrepreneurs add, subtract, or retain roles. We find three mechanisms—perceiving the entrepreneur as someone who ‘gives up the hats,’ discovering new meaning (new role identities) within the venture, and role identity imprinting—lead to a narrowing of one's role set, which ultimately influences venture growth.     

Social ties and venture creation by returnee entrepreneurs

Recent years have witnessed the return of individuals of Indian or Chinese origin from developed markets to their home countries to start new ventures. Returnee Entrepreneurs (REs) facilitate both direct technology transfer and indirect technology spillovers to local firms, thus contributing to the technological development of emerging economies. Much previous work is based on the integration of ethnic entrepreneurs in their host countries or business activities of transnational entrepreneurs that traverse their host and home countries. This study explores the role of social ties in venture creation by REs. Based on twenty case studies in India, the findings show that (1) local ties are indispensable for venture creation, and (2) the heterogeneity in the way REs leverage social ties across the host and home countries is contingent on the location of their intention to start up and generation of idea for their venture. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Entrepreneurs as prime targets: Insights from Mexican ventures on the link between venture visibility and crime of varying severity

This study addresses entrepreneurs as targets of crime. Leveraging insights from strategic responses to institutional pressures as the main theoretical frame, coupled with supporting insights from routine activities theory and interview data from 14 entrepreneurs who have been victims of crime, we introduce entrepreneur-led ventures becoming targets of crime via their engagement in routine activities that increase venture visibility. We then conceptualize that crime severity pushes entrepreneurs toward venture visibility-reduction responses, such as truncating growth, relocating, or discontinuing the venture. Survey data from 87,486 legally registered entrepreneur-led ventures in Mexico provide strong support for the relationships in our theoretical model. We find that as routine venture activities increase, entrepreneurs encounter crime of increasing severity, with the routine venture activity of making transactions at a bank serving as the strongest attractor of crime. Building on these findings, we observe an indirect effect through crime severity such that the choice to relocate the venture is the most likely response to being targeted by criminals. Our results advance the literature at the intersection of crime and entrepreneurship, especially in developing economies, and offers venture visibility as a mechanism that shapes both criminals' targeting of ventures and entrepreneurs' attempts to reduce being targeted.