Market Performance Implications of the Transfer Price Rule

The “transfer price rule” (TPR) defines a vertical price squeeze as an input price, output price combination set by a vertically‐integrated firm monopoly producer of an essential input that would not allow the firm's downstream unit to earn at least a normal rate of return on investment in the “as‐if” case that it had to purchase the input at the price charged independent firms. In its 2009 linkLine decision, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the TPR for the purpose of enforcing the anti‐monopolization prohibition of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In contrast, a vertical price squeeze, defined by a TPR‐like standard, is an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In this article, we model the impact of the TPR on market performance. We find that the TPR increases consumer surplus and net social welfare if all firms remain active in the downstream market. It sometimes induces the upstream firm to refuse to supply the downstream firm, and in such cases, consumer surplus and net social welfare are reduced. The impact of the TPR on market performance thus depends on whether or not an upstream firm can refuse to supply downstream firms on terms that would offer it at least a normal rate of return on investment.     

两部制许可契约下技术转移差异化和统一许可定价策略比较研究

针对技术转移过程中的差异化和统一许可定价问题，本文分别构建了两阶段差异化定价和统一定价博弈模型，讨论了两部制许可契约下的最优技术许可定价决策及社会效率配置问题。研究发现，相对于统一许可定价，差异化许可定价能够促进研发企业和生产企业一体化协调；差异化许可定价允许生产配置效率更高的企业生产更多的产量，进而提高了社会配置效率；差异化许可定价下，尽管研发企业可以降低对生产配置效率更高的企业的提成，但是可以向其收取较高的固定费用，进而可以缓解因过度的许可定价差异所引起的“水床效应”；当生产企业的产品替代性较强时，研发企业的统一许可定价更有利于改善社会福利，但加剧了市场竞争；除此之外，差异化许可定价更有利于改善社会福利。     

研发效率、技术溢出与政府的创新补贴

 在一个三阶段博弈模型的基础上,本文研究了存在技术溢出情况下政府的创新激励政策与企业的研发策略。结果表明,无论是实行竞争型创新补贴政策还是合作型创新补贴政策,政府都应该优先补贴那些低成本、高效率的创新行为。贸易自由化提高了国家的创新补贴水平,但是技术溢出本身对创新补贴的影响却具有不确定性。文章的结果同时显示,贸易便利化的实施与高技术溢出提高了消费者剩余与国民福利水平。贸易壁垒虽然强化了企业对本国市场的垄断,但是,在考虑了政府的创新补贴政策后,具有创新激励的企业实际上更倾向于自由贸易结果,因此,相对于严格的专利保护制度,创新补贴政策可能更容易促进国民福利水平的提高。     

Product Reliability,R&D,and Manufacturing Cost Shocks

Suppose a firm’s research and development (R&D) improves product reliability which in turn decreases the cost of product failure for both the firm and its customers. The primary research question of the paper is how a firm with market power optimally adjusts its R&D if it experiences a manufacturing cost shock. Our model suggests that a manufacturing cost shock prompts the firm to do less R&D in the cases where the replacement cost is low or the marginal manufacturing cost is high. Conversely, if the replacement cost is high and the marginal manufacturing cost is low, then the firm increases R&D, mitigating some of the increase in the manufacturing cost. The paper also compares the outcomes for reliability, profits, consumer surplus, and social surplus for the optimal R&D case as compared to the case of doing no R&D, paying particular attention to how exogenous changes in the marginal manufacturing cost affect this comparison.     

Trade and Tax Reforms in a Cash‐in‐Advance Economy

We examine the effects of both tariff‐only and coordinated trade‐tax reforms on market access, government revenue, and welfare for a small monetary economy, under the assumption that a certain fraction of purchases of each good must be financed with cash held in advance. We show that if the cash requirement ratio in the exportable sector is greater than that in the importable, then, contrary to previous results, (i) a uniform radial reduction of tariffs has ambiguous effects on both welfare and market access, (ii) tariff and consumption tax reforms that leave consumer prices unchanged may be more efficient in improving market access and welfare than a reform that involves only tariffs, and (iii) export and production tax reforms that keep producer prices unchanged may be welfare deteriorating.     

Multi‐Market Competition,R&D,and Welfare in Oligopoly

We investigate a multi‐market Cournot model with strategic process research and development (R&D) investments wherein a multi‐market firm meets new competitors that enter one of the markets. We show that entry can enhance the total R&D expenditures of the multi‐market firm. Moreover, the incumbent's profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases. Depending on the fixed entry costs and R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entry can appear. Our results imply that diversification of their products can be a useful strategy for firms.     

R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly

We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable. When R&D subsidies are not available, in addition to the complete network, the private partial and the private‐hub star networks are Pareto efficient. However, the complete network becomes the unique Pareto efficient network when R&D is subsidized. This result is in contrast with earlier contributions in private oligopoly where under strong market rivalry a conflict between stable and efficient networks is likely to occur. It also highlights the role of a public firm as policy instrument in aligning individual incentives for collaboration with the objective of efficiency, independently of whether R&D subsidies are provided by the regulator.     

The Impact of R&D Cooperations and Mergers in Pharmaceuticals on Research Activities and Drugs Offered on the Market

In the last 10 years, the pharmaceutical industry has experienced steep, unprecedented price increases which are frequently attributed to increasing drug development costs. To cope with rocketing development costs, companies engage in Research and Development (R&D) cooperations. We study the impact of R&D cooperations on firms' research activities and drugs offered on the market. Using a comprehensive dataset, we find that R&D cooperations formed at the early stage of the drug development process increase the number of R&D projects and the number of drugs offered on the market. Late stage R&D cooperations, formed among larger firms in technology and product markets, increase firms' research activities, but reduce the number of drugs launched on the product market. Results suggest that large firms cooperating in the late research stage re‐optimize their R&D pipelines and eliminate similarly aligned research projects.     

International Standards for IP Protection and R&D Incentives Revisited

Aoki and Prusa (1993), Journal of International Economics, examine the effects of differing standards of IPRs protection on the R&D intensity of home country firms. This paper builds on this work by examining the R&D outcomes of home country firms when foreign rivals imitate rather than innovate. In infant industries, full commitment to discriminatory protection always leads to the most R&D. In mature industries, full commitment to discriminatory protection leads to reduced R&D intensity. This contrasts with the dynamic case where discriminatory protection, by relaxing a binding cash in advance constraint, leads to more R&D than does uniform protection.     

CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externality

We investigate a linear state differential game describing an asymmetric Cournot duopoly with capacity accumulation á la Ramsey and a negative environmental externality (pollution), in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its statute, and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function. If the market is sufficiently large, the CSR firm sells more, accumulates more capital, and earns higher profits than its profit‐seeking rival.     

STOCK MARKET VALUATIONS OF R&D AND ELECTRONICS FIRMS DURING TAIWAN'S RECENT ECONOMIC TRANSITION

The objective of the present study is to investigate the market valuation of Research and Development (R&D) investments in the Taiwanese stock market from July 1988 to June 2002. The motivation stems from Taiwan's recent economic transition from a labor‐intensive, then to a capital‐intensive, and currently to a technology‐based economy. The results support not only the existence, but also the persistence of R&D‐associated mispricing. More importantly, it has become stronger as the electronics industry gradually dominates the economy. First, R&D‐intensive stocks tend to outperform stocks with little or no R&D. Second, the R&D‐intensity effect cannot fully be attributed to firm size. Third, the R&D‐intensity effect is more pronounced for firms in the electronics industry after 1996.     

Third-Degree Price Discrimination: Apology Not Necessary

Applied work in price discrimination often treats demand curves among multiple market segments as algebraically additive. Yet the welfare effects of multi-market (third degree) price discrimination depend on how the demand segments are added. Treating demands as geometrically additive yields the well known result that discrimination absent an increase in production diminishes Marshallian surplus. But if demands are treated as algebraically additive then discrimination increases welfare over uniform pricing. Quantity is identical in the three cases, so the effect is not due to market opening. Nor is the effect due to scale economies since marginal cost is assumed constant. Profit is always greater under discrimination, so the effect is due to distributional changes in consumer surplus. The model is restricted to linear demands and constant marginal cost but can be generalized for future work and policy analysis.     

R&D Subsidies,Spillovers, and Privatization in Mixed Markets

We examine the use of subsidies to research and development (R&D) in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers, but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production; however, it does not lead to the equalization of per firm output and therefore to an efficient distribution of production costs. We also find that privatization of the public firm reduces R&D activity and welfare in the duopoly market. This result stands even when optimal R&D subsidies are provided.     

Corporate innovation in China and its implications

China's current economic transition policies focus on shifting from export‐driven manufacturing towards high‐end, high‐tech research and development (R&D), and domestic consumption. Since the early 2000s the government has issued a series of policies and guidelines to encourage innovation. Both in‐house R&D investment and the number of patent grants/applications have seen considerable growth in recent years. More specifically, industry‐funded R&D was responsible for more than three quarters of total in‐house R&D investment. Despite the rapid growth in R&D expenditure and the number of patents, China's corporate innovation still faces many obstacles and challenges. To further stimulate corporate innovation, the government may need to create an environment of fair competition for domestic enterprises, encourage the growth of institutional investors and their active participation in corporate governance, and improve the efficiency of financial systems. The experience of China in promoting innovation provides policy approaches and implications from which other emerging economies can learn.     

基于技术风险的研发联盟政府补贴政策研究

文章考虑研发存在技术风险,建立了合作研发博弈模型,研究了政府不同财政补贴方式（研发投入补贴和产品补贴）下的企业研发和生产策略。通过理论和数值仿真分析找出了不同补贴政策下的企业最优策略和相应的社会福利,并就政府的研发补贴政策提出了相应建议。研究表明,两种补贴政策均无法实现社会福利的最优解,研发难度较小的情况下宜采用研发投入补贴,研发难度较大的情况下应采用产品补贴,以此提高企业研发投入和社会福利。     

R&D Subsidies and Foreign Direct Investment

We devise a model in which domestic firms do applied R&D, which can be subsidized by the government, and foreign firms with superior technology can enter in the domestic market. Foreign Direct Investment can act as a substitute of subsidies to improve domestic R&D, the share of domestic leading firms and consumption. Relatively closed economies may benefit from R&D subsidization while relatively open economies may not. For relatively low growth of the technological frontier, it is optimal to subsidize R&D and close the economy to foreign investment but the opposite happens for relatively high growth. Numerical simulations show the economy dynamics after policy experiments.     

Downstream Research Joint Venture with Upstream Market Power

In a vertically related industry, we examine the downstream firms' incentives to invest in cost‐reducing Research and Development (R&D), and to form a Research Joint Venture (RJV), under two alternative structures of input supply: exclusive vertical relations and a single supplier. In contrast to the “hold‐up” argument, in which downstream firms invest non‐cooperatively and spillovers are low, R&D investments are higher under a single supplier than under competing vertical chains. Downstream firms' incentives to form a RJV are also stronger in the former case than they are in the latter. We identify conditions under which an RJV is beneficial for society. Integrated innovation and competition policies are also discussed.     

Potential Payoff from R&D in the Coconut Industry of North Sulawesi, Indonesia

The coconut industry of North Sulawesi, one of the primary coconut-producing provinces of Indonesia, is dominated by a small number of products that are primarily exported overseas. As they only comprise a small share of the global coconut product export market, demand for coconut products from North Sulawesi is generally very elastic. Conversely, the supply of coconuts is highly inelastic, especially in the short to medium term. Hence, small shifts in supply and demand lead to large fluctuations in farmer incomes. In this context, an equilibrium displacement model is used to examine the intra-industry consequences of R&D investments in farm productivity and product development. These investments are assessed in terms of the producer surplus benefits that they generate.     

Patents,R&D subsidies,and endogenous market structure in a schumpeterian economy

This study explores the different implications of patent breadth and R&D subsidies on economic growth and endogenous market structure in a Schumpeterian growth model. We find that when the number of firms is fixed in the short run, patent breadth and R&D subsidies serve to increase economic growth as in previous studies. However, when market structure adjusts endogenously in the long run, R&D subsidies increase economic growth but decrease the number of firms, whereas patent breadth expands the number of firms but reduces economic growth. Therefore, in accordance with empirical evidence, R&D subsidy is perhaps a more suitable policy instrument than patent breadth for the purpose of stimulating long‐run economic growth.     

Market and Welfare Effects of Mandatory Country‐of‐Origin Labeling in the U.S. Specialty Crops Sector: An Application to Fresh Market Apples

This study provides a new framework of analysis of the market and welfare effects of mandatory country‐of‐origin labeling (MCOOL) for fruits and vegetables that accounts for heterogeneous consumer preferences, differences in producer agronomic characteristics, and retailer market power. The market and welfare effects of MCOOL are shown to be case‐specific and dependent on the labeling costs at the farm and retail levels, the strength of consumer preference for domestic products, the market power of retailers, the marketing margin along the supply chain, and the relative costs of imported and domestic products. Simulation results for the U.S. market of fresh apples indicate that domestic producers are the most likely beneficiaries of MCOOL, followed by domestic consumers. Being unable to exercise market power on consumers or suppliers of fresh apples, retailers will lose if the implementation of MCOOL entails fixed costs. Imports of fresh apples decline after MCOOL introduction.