The Political Economy of India's Economic Reforms*

This paper analyzes the history of the relationship between the state and the private sector in India. It concludes that India's economic reforms, which made development policy more dependent on international trade and private initiative, depended on the evolution of technocratic and political conviction. Reformers needed the support of financial crises for overcoming the powerful vested interests opposed to reforms. Successful reforms involved largely homegrown strategies of policy and institutional change. They have produced impressive growth rates and have benefited the rich and the middle class. The challenge for development and sustainable reforms is to make it more inclusive for poor farmers and unorganized workers.     

Income Taxation and the Diversity of Consumer Goods: A Political Economy Approach*

After‐tax income inequality has risen since the mid‐1990s, as increases in market income inequality have not been offset by greater fiscal redistribution. We argue that the substantial increase in the diversity of consumer goods has mitigated mounting political pressures for redistribution. Within a probabilistic voting framework, we demonstrate that if the share of diversified goods in the consumption bundle increases sufficiently with income, then an increase in goods diversity can reduce the political equilibrium tax rate. Focusing on OECD countries, we find empirical support for both the model's micro‐political foundations and the implied relation between goods diversity and fiscal policy outcomes.     

Domestic Unionization and the Political Economy of Strategic Export Policy

This paper examines the effect of lobbying by a labor union and its parent firm on the argument for strategic export policy in a third market-unionized duopoly. The lobbying-induced export policy frequently deteriorates domestic welfare as compared with free trade. It is true that the politically-determined export policy can improve domestic welfare if the union's bargaining power is strong and the domestic government's responsiveness to political contributions is weak. However, even if the conditions are met, implementing the lobbying-induced export policy will not enhance domestic welfare more than improving labor–management relations. Moreover, the improvement of their relations will be hampered by the opportunity of their lobbying. These results indicate that strategic export policy toward a unionized duopoly should be restrained in light of political economy.     

Clientelism and fiscal redistribution: Evidence across countries

This article marshals empirical evidence from a cross-section of up to 87 countries to consider the impact of clientelism on fiscal redistribution in the form of direct taxes and public transfers. Clientelism may directly undermine fiscal redistribution towards poorer individuals because their political support is cheaper to buy, political patrons will limit redistribution to keep clients dependent and, moreover, will eschew fiscal policies that target broad categories of citizens based on explicit criteria, and favor instead private benefits that they can disburse to individual clients with a relatively high degree of discretion. The empirical analysis controls for a range of potentially confounding covariates, explores various transmission channels and accounts for the real possibility that more extensive redistributive programs may undermine the strength of clientelism. The results strongly suggest that clientelism is inimical to income redistribution towards the poor through taxes and transfers and, moreover, identify reduced public good provision as one indirect channel through which clientelism may undermine fiscal redistribution.     

How Compatible are Public Choice and Austrian Political Economy?

The Review of Austrian Economics - Public Choice relies heavily on equilibrium analysis in its models of government failure. Austrians are suspicious of equilibrium analysis owing to its reliance...     

Monetary transmission with income risk*

In periods of distress, observed and perceived income risk tends to rise. Does this heightened income risk affect monetary transmission? This paper first shows that in partial equilibrium, heightened income risk dampens the substitution effect of interest rate changes but amplifies the indirect income effect of wage changes. The effects are sizable in partial equilibrium. An increase in income risk consistent with heightened risk during recessions affects interest rate and wage responses by around one-third. However, because income risk dampens the effects of interest rate changes but amplifies the effects of wage changes, its effect is weaker in general equilibrium, dampening monetary transmissions to consumption by around 11 percent.     

Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments

This paper investigates the impact of political lobbying on the choice of environmental policy instruments. It is argued that the prevalence of pollution emission standards over more efficient policy instruments may result from rent seeking behaviour. The model further predicts that when an emission standard is used to control pollution, rival political parties have an incentive to set the same standard. There is therefore a convergence of policies. Moreover, it is shown that emission taxes are more likely to be supported and proposed by political parties which represent environmental interest groups. This feature appears to accord with the observed support for environmental taxes by Green parties in Europe, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere.     

论政治经济学的传承与发展——基于我国高校政治经济学教学的思考

马克思主义政治经济学是指导我国经济运行和经济发展的基本理论。政治经济学的传承和发展要后继有人离不开高校这块阵地。必须透过我国高校政治经济学教学中存在的各种现象寻求化解困境的对策,通过社会、教师和学生的共同努力,才能使马克思主义政治经济学的基础性和指导性地位得以巩固,才能用马克思主义经济学的立场、观点和方法去解决我们社会主义经济实践中不断出现的新问题,才能坚定地走中国特色社会主义道路。     

Political Competition, Rent Seeking and the Choice of Environmental Policy Instruments: Comment

In this comment, I analyze Damania's political economy model (Environmental and Resource Economics 13: 415–433, 1999), correcting some flaws and clarifying some ambiguities. I arguethat the political parties are identical at the outset of the game. Onlyafter the parties have chosen the instrument (standards or taxation) and thestrictness of environmental policy do the environmentalists and thepolluting firms know which party to support in the election campaign. Inequilibrium, both parties choose the same platform, so that both have anequal probability of winning the election.     

The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policies*

This paper applies Grossman and Helpman's (1994 ) common agency model to investigate the formation of strategic export subsidy and strategic import tariff under both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition. The results of this paper indicate that even with political pressure, the Grossman–Helpman politically‐determined export policy is identical to the rent‐shifting export policy, which is export subsidy (export tax) in Cournot (Bertrand) competition. The politically‐determined import tariff will be higher than the optimal level. This paper highlights the possibility that lobbying can restore the level of trade intervention to a more efficient one in the absence of the benevolent dictator.     

Social Conflict and Gradual Political Succession: An Illustrative Model*

This paper studies the evolution of political institutions in the face of conflict. We examine institutional reform in a class of pivotal mechanisms—institutions that behave as if the resulting policy were determined by a “pivotal” decision maker drawn from the potential population of citizens and who holds full policy‐making authority at the time. A rule‐of‐succession describes the process by which pivotal decision makers in period t + 1 are, themselves, chosen by pivotal decision makers in period t. Two sources of conflict—class conflict, arising from differences in wealth, and ideological conflict, arising from differences in preferences—are examined. In each case, we characterize the unique Markov‐perfect equilibrium of the associated dynamic political game, and show that public decision‐making authority evolves monotonically downward in wealth and upward in ideological predisposition toward the public good. We then examine rules‐of‐succession when ideology and wealth exhibit correlation.     

Globalization,Tax Distortions,and Public‐Sector Retrenchment*

It is widely perceived that globalization inevitably leads to a retrenchment of tax‐financed public‐sector activities. The argument is that tax distortions increase when production is more easily relocated across countries (the elasticity argument). We question this perception in a model that captures standard mechanisms from trade and open‐economy models. Importantly, the retrenchment argument overlooks the fact that the basic effect of integration (i.e., gains from trade) tends to lower the marginal costs of public funds. Moreover, the elasticity argument is not unambiguously supported, and there is no race to the bottom as a result of the perceived terms‐of‐trade effects of non‐cooperative fiscal policies.     

Good Jobs,Bad Jobs and Redistribution*

We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the policy‐maker is concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a “good jobs” sector due to the capture of quasi‐rents by trade unions. With strong unions and high planner preference for income equality, the optimal policy is a combination of investment subsidies and progressive income taxation. If unions are weaker, the policy‐maker may instead choose to tax investment.     

Post-2008 British Industrial Policy and Constructivist Political Economy: New Directions and New Tensions

The article serves to introduce a number of recent changes in the practices and rationale of British industrial policy since 2008. I observe a shift towards a stronger role for the government and for agencies of industrial policy in the provision of industrial finance, and towards an increasingly discretionary and strategic approach to industrial policy intervention, both of which stand in tension with the neoliberal ‘coordinative discourse’ that continues to structure macroeconomic policy in the post-2008 context. I suggest that this tension is indicative of the emergence of two competing ‘crisis diagnoses’ in government after 2008; one reflecting the neoliberal coordinative discourse that structured economic policymaking prior to 2008, the other at odds with this neoliberal crisis diagnosis. I argue that constructivist analytical frameworks on crisis and political–economic change are insufficiently developed to accommodate these findings. I therefore reflect upon some conceptual and empirical implications that the findings raise for a constructivist analysis of economic policy in the post-2008 context in Britain, before concluding that a more contingent, contested and, crucially, incomplete process of re-alignment in the ideas that structure economic policymaking is underway in Britain than is generally acknowledged.     

Conspicuous Leisure: Optimal Income Taxation When Both Relative Consumption and Relative Leisure Matter*

In previous studies on public policy under relative‐consumption concerns, leisure comparisons have been ignored. In this paper, we consider a two‐type optimal non‐linear income tax model, in which people care about both their relative consumption and their relative leisure. Increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax rates for both ability types, whereas leisure positionality has an offsetting role. However, this offsetting role is not symmetric; concern about relative leisure implies a progressive income tax component (i.e., a component that is larger for the high‐ability type than for the low‐ability type). Leisure positionality does not modify the policy rule for public‐good provision.     

市场环境变迁和政府政策冲击对民营企业创新绩效的影响——考虑企业竞争战略和政治关联的调节作用

在文献梳理和理论分析的基础上,以中国制造业的655家民营企业为研究样本,构建回归模型,对市场环境变迁和政府政策冲击对企业创新绩效的影响进行实证分析,并进一步检验了企业竞争战略和政治关联在其中的调节作用。结果显示:市场竞争程度对民营企业的创新行为不具有显著影响;政府制定的创新激励政策会显著影响企业的创新绩效,而税收等行业政策及创新抑制政策对民营企业的创新绩效没有显著影响;在当前中国经济进入软着陆时期,自主创新战略比成本领先战略更适合于中国民营企业;与政府保持良好关系有助于民营企业降低市场竞争压力、获取额外资源,从而提升创新绩效。     

Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection*

Rochet (1991) showed that with distortionary income taxes, social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re‐examined when ex post moral hazard and adverse selection are included, and under different informational assumptions. Individuals can take actions influencing the size of the loss in the event of accident (or ill health). Social insurance can be supplemented by private insurance, but private insurance markets are affected by both adverse selection and moral hazard. We study how equity and efficiency considerations should be traded off in choosing the optimal coverage of social insurance when those features are introduced. The case for social insurance is strongest when the government is well informed about household productivity.     

The Political Economy of Environmental Taxes with an Aging Population

This paper develops a two-period overlapping-generations model with environmental externalities and uncertain lifetimes, and studies how two sources of population aging, greater longevity and a lower rate of population growth, affect the politically determined environmental tax and the quality of the environment. It is shown that greater longevity and a lower rate of population growth have entirely different effects on these factors; greater longevity has no effect on the environmental tax and has a non-positive effect on the environmental quality, whereas a lower rate of population growth has a negative effect on the tax and has a positive effect on the quality. In addition, the political decision-making on the tax leads to an inefficient allocation of capital and environmental quality.JEL classifications: D72, D78, D91, H41, O40, Q20, Q28     

Welfare Policy in the Presence of Unionised Labour and Internationally Mobile Firms*

To what extent does the welfare state exacerbate the loss of jobs due to offshoring? We consider a model with oligopolistic sectors that are exposed to offshoring, as well as a unionised labour force that is entitled to unemployment benefits. We find that deeper economic integration induces wage moderation to the point that wages become independent of workers' outside options. Because the entire incidence of redistribution falls on net wages, the unions' willingness to moderate wages is constrained by the level of redistribution. Beyond an upper limit of redistribution, extending the welfare state compels unions to oppose wage moderation at the cost of losing jobs to offshoring. Below that upper limit, however, redistribution becomes less rather than more distortive.     

Political entrepreneurs and electoral capital: the case of the Israeli State Economy Arrangement Law

This article looks at a specific institutional change in Israel. In 1985, Israeli politicians adopted the “State Economy Arrangement Law” (SEAL), commonly regarded as part of the budgetary legislation in Israel. This law became an alternative channel through which applicants could circumvent the necessity of applying to the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) for the implementation of certain policies. This law enabled an accelerated, flexible regulatory process that short circuited democratic discussion in the Knesset and obviated the intervention of Israeli consumer organizations. This article suggests that this institutional change should be analyzed as part of a process where institutional reality influences individual and collective beliefs, thus triggering an individual and collective learning process that eventually leads to institutional change, specific policies and outcomes in terms of economic performance. The article also claims that the SEAL legislation is an equilibrium that results from the actions of political entrepreneurs (or agents of change) who operate to maximize their own electoral capital against the backdrop of certain structural and cultural conditions, both local and international. They operate in an environment characterized by the inability of the government to function effectively (non-governability) and the development of an alternative political culture.