基于价格上限的输配电价格管制模型改进研究

由于输配电环节具有自然垄断特性,因此必须接受监管,但随着电力的市场化改革,旧有的监管机制存在一定缺陷,而基于绩效的价格管制模型又不能直接适用于我国的国情。本文提出了一种基于价格上限的价格管制改进模型,在一般价格上限模型中引入电能质量因子,从而很好地克服了该模型导致质量恶化的缺陷,提高了模型的适用性。文中还详细介绍了电能质量因子的确定问题,并对该质量因子进行了算例分析。     

递增阶梯定价:一个综述

作为较独特的非线性定价,递增阶梯定价使消费者预算凸边界非光滑,进而导致某些消费者消费决策异度集中而难以甄别。此特征致使递增阶梯定价机制的理论和实证研究非常复杂。鉴于公共资源的特殊性,公共资源定价需要合理地兼顾效率、社会公正和成本完全补偿原则。在多元化目标角度上,本文初步验证了递增阶梯定价机制的最优性,虽然此最优性受制于接入率和特征信息等假定。递增阶梯定价下的需求设定趋于统一但估计方法却趋于复杂化和多样化。关于递增阶梯定价下的(价格和收入)需求效应明显与否的问题存在完全相反的结果,实证研究和理论对其不一致性给出多种解释和探讨。这种差异性可能由于消费者对价格、价格设计者对家庭特征等信息不完全,还可能因为各实证分析结果中的时间、市场或产品特征维度含义差异所致。基于多元化目标和资源特性的递增阶梯定价机制的设计和执行问题,将成为递增阶梯定价理论研究发展的一大方向。     

长期协议、价格指数和铁矿石定价研究

在长期协议市场和现货市场并存的条件下,当市场存在不确定性和信息不对称时,可以减小随机交易波动,这不仅有利于保持长期协议供给方的领先优势,还能有效降低市场的均衡价格。在我国进口铁矿石定价体系中,国外厂商铁矿石价格指数和中国铁矿石价格指数存在差异和共同点,因此,只有建立运行高效的铁矿石市场交易机制,我国才能获得国际铁矿石定价权。     

价格上限规制在药品定价领域的应用

本文从价格上限规制的产生原因、基本理论和规制效果出发,详细介绍了这一价格规制形式的要点。随后,研究了其在药品价格领域的应用,例如价格上限规制和国际价格比较以及参考定价等制度的结合与对比。最后,以我国药品价格管理的现实问题为基础,重点讨论了价格上限规制在我国的应用前景和实施方法。     

房价水平、交通成本与产业区位分布关系再考量

中心城市房价水平或地租水平的提高具有客观性。房价水平和交通成本变动对制造业区位分布影响较大,而对于生产性服务业的影响并不显著。占用土地面积较大的制造业向外转移不仅有可能抵消房价上涨的压力,而且为具有更高附加值的生产性服务业的发展创造条件。房价水平上涨和交通成本提高加快中心城市制造业的扩散以及生产性服务业的集聚,客观上促使城市间由专业化分工向功能分工结构转变,推动中心城市实现产业升级,有利于形成合理的区域分工格局。     

对基础设施领域引入竞争机制的思考

基础设施领域存在的各种问题及当前国内外的经济环境决定了中国基础设施领域有必要引入竞争机制、理论发展、技术经济条件的变化以及国内外已有的成功的改革实践均表明基础设施领域引入竞争机制是可行的。基础设施领域可通过增加生产者数量、实行激励性规制、利用潜在进入者和替代产品的威胁等多种方式引入竞争机制。     

滞留成本、竞争性定价歧视和定价机制选择

在很多市场环境下,消费者重复消费同一种商品会产生效用折扣或者消费者喜欢尝试不同的商品特性,因此消费者追求消费多样化,重复消费同一种商品会产生滞留成本。文章采用两期动态博弈框架,研究滞留成本的存在对于企业竞争性歧视定价行为和市场绩效的影响,此后又进一步研究了企业的定价机制选择问题。文章的研究结果表明:(1)在歧视定价机制下,企业会奖励忠诚的消费者,即企业会对重复购买自己产品的消费者(忠诚消费者)给予价格优惠,而对新顾客索取高价;(2)与统一定价相比,歧视性定价降低了企业利润和社会福利,增加了消费者剩余;(3)当企业可以在歧视定价和统一定价两种机制之间进行选择时,每个企业选择歧视性定价机制是均衡结果。     

强自然垄断定价理论与中国电价规制制度分析

强自然垄断行业由于其定价方面的两难困境 ,需要规制者对其产品定价进行规制以在厂商利润与社会福利之间进行权衡。边际成本定价原则并不适合于自然垄断厂商。本文在规制定价理论以及激励规制理论的基础上 ,对中国电力定价问题进行了分析 ,认为电价改革的第一步应在发电环节中引入竞争的基础上 ,对不同效率类型的电力厂商设计不同激励强度的定价机制 ,另外本文尝试着对不同技术效率的电力厂商列出了不同激励强度的价格规制方案菜单     

Strategic Choice of the Price Structure and Entry Deterrence Under Price Cap Regulation

This paper shows that a price‐capped firm under the threat of entry in some of the markets it serves can strategically manipulate its price structure to deter entry. In doing so, the regulated firm uses the price cap constraint as a commitment device to an aggressive pricing behaviour in case of entry. A (dynamic) price cap generally entails that the prices allowed today are a function of the previous‐period prices and that the tighter is the constraint on each price, the larger is the quantity sold of this good in the previous period. Hence, the regulated firm may strategically choose its price structure before entry to place a tighter regulatory control on the prices set in the (potentially) competitive markets and to make it optimal to charge in these markets – in case of entry – prices so low that entry is unprofitable.     

网络产业Ramsey接入定价方法研究

网络产业放松规制、引入竞争的改革使得上游"瓶颈"环节和下游竞争性环节出现了"业务分离",催生了接入问题,并成为网络产业规制改革能否成功和有效竞争的关键.通过对用于指导网络产业单向接入定价的Ramsey接入定价方法的研究,得出结论:短期内,将接入服务和最终产品无差别对待的做法可能遭受到较大的实阻碍,从而整体最高价格上限规制的实施显得不太可能.因此,比较现实的做法是,在接入服务市场上,允许在位企业实施两部制(或多部制)接入定价方法.     

网络产业价格规制模式的多元化及其适用性分析

网络产业所具有的自然垄断特性使政府的价格规制成为必要,但价格规制的复杂性在于它不仅受到多重目标导向不一致的困扰,还必须在信息不对称条件下进行设计,使得这类制度安排难以达到理想的效果。针对这种情况,本文在对不同激励强度的价格规制进行比较分析的基础上,提出了如何在提高资源配置效率和减少企业信息租金之间进行权衡的协调模式,并对各种模式的适用性从影响因素的角度予以说明。     

特征价格法在房地产价格指数中的应用

特征价格法（Hedonic method）是将房地产价格变动中的质量特征因素进行分解,以显现出各项特征的隐含价格。并从价格的总变动中逐项剔除质量特征变动的影响,达到仅仅反映纯价格变动的目的。本文通过双重Imputation过程估计缺失价格和剔除异常值的影响,解决了可比性问题,并增强了Hedonic模型的稳定性。     

Price floors and competition

A potential source of instability of many economic models is that agents have little incentive to stick with the equilibrium. We show experimentally that this can matter with price competition. The control variable is a price floor, which increases the cost of deviating from equilibrium. According to traditional theory, a higher floor allows competitors to obtain higher profits. Behaviorally, the opposite result obtains with two (but not with four) competitors. An error model, which builds on Luce (Individual Choice Behavior, 1959), can adequately describe supra-Nash pricing with a low-floor, but then fails to capture the overall pro-competitive effect of a high-floor seen for duopolies.     

Price regulation,product location,and welfare

This paper investigates the imposition of a binding price ceiling and how it affects overall welfare and the location of a monopolist that is price-discriminating between two markets. The analysis shows that the imposition of a price-ceiling induces the monopolist to locate at the regulated market and that the imposition may actually reduce welfare. The setting is extended to a duopoly market. Two types of regulation are considered. The welfare implications of the regulations are discussed.      

火车票定价与社会福利

一般认为火车票市场之所以存在“倒票”都是因为价格管制的结果。价格管制导致了市场中存在套利机会,但是本文应用一个动态博弈模型论证了:对于火车票这种特殊商品,即使价格升高到供求均衡价格,依然可能存在套利机会;单纯地提高价格不仅不能消除“倒票”行为,而且损害了低收入消费者的福利。本文提出了一种差别定价方式———两期定价方法,可以驱逐市场中的“套利者”;同时,恰当的两期定价还可增进社会福利。     

Asymmetric Regulation of Access and Price Discrimination in Telecommunications*

Suppose that a strong and a weak operator compete in a telecommunications market. To terminate a call operators need access to the competitor’s network if the call is off-net. Operators set two-part tariffs and price-discriminate according to termination of a call. Suppose as a benchmark that access prices are regulated at costs. I show that the weak operator’s profit and consumer welfare increase if the regulator sets a higher price to access the weak operator’s network. However, total surplus decreases even locally. *I received helpful comments from Mark Armstrong, Toker Doganoglu, Tommaso Valletti, Julian Wright, and, in particular, two referees and the editor Michael Crew. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Heisenberg Fellowship).     

要素与资产价格重估背景下当前非典型通胀的表现及治理

当前我国经济转型和市场化进程,以及中国近三十年来的发展战略是催生当前通胀发生的体制背景.此次通胀的发生有着"混合型通货膨胀"的特征,体现为货币过剩和结构性的非典型通胀.要理解这种特征事实,需要深入分析当前我国经济增长和转型的体制背景,以及宏观经济变量的互动机制.此类通胀治理问题的关键在于有效的政策搭配.     

Price Regulation and Public Service Obligations under International Arbitrage

National regulation generates price differentials between countries stimulating arbitrage by international distributors. Harmed manufacturers counteract using vertical price-squeeze or non-price discrimination. We show that: (i) either under regulatory commitment or discretion, there are non-linear relationships between technology/market conditions and the first-movers pricing strategy; (ii) public service obligations on distributors allow regulators to manipulate parallel exports so as to improve national welfare; (iii) to prevent sabotage, regulation should provide manufacturers with adequate countervailing incentives; (iv) coordinating national agencies alleviates negative regulatory and market externalities. Therefore, static and dynamic efficiency concerns may arise within a regional exhaustion regime of intellectual property rights.We are grateful to the Editor Michael A. Crew, an anonymous referee, and Luigi Buzzacchi for valuable comments and suggestions. We have benefited from financial support granted by MIUR-FIRB Project MAIS.     

易发生价格竞争的产业特征及企业策略

价格竞争已是我国企业惯常采用的策略行为。本文以彩电行业为例 ,从产品特征、产业生命周期等 6大方面揭示了易发生价格竞争的产业特征 ,提出产业内企业可行的价格战应对策略 ,其结论具有一般性 ,并为预测价格战的发生提供了微观基础。     

Utility Regulation and Risk Allocation: The Roles of Marginal Cost Pricing and Futures Markets

The effects on consumer welfare of requiring a utility facing cost or demand risk to use either a fixed retail price or marginal cost pricing are assessed. With marginal cost pricing and cost volatility an efficient futures market allows consumer welfare to be at least as high in every state as with the fixed price. With demand risk marginal cost pricing can benefit the consumer in every state without harming the firm if the profit difference is transferred to the consumer. A futures market can act as a partial replacement for the transfer.