Cost Reduction,Competitive Pressure and Firms' Optimal R&D Strategies in a Duopolistic Industry

This paper deals with a duopolistic industry where firms are engaged in cost-reducing R&D activity in order to maximize their market shares. Firms' R&D competition is characterized as a dynamic noncooperative feedback game where the optimal strategies are affected by the extra-industry R&D activity and the degree of intra-industry spillovers. Numerical simulations highlight the importance of the assumptions on the firms' absorptive capacity (to exploit external knowledge) in determining the optimal levels of firms R&D investrnents.     

Is targeted advertising always beneficial?

In this paper, we study a simple model in which two horizontally differentiated firms compete in prices and targeted advertising on an initially uninformed market. First, the Nash equilibrium is fully characterized. We prove that when the advertising cost is low, firms target only their “natural markets”, while they cross-advertise when this cost is high. Second, the outcome at equilibrium is compared with random advertising. Surprisingly, we prove that firms' equilibrium profits may be lower with targeted advertising relative to random advertising, while firms are given more options with targeted advertising.     

Informative Advertising Competition

This paper investigates informative price advertising in an established-product Hotelling duopoly where firms compete for shares of a fixed market. Prices are uncertain because firms’ costs are private information. For a sufficiently low cost of advertising, advertising necessarily arises in equilibrium. Also, the less balanced the initial distributions over costs, the greater the potential for informative advertising. Moreover, whenever firms use informative advertising, it increases the firms’ expected profits, and social welfare, relative to the outcome without advertising.     

The benefits of being small: Duopolistic competition with market segmentation

Consider a duopolistic market in which consumers are not necessarily aware of the firms' existence. The market is characterized by the existence of four segments: a duopolistic segment which consists of consumers who are aware of both firms, a segment of consumers who are unaware of either firm and two captive market segments. We assume that by advertising, firms control the proportion of consumers who are aware of their existence. The relative sizes of the four segments affect the equilibrium of the duopolistic pricing game. We show that being large may be disadvantageous, and that even if gaining awareness is costless firms may wish to remain small.We would like to thank Paul Klemperer and an anonymous referee for valuable comments.     

Excess market value,market power,and inside ownership structure

This study is an empirical investigation of whether principal-agent problems do in fact significantly affect corporate managers' decision making, and hence the price of the firms' securities. If inside ownership structure of firms is reflected in firm market value, then agency theory leads one to expect that market value will be a positive function of the degree of inside ownership. This study demonstrates that rational investors recognize inside ownership and its resultant effect on market value. Furthermore, it is shown that excess market value as measured by the Tobin's Q-ratio is related to the level of advertising and R&D expenditure, the degree of market power as proxied by the Lerner Index, leverage, and firm size.     

Market Share Dispersion Among Leading Firms as a Determinant of Advertising Intensity

Previous advertising intensity models have failed toaddress adequately the rivalry effects of leadingfirms trying to protect and enhance the marketshares of their brands. We argue that the relativedegree of market share parity among leading firms inoligopolies is a crucial determinant of marketadvertising levels. This study presents a modelthat more thoroughly characterizes market structureby including the variance in the market shares ofthe top four firms along with the concentrationratio. This model is then tested using a unique1987 data set of 58 well-defined U.S. food andtobacco manufacturing markets that used private datavendors for branded product market shares and mediaadvertising aimed at household consumers. We findthat industry advertising-to-sales ratios arehighest in those industries with the highestprice-cost margins, highest concentration, and thosewith equally-sized leading firms. Oligopolists seemunable to control advertising expenses asconcentration increases and they likely overinvestin advertising rivalry when they have similar marketshares.     

Advertising, Its Determinants, and Market Structure

This study derives a formal model of firm advertising behavior and applies it to the industry level to figure out the relationship between advertising and market structure. The firm advertising model shows that both consumer preference andfirm-specific advertising competence jointly determineprofit-maximizing advertising intensity. At the industry level, advertising intensity is represented multiplicatively by consumer preference and a measure of market structure, which reflects the joint distribution of the levels of advertising competence and market shares among firms. The new market structure measure suggests that those single-dimensional measures of market structure such as seller concentration and the Herfindahl index are inadequate in explaining interindustry differences in advertising intensity, and that the long-debated advertising-concentration relationship differs depending primarily on the appropriability of advertising. An empirical analysis of 426 five-digit Korean manufacturing industries shows that an inverted U-shaped relationship between the Herfindahl index and industry advertising intensity is observed for consumer goods industries but a lazy J-shaped relationship for producer goods industries.     

Achieving superior innovation-based performance outcomes in SMEs through innovation resource-capability complementarity

Firms are increasingly identifying new avenues to enhance their market position. One such effort involves the firms' ability to continuously learn. Learning has the capacity to enable firms to develop and implement more efficient and effective innovation-focused strategies, resulting in the ability to develop and deliver more products in a timelier manner. This study tests the relationship between innovation resource-capability complementarity and innovation-based performance. This study further elaborates that while innovation resource-capability complementarity drives innovation-based performance; their relationship will be enhanced via the firms' possession of superior learning capability. The findings show a significant effect of innovation resource-capability complementarity on innovation-based performance. The results also show that firms that possess superior learning capability are willing to question their operational processes and routines and make adjustments following the feedback obtained from customers and channels; thereby enhancing their abilities to develop more new products and increase their speed in delivering products to the customers.     

Determinants of technology cycle time in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry'

The focus of this study is to examine different factors that influence a firm's technology cycle time. The U.S. pharmaceutical industry is analyzed from 1977–1991. Specifically, the sample includes 21 firms that (a) primarily produce brand ethical drugs, (b) are publicly-owned companies, and (c) have pharmaceutical sales account for a substantial portion of company sales.
Our measure of faster technology cycle time is positively correlated to measures of the knowledge base level of firms, the breadth of firms' knowledge bases, size, and age; it is negatively correlated to advertising expenditures and the percent of US. firm sales to total sales. However, the most notable finding is that technology cycle time is significantly faster for firms that predominantly generate new knowledge internally, and slower for firms that rely more on external sources of new knowledge.     

ASYMMETRIC MARKET SHARES,ADVERTISING AND PRICING: EQUILIBRIUM WITH AN INFORMATION GATEKEEPER*

We analyze how asymmetric market shares impact advertising and pricing decisions by firms that have loyal, non‐shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through a ‘gatekeeper.’ In equilibrium, the firm with the smaller loyal market advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively than the firm with the larger loyal market. Our results differ significantly from earlier literature which assumes that shoppers observe all prices and finds that the firm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price comparison websites such as http://Shopper.com .     

The Small Firm in a Quantity Choosing Game: Some Experimental Evidence

We demonstrate with a grim trigger strategy that the small firm should be more willing to collude tacitly as its market share declines; large firms should be less willing to cooperate. The small firm is not a maverick. The intensity of rivalry between two firms with asymmetric market shares is studied in experimental markets. Treatments give duopolists (1) 50% shares, (2) a 60 or 40% share, and (3) an 80 or 20% share. Choices for the small firm in the latter treatments are not significantly larger than the collusive choice. Irrespective of relative size, firms in all three market environments exhibit collusive behavior.     

Price Competition and Market Structure: The Impact of Cartel Policy on Concentration in the UK

This paper examines the impact of firms' conduct on market structure. It studies the evolution of concentration in UK manufacturing following the abolition of cartels using a theoretical framework based on Sutton's theory of market structure and a panel data set of four-digit industries over 1958–1977. The econometric results suggest that the intensity of price competition has a positive effect on concentration in exogenous sunk cost industries as well as in advertising-intensive and R&D-intensive industries. The concentration-market size relationship, while negative in exogenous sunk cost industries, breaks down in industries with high advertising or R&D intensity.     

Personalized pricing and advertising: Who are the winners?

This paper investigates who wins and who loses when firms depart from a mass advertising/uniform pricing strategy (benchmark model) to a targeted advertising/price discrimination one. Considering a duopoly market in which firms simultaneously compete in prices and advertising decisions, we examine the competitive and welfare effects of personalized pricing with targeted advertising by comparing equilibrium outcomes under customized advertising/ pricing decisions to the results arising under mass advertising and uniform pricing. We show that, when both firms compete in both market segments, all segment consumers are expected to pay higher average prices under the personalized advertising/pricing strategy. We also show that, in the context of our simultaneous game, targeted advertising with price discrimination might boost firms’ profits in comparison to the case of mass advertising and uniform prices. The overall welfare effects of the personalized strategy are ambiguous. However, even when the personalized strategy boosts overall welfare, consumers might all be worse-off. Thus the paper gives support to concerns that have been raised regarding the firms’ ability to adopt personalized strategies to boost profits at the expense of consumers.     

The Formation of Managerial Networks of Foreign Firms in China: The Effects of Strategic Orientations

This study investigates how firms' strategic orientations (i.e., market, technology, and entrepreneurship orientations) influence the formation of two types of managerial networks (top managers' ties with the business community and with government officials), as well as the impact of managerial networking on firm performance. On the basis of a survey of 181 foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) operating in China, we find that a market orientation fosters both types of network building. Technology-oriented firms are more likely to cultivate managerial ties with top managers at other firms but less likely to establish networks with government officials. In contrast, entrepreneurial firms tend to develop vertical networks with government officials but have no intention to deepen their horizontal networks with other firms. Competitive intensity moderates the relationships between strategic orientations and managerial ties. Finally, managerial networking has a positive impact on FIE performance.     

Beer Advertising and Marketing Update: Structure,Conduct, and Social Costs

Beer advertising is a topic that has frequently attracted the attention of industrial organization economists. This update reviews major events, data trends, and research for each of three issues: (1) the importance of advertising and product differentiation for structural change in the brewing industry; (2) the manner and extent to which brewers can strategically alter market shares using advertising; and (3) the social costs of beer advertising and marketing, including advertising bans, targeting of underage youth, and recent changes in the three-tier system of alcohol distribution. Major legal decisions pertaining to commercial speech and other regulations also are discussed.JEL Classifications: L66, L13, M37     

Buyer Market Power and Innovative Activities

This empirical paper deals with the effects of supplier and buyer market concentration on the innovative behavior of suppliers within the German automobile industry. The data set contains firms from all size classes and covers measures of innovation input as well as innovation output. It can be shown that (a) firms' innovation and R & D-employment intensity will decline (increase) in buyer concentrations if supplier markets are low (high) concentrated; (b) buyers' pressure on input prices reduces suppliers' innovation expenditures and their incentive to develop new products; (c) a small number of competitors in suppliers markets and a large stock of customers stimulates innovative behavior; (d) small and medium sized suppliers invest more in their innovative activities but have less probability of realizing innovations than larger firms; and (e) higher technological capabilities lead to higher innovation input and output.     

Getting bank financing: A study of Vietnamese private firms

Private firms in transition economies are operating in an extremely uncertain environment, with underdeveloped market institutions, poorly defined property rights, and absence of reliable business data. This raises a very basic question of how owners of these firms persuade bankers to make much needed loans. This study employs an institutional perspective and argues that firms' legitimacy positively influences their accessibility to bank financing. Specifically, this study develops a model that links networking, professional management practices, and growth stage with bank financing and tests that model using a sample of Vietnamese private firms. The results support the hypotheses that growth stage and networking greatly influence firms' accessibility to bank financing, and that the impact of networking on financing is contingent on the growth stage.     

How does income inequality affect market outcomes in vertically differentiated markets?

The distribution of consumer incomes is a key factor in determining the structure of a vertically differentiated industry when consumer's willingness to pay depends on her income. This paper computes the Shaked and Sutton (1982) model for a lognormal distribution of consumer incomes to investigate the effect of inequality on firms' entry, product quality, and pricing decisions. The main findings are that greater inequality in consumer incomes leads to the entry of more firms and results in more intense quality competition among the entrants. More intense quality competition raises the average quality of products in the market as firms compete for the shrinking share of higher-income consumers. With zero costs of quality improvements and an upper bound on the top quality or when costs of quality are fixed and rise sufficiently fast, greater heterogeneity of consumer incomes also reduces firms' incentives to differentiate their products. Competition between more similar products tends to reduce their prices. However, when income inequality is very high, the top quality producer chooses to serve only the rich segment of the market and charges a higher price. The conclusion is that income inequality has important implications for the degree of product differentiation, price level, industry concentration, and consumer welfare.     

Winning through innovation and marketing: Lessons from Australia and Vietnam

We examine the role of innovation and marketing, two functional capabilities that have the capacity to play a major role in creating superior marketplace performance in firms. Our study of the two capabilities and firms' marketplace performance also takes into account the contribution of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and market orientation (MO) to our focal functional capabilities and marketplace performance. The results of a study of firms in Australia and Vietnam show innovation capability, marketing capability mediate the effects of the firm's MO on its marketplace performance. The results also show that the interaction of innovation and marketing capabilities significantly influences firms' marketplace performance more than they do individually. Finally, our results show that MO partially mediates the relationship between EO and innovation and marketing capabilities.