ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF RETAILER STORE BRAND PRESENCE ON MANUFACTURER BRANDS IN AN EQUILIBRIUM FRAMEWORK*

This article assesses the impact of retailer store brand products on manufacturer brand prices, profitability and consumer welfare in Boston's white fluid milk market. Estimates from a random coefficients logit demand model are used to specify and test a set of pricing games. Under the selected model, milk manufacturers are Stackelberg leaders to retailers, and store brand milks are procured by retailers at cost. The model is used to investigate counterfactual markets without retailer store brand milks. Counterfactual Simulation results indicate that store brands increase channel profits, retailer profits and consumer welfare, while having mixed effects on equilibrium retail prices.     

Should leading brand manufacturers supply private label brands to retailers: Calibrating the trade-offs

The consolidation of retailers across markets has considerably altered the competitive dynamics between leading brand manufacturers and retailers. The era in which brand manufacturers dictate the game to compliant retailers is long gone. Nowadays, with more equal negotiation power retailers are no longer just channel partners but rather business partners with whom to build business-to-business relationships. This has become apparent especially since retailers have developed their own private label brands (PLB) and actively seek brand manufacturers to supply them. For brand manufacturers supplying PLB may bring potential benefits but may also harm profits. Thus, this research investigates conditions under which a leading brand manufacturer would be better or worse off in terms of profitability producing PLB for retailers. Using a game theoretic model, we calibrate the trade-offs between the shelf space devoted by the retailer to the manufacturer brand and the amount of profit required from supplying the PLB necessary to counteract cannibalization and to generate profits for the manufacturer, under different levels of uncertainty regarding the availability of alternative suppliers. Calibrating these trade-offs provides brand manufacturers clear guidelines for negotiations with retailers regarding shelf space allocation and wholesale prices to be profitable supplying PLB.     

Transaction cost implication of private branding and empirical evidence

Branding and transaction cost economics represent two research streams that rarely cross paths in the literature. In this study, I explore the transaction cost implication of private branding, a practice whereby products supplied by unaffiliated manufacturers are sold under private brands owned by retailers. The main thesis is that private branding can preempt a special case of asset specificity called brand specificity, where retailers also invest in the marketing of an outsourced product, but subsequent reputation effects (positive or negative) are specific to the manufacturer who brands the product. Retailers, thus, will not be fully motivated to optimize their investment in product marketing unless they take over the branding right. With potential barriers to private branding being controlled, data obtained from a national chain reveal that the retailer deploys its marketing resources according to the branding status of a product, implying that private branding can deflect the transaction cost of solving the brand specificity problem. The results offer new theoretical insights into branding and transaction cost analysis. This efficiency‐based approach to private branding also provides practitioners with useful guidelines for crafting a branding strategy that will facilitate cooperation between manufacturers and retailers. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Strategic Positioning of Store Brands in Retailer–Manufacturer Negotiations

Store brands are the only brands for which the retailer is responsible not onlyfor promotion, shelf placement, and pricing, but also for positioning the brandin product space. We argue that retailers strongly value control over store brandpositioning because they will be unable to source a national brand with theirdesired product positioning. This is because retailers have an incentive to positionstore brands as close substitutes to leading national brands – a location in productspace which other national brand manufacturers would not find profitable. We presentempirical evidence that is consistent with the results of our model.     

分散决策下的双渠道供应链补偿策略——基于消费者渠道选择行为

为了有效解决由于对消费者的争夺从而引发的渠道之间关于定价、服务水平、利润等方面的冲突,基于消费者渠道选择行为,构建了网络直销市场与传统零售市场需求模型和双渠道供应链利润模型,运用Stackelberg模型,在制造商与零售商实施分决策时,通过制造商对零售商实施补偿激励前后的对比,分析了消费者渠道选择行为对网络直销渠道和传统零售渠道定价、制造商与零售商利润以及供应链总利润的影响,并求得最优定价及制造商的最优补偿额度和零售商的最优销售努力水平,进行了不同情况下的双渠道供应链利润的比较分析。结果表明,无论制造商是否实施补偿激励,都应随着网络消费者比例的增加而增加其网络直销价格;零售商的零售渠道价格应根据网络消费者比例的增加先降低到一定水平后再提升。当更多的消费者选择网络直销渠道时,制造商的补偿激励水平和零售商的销售努力程度均会下降。制造商应提高其补偿水平,进而激发零售商提高销售的努力水平,并使双方利润及供应链总利润最大化。研究结果为基于消费者选择行为的供应链补偿研究提供了新方法,对双渠道的供应链补偿研究有借鉴意义。     

National brand's local advertising and wholesale-price incentive under prior versus no prior information

We study the context of one private label (PL) competing against one national brand (NB) through a unique retailer. We propose a novel utility-demand function that includes the consumer's brand valuation, the retail prices, and the brands' qualities. We investigate the effect of the NB local advertising strategy on supply chain players' profits when either one of the players supports the advertising. Also, we explore the role of prior information about the manufacturer's incentive function on supply chain players' behaviors. We show that although the support for advertising from either the manufacturer or the retailer is Pareto improving, the manufacturer prefers to incite the retailer to invest in local NB advertising through profit sharing instead of using its money to counter the threat of the PL. Furthermore, we also show that the wholesale price incentive motivating the retailer to invest further in advertising is not preferred as expected, and all supply chain players are better off without prior information about the manufacturer's behavior in the context of branding competition and advertising-level dependent incentive.     

Valuable strategy and firm performance in the O2O competition

When the manufacturer opens an online channel to compete with its traditional retailer, what valuable strategy can be utilized to alleviate the O2O (online to offline) competition and conflict and improve the performances of all channel members? Our research addresses this important question by initiating an innovative strategy considering the retailer's sales effort and the manufacturer's support in local advertising simultaneously in a manufacturer – retailer O2O supply chain. Our results show that although the retailer's sales effort helps improve the channel coordination and leads to a win-win solution for both the manufacturer and the retailer, investing in both the retailer's sales effort and manufacturer's support in local advertising is a more effective strategy to be employed to coordinate the O2O distribution and achieve higher profits for all parties in the manufacturer - retailer supply chain. In addition, our results also show that compared to the simultaneous mode, the Stackelberg leader-follower mode provides no competitive advantage to the manufacturer or the retailer when the retailer's sales effort and manufacturer's support in local advertising strategy is implemented to coordinate the O2O distributions.     

Customer and retailer rebates under risk aversion

In a supply chain setting, we analyze a manufacturer's customer and retailer rebates, which are sales incentives offered to the end buyers and retailers, respectively. The performance of both rebates is influenced by the retailer's objective and response to the promotion due to his intermediary position in the channel. Earlier studies investigating rebates in distribution channels have traditionally assumed that the retailer is risk neutral with the objective of maximizing expected profits. In our paper, we consider a risk-averse retailer. We formally model risk aversion by adopting the Conditional-Value-at-Risk (CVaR) decision criterion. Using a stochastic and (effective) price dependent demand, we analyze the manufacturer's rebate amount decisions and the retailer's joint inventory and pricing decisions in a game theoretical framework. We provide several structural properties of the objective functions and show monotonicity of the retailer's decisions in the degree of risk aversion. For the case of retailer rebates, we characterize the unique equilibrium, and for the case of customer rebates, we prove the existence of an equilibrium. Using numerical examples, we provide further insights on the impact of risk aversion. For example, given an exogenous wholesale price, we observe a threshold value on the retailer's risk-aversion parameter below (above) which the manufacturer is better off with retailer rebates (customer rebates); implying that the manufacturer's preferred rebate type can be different depending on whether the retailer is risk neutral or sufficiently risk averse.     

Product substitution in different weights and brands considering customer segmentation and panic buying behavior

Due to recent supply disruptions, there has been a rapid increase in panic buying. This study considers a wholesaler selling two brands of a product with multiple weights and produced by different manufacturers to multiple retailers. The products are substituted based on weight (same brand) and a competitor’s brand over two periods. In the first period (panic situation), the wholesaler attempts to retain the inventory to satisfy the retailer. In the second period (supply disruption), retailers are willing to accept the substitute products. The wholesaler segregates the retailers into high and low indexed customers, where the high indexed retailers (provide higher profit) order greater quantities than the low indexed retailers. The objective of this model is to determine the optimal numbers for ordering quantities and substitutions to maximize total profit. Moreover, supply disruption for both single and multiple brands is analyzed, along with the influence of different degrees of supply disruption and panic rate on decisions and profits. Finally, we compare the models with and without customer-segmented substitution and brand substitution. In addition, other model extensions are discussed, such as an increase in the price in the second period.     

An Empirical Study of the Effect of Brand Proliferation on Private Label – National Brand Pricing Behavior

This paper investigates the competitive pricing interaction between national brand and private label food products, focusing on the effect of brand proliferation. IRI scanner data from 1991 and 1992 for 135 food product categories and 59 geographic markets are used. Empirical findings are grouped into three categories: i) price, promotion and competitive effects, ii) brand proliferation and entry deterrence, and iii) local market effects. Results indicate that both private label and national brand reaction functions are positively sloped and asymmetric. Successful private label penetration, as measured by total private label share, lowers the average price of national brands. The paper's central finding is that the impact of brand proliferation on market pricing behavior is multi-dimensional. First, an increase in the number of brands increases the ability of national brand manufacturers to raise price. Second, the effectiveness of a brand proliferation strategy depends upon the distribution of market share. The more concentrated the brand structure, the lower the market price of national brands. Thus, the net effect of brand proliferation strategies is dependent upon not only the number of brands, but upon the actual distribution of brand shares. Finally, local market conditions play only a small role in the competitive interaction between private labels and national brands.     

区域品牌认同的前因及对消费者购买意愿的影响

目前,相对于其他国家的区域品牌而言,中国区域品牌的发展缓慢,国内学者认为对区域品牌的研究非常有必要且有意义。在区域品牌领域,较少有学者以具体的研究对象分析塑造区域品牌认同的要素和区域品牌认同的作用。基于消费者视角,以自我一致性和感知质量为起点,选择天津地区的区域品牌作为研究对象,调查了共356位学生消费者,探讨研究区域品牌认同的前因变量以及其对消费者购买意愿的影响。应用结构方程模型研究发现,自我一致性和感知质量对区域品牌认同的形成都有显著的促进作用,并且区域品牌认同对消费者购买意愿具有正向的影响。根据结论提出区域品牌利益相关者如何通过提高自我一致性和感知质量构建消费者区域品牌认同的策略。     

Quasi-Partnerships in Distribution

This paper concerns the sale of a vertically differentiated good by a manufacturer to retailers that have market power when reselling to consumers. The contractual relationships between the manufacturer and individual retailers are characterized as “quasi-partnerships,” reflecting the ongoing and multi-dimensional nature of such relationships. Contractual terms are predicted by the Nash bargaining solution and are distinguished from those in an ordinary bilateral monopoly because they make allowance for competing, vertically differentiated brands. The model predicts that differences in retailers’ ability to promote the manufacturer’s brand induce prices that vary systematically with the manufacturer’s market share of retailers’ sales.     

Innovation in business networks: The role of leveraging resources

This study investigates how companies innovate in their business networks. We examine the role of leveraging resources in the context of retail brand paints within the do-it-yourself (DIY) paint industry, where the role of innovation is pertinent to achieve differentiation and create value. The study investigates innovation as a process of leveraging resources within business relationships. Research findings demonstrate that manufacturers and retailers jointly leverage resources to develop and launch innovative retail brands. Companies need to carefully address these resource-leveraging processes and assess their options in developing innovations that enable sustainable growth.     

Economic lot-sizing and dynamic quantity competition

We study a problem of dynamic quantity competition in continuous time with two competing retailers facing different replenishment cost structures. Retailer 1 faces fixed ordering costs and variable procurement costs and all inventory kept in stock is subject to holding costs. Retailer 2 only faces variable procurement costs. Both retailers are allowed to change their sales quantities dynamically over time. Following the structure of the economic order quantity (EOQ) model, retailer 1 places replenishment orders in batches and retailer 2 follows a just-in-time (JIT) policy. The objective of both retailers is to maximize their individual average profit anticipating the competitor's replenishment and output decisions. The problem is solved by a two-stage hierarchical optimization approach using backwards induction. The second-stage model is a differential game in output quantities between the two retailers for a given cycle length. At the first stage, the replenishment policy is determined. We prove the existence of a unique optimal solution and derive an open-loop Nash equilibrium. We show that both retailers follow contrary output strategies over the order cycle. The EOQ retailer, driven by inventory holding costs, decreases his market share whereas the output of the JIT retailer increases. Moreover, depending on the cost structure, the EOQ retailer might partially be a monopolist. At the first stage, the EOQ retailer determines the cycle length, anticipating the optimal output trajectories at the second stage.     

Inducing Cooperation with a Carrot Instead of a Stick

The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Leegin turned on the insight that manufacturers may use resale price maintenance (RPM) for procompetitive purposes. This paper presents a model of manufacturer-retailer interactions that clarifies why, as a rule, retailers and manufacturers are joint beneficiaries of service-inducing RPM. The model identifies factors that determine how RPM-generated benefits are allocated between a manufacturer and its retailers. The paper then shows that manufacturers may use market share discounts (MSD) in lieu of RPM or other vertical restraints to induce retailer performance. The outcomes and efficiency effects that are achieved with RPM can be replicated and usually surpassed if manufacturers substitute MSD for RPM, thereby enabling a manufacturer to retain all incremental profit rather than conceding some of it to retailers.     

Consumer Decision-making at an Internet Shopbot: Brand Still Matters

Internet shopbots compare prices and service levels at competing retailers, creating a laboratory for analysing consumer choice. We analyse 20,268 shopbot consumers who select various books from 33 retailers over 69 days. Although each retailer offers a homogeneous product, we find that brand is an important determinant of consumer choice. The three most heavily branded retailers hold a $1.72 price advantage over more generic retailers in head-to-head price comparisons. In particular, we find that consumers use brand as a proxy for retailer credibility in non-contractible aspects of the product and service bundle, such as shipping reliability.     

The Impact of Upfront Payments on Assortment Decisions in Retailing

There is a contentious debate about the exclusionary effects of upfront payments to be made by manufacturers to place their products on retailers’ shelves. Analyzing a two-stage bargaining process with one downstream retailer and a pool of upstream manufacturers, we find that upfront payments lead to a smaller assortment if the retailer’s bargaining power is high enough and the suppliers’ products are close substitutes.     

Assessing Consequences of Component Sharing across Brands in the Vertical Product Line in the Automotive Market

Component sharing may look great in the boardroom but not in the showroom. Indeed, savings on research and development and production costs could be offset by a plunge in customer brand attractiveness. The central objective of this paper is to investigate consumer and market responses toward component sharing between brands. More specifically, by combining experimental with econometric studies, this paper investigates the impact of component sharing on customer evaluation of luxury, volume, and economy brands offered in a car manufacturer's vertical product line. An experimental study in which component sharing between automotive brands was made explicit aimed to understand the impact of brand combinations and type of sourcing on the evaluations of the two brands sharing components. This experimental study shows that the evaluation of luxury brands sharing with a volume brand suffers more than when a volume brand shares components with an economy brand. This experimental study was executed for two different brand combinations including one luxury, one volume, and one economy brand: (1) Audi, Volkswagen, and Skoda; and (2) Lexus, Toyota, and Suzuki. The evaluation of an economy brand benefits more from sharing with a volume brand than a volume brand suffers from sharing with an economy brand. The magnitude of these effects depends on several factors, such as component type, the source of the component sharing, and the salience of component sharing to the consumers. One important limitation of the experiment is that component sharing is made rather salient, and no behavioral effects of component sharing are studied. Therefore, a second was executed in which market share data on brands of the Volkwagen company (i.e., Audi, Volkswagen, Seat, and Skoda) were collected, while also data on the component‐sharing practices between these brands were gathered. A market share model was estimated in which market shares of the four studied brands were explained by component‐sharing practices and some control variables (i.e., price, model changes) in an exploratory fashion. The explorative examination of market share effects confirms that luxury brands may suffer, while economy brands may benefit from component sharing. In sum, this research suggests that component sharing between brands has negative effects for the higher‐end, and positive effects for the lower‐end brand. However, it also shows that sourcing matters. This study is considered as the first study investigating the phenomenon of component sharing, and it points to multiple future research issues, such as studying this phenomenon in other markets.     

ANOTHER LOOK AT PRICE PROMOTION*

Weekly sales at retail stores exhibit several patterns that the literature on price promotion does not fully capture. In this paper we develop a simple symmetric model where duopoly manufacturers distribute through a monopoly retailer to serve consumers with heterogeneous reservation prices. We show that the heterogeneity in consumers' reservation prices coupled with the retailer's market power is sufficient to resolve the deficiency in the literature. We then show that, while pricing patterns under this model differ significantly from those under a model where the retailer has no market power, the manufacturers' expected profits are the same in both cases.     

Ordering quantity decisions considering uncertainty in supply-chain logistics operations

This research seeks to determine the optimal order amount for a retailer given uncertainty in a supply-chain's logistics network due to unforeseeable disruption or various types of defects (e.g., shipping damage, missing parts and misplacing products). Mixture distribution models characterize problems from solitary failures and contingent events causing network to function ineffectively. The uncertainty in the number of good products successfully reaching distribution centers (DCs) and retail stores poses a challenge in deciding product-order amounts. Because the commonly used ordering plan developed for maximizing expected profits does not allow retailers to address concerns about contingencies; this research proposes two improved procedures with risk-averse characteristics towards low probability and high impact events. Several examples illustrate the impact of a DC's operation policies and model assumptions on a retailer's product-ordering plan and resulting sales profit.