Social context reveals gender differences in cooperative behavior

A number of previous researches indicate that men prefer competition over cooperation, and it is sometimes suggested that women show the opposite behavioral preference. In the current study the effects of social context on gender differences in cooperation are investigated. For the purpose, we compared men and women behavior under two social conditions: in groups of strangers and in groups with long-term socialization—groups of friends. The differences were found in changes in the level of cooperation, taking into account the effects of mixing social and gender variables. Social interaction and communication made cooperation of group members strength and sustainable. However, men’s and women’s cooperative behavior in groups differed. Women were initially more inclined to cooperate in interaction with strangers. Men showed greater sensitivity to sociality effects. They tended to make cooperative decisions more often if there were friends in the group. Furthermore, men cooperated with previously unknown people after socialization with them significantly more than women.     

Trust and reciprocity in inter-individual versus inter-group interactions: The effects of social influence, group dynamics, and perspective biases

Using an experimental trust game, I examine whether the perspectives and behavior of group representatives and consensus groups differ from those of the same individuals in an analogous inter-individual situation. A primary goal of this research is to extend past work on trust and reciprocity by examining the impact of the social contexts within which social interactions are characteristically embedded. Specifically, this research concerns whether norms and dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in the contexts of inter-individual and inter-group interactions. First, I examine whether dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in various inter-group interactions where inter-group decisions are operationalized as 1) autonomous group representatives, i.e., individuals who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making a decision on behalf of a three-person group engaging with a group representative of another such group; and 2) consensus groups, i.e., group members making a consensus trust or reciprocity decision for their groups via a collective process with another such group. Results of these studies show that 1) people trust less and reciprocate less when responsible for a group or organizational decision as autonomous group representatives; 2) consensus groups do not differ from individuals in their level of trust but show dramatically less reciprocity. The group consensus mechanism in fact produced by far the lowest reciprocity level, significantly lower than that exhibited by either individuals or autonomous group representatives. Thus, inter-group trust and reciprocity dynamics are not readily inferable from their inter-individual counterparts. Moreover, an important implication is emerging here: the extent and direction of the discrepancy between individual and group choices in regard to trust and reciprocity levels and possibly other social preferences in general may depend importantly on the precise details of the group decision-making mechanism, for example whether decisions are made consensually, by majority vote, or by a group leader or representative. In addition to examining the level of trust and reciprocity that occur in these various situations, I also studied, using both behavioral and questionnaire data, the roles of self-interest, social influence, and group dynamics in trust and reciprocity perceptions and behavior. The results showed that there exist discrepancies between behavioral forecasts and the actual behavior, and that trusting behavior is driven strongly by expectation of level of reciprocation, while reciprocating behavior is driven strongly by the difference between trust expectation and actual trust received.     

Investment in identity in the field-Nudging refugees’ integration effort

Social identity greatly affects behavior. However, less is known about an individual’s investment in identification, i.e., in belonging to a social group. Using a language-learning platform utilized by refugees to learn the host country’s language, we design a field experiment that allows us to make effort as an investment in a new group identity salient. The social identity in our treatment is a refugee’s identification with the host society. We modified a mailing to 5600 refugees who use an online language-learning platform to learn the host country’s language. These treatment emails make salient that improving the host country’s language ability increases the belonging to the host society. Our analysis reveals that the treatment has a significant positive effect on the effort exerted on the language-learning platform, leading to more completed exercises and more time spent learning the host country’s language. This suggests that refugees invest in becoming part of the host country’s society for its social identity component. Our findings can inform policy considerations on the use of nudges for other integration measures intended for refugees and immigrants in general.     

Keep up with the winners: Experimental evidence on risk taking,asset integration,and peer effects

The paper reports the result of an experimental game on asset integration and risk taking. We find some evidence that winnings in earlier rounds affect risk taking in subsequent rounds, but no evidence that real life wealth outside the experiment affects risk taking. Controlling for past winnings, participants receiving a low endowment in a round engage in more risk taking. We test a ‘keeping-up-with-the-Joneses’ hypothesis and find that subjects seek to keep up with winners, though not necessarily with average earnings. Overall, the evidence suggests that risk taking tracks a reference point affected by social comparisons.     

Misery loves company: Social regret and social interaction effects in choices under risk and uncertainty

Extensive field evidence shows individuals? decisions in settings involving uncertainty depend on their peers? decisions. One hypothesized cause of peer group effects is social interaction effects: an individual?s utility from an action is enhanced by others taking the same action. We employ a series of controlled laboratory experiments to study the causes of peer effects in choice under uncertainty. We find strong peer group effects in the laboratory. Our design allows us to rule out social learning, social norms, group affiliation, and complementarities as possible causes for the observed peer group effects, leaving social interaction effects as the likely cause. We use a combination of theory and empirical analysis to show that preferences including “social regret” are more consistent with the data than preferences including a taste for conformity. We observe spillover effects, as observing another?s choice of one risky gamble makes all risky gambles more likely to be chosen.     

Risk preference interactions between individual farmers and small farmer groups: Experimental evidence from rural Ethiopia

The understanding of risk preference interactions among poor farmers in developing countries has important policy implications, as many programs that aim to alleviate poverty and address risk constraints are provided on a collective basis. We conduct a randomized field experiment in the drought-prone parts of Northern Ethiopia and elicit from poor, vulnerable farmers their hypothetical willingness to pay using individual and group lottery games. Analyzing the certainty equivalent ratios (CERs), we find that farmer groups are more risk averse than individual farmers. When the risk of the lottery is high, the group CER is primarily determined by the most-risk-averse farmer of the group, and to a lesser extent, by the least. The median farmer contributes to the group CER only when the lottery risk is moderate. After participating in the group elicitation, individual farmers also become as risk averse as the group on average. Specifically, the median and the least-risk-averse farmers become significantly more risk averse while the most-risk-averse farmer is unaffected. Our results show that policymakers should carefully consider how social interactions in rural communities affect individual and group risk preference and whether social interactions also affect the participation and effectiveness of development programs.     

“渐进”还是“激进”？家族涉入视角下企业社会责任与双元创新行为

企业社会责任行为和创新能力是市场发展的重要基石，在家族涉入情形下，企业社会责任实践及创新偏好一直存在很多争议。基于家族企业治理理论，探讨家族企业社会责任与双元创新的关系，将家族传承期中的二代交接作为调节机制，研究其在两者间的调节效应。利用2009-2018年中国家族上市企业数据为研究样本进行实证分析，结果发现：企业社会责任行为给企业创新带来了大量有效资源，对家族企业利用式创新和开发式创新行为均能起到促进效应。但与开发式创新相比，企业社会责任对利用式创新行为的促进作用更加显著。在考虑家族传承这一情景因素后，二代交接导致企业呈现出较为保守的战略导向，其正向调节企业社会责任与利用式创新的关系；而对于开发式创新而言，其调节效应恰好相反。从家族企业社会责任视角出发，对创新类别进行划分，有助于加深对家族企业创新行为的认识。     

Higher-order risk preferences in social settings

We study prudence and temperance (next to risk aversion) in social settings. Previous experimental studies have shown that these higher-order risk preferences affect the choices of individuals deciding privately on lotteries that only affect their own payoff. Yet, many risky and financially relevant decisions are made in the social settings of households or organizations. We elicit higher-order risk preferences of individuals and systematically vary how an individual’s decision is made (alone or while communicating with a partner) and who is affected by the decision (only the individual or the partner as well). In doing so, we can isolate the effects of other-regarding concerns and communication on choices. Our results reveal that the majority of choices are risk averse, prudent, and temperate across social settings. We also observe that individuals are influenced significantly by the preferences of a partner when they are able to communicate and choices are payoff-relevant for both of them.     

Green consumers and public policy: On socially contingent moral motivation

“Green” consumers appear to accept individual responsibility for the provision of public goods. The propensity to take such responsibility may depend on beliefs about others’ behavior, even for consumers motivated by internalized moral norms, not by social sanctions. This effect can produce multiple equilibria with either high or low demand for “green” products. Permanent increases in green consumption may be achieved by imposing temporary taxes or subsidies, or through advertising that influences beliefs about others’ behavior or about external effects. If a tax is interpreted as taking responsibility away from the individual, however, taxes can reduce the influence of moral motivation.     

Attitudes Toward Catastrophe

In light of climate change and other global threats, policy commentators sometimes urge that society should be more concerned about catastrophes. This paper reflects on what society’s attitude toward low-probability, high-impact events is, or should be. We first argue that catastrophe risk can be conceived of as a spread in the distribution of losses. Based on this conception, we review studies from decision sciences, psychology, and behavioral economics that explore people’s attitudes toward various social risks. Contray to popular belief, we find more evidence against than in favor of catastrophe aversion—the preference for a mean-preserving contraction of the loss distribution—and discuss a number of possible behavioral explanations. Next, we turn to social choice theory and examine how various social welfare functions handle catastrophe risk. We explain why catastrophe aversion may be in conflict with equity concerns and other-regarding preferences. Finally, we discuss current approaches to evaluate and regulate catastrophe risk.     

The Role of Environmental Management in Consumers Preferences for Corporate Social Responsibility

Consumers in modern societies are increasingly sensitive to environmental performance by large and small corporations, making it a crucial issue in the overall policy of corporate social responsibility. The objective of this paper is to study the role of environmental performance in the profile of corporate social responsibility as perceived by consumers. We utilize a stated preference approach to the study of consumer’s preferences. This approach allows for the evaluation in monetary terms of the trade-offs that individuals can make between various aspects of corporate policy decisions, including the extent of environmental performance. The data is modelled by means of a mixture heuristics approach that allows us to study the utilization of various decision rules in the choice of products with various degrees of environmental performance. The results show that the linear compensatory heuristic is the most extended across individuals and these subjects value most the policies concerned with environmental management. Those subjects opting for the non-compensatory decision rule tend to focus on the attribute of good labour relations as the most salient factor defining corporate social responsibility. In addition, policy measures are relatively more valued for some products rather than for others, suggesting that consumers discriminate between products when valuing companies’ environmental profiles.     

跨层次研究视角下的社会资本与创新绩效——理论框架与实证模型

如何强化员工的知识分享和创新绩效来建立企业的核心竞争优势并维持较高的创新水平,是企业面临的重要挑战。本文对社会资本的基本理论及其与个体创新绩效相关的文献进行了回顾,同时就知识分享和组织学习型文化相关的文献进行综述发现,组织环境因素能够对个体创新绩效产生直接影响,但更重要的是通过其与个体因素的交互作用,共同对个体创新绩效产生影响。因此,推导出一个跨层次研究模型,建立了个体层次的知识分享与组织层次的学习型文化对个体层次社会资本与创新绩效交互作用的影响模型与假设。本研究拟使用社会网络分析软件UCINET、统计软件SPSS以及多层线性模型分析软件HLM对实证模型进行分析。以期验证组织层次的学习型文化通过组织共有的思维模式和行为规范来影响个体层次的个体成员的知识分享和创新绩效,使个体和组织得到共同的成长与发展。     

Mandating behavioral conformity in social groups with conformist members

Social interaction among individuals with a preference for conformity gives rise to coordination externalities which are not internalized in a non-cooperative setting. Mandating behavioral conformity, by centrally imposing a common, group-wide action, internalizes these coordination externalities, but also comes at a cost of restraining individuals’ self-regarding goals. We explore a framework of social interaction among privately informed individuals with conformist preferences to examine when mandating behavioral conformity improves group welfare. Our analysis elucidates how the desirability of mandating behavioral conformity is shaped by the group's socio-economic structure. We find that mandating behavioral conformity is not desirable in social groups that are ex ante homogeneous—either with respect to members’ contribution to group welfare or their innate conformist tendency. In contrast, mandating behavioral conformity can be beneficial in those ex ante heterogeneous social groups where the individuals who contribute most to group welfare also exhibit the strongest preference for conformity.     

The influence of group size on distributional fairness under voting by veto

Voting by Veto [VBV], developed by Dennis C. Mueller, is a two-stage voting mechanism for committee decision making. In the first stage, every member of the committee makes a proposal. The proposals are joined with the current status quo (or another fallback option). For the second stage, a random mechanism determines the order of voting and the committee members sequentially eliminate one alternative each. After every committee member has exercised her veto, a single winning alternative remains. Game theory predicts that the equality of the resulting distribution under VBV varies with group size. Hence, decisions in two-member groups should result in highly unequal distributions of benefits. With increasing group size, however, VBV should generate more equally distributed outcomes. We examine the effect of group size under VBV in a series of laboratory experiments where groups with a varying number of members play a ‘divide the dollar game’. Our results confirm that larger groups choose more equal distributions than smaller groups. However, we also find deviations from the model's predictions. Some committees in our experiment do not select Pareto-optimal alternatives. An exploratory analysis of possible explanations suggests that individual behavior is most likely motivated by a combination of material self-interest and social preferences such as reciprocity and fairness.     

ISO 26000风险及中国应对策略

国际标准化组织（ISO）发布的《社会责任指南》标准,把企业社会责任拓展到了组织社会责任,涉及了人权、劳工权益、国际行为准则、政府治理、国际公约及协定等敏感问题,被认为会对中国等发展中经济体的组织产生负面影响,乃至遭遇风险。论文通过对有关问题的分析,提出了应对ISO 26000风险的策略,包括政治、社会、经济和技术等四个方面的系统风险消减策略和治理、经济、技术、素质等四个方面的组织能力建设策略。主要结论是：要求组织履行社会责任,对于促进组织效益的提升、经济增长方式的转型、社会发展模式的改良具有积极意义。组织应该根据各自具体情况与发展阶段,采取上述社会责任应对策略,有效地应对及避免ISO 26000带来的经济、社会、文化乃至政治风险。     

Heterogeneous preferences and investments in energy saving measures

We investigate whether risk, time, environmental, and social preferences affect single-family homeowners’ investments in the energy efficiency of their house using established experimental measures and questionnaires. We find that homeowners who report to be more risk taking are more likely to have renovated their house. Pro-environmental and future-oriented renovators, i.e. renovators with lower discount factors, live in homes with higher energy efficiency. Pro-social preferences as measured in a dictator game relates positively to the energy quality of renovated houses. Controlling for the energy efficiency of houses, we further find that energy consumption as measured by heating and electricity costs is lower for future-oriented and pro-environmental individuals.     

Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence

Can a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerge among strangers? We investigate this question by examining behavior in an experiment where subjects repeatedly play a two-player binary “trust” game. Players are randomly and anonymously paired with one another in each period. The main questions addressed are whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerges under the most extreme information restriction (anonymous community-wide enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity require additional, individual-specific information about a player’s past history of play and whether that information must be provided freely or at some cost. In the absence of such reputational information, we find that a social norm of trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain. The provision of reputational information on past individual decisions significantly increases trust and reciprocity, with longer histories yielding the best outcomes. Importantly, we find that making reputational information available at a small cost may also lead to a significant improvement in trust and reciprocity, despite the fact that most subjects do not choose to purchase this information.     

WHO VOTES EXPRESSIVELY,AND WHY? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

Experiments have shown that some people behave more altruistically in collective decisions than they do in individual ones, which could be interpreted as an ‘expressive voting’ effect. However, there is substantial variation in the behaviour of experimental participants. We conduct experiments to explore the reasons for this variation, and find that certain characteristics are sometimes associated with a propensity for expressive voting. However, the strength of these effects depends on the ordering of individual and collective choices. The ‘warm glow’ of expressive voting can influence subsequent individual decisions, and the ‘cold shower’ of individual selfishness can influence subsequent collective decisions.     

Destructive behavior in a Fragile Public Good game

Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment–like damaging public goods–is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with constructive behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive decisions, sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destructive decisions, shifting the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%.