Why are price stability and statutory independence of central banks negatively correlated? The role of culture

This paper investigates whether in OECD countries the negative relation between central bank independence and inflation is related to culture, in the sense of common values and norms. It appears that inflation is lower in countries where people dislike uncertainty. Countries, where inhabitants perceive that there should be an order of inequality and a centralisation of authority, are characterised by a dependent central bank and, to a lesser extent by relatively high inflation rates. Hence, the national attitude towards inequality among people appears to be a third factor explaining the negative correlation between inflation and the degree of central bank independence.     

中国实行通货膨胀目标制的可行性分析

通货膨胀目标制是一种以保持低而稳定的通货膨胀为首要目标的货币政策框架。本研究参照IMF提出的相关指标,并考虑到中国作为转型国家的经济特征,从中国当前经济运行中控制一般物价水平的必要性、经济结构的完善性、金融市场和银行体系的健全性、中央银行的独立性、货币政策的透明度以及央行准确预测通货膨胀的技术等方面考察了中国实行通货膨胀目标制的可行性,得出中国已经初步具备实施该货币制度的条件。并提出更彻底的制度改革将会确保中国成功实施通货膨胀目标制,从而使得宏观经济运行处于稳定的价格水平因而更有效率。     

Destabilizing effects of a successful stabilization: a forward-looking explanation of the second Hungarian hyperinflation

Summary. The extreme severity of the second Hungarian hyperinflation is argued to be related to the unusual way in which the inflation was eventually stabilized. The historical features of this episode are represented in a general equilibrium model, which incorporates a transition from one monetary regime to another. During the inflation the government finances a fixed deficit with seigniorage revenue. After the stabilization the government budget is balanced and the central bank engages in a program of subsidized lending to the private sector. Stabilization is achieved by targeting a low inflation rate path through adjustments in the quantity of central bank lending. I show that under this stabilization policy (1) the dynamic equilibrium path of the economy is indeterminate and (2) arbitrarily high pre-stabilization inflation rates are possible. Received: November 5, 1998; revised version: November 30, 1998     

中国通胀惯性特征与货币政策启示

通胀惯性与货币政策效果紧密相关。本文应用具有统计无偏性的"Grid Bootstrap"估计法和未知断点结构突变检验法,研究了1980—2007年中国通货膨胀的惯性特征。本文发现,在低通胀环境下通货膨胀仍然呈现相当高的惯性特征,这暗示着我国货币政策的滞后效应依然非常明显,通货膨胀对政策变化的反应速度缓慢。计量结果说明,中央银行至少应该在出现通胀压力前一年采取措施,来应对高通胀惯性环境下的政策滞后效应。因此,新时期货币当局不仅需要保持对通胀抬头趋势的适度警觉,而且应该关注高通胀惯性对政策效果的影响。     

Inflation literacy and inflation expectations: Evidence from Austrian household survey data

Inflation expectations are known to be quite heterogeneous across agents. We investigate whether this heterogeneity is primarily due to differences in people’s understanding of the inflation process and of the goals and intentions of the central bank. Using micro data from a survey conducted among 2000 Austrian households, we construct an indicator of “inflation literacy” from several questions on people’s knowledge about different aspects of inflation. We find that this indicator helps explain both the level and the uncertainty of inflation expectations: Households with relatively higher levels of inflation literacy tend to have lower and more accurate short-term and long-term inflation expectations. Interestingly, however, they are less certain about their inflation expectations than people with lower levels of inflation literacy. We also find that people’s trust in the central bank and in its ability to maintain price stability significantly dampens their inflation expectations.     

Political influence,central bank independence and inflation in Africa: A comparative analysis

This paper develops a new de facto measure of central bank independence (CBI) based on two recent measures of the turnover rates of central bank governors introduced by Vuletin and Zhu (2011), complemented with measures of alliance with the government in power, captured by prior executive appointment, tribe proximity, and political party affiliation. Using 1980–2009 data from 13 countries from the CFA zone (a currency union) and 18 non-CFA countries, the new index is used to 1) examine whether CBI can help achieve price stability in Africa and 2) show how CBI affects African countries that are part of a monetary union. We find that higher turnover rates lead to higher inflation. Our results are robust to the decomposition of the turnover rates into premature removals and ally replacements. Furthermore, we find that for CFA zone countries, central bank autonomy has no effect on inflation and instead inflation is driven by other variables such as the fixed exchange rate regime or commodity price shocks.     

Openness, income-tax progressivity, and inflation

This paper considers a model of an open economy in which the degree of income-tax progressivity influences the interaction among openness, central bank independence, and the inflation rate. Our model suggests that an increase in the progressivity of the tax system induces a smaller response in real output to a change in the price level. This implies that increased income-tax progressivity reduces the equilibrium inflation rate and that the effect of increased income-tax progressivity on inflation is smaller when the central bank places a higher weight on inflation or when there is greater openness. Examination of cross-country inflation data provides empirical support for these key predictions.     

Openness, centralized wage bargaining, and inflation

This paper develops a model of an open economy containing both sectors in which wages are market-determined and sectors with wage-setting arrangements. A portion of the latter group of sectors coordinate their wages, taking into account that their collective actions influence the equilibrium inflation outcome in an environment in which the central bank engages in discretionary monetary policymaking. Key predictions forthcoming from this model are (1) increased centralization of wage setting initially causes inflation to increase at low degrees of wage centralization but then, as wage centralization increases, results in an inflation drop-off; (2) a greater degree of centralized wage setting reduces the inflation-restraining effect of greater central bank independence; and (3) increased openness is more likely to reduce inflation in nations with less centralized wage bargaining. Analysis of data for seventeen nations for the period 1970–1999 provides generally robust empirical support for all three of these predictions.     

More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries

This study examines the effect of legal central bank independence on inflation in developing countries. In spite of the policy consensus suggesting that central bank independence is an effective tool to control inflation, the evidence is still limited, particularly for developing countries. Using a novel dataset, we analyze the effect of central bank independence on inflation for a sample of 118 developing countries between 1980 and 2013. We find that higher central bank independence is associated with lower inflation rates. This effect on inflation is stronger the more democratic a country is, but it is also present in non-democratic countries. Our results are robust to different specifications and methodologies. Furthermore, we find that all dimensions included in the measurement of central bank independence (objectives, personnel, policy, and financial independence) contribute to curb inflation. Our results shed light on which types of reforms may be more effective at fighting inflation in developing countries.     

Does greater central bank independence really lead to lower inflation? Evidence from panel data

It has long been held that central bank independence (CBI) from political control is a necessary requirement to curb inflation. In recent times, however, this long held belief has been challenged. Using a recently compiled panel data set on central bank independence measures, the proposition that greater CBI leads to lower inflation is tested, using latent variable analysis. The use of this alternative econometric technique, along with two additional indicators that capture more appropriately the degree of de facto independence, leads to empirical results that are highly supportive of the negative relationship between CBI and inflation, thereby restoring faith in the conventionally held wisdom, that greater CBI is needed to lower inflation.     

Announcements and credibility under inflation targeting

We inspect how inflation target announcements are instrumental in building central bank credibility and shaping inflation expectations. Investigating the role of announcements by using a time varying credibility measure, we find that both the accuracy and the frequency of inflation announcements have a positive impact on how much attention the public pays to target announcements.     

Is central bank conservatism desirable under learning?

In a New Keynesian model, we consider the delegation problem of the government when the central bank optimally sets discretionary monetary policy taking account of private expectations formed through adaptive learning. Learning gives rise to an incentive for the central bank to accommodate less the effect of inflation expectations and cost-push shocks on inflation and induces thus a deviation from rational expectations equilibrium. However, discretionary monetary policy under learning suffers from an excessively low stabilization bias. To improve the social welfare, the government should appoint a liberal central banker, i.e., set a negative optimal inflation penalty that decreases with the value of learning coefficient. The main conclusions are valid under both constant- and decreasing-gain learning.     

Inflation Targeting - the Holy Grail of Monetary Policy?

Inflation targeting is a statement about the objective of central bank policy and not about operating procedures. Its success depends not only on the actions of the central bank, but requires a broad consensus concerning the proper role of monetary policy in the economy. It also requires the backing of a sound fiscal policy. As countries differ both in economic structure and monetary transmission mechanism, the implementation of inflation targeting must be country specific. Instability over time in the transmission mechanism also implies that inflation targeting strategies must evolve to avoid the fate of previous monetary policy targeting practices.     

Monetary policy with heterogeneous households and imperfect risk-sharing

This paper considers a sticky-price model with heterogeneous households and financial frictions. Financial frictions lead to imperfect risk-sharing among households with idiosyncratic labor incomes. I study implications of imperfect risk-sharing for optimal monetary policy by documenting its impacts on the monetary transmission mechanism, the inflation–output tradeoff faced by the central bank, the policy objective function, and the resulting targeting rule. The main finding is that while the central bank continues to have the conventional dual mandate — the output gap and inflation stabilization — it should place a greater weight on the later as the degree of financial frictions increases because price stability provides the additional benefit of reducing undesired consumption dispersion.     

Central bank independence,inflation and political instability in developing countries

We test whether political instability affects central bank independence in developing countries. Both a legal measure and the turnover tate of central bank governors are used as proxies for central bank independence and the frequency of government transfers is used to proxy political instability. Only the number of coups affects the turnover rate of central bank governors. We also find that both the turnover rate of central bank governors and political instability affect the rate of inflation.     

Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets

This article studies a two-period game between the public and a central bank about whose ability to commit to an announced target the public is uncertain. The central bank chooses between announcing a target for an intermediate variable (money growth) and its goal variable, inflation. Prior to setting its instrument, the central bank receives private, noisy information about the link between money growth and inflation. Monetary targeting facilitates communication of the central bank's type, in that the probability of separation is always higher than under inflation targeting. This advantage of monetary targets from a dependable central bank's perspective is outweighed for most parameter values by the advantage of inflation targeting in terms of inflation control. If the regime choice is treated as a strategic decision, over a large range of parameter values both central banks choose the regime that a dependable central bank would prefer.     

Stabilising Taylor rules when the supply shock has a unit root

This paper studies the implication of unit root supply shocks for the Taylor rule. I find that, when supply shocks have a unit root, if a central bank wishes to guarantee the stationarity of inflation, then their interest rate reaction function should not respond to the output gap. Once the stationarity of inflation is guaranteed by the output-gap-response parameter, the “Taylor principle” can be applied for warranting determinacy of the dynamics.     

利率、魏克赛尔累积过程与资产价格

通货膨胀目标制的理论基础直接来源于魏克赛尔的累积过程理论。央行的利率政策不但会影响一般价格的上涨,而且会导致资产价格出现泡沫。现时的房产价格与未来的产出和通货膨胀关系密切,应该在CPI中给予一定的权重。低利率、低通胀和资产价格膨胀共存并不意味着累积过程理论失效,而是因为其反馈机制和通胀度量出现了问题。     

Monetary–fiscal policy interaction and fiscal inflation: A tale of three countries

We study the impact of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy on the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation using cross-country data from 1965 to 1999. In a first step, we contrast the monetary–fiscal narrative for Germany, the U.S., and Italy with evidence obtained from simple regression models and a time-varying VAR. We find that the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation is low during periods of an independent central bank and responsible fiscal policy and more pronounced in times of non-responsible fiscal policy and accommodative monetary authorities. In a second step, we use an estimated DSGE model to interpret the low-frequency measure structurally and to illustrate the mechanisms through which fiscal actions affect inflation in the long run. The findings from the DSGE model suggest that switches in the monetary–fiscal policy interaction and accompanying variations in the propagation of structural shocks can well account for changes in the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation.     

Strategic wage setting, inflation uncertainty and optimal delegation

The paper examines optimal monetary policy delegation in an economy where wages are set strategically by a single economy-wide union whose objectives relate to employment and the real wage. Crucially, the central bank exerts imprecise control over inflation, giving rise to a positive relationship between the mean value of inflation and its variance. In this context, union concerns with regard to the employment goal render equilibrium sensitive to the conduct of monetary policy. As a consequence, optimal delegation arrangements closely resemble those identified as optimal in models that assume a direct aversion to inflation on the part of unions.