A positive theory of government debt

A government that cannot commit to future policy choices faces a trade-off that explains the level of debt. On the one hand, there is an incentive to increase debt and delay taxation, so as to reduce current distortions. On the other hand, inflating current prices lowers the real value of nominal debt and so there is a motive to reduce it now. The size of long-run debt will depend on the interaction of these two opposing incentives. The critical determinant is the willingness of households to substitute away from goods being taxed by inflation. Numerical simulations show that the model matches some qualitative and quantitative properties of U.S. policy variables, including the fact that wars are frequently financed with a mix of instruments. The theory interprets the unusual post-World War II inflation and fast liquidation of accumulated debt as being due to higher long-run debt and expenditure in the period leading up to the war.     

The election cycle in the inflation bias: evidence from the G-7 countries

This paper derives and evaluates empirical implications which separate the naive voters view [Nordhaus, W.D., 1975. The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42, 169–190.] from the rational-voters view [Barro R., Gordon, D., 1983. Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 101–121.] under rational expectations. The observational equivalence of the two approaches obtained under a natural rate vanishes as output persistence is introduced. An analysis of inflation in the G-7 countries reveals election patterns supporting the joint hypothesis that demand shocks persist and that monetary policy courts retrospective voters. Patterns turn weaker as central banks become more independent, but do not disappear. Reducing inflationary bias not only requires more central bank independence, but as well less persistence.     

Reconsidering central bank independence

In this paper, we survey the case for central bank independence (CBI). We conclude that CBI is neither necessary nor sufficient for monetary stability. CBI is just one potentially useful monetary policy design instrument among several, and CBI should not be treated as an exogenous variable. Instead, the question that should be addressed is why societies decide to make their central banks independent? The reasons why CBI is chosen are related to legal, political, and economic systems. A number of empirical studies find correlations between CBI and low inflation rates. Endogeneity of CBI suggests, however, that the correlation has no implications for causality.     

Deficit sustainability and inflation in EMU: An analysis from the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

Price determination theory typically focuses on the role of monetary policy, while the role of fiscal policy is usually neglected. From a different point of view, the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level takes into account monetary and fiscal policy interactions and assumes that fiscal policy may determine the price level, even if monetary authorities pursue an inflation targeting strategy. In this paper we try to test empirically whether the time path of the government budget in EMU countries would have affected price level determination. Our results point to the sustainability of fiscal policy in all the EMU countries but Finland, although no firm conclusions can be drawn about the prevalence of either monetary or fiscal dominance.     

Sectoral variability and the foundations of optimal inflation rate

The recent monetary search models argue that the real effects of inflation on economic activity can be gauged through relative price variability (RPV). Our study uses a large panel data of 32 developed and emerging European economies to test the relationship between inflation and RPV. We use a panel threshold model to explore the regime-specific effects of inflation on RPV. Our results confirm a non-linear profile of the relationship between inflation and RPV. Consistent with the monetary search models, our results show that the effects of inflation on the RPV are more significant in its low (below 0.792% per annum) and high (beyond 2.064% per annum) regimes. Finally, we also report a strong moderating role of central bank independence (CBI) in the inflation–RPV relationship.     

An independent central bank faced with elected governments

The literature argues that the benefits of an independent central bank accrue at no cost to the real side. In this paper, we argue that the lack of correlation between monetary autonomy and output variability is due to the proactive role of fiscal policy when faced with rigid monetary objectives. Few of the attempts to measure these correlations actually allow for a changing fiscal role. Yet, when an independent authority handles monetary policy, fiscal and wage/social protection policies remain instruments in the hands of elected governments. We find that, so long as the two authorities pursue their goals independently of each other, a conflict arises that becomes stronger as preferences diverge. We also find that the establishment of a conservative central bank encourages more divergent preferences among the public (as reflected in the government that is elected). The election of more interventionist governments then makes it harder for either authority to reach its own preferred objectives, unless cooperation is possible.     

Hybrid Inflation-Price-Level Targeting in an Economy With Output Persistence

This paper investigates hybrid inflation‐price‐level targeting (HT), employing a Phillips curve with output persistence. By HT we mean that a central bank targets a weighted average of the optimal inflation rate and its corresponding price level. The analysis shows that if output is persistent to some extent, it is desirable to adopt HT because, relative to the case of alternative regimes such as inflation targeting (IT) and price‐level targeting (PT), it will reduce the variability of inflation and thereby social loss. In addition, it is shown that the optimal hybrid‐type target is uniquely determined according to the degree of persistence in output.     

中央银行独立性、收入不平等与通货膨胀--来自中国的实证检验

本文就中国人民银行独立性、收入不平等对通货膨胀的影响机制进行了分析探讨.我们引入中央银行目标函数,对中央银行独立性、收入不平等与通货膨胀间的作用机制进行了模型推理分析.而后我们整合了转型国家中央银行独立性的测度方法,并用此方法对中国人民银行的独立性进行了详细测定.最后,通过计量分析检验了以下结论:收入不平等是引致通货膨胀的一个经验性因素;中央银行独立性越强,越能有效抑制收入不平等引起的通货膨胀.     

On the origin and rise of central bank independence in West Germany∗

Abstract

This paper investigates the (re-)establishment of central banking in West Germany after 1945 and the history of the Bundesbank Act of 1957. The main focus is on the early emphasis on central bank independence, which at the time represented a German peculiarity. The paper inquires whether contemporary German economic thought may have provided a theoretical case for this peculiar tradition and scrutinizes the political calculus that motivated some key actors in the play. Contrary to conventional wisdom, important contradictions between the postulate of central bank independence and Ordoliberalism are identified.

JEL Classification Codes: B22, B31, E50     

中央银行独立性、责任性与通货膨胀目标制

近年来不少学者提出,我国货币政策应转向通货膨胀目标制。我国现行的政策实际上正是一种隐性的通货膨胀目标制,20世纪90年代以来所发生的几次通货膨胀偏倚很大程度上是由于央行的独立性不够。鉴于通货膨胀目标制并不能解决当前我国货币政策调控中的问题并可能带来更多的问题,今后货币政策改革应坚持由直接调控向间接调控、由数量型调控向价格型调控的转变思路,在提高央行独立性的同时,增强其责任性并提高货币政策的透明度。     

How credible is inflation targeting in Asia? A quantile unit root perspective

This article examines the dynamic behavior of the inflation rate for eight Asian countries using a quantile unit root test. We advocate a three-way definition of inflation targeting based on perfect, imperfect and zero credibility and advance the analysis by incorporating a fully-fledged adoption of inflation targeting. In doing so, we offer new insights by showing that the credibility of inflation targeting and the alternative monetary policy frameworks in Asia are imperfect, except for Malaysia and South Korea under a fully-fledged adoption of inflation targeting. In contrast to past studies that focus on the mean-reversion in inflation rates, we also consider trend-reversion and find that Asian inflation targeting countries have been building up their monetary policy credibility more than the non- inflation targeting countries in terms of a faster rate of decline in inflation rate changes. Our results generally indicate the presence of mean reversion at the lower quantiles only. Where stationarity is present, we find evidence of a varied speed of adjustment process across the quantiles. Finally, we determine the threshold levels whereby inflation becomes stationary and demonstrate that Asian inflation rates generally display stationary behavior during periods of inflation declining or slowing down.     

Is central bank conservatism desirable under learning?

In a New Keynesian model, we consider the delegation problem of the government when the central bank optimally sets discretionary monetary policy taking account of private expectations formed through adaptive learning. Learning gives rise to an incentive for the central bank to accommodate less the effect of inflation expectations and cost-push shocks on inflation and induces thus a deviation from rational expectations equilibrium. However, discretionary monetary policy under learning suffers from an excessively low stabilization bias. To improve the social welfare, the government should appoint a liberal central banker, i.e., set a negative optimal inflation penalty that decreases with the value of learning coefficient. The main conclusions are valid under both constant- and decreasing-gain learning.