PIGS or Lambs? The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Role of Rating Agencies

This paper asks whether rating agencies played a passive role or were an active driving force during Europe??s sovereign debt crisis. We address this by estimating relationships between sovereign debt ratings and macroeconomic and structural variables. We then use these equations to decompose actual ratings into systematic and arbitrary components that are not explained by previously observed procedures of rating agencies. Finally, we check whether systematic, as well as arbitrary, parts of credit ratings affect credit spreads. We find that both do affect credit spreads, which opens the possibility that arbitrary rating downgrades trigger processes of self-fulfilling prophecies that may drive even relatively healthy countries towards default.     

Can fiscal rules improve financial market access for developing countries?

A number of countries have introduced fiscal rules to deter fiscal profligacy, enhance the credibility of fiscal policy, and reduce borrowing costs. In this paper, we examine the outcome of fiscal rules in terms of improving financial market access for developing countries. We use entropy balancing and various propensity score matching. We find that the adoption of fiscal rules reduces sovereign bond spreads and increases sovereign debt ratings for a sample of 36 developing countries, which are part of the JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (EMBIG), for the period 1993-2014. We explain this finding by the effect of fiscal rules on the credibility of a country's fiscal policy: more credible governments are rewarded in the international financial markets by low sovereign bond spreads and high sovereign debt ratings. These results are robust to a wide set of alternative specifications. We also show that this favorable effect is sensitive to several country structural characteristics. Our findings confirm that the adoption and sound implementation of fiscal rules is an instrument for policy makers to improve developing countries’ financial market access.     

Evaluating sovereign risk spillovers on domestic banks during the European debt crisis

Using a Markov-switching model with time-varying probabilities, spillovers from sovereign to domestic bank CDS spreads during the European debt crisis for a set of 14 European countries and 30 European banks are investigated. Our model is able to capture how the increased sovereign risk observed between 2010 and 2013 throughout Europe has impacted i) the probability that banks fall into a crisis regime and ii) the probability that banks stay in the crisis regime. The latter state is characterized by a high volatility and large positive returns of CDS spreads. Different regime-dependent indicators have been computed to assess heterogeneity within the region. The evidence indicates that the intensification of sovereign risk observed during the European debt crisis has positively and significantly driven the regime shifts in volatility of the bank CDS spreads due to increased risk aversion. The results show that the increase in sovereign credit risk seems to have generated second-round effects for some banks that have experienced a deterioration in their funding conditions due to a rise in the domestic sovereign default risk. Overall, our results suggest that sovereign CDS spreads can be considered good forewarning indicators for predicting the evolution of bank CDS spreads. We also find that the effects differ depending on the country and the financial institution. This result suggests that banks are heterogeneously exposed to sovereign credit risk within the same country. One argument relates to the size of these financial institutions and the domestic exposure to sovereign debt.     

Mispricing of Risk in Sovereign Bond Markets with Asymmetric Information

The likelihood that a government will repay its sovereign debt depends both on the amount of debt it issues and on the government's future ability to repay. Whilst the former is publicly observable, the government may have more information about the latter than investors. This paper shows that this asymmetric information problem impairs the market's ability to differentiate economies according to their fiscal sustainability, and can lead to a disconnect between bond prices and default risk. The model can help rationalise the behaviour of Eurozone bond prices prior to the recent European sovereign debt crisis.     

The relationship between risk-neutral and actual default probabilities: the credit risk premium

The study investigates empirically the relationship between the risk-neutral measure Q and the real-world measure P. We study the ratio between the risk-neutral and actual default intensities, which we call the coverage ratio or the relative credit risk premium. Actual default intensities are derived from rating agencies annual transition matrices, while risk-neutral default intensities are bootstrapped from CDS quotes of European corporates. We quantify the average risk premium and its changes over time. Compared to related literature, special attention is given to the effects of the recent financial and European sovereign crises. We find that average credit risk premia rose substantially and that post-crisis levels are still higher than those observed before the financial crisis. This observation is especially true for high-quality debt and if it persists, it will have an impact on corporates funding costs. The quantification and revision of risk premia contributes to the discussion of the credit spread puzzle and could give extra insights in valuation models that start from real-world estimates. Our work is furthermore important in the context of state aid assessment. The real economic value (REV) methodology, applied by the European Commission to evaluate impaired portfolios, is based on a long-term average risk premium.     

Sovereign default risk premia,fiscal limits,and fiscal policy

We develop a closed economy model to study the interactions among sovereign risk premia, fiscal limits, and fiscal policy. The fiscal limits, which measure the government's ability to service its debt, arise endogenously from dynamic Laffer curves. The state-dependent distributions of fiscal limits depend on the growth of lump-sum transfers, the size of the government, the degree of countercyclical policy responses, and economic diversity. The country-specific fiscal limits imply that the market perceives the riskiness of sovereign debt issued by different countries to be different, which is consistent with the observation that developed countries are downgraded at different levels of debt. A nonlinear relationship between sovereign risk premia and the level of government debt emerges in equilibrium, which is in line with the empirical evidence that once risk premia begin to rise, they do so rapidly. Nonlinear simulations show that fiscal austerity measures that aim to balance the government budget in the short run fail to contain the default risk premium, even with sizeable cuts in government purchases; but a long-term plan for fiscal reform, if it credibly changes the market's expectation about future fiscal policies, can alleviate the rising risk premium.     

A new test for fiscal sustainability with endogenous sovereign bond yields: Evidence for EU economies

In this paper we develop a new test for fiscal sustainability and propose a synthetic fiscal sustainability indicator. Conventional tests based on fiscal reaction functions assume a constant real interest rate. However, many empirical studies find evidence on a positive response of long-term rates to sovereign debt levels. We take this evidence into account and endogenize the long-term real interest rate in testing fiscal sustainability. We apply the new test for the European economies. We find that considering the response of interest rate to debt may change the assessment of fiscal sustainability. More specifically, our results indicate that fiscal sustainability is at risk in a number of European Union economies, even if the results of traditional approaches suggest sustainable fiscal policy.     

European policy and markets: Did policy initiatives stem the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area?

We investigate how European policy initiatives influenced market assessments of sovereign default risk and banking sector fragility during the sovereign debt crisis in four adversely affected countries — Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy. We focus on three broad groups of policies: (a) ECB policy actions (monetary and financial support), (b) EU programs (financial and fiscal rules as well as financial support in crisis countries), and (c) domestic austerity programs. We measure immediate market impact effects: what policies changed risk perceptions, using CDS spreads on sovereign bonds and banks in this assessment. We employ dynamic panel and event study methodologies in the empirical work. We find that a number of programs initially stabilized sovereign and bank bond markets (e.g. Outright Monetary Transactions program), although announcement and implementation impacts on markets differed in some cases (e.g. second Covered Market Bond Program). Actions designed to shore up sovereign markets often lowered risk assessments in bank bond markets and policies designed to ensure safety and soundness of the European banking system in some cases significantly impacted sovereign debt markets. Finally, a number of policies designed to stabilize markets had surprisingly little immediate impact on either sovereign or bank bond market risk assessments.     

Debt Crises and Risk‐Sharing: The Role of Markets versus Sovereigns

Using a variance decomposition of shocks to gross domestic product (GDP), we quantify the role of international factor income, international transfers, and saving in achieving risk‐sharing during the recent European crisis. We focus on the subperiods 1990–2007, 2008–2009, and 2010 and consider separately the European countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. We decompose risk‐sharing from saving into contributions from government and private saving, and show that fiscal austerity programs played an important role in hindering risk‐sharing during the sovereign debt crisis.     

国家主权信用评级、跨国传染与股票市场回应?--基于全球48个经济体的事件研究

掌握主权信用评级变动的市场影响及其传染机制,对于投资者、国家金融安全及政府采取应对措施来说都意义重大。文章采用事件研究法,以1990-2013年全球48个经济体发生的评级事件和每日股指收益率数据为样本,实证研究了事件国评级变动对非事件国股票市场的影响及其传染渠道,结果表明：(1)评级下调会对股票市场产生显著为负的超额收益,但评级上调产生的超额收益不显著;(2)股票市场可以提前预测评级下调事件,但不能预测评级上调事件;(3)季风效应对评级调整的市场传染有一定的解释力;(4)净传染效应基本不显著,这说明评级事件的市场传染应该有经济基础,而不是由投资者心理预期这类非基本面因素造成的;(5)溢出效应可以较好地解释评级的市场传染,是评级变动影响市场及传染的主要渠道。文章的结论深化了我们对评级调整如何影响股票市场及其传染渠道的认识,也为中国防范国外主权信用评级变动风险提供了有益启示。     

“欧洲学期”:欧盟改善经济治理的重要一步

主权债务危机充分暴露出欧盟内部经济治理方面的体制性缺陷,也让成员国看到深化欧盟内部融合、增进财政预算和宏观经济政策协调的必要性。"欧洲学期"就是欧盟在债务危机恶化之际推出的一项重大改革举措,是完善欧盟经济治理的重要内容。因此,对这一机制的研究显得尤为必要。本文从"欧洲学期"机制的框架内容、创新之处、存在的问题、实施现状和预期政策效应等方面着手,试图对其做出较为客观全面的剖析,并给出初步的评价。     

Do sovereign rating announcements affect emerging market exchange rate correlations? A multivariate DCC-GARCH approach

This article investigates the effects of sovereign credit rating announcements on time-varying exchange rate return correlations for a sample of 11 emerging market countries over the period 2002–2015. The data set covers daily exchange rates and long-term foreign currency sovereign ratings, outlooks and watch list. The pairwise time-varying correlations are derived by corrected Dynamic Conditional Correlation (cDCC) modelling which is a member of multivariate Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models family. Furthermore, to capture the global factor effect, a dynamic-weighted index is created by using dynamic principal component (DPC) analysis. Findings suggest that some of the emerging market exchange rate co-movements are affected by rating announcements. Upgrades of Moody’s and downgrades of Fitch lead to spillovers. Main source of these spillovers are sovereign credit rating changes of European countries, especially Czech Republic and Turkey. Countries with high amount of external debt, large current account deficit and speculative grade are more prone to be influenced by announcements on a foreign country’s long-term sovereign rating.     

Political and Fiscal Risk Determinants of Sovereign Spreads in Emerging Markets

Using a panel of 46 emerging market economies from 1997 to 2008, this paper investigates the key determinants of country risk premiums as measured by sovereign bond spreads. Unlike previous studies, the results indicate that both political and fiscal factors matter for credit risk in emerging markets. Lower levels of political risk are associated with tighter spreads, particularly during financial turmoil. Efforts at fiscal consolidation narrow credit spreads, especially in countries with high initial public debt levels. The composition of fiscal policy also matters as higher public investment lowers spreads as long as the fiscal position remains sustainable and the fiscal deficit does not worsen.     

Cross-country fiscal policy spillovers and capital-skill complementarity in integrated capital markets

The 2010 European sovereign debt crisis has renewed discussions on fiscal policy coordination. One rationale for coordination is fiscal policy cross-country spillovers. A common finding in the literature is that spillovers tend to be small in normal circumstances but can be large if monetary policy is at the zero lower bound. Orthogonal to the existing literature, we document a novel channel that generates cross-country spillovers over the medium run. We assume perfect capital markets integration and find that capital-skill complementarity can lead to large spillovers without the zero lower bound nor a large import share in government expenditures. As capital markets have become increasingly integrated in the Eurozone, the current degree of fiscal policy coordination between its members, low, may be insufficient. We also find that the smoothing benefits from a temporary rise in public debt spill over to other countries.     

Fundamentals and Sovereign Risk of Emerging Markets

We empirically assess the relative importance of various economic fundamentals in accounting for the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads of emerging markets during 2004–2012, which encompasses the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. Inflation, state fragility, external debt and commodity terms of trade volatility were positively associated, while trade openness and a more favourable fiscal balance/GDP ratio were negatively associated with sovereign CDS spreads. Yet the relative importance of economic fundamentals in the pricing of sovereign risk varies over time. The key factors are trade openness and state fragility in the pre‐crisis period, the external debt/GDP ratio and inflation in the crisis period, and inflation and the public debt/GDP ratio in the post‐crisis period. Asian countries enjoy lower sovereign spreads than Latin American countries, and this gap widened during and after the crisis. Trade openness was the biggest factor behind Asia's lower sovereign spreads before the crisis, and inflation during and after the crisis. The results imply that external factors were paramount in pricing sovereign risk prior to the crisis, but internal factors associated with the capacity to adjust to adverse shocks gained prominence during and after the crisis.     

The democratic (dis)advantage: The conditional impact of democracy on credit risk and sovereign default

Many have argued that democracies are able to make credible commitments to repay their debts and consequently enjoy higher sovereign credit ratings. In contrast to this expectation, I argue that the advantage of democracies in credit ratings is conditional on the countries' level of financial vulnerability and adjustment needs. Because democracies have more diffuse decision-making and are more accountable to the public, they encounter greater difficulty than autocracies in passing unpopular economic adjustment measures. Thus, I argue that democracies with high debt levels and low foreign reserve assets experience worse credit outcomes, whereas democracies with low vulnerability experience more positive outcomes. In a sample of up to 96 developing countries, I show that democracies have worse credit ratings and CDS Spreads and are more likely to default than their autocratic counterparts when foreign reserves are low relative to external debt. Notably, I also show that large debt burdens increase credit risk mainly in more democratic countries. I further test the causal pathway of the democratic advantage by constructing democracy scores of “market-friendly” and “adjustment-difficulty” democracy, finding that democracy worsens debt outcomes due to adjustment difficulty. These findings help to revise and clarify the causal logic surrounding the democratic advantage hypothesis.     

Effects of Eurobonds: A stochastic sovereign debt sustainability analysis for Portugal,Ireland and Greece

This paper assesses the impact of Eurobonds on sovereign debt dynamics for selected European member states (Greece, Ireland and Portugal). For each member state, we produce sovereign debt fan charts of (i) a baseline scenario (no Eurobonds) and (ii) a Full-Fledged Eurobond introduction. The key building blocks of our methodology are (i) a debt framework (which embeds the traditional recursive debt equation), (ii) a vector autoregressive model to take into account and parametrise macroeconomic uncertainty and (iii) a fiscal reaction function. Conditional on the absence of moral hazard, we find Eurobonds to be a good instrument to absorb macroeconomic shocks and to diminish uncertainty over future debt forecasts; for Ireland and Portugal, we find debt to be 20 percentage points lower than under our baseline scenario, by 2020.     

Fiscal adjustment and the costs of public debt service: evidence from OECD countries

We use a panel of 21 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009 to investigate the effects of different fiscal adjustment strategies on long-term interest rates – a key fiscal indicator reflecting the costs of government debt service. As Europe’s sovereign debt crisis has shown, governments confronted with high deficits and rising debt may be forced to enact fiscal adjustments in order to avoid increasing market pressure and solvency problems. Over the last four decades, such measures taken by governments in OECD countries have varied in duration, size, composition and in their success to re-establish fiscal sustainability. We find that large and expenditure-based adjustments lead to substantially lower long-term interest rates. Small and revenue-based measures do not have an effect on interest rates. Financial markets thus only seem to value strict and decisive measures – a clear sign that the government’s pledge to cut the deficit is credible.     

INCOME DISTRIBUTION, SOVEREIGN DEBT, AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT

We develop a political economy model of sovereign debt that shows that income inequality leads to popular pressures on the government to use foreign debt to finance a redistribution of income at the expense of productive public investment. Recognizing this fact, international lenders impose credit ceilings with the consequence that developing country borrowers invest less and grow slower.     

Modelling sovereign credit ratings: The accuracy of models in a heterogeneous sample

The accuracy of sovereign credit ratings renewed interest toward sovereign credit ratings in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The controversy over the accuracies encouraged internal credit scoring systems to reduce reliance on sovereign credit ratings. By employing classification and regression trees (CART), multilayer perceptron (MLP), support vector machines (SVM), Bayes Net, and Naïve Bayes; we explore the prediction performance of several artificial intelligence (AI) techniques in predicting sovereign credit ratings in a heterogeneous sample. The results suggest that AI classifiers outperform the conventional statistical technique in terms of accurate prediction. According to within one notch and two notches accurate prediction measure, the prediction performances of the AI classifiers exceed 90% accuracy whereas the performance of the conventional statistical method is around 70%. The results further reveal that the prediction performance of the models declines around the threshold rating that is located between investment grade and speculative grade which is not necessarily the result of inadequacy of the models. Rather, this is potentially due to CRAs' cautious behaviour toward those countries around threshold rating which can be interpreted as the certification price of upgrading to investment grade.