中美风险投资介入中小企业公司治理过程的对比分析

随着深圳创业板的推出,我国风险投资业再一次迎来了发展的高峰。美国作为风险投资这种新型融资方式的发源地,被世界公认为风险投资业最为成熟,发展最为成功。本文通过对比中美风险投资介入中小企业公司治理的过程,找出其中的异同,结论显示我国风险投资参与中小企业公司治理时选择的介入方式和途径还较为单一,一些有效的监管策略运用尚不成熟,这说明我国风险投资业还需要很大的完善。     

风险投资对我国中小企业IPO情况及成长性的影响探究——基于深圳证券交易所中小板上市公司数据的实证分析

本文以深圳证券交易所中小板2013年上市的203家公司为研究对象,对风险投资的介入与否在IPO情况和成长性方面对我国中小企业的影响进行了实证研究。研究结果显示,有风险投资背景的企业在IPO情况方面与无风险投资背景企业存在显著差异,而在公司成长性方面的差异并不显著。这表明如今在我国,风险投资的注资及其所带来的增值服务并未给被投资企业带来更好地发展。     

风险投资异质性、公司治理机制与企业IPO前盈余管理

本文以2008~2014年在深圳中小板上市的202家有风险投资参与的IPO公司为研究样本,考察风险投资参与公司治理及其背景异质性对被投资企业IPO前盈余管理的影响.实证检验表明,风险投资机构持股比例及向企业派出董事比例对风险企业IPO前盈余管理无显著影响,但是向风险企业派出专业董事比例与IPO前盈余管理显著负相关.进一步区分不同背景风险投资的研究发现,政府背景风险投资向企业派出董事、 专业董事及其持股比例有助于减轻企业IPO前盈余管理程度,但是上述研究结果并未出现在独立背景风险投资和企业背景风险投资中.尽管风险投资普遍成为一种外部治理机制,但是其治理能力和效果却受到不同制度环境的制约与影响,这为进一步完善风险投资环境提供了经验证据.     

风险投资能够有效缓解企业融资约束吗?——基于企业社会资本中介效应的分析

融资约束是制约中小企业发展的主要因素,风险投资通常被认为是最适合中小企业的融资模式之一.文章分析了风险投资对企业融资约束的影响,以及风险投资通过企业社会资本缓解企业融资约束的作用机理.运用深圳中小板2009年至2014年数据,实证检验风险投资对被投资企业融资约束的影响及其作用机制.实证结果表明,风险投资能够缓解被投资企业的融资约束,企业社会资本在其中起到了中介作用,即风险投资通过增强企业社会资本缓解了被投资企业的融资约束.     

加快我国风险投资业发展的若干对策

一、风险投资的融资渠道 现阶段我国风险投资的资金绝大部分来源于政府和银行政策性贷款.鉴于财政收入少和大量赤字压力,今后再依靠政府用大量财政收入进行风险投资是不现实的;同时,由于目前我国的银行不良资产比例较高,承受风险能力有限,再大比例增加对风险企业的融资困难较大.在这种情况下,要获得大量资金支持风险投资业的发展就必须扩大风险投资的融资渠道.一般来讲,风险融资渠道除了政府资助、银行贷款外,还包括个人投资、大企业投资、各种共同基金和国外风险资本.但考虑到政府资本的介入对我国尚处于起步阶段的风险投资业发展非常有利;我国富有阶层人士的投资意识差、资金尚不雄厚且缺乏冒险精神,目前还不具备个人和家庭单独进行风险投资的条件;国有企业的负债率高达80%,其中有40%的企业已资不抵债,即使是盈利的企业,其利润率也不高,企业实力决定它们不可能进行大规模的风险投资等因素,目前比较可行的扩大风险投资融资渠道的措施是大力发展多方投入、风险共担的风险投资基金和积极吸收国外风险投资基金以及国家利用部分资源启动风险投资.具体来讲:     

大公司参与风险投资的动机与模式

本文分析了大公司参与风险投资的动机及介入风险投资的模式。大公司介入风险投资除受高额利润回报率吸引外,一些在行业内处于领先地位的、实力雄厚的大公司更多出于自身长远发展的战略动机介入风险投资。大公司参与风险投资的模式主要有独资成立、发起控股、及参与持股三种方式。此类大公司背景风险投资机构能帮助新创企业获得行业战略资源,但也可能由于过于追求自身利益阻碍新创企业发展。本文建议大公司参与风险投资时应量力而行,并依据自身经济实力及参与动机,选择适合的参与模式。此外,监管当局应鼓励大公司投资于与自身主营业务存在协同效应的新创企业,促进产业升级与经济增长。     

构建以信息平台为依托的合伙制中介组织——促进我国风险投资业的发展

风险投资在我国的发展时间不长,如何在我国现有的法律框架下,找到风险投资的最佳组织形式；如何积极引导私人资本、民间资本介入风险投资,扩大风险资金来源,是当前我国风险投资业面临的重大课题。本文拟从我国现有的风险投资业的组织架构入手,对设立合伙制风险投资管理事务所的必要性和可行性进行论证,并在解决此问题的基础上提出构建信息平台,以促进我国风险投资业的发展。     

企业发展过程中的法律风险防范——以风险投资为例

风险投资是一种高风险、高收益的投资,在我国现阶段.风险投资适合什么产业?进行风险投资面临哪些技术及法律风险?企业能否在投资协议中约定风险投资者的优先权?如何通过完善公司治型结构来降低投资风险?针对这些疑问,本文对企业发展过程中的风险投资法律风险防范进行了研究。全文首先对企业发展过程中的风险投资法律风险防范的典型案例进行了分析,然后以此分析了企业发展过程中的风险投资法律风险,最后提出了企业发展过程中的风险投资的法律风险防范对策。     

风险投资与中小企业业绩关系研究

本文首先对风险投资的概念进行界定,然后对风险投资的发展现状进行介绍,最后对风险投资和中小企业业绩的关系进行研究分析,结果表明:风险投资介入与支持能够显著提高中小企业业绩水平;公司治理在风险投资对中小企业业绩的正向关系中存在中介作用。     

中国风险投资业的几个误区

着眼于我国风险投资业的现状,客观分析了易使人们对风险投资产生错误认识和概念偏差的几个方面,包括风险投资对高科技产业的影响;风险资本家与科技企业家的关系,风险投资的退出与创业板的建立以及风险投资对改善公司治理结构的贡献,以求对风险投资有全面的认识。     

Structuring deals and governance after the IPO: Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in high tech start-ups

In an effort to better understand the effects of venture capital investment on selected firm governance and financing structures, we examined the post-IPO experiences of 190 biotechnology and healthcare firms (see appendix). Our study revealed that in virtually all cases, the involvement of venture capitalists reduced the role of the founder-entrepreneur in strategic decision making. This was illustrated by the larger proportion of outside directors when venture capitalists invested and the smaller proportion of entrepreneurs who remained officers or in board positions after the IPO. We also found that venture capitalists rarely invested alone, and preferred to structure deals in which venture capital partners share both risks and rewards.     

中小企业治理、治理指数与企业绩效

本文设计了中小企业治理评价指标体系,并对100家县域中小企业的治理状况进行了评价,结果显示中小企业治理指数平均值仅为33.57。实证分析表明,中小企业治理指数不能够显著解释每股收益和净资产收益率;同时也发现,第一大股东持股比例、董事会是否设立、总经理薪酬结构等对企业绩效也没有显著的影响,中小企业治理结构与机制的建立仅仅是形式上所为,最后据此给出提升中小企业治理水平的政策建议。     

The board and strategy: Venture capital and high technology

In the area of strategy formulation, the part played by the board of directors in high technology firms operating with funds provided by venture capital organizations has not been investigated before. This exploratory study, although based on a limited sample, looks at some of the fundamental issues and contrasts the involvement of the board in firms of this kind with very limited involvement of the board in small conventional firms and in large publicly-held corporations. The relative power of management and the board of directors is of great importance. In contrast with the small conventional firm and the large corporation, in both of which the Chief Executive Officer is usually in firm control of the board and generally does not look to the board for active involvement in strategy formulation, the high-technology firms funded by venture capital organizations are characterized by a board of directors that has high power relative to management. This power can be understood not only in terms of the “power of the purse” (high concentration of the ownership in hands external to management), but also in terms of the expertise of the venture capitalists and their access to important networks.The business plan which is a key element in obtaining initial funding is in effect a statement of strategy that is carefully scrutinized by the venture capitalists, some of whom will assume positions on the board of directors. The board is similarly involved in the revisions of business plans in conjunction with later rounds of funding.The study found that the board is typically small, with outsiders rather than management in control; further, at least some of the outside members were found to have a high degree of expertise and a close working relationship with management. Board meetings are frequent and deal actively with key issues and with the review of how the strategy is working and what changes in strategy may be required. Reviews of the business plan when a new round of funding is required or when major new product or marketing decisions are needed are examples of likely occasions for involvement of the board in strategy revisions.Further research should center on identifying the conditions under which board involvement can play a constructive role in the strategy process of these high technology companies. Some pertinent variables are suggested. The next step in research should be more structured and quantitative and should use a geographically dispersed sample, but field interviews will be of continuing value as a complement.For firms funded by venture capital organizations, the board of directors is a significant interface between the venture capitalists and the internal management group. The working relationship between inside and outside directors in this arena, in strategy formulation and in other major business decisions, is a matter of considerable practical importance.     

风险投资组织形式与治理结构的有效性分析

风险投资组织形式和治理结构直接决定和影响风险投资效率。一种有效的风险投资组织形式其治理结构应解决的两个基本问题:激励约束机制问题和选择、监督的成本与效率问题。用三种不同组织形式治理结构效率的比较和有限合伙制为什么成为美国风险投资主流的分析,为我国各地兴起的风险投资及其组织形式提供借鉴。     

风险投资系统结构分析

随着深交所中小企业板块的设立,我国风险投资将会得到快速的发展。通过对风险投资系统结构的分析,揭示了风险投资系统结构由风险投资要素子系统、风险投资主体子系统、风险投资客体子系统的组成。     

Ethnic matching in the U.S. venture capital market

We document the role of entrepreneurial founder and venture capital (VC) partner co-ethnicity in shaping investment relationships. Co-ethnicity increases the likelihood that a VC firm invests in a company. Conditional on investment, co-ethnicity strengthens the degree of involvement by raising the likelihood of VC board of director involvement and increasing the size and scope of investment. These results are consistent with trust and social-network based mechanisms. Shared ethnicity in our sample is associated with worse investment outcomes as measured by investment liquidity, however, which our results suggest might stem from looser screening and/or corporate governance.     

风险投资、管理层过度自信与企业并购溢价

现有研究多关注管理层过度自信所带来的一系列“后果”，对影响管理层过度自信的“前因”研究较为鲜见，这种“头重脚轻”式的不对称式研究对深入理解管理层过度自信造成了障碍。文章以2012-2017年我国创业板上市企业完成的并购事件为研究样本，从并购视角出发，研究了风险投资对管理层过度自信的影响及其带来的并购后果。结果发现，风险投资能够显著抑制并购活动中管理层的过度自信行为，而抑制管理层过度自信在风险投资降低并购溢价过程中发挥了重要的中介效应，上述作用在民营企业或风险投资派驻了董事的企业中更为显著。进一步分析显示，在考虑了风险投资与管理层过度自信之间的反向因果关系、风险投资这一“外部”监督角色和企业董事会治理这一“内部”监督角色的交互影响对结论可能产生的影响后，上述结论仍显著成立。     

CEO任期、董事会治理与绩效强制变更敏感性

本文以2010-2014年我国沪深A股主板上市公司以及在此期间的1341例CEO变更事件为初始研究样本,采用Logit模型和OLS模型研究CEO任期对公司绩效与CEO强制变更敏感性的影响,并从董事会治理视角,进一步说明敏感性发生变化的原因。研究发现,任期是识别CEO能力的重要标识,随着CEO任期逐渐延长,绩效与CEO强制变更的敏感性、以及董事会的监督力度均显著降低,董事会治理机制能够反映股东监督CEO并获取相关信息的需求。     

股权分置改革对上市公司治理优化的影响研究

股权分置的制度缺陷导致了上市公司治理缺乏共同的利益基础,扭曲了资本市场发挥作用的机理。股权分置改革有利于上市公司逐步形成共同的治理基础。从股权分置改革对上市公司治理优化的影响关系框架可以看出,指出股权分置改革通过上市公司股东行为、董事会作用及经营者激励约束机制等内部治理因素和资本市场定价机制、控制权市场并购重组机制及监督约束机制等外部治理因素影响着上市公司整体治理的优化,从而使后股权分置时代促进上市公司治理优化。     

The CEO,venture capitalists,and the board

An element in the never-ending debate about the process of funding highpotential businesses is the extent to which venture capitalists add value besides money to their portfolio companies. At one end of the spectrum, venture capitalists incubate start-ups and nurture hatchlings, while at the other extreme, so-called “vulture” capitalists feed on fledgling companies. A very important way in which venture capitalists add value other than money to their portfolio companies is by serving on boards of directors. Hence, by studying the role of outside directors, especially those representing venture capital firms, we were able to shed light on the issue of value-added.In the first phase of the research, we studied 162 venture-capital-backed high-tech firms located in California, Massachusetts, and Texas. In the second phase (with data from 98 of the 162 firms), the lead venture capitalists on the boards were classified according to whether or not they were a “top-20” firm.Board Size The average board size was 5.6 members, which was somewhat less than half the size of the board of a typical large company. Board size increased from 3 to 4.8 members with the first investment of venture capital.Board Composition and Control The typical board comprised 1.7 inside members, 2.3 venture capital principals, .3 venture capital staff, and 1.3 other outsiders. Insiders constituted 40% or less of the members of 82% of the boards, while venture capitalists made up over 40% of members of 55% of the boards. When a top-20 venture capital firm was the lead investor, then 55% of the board members were venture capitalists; in contrast, when the lead was not a top-20 firm, only 23% of board were venture capitalists.Value-Added Overall, our sample of CEOs did not rate the value of the advice of venture capitalists any higher than that of other board members. However, those CEOs with a top20 venture capital firm as the lead investor, on average, did rate the value of the advice from their venture capital board members significantly higher—but not outstandingly higher—than the advice from other outside board members. On the other hand, CEOs with no top-20 as the lead investor found no significant difference between the value of the advice from venture capitalists and other outside board members. Hence, in our sample, we could not say that there was a noticeable difference in the value of valueadded by top-20 boards and non-top-20 boards.The areas where CEOs rated outside board members (both venture capitalists and others) most helpful were as a sounding board, interfacing with the investor group, monitoring operating performance, monitoring financial performance, recruiting/replacing the CEO, and assistance with short term crisis. That help was rated higher for early-stage than later-stage companies.Our findings have the following implications for venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and researchers.Venture Capitalist The main product of a venture capital firm is money, which is a commodity. It's impossible to differentiate a commodity in a martetplace where the customers have perfect information. As venture capitalists learned since the mid-1980s, their customers (entrepreneurs) now have an abundance of information that, while it may not be perfect, is certainly good enough to make a well-informed decision when selecting a venture capital firm. Hence, value-added may be the most important distinctive competence with which a venture capital firm—especially one specializing in early-stage investments—can differentiate itself from its competitors. If that is the case, then venture capital firms need to pay more attention to their value-added, because CEOs, overall, do not perceive that it has a great deal of value to their companies. The top-20 appear to be doing a somewhat better job in that area than other venture capital firms.Entrepreneurs If an entrepreneur wants outside board members who bring valueadded other than money, it appears that they can do as well with non-venture capitalists as with venture capitalists. The entrepreneurs we talked to in our survey gave the impression that board members with significant operating experience are more valued than “pure” financial types with no operating experience. If venture capital is an entrepreneur's only source offunding, then the entrepreneur should seek out firms that put venture capitalists with operating experience on boards. It also appears that an entrepreneur, will, on average, get more value-added when the lead investor is a top-20 firm, but there is a drawback: when a top-20 is the lead investor, it is more likely that venture capitalists will control the board. No entrepreneur should seek venture capital solely to get value-added from a venture capitalist on the board, because outside board members who are not venture capitalists give advice that is every bit as good as that given by venture capitalists.Researchers Value-added is a fruitful avenue of research. From a practical perspective, if valueadded exists it should be measurable. So far the jury has not decided that issue. Some finance studies of the performance of venture-capital-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) claim to have found valueadded, some claim to have found none, and at least one study claims to have found negative value- added. From a theoretical perspective, value-added is relevant to agency theory, transaction cost economics, and the capital asset pricing model. It also is relevant to strategic analysis from the viewpoint of distinctive competencies.