Sugden’s critique of Sen’s capability approach and the dangers of libertarian paternalism

The force of Sugden’s critique of Sen’s capability approach depends on the interpretation of the approach adopted. It is persuasive when public reasoning about what is good (or best) for people can justify policies which promote opportunity through (potentially objectionable) restrictions on liberty. Sunstein’s discussion of preference formation and politics shares key elements of Sen’s views. His proposals for democratic controls illustrate the potential danger Sugden signals about application of the capability approach. Sugden is also critical of paternalist views inspired by the findings of behavioural economics. One of these—Sunstein and Thaler’s ‘libertarian paternalism’—is a worrying extension of Sunstein’s earlier views and opens the door to a much wider range of interventions. Sugden rightly and forcefully resists it. His critique of the capability approach may, by contrast, be better seen as sounding a cautionary note than as an act of resistance.     

‘Regular’ choice and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference

We explore the relation between two ‘rationality conditions’ for stochastic choice behavior: regularity and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference (WASRP). We show that WASRP implies regularity, but the converse is not true. We identify a restriction on the domain of the stochastic choice function, which suffices for regularity to imply WASRP. When the universal set of alternatives is finite, this restriction is also necessary for regularity to imply WASRP. Furthermore, we identify necessary and sufficient domain restrictions for regularity to imply WASRP, when the universal set of alternatives is finite and stochastic choice functions are all degenerate. Results in the traditional, deterministic, framework regarding the relation between Chernoff’s condition and the weak axiom of revealed preference follow as special cases. Thus, general conditions are established, under which regularity can substitute for WASRP as the axiomatic foundation for a theory of choice behavior.     

The firm-level employment effects of innovations in high-tech US manufacturing industries

We focus on four two-digit manufacturing industries that are known for their high patenting activity. We then use Principal Components Analysis to generate a firm- and year-specific ‘innovativeness’ index by extracting the common variance in a firm’s patenting and R&D expenditure histories. To begin with, we explore the heterogeneity of firms by using semi-parametric quantile regression. We then move on to parametric regressions that include a weighted least squares (WLS) analysis, which explicitly takes into account the different job-creating potential of firms of different sizes. As a result, we investigate the effect of innovation on total number of jobs, whereas previous studies have focused on the effect of innovation on firm behavior. Indeed, previous studies have typically taken the firm as the unit of analysis, implicitly weighting each firm equally according to the principle of ‘one firm equals one observation’. Our results suggest that firm-level innovative activity leads to employment creation that may have been underestimated in previous studies.     

Pareto and contemporary economic theory

This paper provides explanations for Pareto’s apparently contradictory approach to demand theory in simultaneously insisting that measurability of utility is not needed to explain the equilibrium of consumers in competitive markets, and embracing concavifiability and thus measurability of utility when this implies restrictions on consumers’ behavior such as the law of demand. It also treats his method of calibrating an aggregate demand function by employing his law of income distribution, so as to reproduce “Gregory King’s law”. Finally, some disputed issues are dealt with concerning the nature of Pareto’s contributions to welfare economics. (JEL: B13, D11, D60).     

Fertility, female labor force participation, and the demographic dividend

We estimate the effect of fertility on female labor force participation in a panel of countries using abortion legislation as an instrument for fertility. We find that removing legal restrictions on abortion significantly reduces fertility and estimate that, on average, a birth reduces a woman’s labor supply by almost 2 years during her reproductive life. Our results imply that behavioral change, in the form of increased female labor supply, contributes significantly to economic growth during the demographic transition when fertility declines.      

Alertness, local knowledge, and Johnny Appleseed

Anderson and Hill argue that property rights entrepreneurs, driven by non-replicable Kirznerian alertness, identify unowned and unpriced attributes of a resource and capture rents to those resources by limiting access to them. I argue that alertness is non-replicable, but it is also not random. Kirzner’s analytical framework emphasizes an individual’s local knowledge and subjective interpretative schema. Incorporating these concepts and emphasizing two types of local knowledge, about social and commercial conditions, explains why some people are alert to profit opportunities and others are not. This implies that economic restrictions are more detrimental to entrepreneurship than previously understood. I provide evidence by examining Johnny Appleseed’s successful nursery business.     

Pricing inputs to induce efficient Make-or-Buy decisions

We investigate input pricing regimes that induce efficient Make-or-Buy decisions by entrants when there is constant returns in the production of the input(s) and simultaneous noncooperative price competition in downstream retail markets. Necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient Make-or-Buy decisions are derived. The necessary condition shows that input prices are relevant for Make-or-Buy decisions except under restrictive and often unverifiable assumptions on the demand structure, and that the least informationally-demanding way to ensure efficient Make-or-Buy decisions is to price inputs at marginal cost provided changes in the entrant’s cost have a “normal” effect on the entrant’s profit. The conditions also show that pricing the incumbent’s input at the entrant’s marginal cost always ensures efficient Make- or-Buy decisions. The extent to which input prices can depart from marginal cost while still inducing efficient Make-or-Buy decisions increases with the efficiency differential between the incumbent and entrant and with the demand displacement ratio.      

Aggregation under homogeneous ambiguity: a two-fund separation result

Contrary to the common prior model, the construction of a representative agent whose preferences follow the multiple-priors model (1989) requires strong restrictions on sets of priors and on an aggregate endowment process if we permit a large deviation among agents’ degrees of risk aversion. This paper shows that if agents’ felicity functions belong to a family of linear risk tolerance functions with the same marginal risk tolerance, the representative agent always exists at an interior equilibrium without such restrictions, and two-fund separation holdsI am grateful to a referee and to participants at the conference, Uncertainty in Economic Theory, held at Yale University (October 2004) for their valuable comments and suggestions     

The World of Regulatory Influence

Models of firms’ influence over the regulatory agencies that oversee them have traditionally been constrained by several factors, including a lack of direct measures of “influence,” an inability to account for variations in the institutional environment within which firms operate, and a nearly singular focus on industry-level measures of interest group strengths. In this paper, we employ a global database and novel measures to provide a fresh look at the determinants of firms’ influence over regulatory agencies. We find that in addition to traditional industry-level determinants, important country-level institutional and firm-level determinants affect firms’ regulatory agency influence. We also find that regulatory process variations affect firms’ influence over regulators. With these empirical estimates in hand, we generate a Regulatory Influence Index that ranks influence levels of typical firms that operate in each sample country in the dataset, and then discuss the substantial country-level variation in regulatory agency influence that obtains.     

An evolutionary edge of knowing less (or: On the ‘curse’ of global information)

Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his two adjacent neighbors. The trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma ‘rule of engagement.’ A farmer’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the two prisoner’s dilemma games played with his two neighbors. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son decides whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous members of the group comprising his own father and a set of his father’s neighbors. The size of this set, which can vary, is termed the ‘span of information.’ It is shown that a larger span of information can be detrimental to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection, and that in well-defined circumstances, a large span of information leads to an end of cooperation, whereas a small span does not. Conditions are outlined under which, when individuals’ optimization is based on the assessment of less information, the social outcome is better than when optimization is based on an assessment of, and a corresponding response to, more information.     

In search of an evolutionary edge: trading with a few, more, or many

Consider a population of farmers who live around a lake. Each farmer engages in trade with his m adjacent neighbors, where m is termed the “span of interaction.” Trade is governed by a prisoner’s dilemma “rule of engagement.” A farmer’s payoff is the sum of the payoffs from the m prisoner’s dilemma games played with his ^m/₂^m/_2 neighbors to the left, and with his ^m/₂^m/_2 neighbors to the right. When a farmer dies, his son takes over. The son who adheres to his father’s span of interaction decides whether to cooperate or defect by considering the actions taken and the payoffs received by the most prosperous member of the group comprising his father and his father’s m trading partners. Under a conventional structure of payoffs, it is shown that a large span of interaction is detrimental to the long-run coexistence of cooperation and defection, and conditions are provided under which the social outcome associated with the expansion of trade when individuals trade with a few is better than that when they trade with many. Under the stipulated conditions it is shown, by means of a static comparative analysis of the steady state configurations of the farmer population, that an expansion of the market can be beneficial in one context, detrimental in another.     

Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion

In this paper, we show that loopholes in EU emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product markets. The abuses originate from the covert misuse of EU emissions trading institutions, such as pooling or project-based mechanisms. We analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish output restrictions, even if those firms are price takers on the~permit market (which might actually be the case for the majority of obligated firms in the EU). The identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms’ profits, decreases the consumers’ surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges. Consequently, public authorities should not allow emissions trading’s overall good reputation—based upon its efficient abatement of pollution—to blind them to options in European emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition.      

The directions of FDI and the self-intensifying expectations of the exchange rate and the effectiveness of sterilized intervention

In this paper, we develop the Renminbi’s dynamic model to analyze the relationship between the flow directions of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the exchange rate’s expectations on the basis of distinguishing the real interest rate from the desired interest rate. We find that the exchange rate expectation has a self-intensifying mechanism, which could have a reverse effect on the country’s macroeconomic stabilization. We discuss the issue on how expectation impacts the macro economy and then analyze the conditions of successful intervention, which is helpful for policy management. __________ Translated from the The Journal of World Economy (世界经济), 2005, (7) (in Chinese)     

Keynes and Wagner on government expenditures and economic development: the case of a developing economy

This paper investigates the Keynesian view and the Wagner’s Law on the role of public expenditure on economic growth for Malaysia (1970–2004). The empirical results using the Auto-Regression Distributed Lag (ARDL) model and the ‘bounds test’ (Pesaran et al. in J Appl Econ 16:289–326, 2001) showed evidence of a long run relationship between total expenditures (including expenditures on defense, education, development and agriculture) and Gross National Product. The results also show that with the structural break in 1998, the long run causality is bi-directional for GNP and expenditures on administration and health, supporting both Keynes view and Wagner’s Law. For all other expenditure categories the long run causality runs from GNP to the expenditures, which supports Wagner’s Law. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Schumpeter’s ‘conduct model of the dynamic entrepreneur’: scope and distinctiveness

Schumpeter formulated a ‘conduct model’ of entrepreneurial behaviour. Received wisdom has emphasised the economic functions of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur, neglecting behavioural aspects. Schumpeter’s model is examined; it posits a continuum of behaviours which are ‘entrepreneurial’, that rely on socially situated, tacit knowledge and are expressions of conscious, subjective rationality. Schumpeter’s model excluded unconscious optimisation and decision rules derived from bounded rationality. Comparisons are drawn with modern neoclassical, Austrian, and the older behavioural characterisations of entrepreneurial behaviour. The newer ‘effectuation’ model of entrepreneurial behaviour is also contrasted with Schumpeter’s approach. We find, among other things, that modern Schumpeterian economics associated with Nelson and Winter is not a natural continuation of Schumpeter’s model. However, some developments in neo-Schumpeterian economics, including the effectuation model deriving from the older behavioural tradition, are congruent with both the original ‘conduct model’ and Schumpeter’s directions for further research.     

Sustainable recursive social welfare functions

What ethical criterion for intergenerational justice should be adopted, e.g., when faced with the task of managing the global environment? Koopmans’ axiomatization of discounted utilitarianism is based on seemingly compelling conditions, yet this criterion leads to hard-to-justify outcomes. The present analysis considers a class of sustainable recursive social welfare functions within Koopmans’ general framework. This class is axiomatized by means of a weak equity condition (“Hammond Equity for the Future”) and general existence is established. Any member of the class satisfies the key axioms of Chichilnisky’s “sustainable preferences”. The analysis singles out one of Koopmans’ original separability conditions (his Postulate 3′a), here called “Independent Present”, as particularly questionable from an ethical perspective.     

On transaction efficiency and China’s Urban-Rural disparity

It is recommended for economists to examine China’s Urban-Rural disparity from the perspective of transaction efficiency, in that it can provide us with a systematic explanation to both the cases of different countries and development stages. China’s Urban-Rural disparity is special and virtually a demonstration of its special transaction efficiency structure. Exploration of China’s Urban-Rural disparity from such perspective indicates that, different from those in countries with a market economy, China’s case involves many exogenous and contrived factors. Therefore, the solutions are to improve the whole transaction efficiency in the economy, which includes eliminating its regionally unfavorable policies and institutions, and enforcing more favorable and regionally balanced institutional reforms. __________ Translated from Fudan Journal (复旦学报, Social Science Edition), 2006, (1) (in Chinese)     

增长失衡与政府责任:基于社会性支出角度的分析

There exists a kind of growth imbalance in China’s current development process, which is essentially characterized by the imbalance between the nation’s wealth and the people’s welfare. This paper points out that growth imbalance results mostly from insufficient government social spending on people’s welfare. Consequently, the government should shoulder the basic responsibility for the provision of education, health and social security, quicken the transformation of government expenditure structure and increase the share of social spending, in order to improve the people’s welfare and achieve the rebalancing of growth. The increase in social spending can also promote the accumulation of human capital, which will help the conversion of economic growth pattern and the realization of sustainable and healthy economic development. Translated from Jingji Yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2006, (10): 4–17     

Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?

The Coasean theory of the firm (Coase in Economica 4:386–405, 1937) has flourished with the theory of incomplete contracts. Transaction costs in the form of enforcement costs have been deemed to be the main determinants of the decision to ‘make’ versus ‘buy’. Surprisingly, this stream of literature has almost neglected that transaction costs may also generate incomplete property rights (Coase in J Law Econ 3:1–44, 1960). As firm’s activities entail both contractual and property rights, these two domains interfere each other on the decision to carry out a transaction within the firm. When property rights are incomplete, potential externalities may increase the cost of using the price mechanism to procure the assets needed in a given transaction. The resulting ‘Coasean firm’ would not only centralize incomplete contracts under a unified governance system, but it will also aggregate incomplete property rights under a unified ownership structure.     

Bargaining and Devolution in the Upper Guadiana Basin

Increasingly, central governments approach contentious natural resource allocation problems by devolving partial decision-making responsibility to local stakeholders. This paper conceptualizes devolution as a three-stage process and uses a simulation model calibrated to real-world conditions to analyze devolution in Spain’s Upper Guadiana Basin. The Spanish national government has proposed spending over a billion euros to reverse a 30 year decline in groundwater levels. We investigate how the government can most effectively allocate this money to improve water levels by utilizing its power to set the structure of a local negotiation process. Using a numerical Nash model of local bargaining, we find that if the national government creates appropriate incentives, local bargaining can produce water stabilization. The actual water levels that will emerge are highly dependent on the central government’s decisions about the budget available to local stakeholders and the default policy, which will be influenced by the relative value the government places on various financial and environmental outcomes. Our paper concludes by determining the relationship between these relative valuations and the government’s preferences over water levels.