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1.
Summary. Boldrin and Montrucchio [2] showed that any twice continuously differentiable function could be obtained as the optimal policy function for some value of the discount parameter in a deterministic neoclassical growth model. I extend their result to the stochastic growth model with non-degenerate shocks to preferences or technology. This indicates that one can obtain complex dynamics endogenously in a wide variety of economic models, both under certainty and uncertainty. Further, this result motivates the analysis of convergence of adaptive learning mechanisms to rational expectations in economic models with (potentially) complicated dynamics. Received: June 21, 1996; revised version: October 31, 1996  相似文献   

2.
Consumption choice and asset pricing with a non-price-taking agent   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Summary. This paper develops a pure-exchange model to study the consumption-portfolio problem of an agent who acts as a non-price-taker, and to analyze the implications of his behavior on equilibrium security prices. The non-price-taker is modeled as a price leader in all markets; his price impact is then recast as a dependence of the Arrow-Debreu prices on his consumption, allowing a tractable formulation. Besides the aggregate consumption, the endowment of the non-price-taker appears as an additional factor in driving equilibrium allocations and prices. Comparisons of equilibria between a price-taking and a non-price-taking economy are carried out. Received: March 29, 1996; revised version October 29, 1996  相似文献   

3.
Summary. A single condition, limited arbitrage, is shown to be necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the core in economies with any number of markets, finite or infinite, with or without short sales. This extends earlier results of Chichilnisky [8] for finite economies. This unification of finite and infinite economies is achieved by proving that in Hilbert spaces limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the compactness of the Pareto frontier. Limited arbitrage has also been shown to be necessary and sufficient for a resolution of the social choice paradox [9], [10], [12], [13], [14]. Received: August 4, 1995; revised version: April 11, 1997  相似文献   

4.
Summary. If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y). Received: August 29, 1996; revised version: March 24, 1997  相似文献   

5.
Summary. Using a mixed market model for analyzing imperfectly competitive economies, we maximize the oligopolists' Welfare Function, given individual rationality and feasibility constraints. We prove that solutions belong to the core for a large class of economies. This class includes, in particular, every monopoly having a single type of small traders. Note that all such solutions yield the large trader, utility-wise, strictly more than at any monopoly solution, where the monopolist plays strategically, and the ocean of small traders act as being as price-takers. Received: March 4, 1996; revised version July 7, 1996  相似文献   

6.
Summary. This paper studies the conditions for aggregation, portfolio separation and effective completeness of competitive allocations in general equilibrium models with incomplete markets where agents have general preference and endowment distributions. We show that these properties are distinct. Demands may aggregate yet may fail to exhibit fund separation and conversely. Fund separation implies effective completeness while aggregation does not. The implications of these properties for the structure of equilibria are discussed, and generalizations of the CAPM, the consumption CAPM and the CAPM with nonmarketed wealth emerge from the analysis. Received: September 12, 1996; revised version: November 7, 1996  相似文献   

7.
Summary. We show that the set of balanced steady state (resp. golden rule) equilibria, parameterized by endowments, of stationary overlapping-generations economies are smooth manifolds diffeomorphic to Euclidean spaces. These properties extend similar properties of the Walrasian equilibria and enable one to apply the natural projection approach to the study of these equilibria. Received: October 30, 1995; revised version: October 10, 1996  相似文献   

8.
Summary. We integrate and sharpen two characterizations of aggregate excess demand functions: we obtain Mas-Colell's (1977) equilibrium invariance, and strengthen Geanakoplos' (1984) weakly concave utility functions to strictly concave ones. Our proofs modify and extend Geanakoplos' utility-construction. We note two applications: a sharper characterization of equilibrium price sets (cf. Mas-Colell (1977)), and a basis for the studies of computable economies (Richter and Wong (1996)). Received: July 29, 1996; revised version: February 20, 1997  相似文献   

9.
Summary. Convergence of the cores of finite economies to the set of Walrasian allocations as the number of agents grows has long been taken as one of the basic tests of perfect competition. The present paper examines this test in the most natural model of commodity differentiation: the commodity space is the space of nonnegative measures, endowed with the topology of weak convergence. In Anderson and Zame [12], we gave counterexamples to core convergence in L 1, a space in which core convergence holds for replica economies and core equivalence holds for continuum economies; in addition, we gave a core convergence theorem under the assumption that traders' utility functions exhibit uniformly vanishing marginal utility at infinity. In this paper, we provide two core convergence results for the commodity differentiation model. A key technical virtue of this space is that relatively large sets (in particular, closed norm-bounded sets) are compact. This permits us to invoke a version of the Shapley-Folkman Theorem for compact subsets of an infinite-dimensional space. We show that, for sufficiently large economies in which endowments come from a norm bounded set, preferences satisfy an equidesirability condition, and either (i) preferences exhibit uniformly bounded marginal rates of substitution or (ii) endowments come from an order-bounded set, core allocations can be approximately decentralized by prices. Received: July 29, 1996; revised version: January 14, 1997  相似文献   

10.
Summary. This paper analyzes two equivalent equilibrium notions under asymmetric information: risk neutral rational expectations equilibria (rn-REE), and common knowledge equilibria. We show that the set of fully informative rn-REE is a singleton, and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partially informative rn-REE. In a companion paper (DeMarzo and Skiadas (1996)) we show that equilibrium prices for the larger class of quasi-complete economies can be characterized as rn-REE. Examples of quasi-complete economies include the type of economies for which demand aggregation in the sense of Gorman is possible (with or without asymmetric information), the setting of the Milgrom and Stokey no-trade theorem, an economy giving rise to the CAPM with asymmetric information but no normality assumptions, the simple exponential-normal model of Grossman (1976), and a case of no aggregate endowment risk. In the common-knowledge context, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a common knowledge posterior estimate, given common priors, to coincide with the full communication posterior estimate. Received: May 29, 1997; revised version: July 18, 1997  相似文献   

11.
Summary. This paper analyzes the optimal allocation problem of a small trading country facing an uncertain technology. It is involved in production of many commodities. Differentiability cannot be guaranteed, hence, the Ramsey-Euler condition of optimality needs to be modified. From the optimality criterion, we derive a pair of conditions, which does not require differentiability. If “enough” uncertainty is allowed, the sequence of the distribution functions of investment expenditure converges uniformly to a unique invariant measure. In addition to the weak convergence of the stochastic process of investment expenditure we also have the sequences of the stochastic process of investment expenditure converging weakly. Received: September 8, 1994; revised version: September 25, 1997  相似文献   

12.
Summary. For continuous aggregate excess demand functions of economies, the existing literature (e.g. Sonnenschein (1972, 1973), Mantel (1974), Debreu (1974), Mas-Colell (1977), etc.) achieves a complete characterization only when the functions are defined on special subsets of positive prices. In this paper, we allow the functions to be defined on a larger class of price sets, (allowing, for example the closed unit simplex, including its boundary). Besides characterizing excess demands for a larger class of economies, our extension provides a useful tool for proving other results. It allows us to characterize the equilibrium price set for a larger class of economies. It also permits extending Uzawa's observation (1962), by showing that Brouwer's Fixed-Point Theorem is implied by the Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium Existence Theorem (1954, Theorem I). Received: October 18, 1995; revised version June 28, 1996  相似文献   

13.
This paper analyses the intraday lead-lag relationships between returns and volatilities in the Ibex 35 spot and futures markets. Using hourly data, we jointly analyze the interactions between markets, estimating a bivariate error correction model with GARCH perturbations which captures stochastically the presence of an intraday U-shaped curve for both spot and futures market volatility. Our findings show a bidirectional causal relationship between market volatilities, with a positive feedback. This two-way transmission of volatility is consistent with market prices evolving according to a long-run equilibrium relationship, and shocks affecting both markets in the same direction. Our empirical results also support a unidirectional cross interaction from futures to spot market returns. This pattern suggests that the futures market leads the spot market in order to incorporate the arrival of new information.  相似文献   

14.
    
Summary. A sunspot equilibrium (SSE) is based on some extrinsic randomizing device (RD). We analyze the robustness of SSE. (1) We say that an SSE allocation is robust to refinements if it is also an SSE allocation based on any refinement of its RD. (2) We introduce two core concepts for analyzing the robustness of SSE in the face of cooperative-coalition formation. In the first, the blocking allocations are based on the RD that defines the SSE. In the second (stronger) core concept, coalitions select their own RDs. For the convex economy with restricted market participation, SSE allocations are robust under each of the definitions and the cores converge on replication of the economy to the set of SSE allocations. For the economy with an indivisible good, SSE allocations are not always robust. We provide examples of each of the following: (i) an SSE allocation that is not robust to refinement, (ii) an SSE allocation that is in neither core, (iii) an SSE allocation that is in the first core, but not in the second, and (iv) a core that does not converge upon replication to the set of SSE allocations. Received: July 31, 1995; revised version August 30, 1996  相似文献   

15.
    
Summary.  This paper contributes to the recent focus on dynamics in noncooperative games when players use inductive learning. The most well-known inductive learning rule, Brown’s fictitious play, is known to converge for games, yet many examples exist where fictitious play reasoning fails to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Building on ideas from chaotic dynamics, this paper develops a geometric conceptualization of instability in games, allowing for a reinterpretation of existing results and suggesting avenues for new results. Received: October 27, 1995 revised version May 2, 1996  相似文献   

16.
Abstract. Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volume in stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion of asset returns and the correlations between trading volume, price changes and price levels) to support theories where agents are not rational expected utility maximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in fact consistent with a standard infinite horizon – perfect information – expected utility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar to those found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharp contrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differences that are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futures markets. We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize the integral of their discounted utility from consumption under both budget and leverage constraints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou (1997), we find a closed form solution, up to a negative constant, for the equilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where the constraint is non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdings volatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are increasing functions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of the price-volume relation. We would like to thank the editor and two anonimous referees for valuable substantive comments. Our gratitude also to Franklin Allen, Kerry Back, Domenico Cuoco, Xavier Freixas, Sanford Grossman, Michel Habib, Lutz Hendricks, Richard Kihlstrom, Fernando Restoy, Mary Thomson, Jean-Luc Vila, participants to seminars at Birkbeck College, Carnegie-Mellon, Columbia, ESSEC, HEC, IAE, INSEAD, London Business School, London School of Economics, McGill, Michigan, National University of Singapore, Pompeu Fabra, North Carolina, Washington-St-Louis, Wharton, the Jornadas de Economía Financiera BBV, and the Meetings of the Society for Economic Dynamics and Control and the American Finance Association. Special thanks are due to Süleyman Basak for his enthusiastic support and many helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the BBV and Caja de Madrid Foundations and CREF (both authors) and of the Spanish Ministry of Education under DGICYT grant no. PB93-0388 (first author).  相似文献   

17.
Summary . This note extends the example of Gale (1963) by considering the continuous time tatonnement process for a class of two agent, two commodity exchange economies, parametrized by a number μ∈(0,1). We demonstrate that as the parameter passes a threshold value μ* the unique, globally stable competitive equilibrium loses local stability while two new locally stable equilibria appear. Intuitively, as μ increases the income effect become increasingly more important relative to substitution effect, and eventually overwhelms the latter. As the parameter μ approaches 1, the economy tends to the example considered by Gale, as does the limiting behavior of the tatonnement. Received: February 28, 1996; revised version August 5, 1996  相似文献   

18.
Summary. We consider the problem of reallocating the total initial endowments of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. With the uniform reallocation rule we propose a solution which satisfies many appealing properties, describing the effect of population and endowment variations on the outcome. The central properties which are studied in this context are population monotonicity, bilateral consistency, (endowment) monotonicity and (endowment) strategy-proofness. Furthermore, the uniform reallocation rule is Pareto optimal and satisfies several equity conditions, e.g., equal-treatment and envy-freeness. We study the trade-off between properties concerning variation and properties concerning equity. Furthermore, we provide several characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule based on these properties. Received: August 29, 1995; revised version June 26, 1996  相似文献   

19.
Summary. We offer an alternative approach to the study of representability of choice behavior in a competitive framework that is based on recent advances in utility theory (cf. Alcantud and Rodrí guez-Palmero (1999)). Our technique enables us to tackle this classical problem efficiently in fairly general situations, thus obtaining alternative sufficient conditions as well as different proofs and generalizations of prior results. Received: July 14, 1999; revised version: February 15, 2001  相似文献   

20.
Summary . The paper is concerned with the following question: in addition to local uniqueness, what other conditions must be imposed to ensure global uniqueness of competitive equilibrium? The answer is provided within a standard framework involving excess demand functions. Conditions are identified which have the nice property that they are true close to a regular equilibrium. Uniqueness is established by considering an adjustment process and showing that under the mentioned conditions, every equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable and moreover the process itself is globally stable; uniqueness follows from an Arrow and Hahn (1971) result. Alternatively, the paper may be seen as identifying conditions under which there is a vectorfield satisfying the requirements of an uniqueness result due to Dierker (1974). Received: July 1, 1996; revised version October 7, 1996  相似文献   

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