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最近,国务院国有资产监督管理委员会、财政部联合制订了《企业国有产权向管理层转让暂行规定》,要求各地在实践中贯彻落实。这个文件是继2003年12月发布的《企业国有产权转让管理暂行办法》后的进一步深化和规范。党的十五大和十五届四中全会以来,各地认真贯彻落实党中央关于调整国有经济布局和结构、有进有退的方针,着力发展具有自主知识产权和核心竞争力的大型企业和企业集团。同时,通过采取改组、联合、兼并、租赁、承包经营和股份合作制、出售等多种形式,放开搞活国有中小企业,取得了明显成效,不少国有中小型企业通过改制重新焕发了生机与活力,增强了企业核心竞争力。但是,在企业国有产权向管理层转让的过程中存在比较突出的问题:有的自卖自买,暗箱操作;有的以国有产权或实物资产作为其融资的担保,将收购风险和经营风险全部转嫁给金融机构和被收购企业;有的损害投资人和企业职工的合法权益,等等。这次颁发的《暂行规定》,主要是按照中央确定的方针,进一步规范企业国有产权的转让,确保企业国有产权向管理层转让行为的公开、公平、公正和有序进行,这既是维护国有资产出资人、企业职工合法权益,防止国有资产流失的需要,也是保护企业管理层自身合法权益的需要。 相似文献
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一《、关于进一步规范国企改制工作的实施意见》的主要内容国务院国资委成立三年多以来,为深化国企改革、规范国企改制工作,先后出台了一系列政策法规,其中包括2003年11月发布的《关于规范国企改制工作的意见》(以下简称《意见》)、2004年1月的《企业国有产权转让管理暂行办法》、2004年9月的《关于企业国有产权转让有关问题的通知》、2005年4月的《企业国有产权向管理层转让暂行规定》。2005年12月19日,进一步发布《关于进一步规范国企改制工作的实施意见》(以下简称《实施意见》)。这是一个全面、系统的,具有较强操作性和符合当前国企改革… 相似文献
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为规范水电工程预可行性研究阶段勘察设计收费,国家发展和改革委员会、建设部根据《建设项目前期工作咨询收费暂行规定》和2002年发布的《工程勘察设计收费管理规定》,于2006年颁布了《水利、水电、电力建设项目前期工作勘察收费暂行规定》。《工程勘察设计收费管理规定》与《水利、水电、电力建设项目前期工作工程勘察收费暂行规定》,对规范建设项目前期工作和勘察设计工作收费行为具有积极的意义。对两规定的区别加以分析说明.以利工作中理解、执行。 相似文献
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《易制毒化学品进出口管理暂行规定》出台为履行《联合国禁止非法贩运麻醉药品和精神药物公约》所规定的义务,加强对易制毒化学品进出口的管理,规范易制毒化学品进出口管理工作,日前,外经贸部制定了《易制毒化学品进出口管理暂行规定》。该规定指出,国家对易制毒化学... 相似文献
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对驰名商标界定的思考——兼评修订后的《商标法》对驰名商标的规定 总被引:9,自引:0,他引:9
第九届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第二十四次会议于2001年10月27日通过了《商标法》的修正案(下称修正案)。在这个修正案中,新增了两条有关驰名商标保护的规定,加上国家工商局颁布的《驰名商标认定和管理暂行规定》(下称《暂行规定》)共同构成了我国驰名商标的法律保护体系。 相似文献
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L. M. Lamont 《R&D Management》1972,2(3):119-123
In recent years, the small technology-based enterprise ('spin-off') has had a significant impact on regional economic development. As a source of new technology and entrepreneurs, the university has made an important contribution to the formation of new enterprises. This article focuses on the role of the university as an incubator organization and the special problems of academic entrepreneurs and their firms. Guidelines are given to improve the academic entrepreneur's corporate performance and suggestions are offered to enable the university to facilitate the entrepreneurship process. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the future prospects for academic entrepreneurship. 相似文献
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PAUL S. GOODMAN 《劳资关系》1969,9(1):54-66
The objective of this paper is to present a model that can explain and predict behavior on programs designed to hire, train, and retain the hard-core unemployed. More than 50 variables and their relationships have been specified. Some of these variables have been identified in other studies, or can be derived from the organization change literature, but this paper tries to provide a comprehensive list of the extensive set of empirically based variables. 相似文献
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This comparative paper examines the relationship between equity markets and corporate governance on one hand, and job tenure, training, and pay on the other. Two dimensions of equity markets and corporate governance are used: share trading activity and mergers and acquisitions. There is support for the posited links between these measures and job tenure, employee stock ownership plans, pay dispersion, and collective bargaining arrangements. Evidence on the relationship with training is more mixed. 相似文献
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This study decomposes changes in science and engineering employment into their growth and technological change components, using an input-output approach. The analysis is based on highly disaggregated industy-occupation employment data and reveals that approximately 30 per cent of the change in total science and engineering employment can be attributed to technological change. This contrasts with the 54 per cent figure found in earlier research. The difference in these findings is due to the highly aggregated data employed in the earlier research. 相似文献
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Professor Barnes responds to William Curran's fictional dialogue between Senator John Sherman and philosopher John Rawls, with a fictional letter from Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. Professor Barnes discusses the importance of the anarcho-socialist movement of the late nineteenth century to the adoption of the Sherman Act, the historical and logical inevitability of adoption of a rule of reason in antitrust law, the relevance of efficiency to the rule of reason, and the relationship between competition and the promotion of democratic ideals. 相似文献
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Michael V. Russo 《战略管理杂志》1992,13(2):103-118
This paper uses a transactions cost perspective to examine the development of organizational tendencies that plague the governance of unregulated subsidiaries by regulated parent companies. By focussing on what Williamson (1985) calls the ‘incentive limits’ of firms, conditions that should exacerbate the problems facing these firms as they diversify are identified. Empirical testing of hypotheses drawn from this discussion is conducted using a sample of nonutility, nonregulated subsidiaries of 54 electric utilities. The analysis, using both linear regression and event history methods, confirms the connection between the characteristics of the regulated parent company and subsidiary performance. The paper concludes with a discussion of how further research might extend the state of knowledge on the topic of the economic losses of bureaucracy. 相似文献
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An economic theory of the firm must explain both when firms supplant markets and when markets supplant firms. While theories of when markets fail are well developed, the extant literature provides a less than adequate explanation of why and when hierarchies fail and of actions managers take to mitigate such failure. In this article, we seek to develop a more complete theory of the firm by theorizing about the causes and consequences of organizational failure. Our theory focuses on the concept of social comparison costs that arise through social comparison processes and envy. While transaction costs in the market provide an impetus to move activities inside the boundaries of the firm, we argue that envy and resulting social comparison costs motivate moving activities outside the boundary of the firm. More specifically, our theory provides an explanation for ‘managerial’ diseconomies of both scale and scope—arguments that are independent from traditional measurement, rent seeking, and competency arguments—that provides new insights into the theory of the firm. In our theory, hierarchies fail as they expand in scale because social comparison costs imposed on firms escalate and hinder the capacity of managers to optimally structure incentives and production. Further, hierarchy fails as a firm expands in scope for the simple reason that the costs of differentially structuring compensation within the firm to match the increasing diversity of activities also rises with increasing scope. In addition, we explore how social comparison costs influence the design of the firm through selection of production technologies and compensation structures within the firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献