election economics

Economic management is crucial to winning elections, Robert Lind of UBS Phillips and Drew reviews the prospects and outlines possible strategies for victory.     

Ambiguity in Electoral Competition

The paper proposes an explanation to why electoral competition induces parties to state ambiguous platforms even if voters dislike ambiguity. A platform is ambiguous if different voters may interpret it as different policy proposals. An ambiguous platform puts more or less emphasis on alternative policies so that it is more or less easily interpreted as one policy or the other. I suppose that a party can monitor exactly this platform design but cannot target its communications to individuals one by one. Each individual votes according to her understanding of the parties’ platforms but dislikes ambiguity. It is shown that this electoral competition has no Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless its max–min strategies are the optimal strategies of the Downsian game in mixed strategies. Furthermore, if parties behave prudently enough and if the voters aversion to ambiguity is small enough, these strategies do form an equilibrium.     

Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games

Extensive form games modeling continuous-time decisions are plagued with problems of nonexistence and nonuniqueness of outcomes. As a “second-best”, the literature has imposed extraneous restrictions on the strategy sets, raising questions on the nature and interpretation of the resulting formal object, and on which restrictions are appropriate. We provide a “first-best” framework, formalizing continuous-time repeated games as extensive form games incorporating natural conditions from the onset. Every strategy profile induces a unique outcome, without any restrictions on the strategy sets. Further, the unrestricted strategy sets are equivalent to a specific class of strategies in a more naïvely specified continuous-time game.     

Predicting general election outcomes: campaigns and changing voter knowledge at the 2017 general election in England

There is a growing literature suggesting that the result for each constituency at British general elections can be predicted using ‘citizen forecasts’ obtained through voter surveys. This may be true for the majority of constituencies where the result at previous contests was a substantial majority for one party’s candidates: few ‘safe seats’ change hands. But is it true in the marginal constituencies, where elections are won and lost? Analysis of such ‘citizen forecast’ data for the Labour-Conservative marginal constituencies in 2017 indicates not. Although respondents were aware of the seats’ relative marginality and of general trends in party support during the campaign, they could not separate out those that were eventually lost by each party from those that were won again, even in seats where the elected party won comfortably.

     

Rationalizability in continuous games

Define a continuous game to be one in which every player's strategy set is a Polish space, and the payoff function of each player is bounded and continuous. We prove that in this class of games the process of sequentially eliminating “never-best-reply” strategies terminates before or at the first uncountable ordinal, and this bound is tight. Also, we examine the connection between this process and common belief of rationality in the universal type space of Mertens and Zamir (1985).     

Survival in Cournot games

In a model that encompasses a general equilibrium framework, we consider a monopolist (a producer) with subjective beliefs that endogenously hedges against fluctuations in input prices in a complete market. We allow for entries and Cournot competition in this economy, and we study how erroneous beliefs affect long-run survival for those firms. We introduce a notion of entropy of beliefs, and we use it to characterize the class of beliefs for which the monopolist eventually disappears almost surely. When disappearance occurs, the whole market power switches to the entrant making the most accurate predictions in our sense. The class of beliefs for which survival occurs is much broader than that of perfectly competitive settings.     

Learning games

This paper presents a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little knowledge about the game. Through playing the same game repeatedly, each player not only learns which action to choose but also constructs a personal view of the game. The model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma and coordination games. Results of computer simulations show that (1) when all the players are slow at learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but might enjoy higher payoffs than in cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one player is quick in learning the game, that player obtains a higher payoff than the others. However, all can receive lower payoffs than in the case in which all players are slow learners.     

Single-stage election procedures for large electorates

The Condorcet efficiency of single-stage election procedures is considered under the assumption of impartial culture for large electorates. The most efficient ranked voting rule is either Borda rule or a truncated scoring rule. A decision rule is established to determine the number of candidates, k, that individuals should be required to vote for, whether or not ranking should be required, and the scoring rule that should be used if ranking is required. This decision depends upon the number of candidates available and the probabilities that individuals will vote if they must rank k candidates or simply report k candidates.     

英语习用语及其翻译中的歧义性

该论文将习用语翻译中出现的问题归纳为三类。一类是不求甚解,就习用语的表面意义直译;二是生搬硬套,用意义不合的汉语成语替换;三是忽略了习用语的文化内涵,使译文失去了原文的韵味。论文最后指出只要深入地掌握英语的文化背景知识,才能做好习用语的翻译。     

Recurrent crises in global games

Global games have unique equilibria in which aggregate behavior changes sharply when an underlying random fundamental crosses some threshold. This property relies on the existence of dominance regions: all players have a highest and lowest action that, for some fundamentals, is strictly dominant. But if the fundamental follows a random walk, it eventually spends nearly all of its time in these regions: crises gradually disappear. We obtain recurring crises by adding a single large player who lacks dominance regions. We also show that in order to obtain recurring crises, one must either relax dominance regions or restrict to fundamentals that continually return to or cross over a fixed region.     

Non-manipulability in Walrasian cost games

JEL classification: D41, D51 Received: 24 December 1999 / Accepted: 18 October 2001     

Strategic behavior in non-atomic games

In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal choice, this study proposes a refinement of Nash equilibrium, strategic equilibrium. Given a non-atomic game, its perturbed game is one in which every player believes that he alone has a small, but positive, impact on the societal choice; and a distribution is a strategic equilibrium if it is a limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibrium distributions of games in which each player’s belief about his impact on the societal choice goes to zero. After proving the existence of strategic equilibria, we show that all of them must be Nash. We also show that all regular equilibria of smooth non-atomic games are strategic. Moreover, it is displayed that in many economic applications, the set of strategic equilibria coincides with that of Nash equilibria of large finite games.     

On Markov games

In the paper it is demonstrated, how a dynamic programming approach may be useful for the analysis of Markov games or stochastic games. Markov games with finitely many stages are dealt with extensively. The existence of optimal Markov strategies is proven for finite stage Markov games using a shortcut of a proof by D erman for the analogous result for Markov decision processes. For Markov games with a countably infinite number of stages some results are summarized. Here again the results and the methods of proof have much in common with results and proofs for Markov decision processes. Actually the theory of Markov games is a generalisation. The paper contains short introductions into the theories of matrix games and tree games.     

Proper strong-Fibonacci games

We define proper strong-Fibonacci (PSF) games as the subset of proper homogeneous weighted majority games which admit a Fibonacci representation. This is a homogeneous, type-preserving representation whose ordered sequence of type weights and winning quota is the initial string of Fibonacci numbers of the one-step delayed Fibonacci sequence. We show that for a PSF game, the Fibonacci representation coincides with the natural representation of the game. A characterization of PSF games is given in terms of their profile. This opens the way up to a straightforward formula which gives the number \(\varPsi (t)\) of such games as a function of t, number of non-dummy players’ types. It turns out that the growth rate of \(\varPsi (t)\) is exponential. The main result of our paper is that, for two consecutive t values of the same parity, the ratio \(\varPsi (t+2)/\varPsi (t)\) converges toward the golden ratio \({\varPhi }\).     

Restricted houseswapping games

Restricted houseswapping games (RHGs) are a generalization of ‘one-sided matching games’, in which we specify a class II* of ‘allowable’ simple trading cycles. The cores of such games may be empty. Given II*, all possible closed RHGs have non-empty cores of II* is ‘strongly balanced’. Examples include the one-sided matching markets (^{Shapley and Scarf. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1974. 1. 23–37}. ^{Tijs et al., OR Spektrum 1984, 6, 119–123}; ^{Quinzii, International Journal of Game Theory 1984, 13, 41–60}) and the two-sided matching markets (^{Gale and Shapley. American Mathematical Monthly 1962. 69, 9–16}; ^{Shapley and Shubik, International Journal of Game Theory 1972, 1, 111–130}: and ^{Demange and Gale Econometrica 1985, 53, 873–888}).We then consider the subclass of RHGs in which there is no transferable resource. In this case, a weaker condition on II*, called ‘weak balancedness’, is sufficient to guarantee core non-emptiness. In addition, if II* is not weakly balanced, then there exists a preference profile such that the strict core of the resultant game is empty.Several other examples are given of II* that are (a) strongly balanced: (b) weakly balanced but not strongly balanced: and (c) not even weakly balanced.Finally, we discuss the issues of equilibrium definition, existence, and core-equilibrium allocation equivalence in RHGs.     

Law,Property and Ambiguity: The Uses and Abuses of Legal Ambiguity in Remaking Istanbul's Informal Settlements

What is the role of legal ambiguity in the creation and institutionalization of private property regimes? In what ways does the (ab)use of legal ambiguities affect market‐making processes? I address these questions through a detailed analysis of two large‐scale urban renewal projects in Istanbul that impose a formal private property regime on informal settlements. My research reveals that without the strategic utilization of legal ambiguities and administrative arbitrariness by public and private actors, private property cannot be easily created and hence capitalist markets cannot function efficiently. My findings challenge the assumptions of several social science traditions such as neoclassical and neoinstitutionalist economics, as well as most works within the law and economics tradition regarding the relationship between law, property and economic development. These approaches to economic development are underpinned by the legal certainty that private property entails as the most important element for an efficient economic order. However, in their unconditional support for private ownership, they fail to realize the degree of legal ambiguity and administrative arbitrariness needed to create the private property regime in the first place. As such their arguments remain theoretically and empirically incomplete. A more complete analysis of the relationship between law and economic dynamics must focus on how private property is constructed, and the extent to which legal ambiguities and loopholes are utilized in this process.     

Forecasting election results by studying brand importance in online news

This study uses the semantic brand score, a novel measure of brand importance in big textual data, to forecast elections based on online news. About 35,000 online news articles were transformed into networks of co-occurring words and analyzed by combining methods and tools from social network analysis and text mining. Forecasts made for four voting events in Italy provided consistent results across different voting systems: a general election, a referendum, and a municipal election in two rounds. This work contributes to the research on electoral forecasting by focusing on predictions based on online big data; it offers new perspectives regarding the textual analysis of online news through a methodology which is relatively fast and easy to apply. This study also suggests the existence of a link between the brand importance of political candidates and parties and electoral results.