Voluntary disclosure of accruals in earnings press releases and the pricing of accruals

This study investigates firms’ decisions to disclose accruals information in earnings press releases versus to provide it only in 10-Q filings and the impact of this disclosure on the pricing of accruals. I find that firms disclose accruals in their press releases when earnings alone are a weak indication of cash flow performance and that following these disclosures the accruals information is fully impounded into stock prices. The evidence suggests that when investor demand for accruals is likely to exist and firms disclose the information in earnings press releases, the mispricing typically associated with accruals is mitigated.

Non-audit service and auditor independence: an examination of the Procomp effect

This paper examines whether non-audit service provision impairs auditor independence, and whether the degree of auditor independence in Taiwan changed in the wake of the 2004 Procomp scandal. The auditors involved in the Procomp affair were suspended from practice for 2 years and were sued, and we posit that these unprecedented sanctions and litigation affected subsequent auditor behavior. Considering the measurement errors involved in discretionary accruals, we propose an alternative analytic approach in which the dependent variable in the regression analysis is the difference between audited earnings and forecast earnings, scaled by total assets, and the primary independent variable is the non-audit fees ratio. After controlling for the effects of financial leverage, operating and market performance, industry, company size, audit firm size, management forecast error, and management attempts to manipulate earnings, regression analysis indicates that the coefficient for non-audit fees ratio is negative and significant in 2003 but not in 2004. Using non-audit fees instead of non-audit fees ratio to conduct the regression analysis yields similar results. This finding is consistent with the notion that auditors make a trade-off between gaining service fees and avoiding litigation and reputation loss. Limitations and policy implications are also offered.

Underwriter choice and earnings management: evidence from seasoned equity offerings

Using a sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), this paper examines the association between the choice of financial intermediary and earnings management. We contend that with more stringent standards for certification and intense monitoring, highly prestigious underwriters restrict firms’ incentives for earnings management to protect their reputation and to avoid potential litigation risks, while firms with greater incentives for earnings management avoid strict monitoring by choosing low-quality underwriters. Consistent with our predictions, we find an inverse association between underwriter quality and issuers’ earnings management. In addition, we find that underwriter quality is positively related to SEOs’ post-issue performance, even after controlling for the effect of earnings management. We also find that firms with low-underwriter prestige and high levels of earnings management under-perform the most. However, the effect of underwriter choice on post-issue performance does not last long.

Strategic timing of annual earnings announcements: evidence from an order-driven market

Using Spanish data, this paper examines, for the first time, the differences in the intraday response of an order-driven market to earnings announcements made during trading and non-trading hours. We show that the speed of reaction depends on timing of the announcement: for overnight (daytime) announcements, the improvement in liquidity is (not) immediate. This finding could explain why Spanish firms prefer to release the bad (good) earnings announcement in trading (non-trading) hours. This strategic timing differs from the traditional disclosure policy in American markets, suggesting that different microstructures may react differently to news releases and, consequently, drive the strategic timing of corporate disclosures.

Do analysts overreact to extreme good news in earnings?

We provide an alternative explanation for the previous finding of analysts’ overreaction to extreme good news in earnings. We show that such finding could be a result of analysts’ rational behavior in the face of high earnings uncertainty rather than their cognitive bias. Extreme earnings performance tends to be associated with higher earnings uncertainty that generally leads to more forecast optimism. Once this effect is accounted for, the univariate result of analysts’ overreaction to extreme good news in earnings is subsumed, leaving only their underreaction in general.

Macro information environment change and the quality of management earnings forecasts

The 1990s were characterized by substantial increases in the performance of and investor reliance on financial analysts. Because managers possess superior private information and issue forecasts to align investors’ expectations with their own, we predict that managers increased the quality of their earnings forecasts during the 1990s in order to keep pace with the improved forward-looking information provided by financial analysts, upon which investors increasingly relied. Using a sample of 2,437 management earnings forecasts, we document an increase in management earnings forecast precision, management earnings forecast accuracy, and managers’ tendency to explain earnings forecasts in 1993–1996 relative to 1983–1986. Given that these forecast characteristics are linked to greater informativeness and credibility, we also document that the information content of management earnings forecasts, as measured by the strength of share price responses to forecast news, increased in 1993–1996 relative to 1983–1986. As expected, the increased information content of management forecasts primarily occurred for firms covered by financial analysts.

Information effects of dividends: Evidence from the Hong Kong market

The literature has suggested that earnings and earnings forecasts provide stronger signals than dividends about future performance of a firm. We test the information effects of simultaneous announcement of earnings and dividends in the Hong Kong market, distinguished by three interesting features (concentrated family-shareholdings, low corporate transparency, and no tax on dividends). Our results show significant share price reactions to unexpected earnings and dividend changes, but dividends appear to play a dominant role over earnings in pricing, a result contrary to findings in the literature. The signaling hypothesis works primarily for firms with earning increases, while the maturity hypothesis works mainly for firms with earnings declines.

Stock Price Reaction to Evidence of Earnings Management: Implications for Supplementary Financial Disclosure

We condition security price reactions to quarterly earnings announcements on whether firms disclose supplementary balance sheet and/or cashflow information that can be used to estimate the consequences of earnings management. Disclosure of supplementary information is voluntary, and thus, we consider the possibility that firms that disclose balance sheet and/or cashflow information differ systematically from firms that do not disclose. Results indicate that investors discount evidence of earnings management at the disclosure date when supplementary information is disclosed. Such results indicate more informed earnings interpretations of quarterly earnings when firms provide balance sheet and/or cashflow information concurrently.

The valuation consequences of voluntary accounting changes

Firm management typically claims that voluntary accounting method changes (VACs) are made to enhance the informativeness of earnings by better matching accounting practices with economic reality. In contrast, skeptics argue that managers adopt new accounting procedures to opportunistically manage earnings and influence their firm’s stock price. In this paper, we investigate these alternative motives for VACs. Specifically, we investigate whether VACs cause equity prices to deviate from their fundamental values in the short-term by studying the long-run stock-price performance for a sample of firms that voluntarily change accounting methods. In addition, we investigate changes in earnings informativeness by examining the behavior of earning response coefficients and the relationship between earnings and future cash flows in years surrounding the VAC event. In contrast to prior research, we find little evidence that a strategy based solely on the earnings effect of a VAC can generate abnormal returns. While we find weak evidence of post-VAC abnormal returns for extreme VACs, this result appears to be driven by the accruals anomaly documented in Sloan [Sloan, R. G. (1996). The Accounting Review, 71, 289–315]. Our evidence further suggests that earnings informativeness is not significantly altered by voluntary changes in accounting methods. Taken together, our evidence suggests the market recognizes the financial statement effects of alternative acceptable accounting methods and efficiently processes the valuation implications of VACs.

Never judge a book by its cover: what security analysts have to say beyond recommendations

Our study analyzes market reaction to the entire content of a large sample of analysts’ reports from the period 2002 to 2004 for the German market. In particular, we explore whether the three summary measures in the reports, i.e., recommendation revisions, earnings forecast revisions, and target price forecast revisions are acknowledged by the market. Additionally, we investigate if stated justifications in the written text of analysts’ reports contain information value beyond the three summary measures. We find that earnings forecast revisions and target price forecast revisions contain valuable information, both unconditionally and conditional on the rest of the information in the report. Our findings also reveal that justifications made by analysts are of high salience to market participants. These justifications provide valuable information, both unconditionally and conditional on all other types of information in a report. Our findings also suggest that business ties between banks and the analyzed companies do not affect market reaction to dissemination of an analysts’ report.

An alternative interpretation of the discontinuity in earnings distributions

We show that the asymmetric effects of income taxes and special items for profit and loss firms contribute to a discontinuity at zero in the distribution of earnings. Income taxes draw profit observations towards zero while negative special items pull loss observations away from zero. These earnings components are thus expected to contribute to a discontinuity even in the absence of discretion. We show our results are not an artifact of deflation and that other common components of earnings do not have similar effects on the earnings distribution around zero.

Firm diversification and earnings management: evidence from seasoned equity offerings

Popular press suggests that diversified firms are more aggressive in managing earnings than non-diversified firms. We examine this claim in the seasoned equity offering (SEO) setting, where firms have been shown to have the incentive to manage earnings upwards. Using the cross-sectional modified Jones [(1991) J Accounting Res 29:193–228] model to measure discretionary current accruals, we find that discretionary current accruals are higher among diversified firms than in non-diversified ones. Our evidence is consistent with the view that the extent of firm diversification is directly related to the degree of earnings management. We further show that diversified issuers with high discretionary accruals underperformed other SEO firms.

Value relevance of value-at-risk disclosure

The SEC issued FRR No. 48 in 1997 to enhance public disclosure of firms’ exposures to market risk. We examine whether the quantitative value-at-risk (VAR) estimates disclosed by 81 non-financial firms during the period 1997–2002 are value-relevant using the earnings-returns relation. The empirical results indicate that high VAR is associated with weaker earnings-returns relation. Further analysis shows that VAR is positively and significantly associated with future stock return volatility. Our evidence suggests that investors perceive the earnings of firms with substantial market risk exposure to be less persistent, and adjust the future abnormal earnings for the higher risk exposure. Thus, this results in a lower expected rate of return.

An integrated analysis of the association between accrual disclosure and the abnormal accrual anomaly

We find no evidence of accrual mispricing for firms that disclose accrual information at earnings announcements. For these firms, the market differentiates the discretionary from the nondiscretionary components of the earnings surprise. In contrast, the market fails to distinguish between the discretionary and the nondiscretionary components of the earnings surprise for firms that do not disclose accrual information at earnings announcements. These firms experience some stock price correction around the filing date. However, the correction is only partial, resulting in a post-filing drift.

Do Short Sellers Target Firms with Poor Earnings Quality? Evidence from Earnings Restatements

We study the behavior of short sellers around earnings restatements. We find that short sellers accumulate positions in restating firms several months in advance of the restatement and subsequently unwind these positions after the drop in share price induced by the restatement. The increase in short interest is larger for firms with high levels of accruals prior to restatement. We document that heavily shorted firms experience poor subsequent performance and a higher rate of delisting. Overall, these results suggest that the motive for short selling is, at least in part, related to suspect financial reporting and that short sellers pay attention to information being conveyed by accruals.

Experimental evidence of how prior experience as an auditor influences managers’ strategic reporting decisions

We design an experiment to examine the influence of audit experience on subsequent reporting decisions when auditors become managers of audited firms. In contrast to the independence issues that can arise when auditors and their clients are related by prior affiliation, we focus this study on the more common case in which auditors assume subsequent employment with other firms’ clients. In a bi-matrix experimental game that captures key features of the strategic tension between auditors and reporters, we find that reporters who have prior experience as an auditor, particularly the experience of having been a diligent auditor, are more sensitive to large penalties for aggressive reporting than are reporters whose experience is exclusively as a reporter. Our results suggest implications for regulators in predicting the effects of reporting penalties and for firms in considering the effects of CPA experience when hiring for reporting positions.

What drives the increased informativeness of earnings announcements over time?

Landsman and Maydew (J Acc Res 40:797–808, 2002) document that the information content of earnings announcements has increased over the past three decades, and Francis et al. (Acc Rev, 77:515–546, 2002) conclude that expanded concurrent disclosures in firms’ earnings announcements, especially the inclusion of detailed income statements, explain this increase. We posit and find that the temporal increase in the intensity of the market’s reaction to Street earnings offers a competing explanation for the Landsman and Maydew finding. We also find that expanded concurrent disclosure of GAAP-based information contributes to the temporal increase in the information content of earnings announcements. However, unlike Francis et al., we find that the temporal increase in concurrent balance sheet and cash flow statement information dominates concurrent income statement information once we control for Street earnings.

The association between audit committees,compensation incentives,and corporate audit fees

This study uses audit fee data from the 2001–2003 reporting periods to examine the relationship between measures of audit committee effectiveness and compensation incentives with corporate audit fees. Our results suggest that audit committee size, committee member expertise, and committee member independence are positively associated to audit fee levels, consistent with the notion that audit committees serve as a complement to external auditors in monitoring management. In contrast, CEO long-term pay and insider ownership are inversely related to audit fee levels, substituting for external audit effort in motivating management. Notwithstanding results on the full sample of firm-years, we uncover significant differences in the determinants of audit fees between the years examined. An important implication of these results is that explaining the intra-firm variation in audit fees over time is clearly necessary in order to understand the antecedents and consequences of audit fees.

An empirical assessment of the premium associated with meeting or beating both time-series earnings expectations and analysts’ forecasts

Recent research provides evidence of a market premium accruing to firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. We find similar results for our sample of firms. However, we also find a market premium for firms that meet or beat time-series forecasts, and that the highest market premium accrued to firms that meet or beat both analysts’ and time-series forecasts. These findings are supported by assessments of future financial performance over the next two subsequent years. Our findings are consistent with the notion that when time-series benchmark is used in conjunction with analysts’ forecasts, investors obtain a more reliable (i.e., less noisy) signal regarding whether firms have actually met or beaten market expectations.

Do German security analysts herd?

We employ an innovative methodology suggested by Bernhardt et al. (J. Financ. Econ. 80:657–675, 2006) to examine the herding (or anti-herding) behavior of German analysts regarding earnings forecasts. This methodology avoids well-known shortcomings often encountered in related studies, such as correlated information signals, unexpected common shocks to earnings, systematic optimism or pessimism, or forecast target mismeasurement. Our findings suggest that German analysts anti-herd, that is, they systematically issue earnings forecasts that are further away from the consensus forecast than their private information indicates. Furthermore, we analyze the association between herding behavior and different characteristics, including the size of the brokerage, general or firm-specific experience, and the coverage of firms on the Neuer Markt. We mainly confirm findings for the United States, for example, that anti-herding is more severe in cases of higher competition among analysts. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, we also find anti-herding behavior in earnings forecasts for Neuer Markt firms during the “new economy” bubble.