渐进式延迟退休的三个先决条件

延迟退休是各国现代社会化进程中普遍采取的一项社会政策,主要是为了应对人口结构和劳动力结构变化带来的劳动力短缺和老龄化问题,一般采取渐进式方式进行调整。我国职工退休年龄比较低,而我国城镇人口预期寿命达到75岁以上。较低的退休年龄与人口预期寿命大幅提高的情况不相适应,甚至出现领取养老金的时间超过缴费年限的现象。因此,延迟退休年龄的改革势在必行,但是这项政策复杂性、敏感性很强。     

论我国不同地区职工养老金差异及对策

本文运用保险精算的知识,构建了养老保险基金平衡模型,研究工资水平、参保年龄和退休年龄等因素对职工退休后领取养老金的影响,找出其影响程度,并据此提出解决东、中、西部地区职工养老金差异一些建议和对策,以期为我国养老保险制度的发展和完善提供一些理论方面的借鉴。     

工资增长、生育率差异与人力资本积累——基于内生生育和退休的动态一般均衡研究北大核心CSSCISSCI

本文结合我国收入不平等程度较高、计划生育政策放松和工资增速转变等特点,研究了工资增长对劳动力质量的影响。研究表明,生育行为受生育数量和老年闲暇的替代关系影响,低收入群体生育率较高,质量投入较低,退休也较晚,于是工资增长将通过生育率差异影响人力资本积累。通过对转移动态的定量评估,本文建议为缓解社保资金压力,政府应在短期选择延迟退休年龄和提高社会保障税率、在长期选择继续延迟退休年龄和降低社会保障税率的政策组合。     

渐进式延迟退休年龄对职工医保基金可持续的影响——基于上海市数据的模拟分析

随着老龄化程度的加深,我国职工医保统筹基金可持续性受到威胁。本文以上海市职工医保为例,建立职工医保统筹基金精算模型,分析八套延迟退休方案对上海市职工医保基金财务运行的影响,研究发现：如果仍实行现行退休政策,统筹基金将分别于2024年和2034年开始出现当期赤字和累计赤字。如果实施先延迟女性、后延迟男性退休年龄的方案,当延退速度为每年延迟2个月、3个月、4个月和6个月时,统筹基金出现累计赤字的时点不变,2050年累计赤字规模逐渐减小。如果实施同时延迟男、女性退休年龄的方案,四种延退速度方案下均可延后统筹基金出现累计赤字的时点,2050年累计赤字规模进一步缩小。如果将退休职工纳入医保缴纳人群,能够进一步改善基金情况。可见,延迟退休年龄政策能在一定程度上提高上海市职工医保基金的抗风险能力。据此,本文提出尽快实施延迟退休年龄及其他提高医保基金可持续性的政策、辅以配套措施助力延迟退休年龄政策实施等建议。     

新中国成立以来法定退休年龄思想演进与展望

目前我国企业职工中男性的法定退休年龄为60岁,女干部为55周岁,女职工为50周岁,这项基于《劳动保险条例》的规定沿用已久。进入21世纪后,面对人口老龄化问题突出、人口预期寿命增长、人口受教育程度提高以及职工退休年龄一直普遍低于国际退休年龄等情况,我国各界提出延迟法定退休年龄的设想,并展开了相应讨论。本文在回顾与总结新中国成立以来法定退休年龄思想演进过程的基础上,对我国未来养老保险法定退休年龄设定提出政策建议:将养老金收益水平与退休年龄挂钩,增强激励机制;暂不大幅提高女性退休年龄;依据不同行业和地区人口结构设计分类退休;各类职员的退休年龄与健康指数挂钩等。     

新生代劳动力供给变化对产业升级的影响研究-基于分地区新生代劳动力供给和产业结构数据的实证

基于1995-2014年全国31个省(市)新生代劳动力供给与产业结构数据,构建面板FGLS模型,考量新生代劳动力供给变化影响产业升级效应.结果表明:全国新生代劳动力供给数量与质量上升均有利于我国产业升级;分地区新生代劳动力供给数量增加对中部地区产业升级正向影响效应显著,西部次之,东部较弱;新生代劳动力质量改善对西部地区产业升级的助推作用最大,中部次之,东部较小.因此,应适当放开计生政策和延长退休年龄以缓解劳动力供给数量下行压力,扶持西、中部地区教育事业发展,加速提高当地人均受教育年限,以加快缩小区域差距等.     

企业职工延长退休年龄的意愿及影响因素研究——基于对南京市某经济开发区的调查

基于微观调研数据,本文运用有序概率模型和结构方程模型,对影响企业职工延长退休年龄意愿的因素进行了实证分析。研究表明,个体和岗位因素对企业职工的延退意愿具有显著的正效应,家庭和单位因素的作用显著为负。具体到各观测变量上,学历越高、健康状况越好的职工,其延退意愿越强烈;年龄越大、家庭经济条件越好、周均工作时间越长,延退意愿越弱;担任职务、福利保险项数、工作满意度与职工是否愿意延退呈现显著的正相关关系。企业职工的延退意愿在性别、婚姻状况、有无需负担的下一代、所在行业和企业类型上也具有显著的差异。     

争鸣

“我国应逐步延长退休年龄，建议到2045年不论男女．退休年龄均为65岁。”——征7月1日召开的“积极应对人口老龄化战略研讨会”上，人力资源和社会保障部社会保障研究所所长何平建议，以延长退休年龄来应对劳动力不足。     

门诊共济改革、渐进式延迟退休年龄与职工医保基金可持续性——基于多种方案的模拟分析

随着老龄化程度加深,我国职工医保基金支付压力凸显,那么即将实施的门诊共济改革和渐进式延迟退休年龄政策对职工医保基金可持续性的影响如何?本文运用精算模型研究发现,若没有任何政策干预,职工医保基金分别于2027年和2034年开始出现当期赤字和累计赤字;若自2022年开始实施“部分门诊共济”,门诊费用报销比例为50％或75....     

延迟退休年龄对养老金资金平衡的影响

退休年龄是我国养老保险工作开展中的一项关键参数,在我国老龄人口不断增加的情况下,对退休年龄进行延迟已经成 为了一项势在必行的工作.在本文中,将就延迟退休年龄对养老金资金平衡的影响进行一定的研究.     

Forced retirement risk and portfolio choice

Current literature on the effect of labor income on portfolio choice overlooks that workers face a risk of being forced to retire before their planned retirement age. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, this paper finds that the forced retirement risk is both significant and highly correlated with stock market fluctuations. Using a life-cycle portfolio choice model, this paper shows that forced retirement risk makes labor income near retirement stock-like. Therefore, contrary to conventional wisdom, those who are still working but near retirement should have a lower share of risky assets in their financial portfolios than retirees do.     

渐进式差异化退休年龄的决定机制、经验借鉴与政策建议

退休年龄本质上是劳动者在职期间的劳动贡献与退休后所享福利之间的均衡。公平、合理、科学的确定退休年龄,对劳动者在生命周期不同阶段(在职期间与退休之后)的福利具有十分重要的影响。借鉴我国台湾地区经验,结合大陆实际,以工作年限为基础,采用渐进式、差异化的退休年龄政策,即采取"95(99)=标准退休年龄+工作年限"的思路,在"95制"、"96制"、"97制"、"98制"和"99制"五个方案进行优选渐进,对不同类型劳动者(工种、受教育程度、性别等)应采取差异化的退休年龄政策。     

Optimal retirement time under habit persistence: what makes individuals retire early?

As the effective labor market exit observed in most OECD countries is lower than the corresponding official retirement age, the question concerning the driving factors for an early retirement decision arises. This paper incorporates the optimal retirement decision in an optimal consumption and asset allocation problem in order to analyze, among others, the effect of habit forming preferences and diverse leisure preferences for earlier retirement. We compare two possible situations for the retirement phase: (a) the individual is allowed to freely consume and invest; (b) he annuitizes his wealth at retirement and consumes the annuity income. We find that early retirement is optimal if leisure gain through earlier retirement is highly appreciated or the standard of living (habit level) is low. Additionally, our numerical results show that high initial wealth or low labor income lead to early retirement, confirming observations of Fields & Mitchell.     

Retirement and Social Security in a Probabilistic Voting Model

Why are social security transfers associated with retirement rules? This paper focuses on the political interactions between retirement and social security. Using a probabilistic voting approach, it analyzes why old people are induced to retire in order to receive pension transfers from the young. A crucial hypothesis is that leisure in old age represents a “merit good,” which is positively valued by all agents in the society, young and old. Thus, the politicians choose to tax the labor income of the old, to induce them to retire. Retirement increases the level of ideological homogeneity of the old. In fact, once retired, the elderly are more “single-minded,” since they only care about redistributive issues, such as pensions. This increase in their political power allows them to win the political game and to receive a positive transfer from the young (social security).     

中国退休年龄的现状、问题及实施延迟退休的必要性分析

中国退休年龄基本沿用了20世纪50年代的规定,存在着退休年龄较低、男女退休年龄差距较大、提前退休较为严重等问题。从降低养老保险支付压力、应对人口红利期即将结束和增强经济竞争力等各种现实情况考虑,实施延迟退休具有必要性。但是,在延迟退休政策的制定上要通过弹性制度、自愿选择等方式,降低对社会公众的影响。     

Voting on Pensions with Endogenous Retirement Age

It is often argued that the observed trend towards early retirement is due mainly to the implicit tax imposed on continued activity of elderly workers. We study the relevance of such a distortion in a political economy model with endogenous age of retirement. The setting is a two-period overlapping generations model. Individuals differ in their productivity. In the first period they work a fixed amount of time; in the second, they choose when to retire and then receive a flat rate pension benefit. Pensions are financed by a payroll tax on earnings in the first and in the second period of life. Such a tax is non distortionary in the first period; it is distortionary in the second period. We allow for some rebating of the second period tax. Individuals vote on the level of the payroll tax given the rebate which can range from 0 (biased system) to 100% (neutral system). We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a voting equilibrium and study its properties. Under these conditions, high tax rates are supported by all the old and by low productivity young individuals. We show that the pivotal voter is a young individual. The number of young individuals who have higher wage than the pivotal voter equals half the total population. We also show that the introduction of a bias increases the political support for the pension system. Finally, we study the simultaneous determination of the bias and the tax rate through a voting procedure and show that the equilibrium (if any) implies a bias which is always positive and may or not be larger than one.     

Public pensions and labor supply over the life cycle

In order to remain fiscally solvent, governments of many countries have reformed their public pension schemes to encourage labor supply at older ages. These reforms include reductions in the generosity of public pensions and reduced penalties for working past the normal retirement age. In this paper, we consider how reforms to public pension systems affect labor supply over the life cycle. We put the recent empirical evidence on the effect of government pensions on labor supply in a life cycle context, and we present evidence on the effectiveness of tax reforms for stimulating labor supply over the life cycle. Our main conclusion is that the labor supply of older workers is responsive to changes in retirement incentives. The labor supply of younger workers is less responsive. Thus the trend towards lower taxes on older workers in many developed countries should continue to fuel their trend towards later retirement.     

延迟退休对城镇职工养老保险收支影响的净效应估计——基于2025年起渐进式延迟退休年龄的假设

鉴于延迟退休对养老金收支有多重影响,本文假定2025年起以"每4年延迟1年"节奏,逐步将男(女)养老金正常领取年龄(NRA)从60(55)岁提高至2049年的65(60)岁,利用中国未来分年龄人口数的完整估计数据,估算了延迟退休对城镇职工基本养老保险收支影响的净效应。估算结果显示,延迟退休为2050年争取到了近25%的制度赡养比下降空间,养老压力高峰期大大推迟。无论延迟与否,未来养老金收支缺口规模都很大,但延迟退休对抑制缺口扩大仍有显著效果,特别是在短中期,每年的收支缺口会因此减少40%~70%,但2050年后的远期效果明显减弱。建议尽早实施渐次延迟退休,减少工作退休的强制性,尊重国情允许男女差龄退休;加强养老金财政补贴长期规划,减轻远期财政兜底压力;加强养老金缴费与受益的精算联系,大力提高基金投资效率等。     

Making Federal Pension Policy Work

Abstract

Millions of Americans retire while they are still productive. Of these, many will have the resources to enjoy all of their golden years. Unfortunately, many others will face economic hardships after they have exhausted their own resources but have become too frail to return to work. Part of the problem is that the current pension system is fraught with financial incentives that push ablebodied elderly workers into retirement just when they should instead be encouraged to remain in the workforce to accumulate additional retirement assets. This paper recommends a number of ways to change federal pension laws in order to encourage elderly workers to remain in the workforce. For example, this paper recommends toughening the penalty on premature distributions, repealing the minimum distribution rules, and repealing the exceptions to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act that permit retirement plans to provide early retirement incentives and subsidies.

This paper also considers whether the government should require that all retirement plans be neutral as to the timing of retirement. In an age-neutral world, workers would always accrue more benefits if they kept working. Consequently, more workers would remain in the workforce, accumulating additional assets for their eventual retirement.

Finally, this paper also considers how federal pension policy could help counteract the tendency of Americans to retire too early because they underestimate their life expectancies, overestimate their financial resources, and fail to understand the deleterious effects of inflation. In particular, this paper recommends that the government require that virtually all retirement plans pay at least a portion of their benefits in the form of an inflation-adjusted annuity.     

企业年金税收优惠政策的成本:一个文献综述

企业年金规模和税收优惠政策的关系很复杂,若无相应约束机制,提高优惠力度只会增加成本,企业年金得不到良性发展,税收优惠政策只能低效率运行,并产生相应成本。限制高收入职工的避税行为、明确参保职工的税收优惠政策以及加强职工退休年龄的监管,有利于降低税收优惠政策的成本,进而提高目前我国企业年金税收优惠政策的效率。