Asymmetric Network Interconnection

We develop a model of competition between interconnected networks,that allows for carriers to differ in size. Under two-partpricing, we show that because of asymmetry the larger network willalways prefer a reciprocal interconnection charge be set at cost.For sufficiently large asymmetry the smaller network will have thesame preference. Under the assumptions of our model a particularly simple regulation is optimal – if carriers cannot agree on the terms of interconnection, the larger carrier is entitled to select the access price which is then applied reciprocally.     

纵向一体化网络的接入定价研究

中国铁路、煤气、自来水、邮政等绝大多数网络型产业的结构改革将选择纵向一体化与自由接入作为突破口，研究纵向一体化网络的接入定价理论和政策已成为中国网络型产业规制政策研究的一个重要问题。本文首先依据资源最优配置、次优配置、生产效率等原则，研究了不同的接入定价理论，详细探讨了不同的接入定价方法，最后进一步分析了纵向一体化网络在不同政策目标下的接入定价政策选择。     

Interconnection in Network Industries

Recent deregulation of telecommunications in the U.S. and elsewhere has highlighted the importance of interconnection in network industries. In this paper, we analyse interconnection in a deregulated network where the participants compete in the final retail market. We consider both the case of a mature industry as well as one where a new entrant challenges the incumbent. In the later case, network externalities allow the incumbent to use the terms of interconnection to maintain its dominant position. Moreover, in either case, competition in the retail market can be undermined by collusion over access prices. We discuss the implications for some of the provisions of the new U.S. Telecommunications Act, specifically mandatory interconnection and reciprocity of tariffs, comparing these to the simple bill and keep rule.     

Vertical Integration in International Telecommunication System

The process of liberalization and privatization is drastically altering the links among international telecommunications carriers. The model presented in this paper analyses the international telecommunications market illustrating the effects of vertical mergers, under symbiotic production conditions, when vertically integrated and unintegrated carriers coexist. The effect of competition is analysed both in the final market and in the intermediate one where carriers compete over tariffs to get an appropriate distribution of profits. In particular, the results show the relations between final market prices, intermediate tariffs and market dimensions and their implications on profits.     

Upstream-Downstream Specialization by Integrated Firms in a Partially Integrated Industry

We propose a simple model of a partially integrated industry which explicitly takes into account persistent production cost differences across upstream firms, such as one might observe in natural resource industries. The model allows us to highlight the respective roles of strategic considerations and of cost considerations in the determination of an integrated firm's interaction with the non-integrated sector of the industry and, in the end, on its relative upstream-downstream specialization. Some crude stylized facts from the world oil industry are used to motivate and illustrate the analysis.     

Switching Costs in Vertically Related Markets

In the presence of switching costs, firms are ofteninterested in expanding current market shares toexploit their customer base in the future. However, ifthe product is sold by retailers, manufacturers mayface the problem of extracting too much surplus fromthe retailer. If this happens, then the latter has notan incentive to build a subscriber base. This paperwould like to connect two streams in the literature,on switching costs and vertical restraintsrespectively. An upstream–downstream duopoly model ispresented to analyse the mutual incentive for firms toenter into particular trading relationships. Whenswitching costs are high, then integrated structuresare predicted. On the other hand, when lock in effectsare not too relevant, mixed structures withindependent and integrated firms emerge as anequilibrium in growing industries. The results arediscussed with reference to the UK mobiletelecommunications industry.     

工程量清单计价与定额的适用性研究

工程量清单计价方法颁布后,规定了工程量清单的编制方法和计价的原则,但工程建设定额仍然是工程项目估价的重要依据。结合工程量清单项目内容,提出了用编制综合预算定额的方法编制企业定额,可以直接满足清单项目投标报价的需要,简化工程量清单计价过程;工程量清单项目的设置应该反映构成建筑物实体完整的结构构件价值,才能与工程实际相符合,和现行的概预算定额相适应。     

应用工程量清单计价遇到的实际问题及对策

对当前实际应用工程量清单计价方式所存在的问题进行了分析研究,提出了解决这些问题的对策措施。     

Regulation and investment behaviour in the telecommunications sector: policies and patterns in US and Europe

This paper reports the results of the quantitative analysis of international experience of the relationship between infrastructure investment in the deployment of capacity that can carry large volumes of voice and data traffic and regulatory policy changes in the telecommunications sectors. It looks at the relationship between infrastructure investment for these infrastructure assets and the access pricing régimes for local exchange carriers in the United States and Europe. It then looks at the relationship between various aspects of regulatory and institutional policy changes in Europe and how they affect access prices.The paper finds that a lower access price promotes greater deployment of digital technology among US incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). Based on this finding, it suggests that it is in the ILECs interest to have access to their networks encouraged.The European data for interconnection are recent and far reaching conclusions are not feasible, but the findings, however, suggest that competition has worked by facilitating new entry through decreasing interconnection prices, although path dependencies, of existing and traditional concepts, in the mindsets of operators as well as regulators, may account for these findings.     

药价虚高博弈分析

药价问题是关系能否顺利建设和谐社会的大事，“药价虚高”已引起各方高度关注，如何才能根治这个问题呢？本文发现医药定价改革的关键是解决医患之间严重的信息不对称问题，为此本文建立了一个序贯均衡博弈模型，给出了解决医患信息不对称的方法：进行医院专业化及建立医德机制。     

On access pricing in telecoms: theory and European practice

This paper discusses European legislation concerning interconnection between telecommunications operators. An important and distinct element of regulatory policy in the European Union is that operators with significant market power are required to provide cost-based interconnection whereas other operators are not required to provide such cost-based interconnection. It analyzes the consequences of different interconnection charges for competition and investments. Using recent insights from the theoretical literature on competition in telecommunications, it finds that the socially optimal regulatory policy concerning interconnection has the same characteristics as that adopted in the European Union.     

电信主导运营商价格压榨的竞争效应

在纵向相关市场结构下,电信在位主导运营商的价格压榨行为是一种恢复纵向垄断市场势力和获取纵向一体最大化垄断利润的策略性行为,它会严重伤害下游市场的竞争,并降低社会总福利。在反垄断执法中,判定反竞争的价格压榨行为需要分析市场结构条件和进行竞争伤害检验,本文提出了基础的归因检验规则和具体的四种不同类型价格压榨检验方法。基于上述分析,对中国电信和中国联通网络接入价格歧视行为反垄断审查的结构条件和归因检验进行了分析,并认为不合理接入管制政策是价格压榨长期存在的重要原因。     

Functional separation in Swedish broadband market: Next step of improving competition

Technological development together with liberalization policy has led to competition in the telecommunications market. Broadband has been recognized as a driving force in the social and economic development of nations, and many countries have introduced policies and/or regulatory frameworks to improve competition in broadband markets. An evolution can be seen from the 1980s until the present day through open access to local loop unbundling to several degrees of separation including functional separation. There are several countries implementing functional separation such as the UK, Italy, Sweden and, recently the EU. It has been suggested that functional separation can be an effective policy for increasing competition in broadband markets under certain circumstances. Sweden has implemented functional separation by amending the Swedish Telecommunications Act in 2008 to include mandatory functional separation as one of the powers of the PTS, the Swedish telecommunications regulator. Although TeliaSonera, the incumbent fixed line operator decided to voluntarily separate part of their business, the amendments to the law were debated with arguments similar to the debates in the EU following the new regulatory framework implemented in 2009. Against this background, this paper provides an overview of the development of functional separation in the EU and European countries such as Sweden and the UK. The paper also provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the implementation of functional separation. The evolution of functional separation in Sweden is explained and ends with a discussion of the implementation of functional separation in the Swedish broadband market.     

美国现行反垄断法对软件产业的适用性探析--以搭售和掠夺性定价为例

本文对软件产业的搭售与掠夺性定价行为进行了法律和经济分析。在美国现行的反垄断法体系中，这是属于典型的滥用市场势力的两种行为。但在软件产业却不能凭借传统标准简单地把这两种行为归结为垄断行为，而应从产业本身的特点和竞争环境出发谨慎对待。如一味运用美国现行的反垄断法惩罚软件产业正当的竞争行为，只会从更大程度上抑制竞争，损害消费者福利。在网络经济条件下，反垄断法应该顺应经济和技术的     

企业内部市场定价:基于行为的理论模型

本文从行为的视角探讨内部市场定价问题。根据内部市场主体之间的合作、竞争行为提出并界定了内部市场结构的概念，将内部市场划分为简单型、合作主导型、竞争主导型、复合型四种结构类型；通过分析企业战略、内部定价对内部市场主体之间合作、竞争行为的影响，得出了企业战略决定内部市场结构应然、内部定价调节内部市场结构实然的结论：以内部市场结构的实然与应然相一致为原则．构建了企业内部市场定价的理论模型，阐述了在各种内部市场结构应然要求下的内部定价方法、决策权安排、绩效考核标准和激励机制等。     

回收数量受价格和随机因素影响的定价模型

假设在再制造闭环供应链中,集中决策者、第三方和制造商分别从最终客户那里回收废旧品,其回收数量受回收价格和随机因素影响,制造商对获得的旧部件进行再制造,如果旧部件不能满足生产需求,制造商将从新部件供应商那里以高价格采购新部件来补充短缺。本文按照废旧品回收的供应链成员不同,建立了3个定价决策模型,证明了每个模型最优解的存在性和唯一性,然后在特殊情形下进一步求得各模型最优解的解析式,最后用具体算例对模型进行了验证。     

Pricing process as a capability: a resource‐based perspective

Strategists following the resource‐based view argue that firms can generate rents through value creation. To create value, firms develop and use resources and capabilities that other firms cannot imitate, trade for, or substitute other assets for. Even a firm that has created value, however, may not capture the potential rents associated with that value. To capture rents, a firm must set the right prices for what it sells. Most views of pricing assume that a firm can readily set appropriate prices. In contrast, we argue that pricing is a capability. To develop the ability to set the right prices, a firm must invest in resources and routines. We base our argument on a study of the pricing process of a large Midwestern manufacturing firm. We show that pricing resources, routines, and skills may help or inhibit a firm in setting the right price—and hence in appropriating value created. Our view of pricing as a capability contributes to the resource‐based view because it suggests that strategists should consider the portfolio of value creation and value appropriation capabilities a firm uses to create competitive advantage. Our view also contributes to economics because it suggests that strategic decisions about pricing capabilities have important implications for a fundamental economic action, determining prices. Managers in firms without effective pricing processes may be unable to set prices that reflect the wishes of its customers, so the customers may misuse their resources. As a result, resources may be used ineffectively. Our view of pricing as a capability therefore takes the resource‐based‐view straight to the heart of what is perhaps the central economic question: the best use of resources. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Network effects and the adoption of new technology: evidence from the U.S. telecommunications industry

This paper examines variations in the adoption of new technology by firms operating in a network-based industry: telecommunications. These variations are explained as a function of three network effects: the first is the conversion effect, driven by operations-related increasing returns to scale; the second is the consumption effect, driven by demand-side increasing returns to scale; the third is an imitative effect. We expect the conversion effect to be felt more strongly during earlier phases of a technology's evolution, while a strong consumption effect is felt throughout. The imitative effect is also expected to be felt throughout. These hypotheses are examined with respect to electronic switching adoption in the local operating sector of the U.S. telecommunications industry. An analysis of the variations in adoption levels of the 40 largest firms over a period lasting from 1973 to 1987 supports our expectations, except for the imitative effect. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Uncertainty in the transaction environment: an empirical test

Previous studies examining the relationship between uncertainty and vertical integration have produced a conflicting set of results. To clarify this puzzle we drew on the literature to conceptualize three distinct forms of uncertainty—primary, competitive, and supplier—and hypothesized that each had a different effect on vertical integration. The hypotheses were tested using experimental data collected from 308 managers. Consistent with our prediction of differential effects, we found that primary and competitive uncertainty were negatively associated with the decision to vertically integrate, but supplier uncertainty was positively related to the vertical integration decision. No interaction effects were found. Implications for theory and research are suggested. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Vertical integration versus vertical separation: An equilibrium model

In this paper, the role of strategic forces in vertical relationships is examined. Using a simple model of differentiated products with symmetric demands and costs, the Perfect equilibrium to a vertical integration-vertical separation game between manufacturers is determined. Given the assumptions of the model, I show that the manufacturer's decision whether to vertically integrate or to remain separate from its retailer depends on the degree of product differentiation. I show that when the products are poor substitutes, the only Perfect equilibrium is vertical integration by both manufacturers. As the products become closer substitutes, an additional Perfect equilibrium appears, both firms vertically separated. For manufacturers, the vertically separated equilibrium always Pareto dominates the vertical integration equilibrium when both equilibria exist.This paper is a revision of Chapter 4 of my Ph.D. dissertation. I wish to thank my Senior Supervisor, Professor Thomas W. Ross, for his many helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Canadian Economic Association meetings in Kingston, June 1991. Helpful comments and suggestions were also received from Keith Acheson, Leigh Anderson, Jeffrey Church, Chantale Lacasse, Frank Mathewson, and Don McFetridge and two anonymous referees. I am responsible for any errors or omissions.