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1.
The increasing danger of excess capacity in the regulated fixed networks calls into question the established long-standing pricing standards for wholesale services based on forward-looking long-run incremental costs (FL-LRAIC). Within the EU “Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications and Services”, the FL-LRAIC standard has worked quite well in expanding markets, although even there price-squeeze problems have appeared. In contracting markets the price-squeeze issue, however, becomes paramount and lower prices both at the wholesale and retail levels would be efficient. Because both expansion and contraction could be relevant in the future, this paper suggests an optional approach based on the wholesale price formula p=min{FL-LRAIC, Retail-Minus} with an optional replacement of per-minute charges by capacity-based access charges (CBC). This will generally protect alternative competitors against price-squeeze while at the same time allowing the fixed-network incumbent full downward price flexibility. It also protects alternative competitors and end users against excessively high prices. 相似文献
2.
We analyze an endogenous average cost based access pricing rule, where both the regulated firm and its rivals realize the
interdependence among their outputs and the regulated access price. In contrast, the existing literature on access pricing
has always assumed that the access price is exogenously fixed ex-ante. We show that endogenous access pricing neutralizes the artificial cost advantage that is enjoyed by the incumbent firm.
Further, endogenous access pricing results in a consumer surplus that is equal to or higher than that under exogenous access
pricing. If the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, then the welfare under endogenous access pricing is higher than
that under exogenous access pricing. 相似文献
3.
In many countries worldwide access networks are in the transition from copper to fiber access. During the transition phase copper and fiber networks are operated in parallel. All regulators facing this situation of technological change have to decide how to price unbundled access to the copper loop in this transition phase. Should they keep the usual forward looking long-run incremental cost standard charge, or should they move to some different approach? The authors propose to price copper access based on the modern equivalent asset (MEA) of fiber access. Since fiber access is superior to copper access, the cost of fiber access (as a basis for pricing copper access) should, however, be corrected by the performance delta between copper and fiber access. 相似文献
4.
This paper estimates reduced-form models for incumbent prices in the fixed telecommunications industry using data for European Union (EU) countries from 1998 to 2002. The regulation of fixed-line telephony has a significant impact on prices for residential consumers. Liberalization of the telecommunications industry decreased retail prices by about 8.2%. The introduction of carrier pre-selection and number portability had a negative impact on price levels. The estimation results also suggest that a 1% decrease in termination charges on the incumbent network led on average to a 0.17% decrease in the cost of usage basket for residential consumers. Furthermore, in the pricing regressions for incumbent local and national calls at peak and off-peak times interconnection charges are significant only in the estimation of national peak prices. A 1% decrease in single transit interconnection charges on the incumbent network led to a 0.31% decrease in incumbent national prices at peak times, as calculated for the average prices in the EU in 2002. 相似文献
5.
对于大多数无力自建WEEE 回收体系的生产企业选择加入PRO 是明智的选择。本文基于行业PRO 运作模式,构建了由两制造商和回收商联盟组成的供应链模型,将与市场增长挂钩的产品设计作为其中一制造商的竞争策略,研究了产品设计和回收双责任要求下供应链各主体的生产决策问题。研究发现:(1)当产品设计成本较低和市场增量较高时,以产品设计作为竞争策略的在位制造商可以淘汰竞争制造商;(2)当产品设计成本低于市场增量时,在位制造商的生产决策优于竞争制造商。一定条件下,竞争制造商存在“搭便车”行为;(3)产品设计降低了处理成本,但损害了回收商经济效益,回收商抵制过度产品设计,并通过转移价格实现供应链主体的利润配置。当经济驱动下回收商自愿回收时,更高的政府回收率会导致整个供应链经济效益变好;(4)存在一个三方共赢局面使三者经济效益都更优,存在一个双赢局面使回收商和在位制造商更优。 相似文献
6.
This article studies the impact of regulatory uncertainty on an incumbent’s incentives to undertake the socially optimal investments in NGA networks. Thus, a regulatory non-commitment setting in which the regulator sets the access price after the deployment of the NGA network is used. In particular, it is assumed that the regulator sets the access price at the marginal cost of providing the access with some probability and gives an access markup, which equals the average cost of the investments, with the complementary probability. It is found that when the slope of the marginal investment cost function is not particularly steep in relation to the impact of investments on demand, the incumbent underinvests compared to the socially optimal investment level. On the contrary, in a more realistic case when the impact of investments on demand is low in relation to the slope of the marginal investment cost function, the incumbent may overinvest or underinvest depending on the probability of incorporating an access markup into the access price. 相似文献
7.
In the beginning of fixed network liberalisation in Europe in the late 1990s, the main concern of regulators was to lower retail call prices. This was done by introducing wholesale regulation and promoting service-based competition. Some years later, the concern of some regulators turned from too high retail call prices to too low call prices, which might ‘squeeze’ entrants out of the market. This paper looks at a simple model in which this development is explained by increasing competitive pressure from an ‘outside opportunity’, most notably mobile telephony and cable. It is concluded that a margin squeeze is not necessarily used by the incumbent as a device to drive competitors out of the market and to increase market power but can also result from increased inter-modal competition. If this is the case, it is argued that the appropriate response would be deregulation or – under particular circumstances – a switch from cost-oriented access prices to alternatives such as retail-minus or capacity-based interconnection. 相似文献
8.
Coarse rice market integration between Nepal and India is analyzed applying a threshold autoregressive model. The price response behaviour of traders is found to be consistent with an asymmetric price adjustment mechanism, indicating coarse rice prices in Nepal respond to shocks originating in India. The results show that adjustments to negative price deviations from long-run stable equilibrium are faster than adjustments to the positive ones given a null threshold. Given that trade flows mainly from India to Nepal, Nepali traders would adjust their prices upward to align with the long-run equilibrium value relatively more quickly in the case of negative price deviations, than if the price deviations were positive. Such a high speed of adjustment to negative price deviations could be detrimental to net food buyers’ food security status in the absence of a price stabilization mechanism. However, a price stabilization policy in Nepal, a food deficit and import dependent country, would hardly have any effect on prices unless further effort is made to build up the level of national food reserves for short-term food security interventions. In the current context of structurally low levels of national food reserves, an alternative short-term policy such as foreign aid, in the form of food or income transfers, targeting the most vulnerable households to price increases is necessary through social safety net programmes. In the long-run, an improvement of transportation infrastructure between market hubs (other than the Biratnagar trade basin) in the Terai (Nepal) and India would contribute to the reduction of transaction costs and create incentives for more competition in formal cross-border trade with India. In times of negative shocks such as the high food price crisis in 2008, restrictive food trade policies in India will continue to undermine household food security in Nepal. 相似文献
9.
DAMIEN J. NEVEN LARS‐HENDRIK R
LLER ZHENTANG ZHANG 《The Journal of industrial economics》2006,54(3):351-368
This paper allows for endogenous costs in the estimation of price cost margins. In particular, we estimate price‐cost margins when firms bargain over wages. We extent the standard two‐equation set‐up (demand and first‐order condition in the product market) to include a third equation, which is derived from bargaining over wages. In this way, price‐cost margins are determined by wages and vice versa. We implement the model using data for eight European airlines from 1976–1994, and show that the treatment of endogenous costs has important implications for the measurement of price‐cost margins and the assessment of market power. Our main result is that observed prices in Europe are virtually identical to monopoly prices, even though observed margins are consistent with Nash behavior. Apparently, costs had been inflated to the point that the European consumers were faced with a de facto monopoly prices. 相似文献
10.
《Telecommunications Policy》2018,42(4):315-322
A key concern with the Licensed-shared access (LSA) approach currently being developed by European regulators is that leaving incumbents and secondary users to agree to bilateral arrangements may be insufficient to incentivise an optimal level of sharing.We propose an efficient auction mechanism to incentivise incumbent users to offer shared access to the spectrum they use. The mechanism consists of two stages. In the first stage, LSA licences are auctioned. In the second stage, the incumbent is provided with a choice of either granting access under an LSA agreement to the winner of the auction or not. If the incumbent accepts, its existing licence fee is reduced, whereas, if it rejects, its existing licence fee is increased. The change in the licence fee is such that a rational incumbent always opts to share when it is efficient to do so, i.e. when the cost of sharing is below the value to the secondary user.We also explore how this simple mechanism can be extended to situations in which there is more than one incumbent in a band. Our proposed approach involves package (combinatorial) bidding and linear reference prices. 相似文献
11.
Access Pricing in the Postal Sector: Theory and Simulations 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Philippe de Donder 《Review of Industrial Organization》2006,28(3):307-326
This paper studies a theoretical model aimed at assessing the optimal access charges and retail prices in the postal sector.
It takes explicitly into account three main characteristics of the postal sector: the ability of entrants to bypass the incumbent’s
delivery network; the imposition on the incumbent, but not on entrants of universal service obligations; and the provision
of access to both competitors and customers. The paper first develops analytical formulations of the optimal access charges
and the incumbent’s end-to-end retail price. It then presents calibrated results illustrating the impact on prices and welfare
of various scenarios. 相似文献
12.
《Telecommunications Policy》2001,25(8-9):611-623
The analysis in this paper considers the problem of excessive originating and terminating access charges imposed by some competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) in the United States. The problem arises because the current institutional structure provides an incentive for CLECs to charge for access service in excess of what a competitive market would indicate. An examination of the data shows that the problem of excessive access charges imposed by CLECs is very real. An analysis of terminating access charges for September 2000 reveals that average terminating access charges billed to three interexchange carriers (IXCs) are excessive, exceeding average price cap regulated incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC) access charges by 370–470 percent. Some solutions to the problem are offered including a first-best solution whereby the calling party would be required to pay for originating access service and have the receiving party pay for terminating access service. A second-best solution would be to limit CLEC's access charges to an IXC to be less than or equal to the access charges of the ILEC with which it directly competes for customers. 相似文献
13.
Patrick DeGraba 《International Journal of Industrial Organization》2013,31(5):516-526
Recent literature has shown that an incumbent can use exclusive contracts to maintain supra-competitive prices when buyers of the good are also competitors. Most of the models require the incumbent to completely prevent a more efficient potential entrant from entering, and assume that the entrant is exogenously prevented from making exclusive offers. Such models cannot explain how exclusive arrangements can lower welfare when they do not completely foreclose a small rival, when the rival can make exclusive offers, nor can they identify rudimentary relationships such as how a dominant supplier's size affects his incentive and ability to exclude and lower welfare. I extend the intuition of the literature by formally modeling competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival selling to competing downstream firms. I show that a dominant supplier can pay downstream firms for exclusivity, allowing him to maintain supra-competitive input prices, even when a small rival that is more efficient at serving some portion of the market can make exclusive offers. I also show that exclusives need not completely exclude the small rival to cause competitive harm. The payment the dominant supplier makes for exclusivity equals the incremental rents that the rival's input could generate if exactly one downstream firm sold final goods using it. 相似文献
14.
House Prices and Inflation 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
The present paper examines the long-run impact of inflation on homeowner equity by investigating the relationship between house prices and the prices of nonhousing goods and services, rather than return series and inflation rates as in previous empirical studies on the inflation hedging ability of real estate. There are two reasons for this methodological departure from prior practice: (1) while the total return on housing cannot be accurately measured, the total return on housing is fully reflected in housing prices, and (2) given that using returns or differencing a time series leads to a loss of long-run information contained in the series, valuable long-run information can be captured by using prices. Also, unlike previous related studies, we exclude housing costs from goods and services prices to avoid potential bias in estimating how inflation affects housing prices. Monthly data series are collected for existing and for new house prices as well as the consumer price index excluding housing costs for the period 1968–2000. Based on both autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) models and recursive regressions, the empirical results yield estimated Fisher coefficients that are consistently greater than one over the sample period. Thus, we infer that house prices are a stable inflation hedge in the long run. 相似文献
15.
Thomas Blake 《Real Estate Economics》2019,47(4):1089-1118
The demand for housing is heavily influenced by access to employment opportunities. The cost of gasoline determines, in part, the cost of such access and therefore the relative demand across markets with varying commuting needs. Locally exogenous gasoline price movements demonstrate the causal impact of higher fuel costs on housing markets: a shift of market demand toward real estate markets with less costly commutes. Higher fuel prices increase the value of real estate with shorter commutes and easier access to driving alternatives relative to more driving dependent homes. Every incremental $1 per gallon of gasoline reduces home values by 0.143% for every additional mile relative to counterfactual markets, or $5,200 for the average home and commute. This translates into a discount rate of 6.4%, comparable to mortgage rates for the period. 相似文献
16.
There is a widespread belief that consumer coffee prices are high relative to bean prices and that lower consumer prices would lead to substantial increases in bean exports from Third-World countries. This issue is evaluated by analysing how retail prices, preferences and market power influence coffee demand in Sweden. A demand function is estimated for the period 1968–2002 and used, together with information on import prices of coffee beans, to simulate an oligopoly model. This approach gives estimates of the maximum average degree of market power and shows how coffee demand would react to reductions in marginal cost to its minimum level. The maximum level of market power is found to be low, but it generates large spreads between consumer and bean prices because the price elasticity has low absolute values. Moreover, the impact of a price decrease would be small because long-run coffee demand is dominated by changes in the population structure in combination with different preferences across age groups. Hence, a change to perfect competition would only have a negligible effect on bean imports. 相似文献
17.
《Food Policy》2013
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the private sector maize marketing system in Malawi using threshold autoregression models. Two dimensions of maize market performance are evaluated: (1) inter-regional trade and spatial price transmission; and (2) storage and seasonal price relationships. In both cases, threshold autoregression models which account for nonlinearities predicted by economic theory are applied. Results indicate that spatial price transmission and seasonal price patterns in private sector maize markets in Malawi are generally consistent with long-run competitive inter-regional trade and storage behavior, and that in most cases shocks to long-run equilibrium are arbitraged away quickly. This suggests the private sector in Malawi is generally doing a good job of transporting maize from surplus to deficit regions and smoothing maize consumption between harvests. 相似文献
18.
Equilibrium price dispersion with heterogeneous searchers 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Firms simultaneously set prices in a homogeneous-product market where uninformed consumers search for price information. Some uninformed consumers are “local” searchers who visit only one seller, whereas others search sequentially with an optimal reservation price. Equilibrium prices may follow a mixture distribution, with clusters of high and low prices separated by a zero-density gap. When the (exogenous) reservation price of local searchers depart from that of the optimizing sequential searchers by a relatively small amount, the presence of local searchers either has no effect on market outcomes or benefits all consumers. A reduction in search cost sometimes leads to higher equilibrium prices. 相似文献
19.
《Telecommunications Policy》2022,46(8):102352
Internet users have suffered collateral damage in tussles over paid peering between large ISPs and large content providers. Paid peering is a relationship where two networks exchange traffic with payment, which provides direct access to each other’s customers without having to pay a third party to carry that traffic for them. The issue will arise again when the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) considers a new net neutrality order.We first consider the effect of paid peering on broadband prices. We adopt a two-sided market model in which an ISP maximizes profit by setting broadband prices and a paid peering price. We analytically derive the profit-maximizing prices, and show that they satisfy a generalization of the well-known Lerner rule. Our result shows that paid peering fees reduce the premium plan price, increase the video streaming price and the total price for premium tier customers who subscribe to video streaming services; however, the ISP passes on to its customers only a portion of the revenue from paid peering. ISP profit increases but video streaming profit decreases as an ISP moves from settlement-free peering to paid peering price.We next consider the effect of paid peering on consumer surplus. We find that consumer surplus is a uni-modal function of the paid peering fee. The paid peering fee that maximizes consumer surplus depends on elasticities of demand for broadband and for video streaming. However, consumer surplus is maximized when paid peering fees are significantly lower than those that maximize ISP profit. However, it does not follow that settlement-free peering is always the policy that maximizes consumer surplus. The peering price depends critically on the incremental ISP cost per video streaming subscriber; at different costs, it can be negative, zero, or positive. 相似文献
20.
Joo Vareda 《Telecommunications Policy》2010,34(11):697-710
This papers studies if access price regulation has an impact on incumbents’ incentives to invest in their network that might differ according to the nature of investments, that is, quality-upgrading and cost-reducing. It is shown that if the marginal cost of quality-upgrading is very low both types of investment are increasing in the access price. If the marginal cost of cost-reducing is very low, both investments decrease after an increase in the access price. Otherwise, a high access price increases the incentives for quality-upgrading and reduces the incentives for cost-reducing. Therefore, regulators should set a higher access price the lower is the marginal cost of quality-upgrading as compared to the marginal cost of cost-reducing. 相似文献