Will 5G lead to more spectrum sharing? Discussing recent developments of the LSA and the CBRS spectrum sharing frameworks

This paper discusses two recent spectrum management frameworks, the Licensed Shared Access (LSA) developed in Europe and the Citizens Broadband Radio Services (CBRS) developed in the United States (US), which build their management approach on spectrum sharing. The importance of these two frameworks, besides their leading normative roles, is that recent debates have shaped them as cases to consider in the adoption of the upcoming fifth generation (5G) of mobile communications technology, in particular in the C-band. A discussion on these two frameworks is organised by following the four-step decision-making guide for spectrum management developed by Pogorel (2007), which requires spectrum authorities to make decisions in four areas of spectrum management: frequency harmonization, technology standardization, type of usage rights and assignment procedures.Notwithstanding the similarities with respect to the four areas of spectrum management considered, the two frameworks differ on their implementation schedules. CBRS leads the way, with a handful of providers receiving government approval to manage spectrum access controllers, and as of mid 2020, scheduled to have allocated spectrum licenses on half of its available spectrum. On the contrary, European countries have shown scarce interest towards implementing the LSA, despite the extensive work carried out by regulatory and standardization bodies.This may suggest that there are external contextual factors which influence the successful implementation of spectrum sharing frameworks. An interesting aspect which deserves further investigation is the institutional context in which decisions related to radio spectrum management are taken. Unlike the US authorities, European institutions do not possess coercive enforcement powers with respect to spectrum sharing. This key difference may contribute to explaining the different speed at which LSA and CBRS are implemented.     

Setting licence fees for renewing telecommunication spectrum based on an auction

This paper presents a methodology for setting fees for the renewal or extension of spectrum licences, by using the outcome of an auction for comparable licences but with a different licence period. The methodology is a combination of market and cash flow valuation and consists of two main steps. First, prices for spectrum corresponding to that of the licences to be extended are derived from the auction outcome. Second, the relative value addition of the extension period for the new licensee, compared to the value of the licences auctioned, is derived by using a model for the development of EBITDA for an operator over time. A combination of these two is used to calculate fees that match the opportunity costs of extension. Thus, optimum alignment is achieved with the policy objective of using licence fees only to promote efficient use of spectrum, while avoiding state aid at the same time.     

Spectrum auctions in a thin market: The Korean case

In 2010, the Korean government adopted spectrum auctions and introduced a market mechanism into spectrum management. However, the government has often been confronted with conflicts between diverse policy goals of spectrum auctions. A thin spectrum market, where only three incumbent MNOs bid for spectrum, has led to concerns that the government may fail to maximize revenues.Based on the past experiences in Korea, this paper examines the Korean government's choice of auction rules in the face of conflicting policy goals. This paper also recommends that the government implement the following regulatory reforms and consider the auction related measures to deepen its spectrum market or increase the number of bidders: (i) relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions, (ii) introduction of regional or site-specific spectrum licenses, and (iii) modification of auction formats. Spectrum markets tend to be thin in many countries, and the Korean experience may offer implications for those countries when they implement spectrum auctions.     

Spectrum limits and competition in mobile markets: the role of licence fees

The paper discusses the impact of scarcity of frequency spectrum on the performance of the mobile telecommunications industry. An oligopoly model with endogenous sunk costs illustrates the trade off between ex ante extraction of oligopoly rents and market entry of firms. The determination of the licence fee through an auction provides scope for setting market structure endogenously: the higher the licence fee, the lower the number of firms sustained by the market. High licence fees may be a signal for post-entry collusion. Differences across national regulatory frameworks with respect to the conditions for allocation of spectrum licenses may induce problems of fair competition in an integrated market.     

Endogenous Average Cost Based Access Pricing

We analyze an endogenous average cost based access pricing rule, where both the regulated firm and its rivals realize the interdependence among their outputs and the regulated access price. In contrast, the existing literature on access pricing has always assumed that the access price is exogenously fixed ex-ante. We show that endogenous access pricing neutralizes the artificial cost advantage that is enjoyed by the incumbent firm. Further, endogenous access pricing results in a consumer surplus that is equal to or higher than that under exogenous access pricing. If the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, then the welfare under endogenous access pricing is higher than that under exogenous access pricing.     

Dynamic usage of narrowband spectrum

We examine the potential for expansion of the white space spectrum sharing model in the 400 MHz band. As opposed to UHF broadcast spectrum, which contains unassigned or idle segments known as white spaces, the 400 MHz band is characterised by intensive licence usage. However, productive spectrum usage does not guarantee allocative efficiency, which would require knowledge of the highest value service for each licence. 400 MHz frequencies are not priced on opportunity cost. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the economically efficient mix of services to deploy in the 400 MHz band. Drawing parallels with the high-economic value revealed and generated through the operations of unlicensed white space devices in UHF broadcast spectrum, we identify untapped 400 MHz spectrum capacity, which we refer to as narrowband spaces. Encouraging dynamic spectrum usage of narrowband spaces could, similarly to TV white space usage help realise the efficient allocation of the 400 MHz band. However, the narrowband nature of the 400 MHz licences and high licensing turnover imply a significantly different concept of dynamic spectrum access than that considered for TV Bands. The paper discusses regulatory implications and the type of services suited to exploit narrowband spaces.     

The 5G spectrum auction in Chile

In 2021, the Chilean government implemented a first-price package auction to allocate electromagnetic spectrum for 5G mobile services. The auction was run sequentially for different spectrum bands, allowing firms to exploit band complementarities. It was a combinatorial auction, so firms could bid for any combination of blocks within a band. It contemplated spectrum caps – upper limits on the spectrum for each firm – to ensure competitiveness. The beauty contests used in previous processes became obsolete, as there was a need to promote competitiveness and transparency in the telecommunication sector. Four incumbents and one potential entrant participated in the auction. The auction raised more than USD $450 million, which was six times more than the sum of the revenues of all previous contests in the country. We discuss this experience and show how different aspects of the context justified our design choices.     

Untangling the paradox of Licensed Shared Access: Need for regulatory refocus

This paper looks at the evolution of the Licensed Shared Access (LSA) – a pioneering European scheme for tapping into radio spectrum that remains assigned to incumbent users. Using the theoretical framework of Co-evolutionary Development, we build analytical case study to understand why this crucial innovation did not take hold in the European wireless market, despite a decade of regulatory and standardisation efforts. Drawing on literature analysis and expert knowledge, we identify barriers that contributed to the stalling of LSA deployment and co-evolutionary forces that could help alleviating them. We expose the need for more proactive engagement of European regional policymakers and suggest directions for refocusing future LSA regulatory activities to target an expanded set of frequency bands, as well as broadening their scope to include local non-public networks and industry verticals.     

NON‐COOPERATIVE ENTRY DETERRENCE IN LICENSE AUCTIONS: DYNAMIC VERSUS SEALED BID*

We examine the impact of potential entry on incumbent bidding behavior in license auctions, in both dynamic and sealed bid formats. Unlike sealed bid auctions, dynamic auctions reveal information about the identities of potential winners and allow bidders to revise their bids. This helps incumbents to coordinate their entry deterrence efforts. If entry is sufficiently costly for each incumbent, only the dynamic auction has an equilibrium where entry is deterred for sure. Numerical calculations suggest that, regardless of how costly entry is for each incumbent, sealed bid auctions can generate a higher probability of entry as well as a more efficient allocation.     

The value of 1800 MHz and 2100 MHz spectrums in India and implications for auction design

The sequence of events leading up to the upcoming auction of 1800 MHz spectrum in India has led to the auctions acquiring an extraordinary significance for the future of the Indian mobile industry. A key feature of the auction design proposed by the regulator TRAI is the benchmarking of the reserve price of 1800 MHz to the price of 2100 – 3G spectrum revealed in the 2010 auction. In the context of the low number of LTE devices available and the fragmentation in the 1800 MHz band, this paper proposes reducing the duration of spectrum holding to ten years (from the current level of twenty years), and calibrating the reserve price of 1800 MHz with its value with GSM deployment. An economic model is used to compute the value of startup and incremental 1800 MHz spectrum. The estimated values are shown to differ from the value of 2100 MHz spectrum at a pan-India level and also in their distribution across circles. A new set of reserve prices are computed based on the estimation. The estimated values are also shown to be close to the AGR-adjusted price revealed in the 2001 auction. A reserve price based on the 2001 auction is also provided. Concomitant features of the auction are suggested to give coherence to the auction design.     

The unfinished history of usage rights for spectrum

The key task in the next stage of spectrum management is to adapt regulation to the prospect of widespread sharing, on a much more sophisticated basis than sharing is used today. There is a role for the regulator to take steps to expand the area of choice within which public and private sector users can operate. This is best done in general by enhancing the flexibility of usage rights, which itself is best achieved by enhancing the freedom to trade them in the dimensions of time, space, level of interference and priority of access, by subdividing, re-aggregating, etc. However, there are considerable transactions cost impediments to trading where unlicensed users are involved. This creates a role for the regulator pro-actively to investigate different allocations, to make provisions for the most promising to occur and to incorporate both in refarming exercises and in primary assignments based on auctions configurations of usage rights, which might favour promising avenues of shared spectrum use.     

Access regulation,entry and investments in telecommunications

This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In the case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms’ investments. We find that without regulation the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this generates a social inefficient level of facility based entry. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in the case of facilities based entry.     

How to Auction a Bottleneck Monopoly When Underhand Vertical Agreements are Possible

A seaport is awarded in a Demsetz auction to the operator bidding the lowest cargo-handling fee. The competitive auction is irrelevant if the port operator integrates into shipping and sabotages competitors, thus providing a motive for a ban on vertical integration. The paper shows that such a ban increases welfare even when underhand agreements with shippers are possible. For this result to attain, the auction must be combined with a sufficiently high floor on the cargo-handling fee that operators can bid in the auction. With no floor, a Demsetz auction is worse than an unregulated bottleneck monopoly.     

Economic viability of private commons: Framework and guidelines for profitability

Ongoing regulatory reforms have led to several novel spectrum sharing models under the general umbrella of dynamic spectrum sharing. The private commons model introduced by FCC in 2004 allows spectrum licensees to provide secondary access to spectrum on an opportunistic basis while retaining ownership. Since wireless communication systems are typically overprovisioned in order to deliver service-level guarantees to (primary) users under short-term load variations, this model bears significant potential by facilitating utilization of temporal and spatial surplus of capacity through serving secondary users at possibly different service levels. A potential barrier to adoption of the private commons model is the uncertainty about secondary price–demand relationship which is difficult to predict in an emerging market: A selected price for secondary access may be profitable for some values of secondary demand but not for others, leading to a profound uncertainty about ultimate benefit of spectrum sharing. This paper aims to eliminate such an uncertainty by devising concrete guidelines and methods for profitability. The paper establishes that the price of secondary spectrum access can be chosen to guarantee profitability for any value of secondary demand: It is shown that for both the coordinated and uncoordinated commons regimes a profitable price should exceed a threshold value, which can be calculated. Hence profitability of private commons is insensitive to the demand function. This observation has two complementary interpretations: From a business perspective it provides a constructive approach to profitability; and from a regulatory perspective it provides reassurance that private commons is a healthy model. The paper also leverages the insensitivity property and outlines a technique to further enhance revenue via iterative spectrum offerings.     

Alternative radio licensing arrangements: A case study of the multipoint distribution service

Currently, the FCC assigns radio licences after making a determination of the public interest. Conflicting licence applications are resolved through comparative hearings. This mechanism is cumbersome and unreliable. This article analyses three alternatives: Increasing the available spectrum; an auction; or, lottery of radio licences. The analysis deals specifically with the Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS). The analysis suggests that increasing the spectrum allocation will create more assignments than will be demanded by MDS. Rough calculations suggest that auctions offer a more efficient selection mechanism. Lotteries with resale of the license are better than hearings, but not as good as auctions.     

Investment sharing in broadband networks

This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent firm and an Other Licensed Operator (OLO) in the broadband market, where the incumbent has an investment option to build a Next Generation network (NGN) and it can do so by making an investment sharing agreement with the OLO, or alone. Two different kinds of investment sharing contractual forms are analyzed, a basic investment sharing, where no side-payment is given for the use of the NGN between co-investors, and joint-venture, where a side-payment is set by the co-investing firms. Results show that investment sharing can potentially be beneficial in terms of competition and investments, but the number of firms involved matters and so does the choice of the NGN access price, for insiders and outsiders of the agreement. Even when the presence of firms outside of the agreement force insiders to compete more fiercely, there might be a concern with the potential exclusion of the outsiders from the NGN.     

The evolving 5G case study in United States unilateral spectrum planning and policy

This paper tracks increasingly aggressive initiatives by the United States government to reallocate spectrum on an expedited and unilateral basis well before conclusion of inter-governmental coordination. Rather than embrace the customary commitment to achieve consensus on global spectrum allocations at the International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”), the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has auctioned off large blocks of frequencies for the next generation (“5G”) of wireless services.The FCC might have framed its first 5G auction, reassigning Ultra High Frequency (“UHF”) spectrum, as a one-time deviation from compliance with long standing, intergovernmental coordination procedures. These frequencies have ideal signal propagation characteristics and the Commission could use financial incentives—unavailable in most nations—to expedite “repacking” by incumbent broadcasters willing to move, share or abandon spectrum in exchange for ample financial compensation. However, the FCC has continued to auction off 5G spectrum on grounds that it must find ways to abate an acute shortage of wireless bandwidth and doing so will regain or maintain global leadership in wireless technologies. This paper offers a critical rebuke to unilateral spectrum management, because the short-term benefits expected by the U. S. government likely will be offset by countervailing harms to 5G manufacturers, carriers and consumers. The paper tracks fractious preparation for the ITU's 2019 World Radio Conference by the U.S. delegation and the mixed record achieved there. Additionally, the paper explains how injecting trade, industrial policy and national security issues at the ITU can trigger more delays and disputes, including possible retaliation by nations displeased with U.S. efforts to subvert traditional technology optimization goals.A worst case scenario has the ITU deadlocked and unable to reach closure on “mission critical” spectrum planning issues at World Radio Conferences, convened every four years. The paper concludes that costs and likely challenges to the efficacy and legitimacy of the ITU will reduce the benefits accruing from the FCC's unilateral, spectrum planning campaign.     

Bidder Asymmetry in Infrastructure Procurement: Are There any Fringe Bidders?

Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from intensified auction competition could be enormous in the public procurement context. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competition and break potential collusive arrangements among incumbent bidders. Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. Using data from official development projects, this paper shows that entrants actually submitted aggressive bids in the presence of incumbent(s) in the road sector and to a certain extent in the water sector. For electricity projects, the general competition effect is found to be particularly significant, but the entrant effect remains unclear. The results suggest that auctioneers should foster competition in public procurement, including fringe bidders, to contain public infrastructure investment costs.     

Unbundling and infrastructure competition for broadband adoption: Implications for NGA regulation

The common idea of open access policy is that it refers to the sharing of particular elements, such as wholesale access networks, backhaul, under-sea cable and internet exchange points in fixed and mobile networks. In broadband networks, the use of open access policy usually refers to the infrastructure parts, which are considered a bottleneck. Many regulators have generally focused open access policy on fixed broadband networks, especially digital subscriber line (DSL) technology, in the last decade. Local loop unbundling (LLU) regulation is one of the main strategies for the regulator to open access to an incumbent’s bottleneck network in order to soften its monopoly power and encourage competition in the DSL broadband market. The OECD countries have different strategies regarding unbundling local loop and infrastructure competition, as the characteristics and infrastructure networks of countries vary. There are currently more choices of next generation network (NGN) technologies to develop. While local loop unbundling may not be applied fully to NGN development (the cost is not sunk, more technologies are available to implement, incentive of investment by operator), it can indicate benefits and drawbacks of open access policy in the past decade that can be adapted to NGN.The empirical results of this study show that during 2002–2008, LLU regulation was one of the strategies used to increase broadband adoption in countries that had difficulty encouraging infrastructure competition. Unbundling regulation can therefore be implemented carefully and differently in each country that has inefficiency that is harmful to consumers in its market from a monopoly incumbent. Infrastructure competition, on the other hand, is introduced as another strategy to increase broadband adoption. The empirical results of this study indicate that infrastructure competition can be used as a strategy when there are already enough infrastructures in the area or country. These results support the idea of using open access and infrastructure competition policy depending on the existing competition of broadband infrastructure in each country.     

Synergistic valuations and efficiency in spectrum auctions

In spectrum auctions, bidders typically have synergistic values for combinations of licenses. This has been the key argument for the use of combinatorial auctions in the recent years. Considering synergistic valuations turns the allocation problem into a computationally hard optimization problem that generally cannot be approximated to a constant factor in polynomial time. Ascending auction designs such as the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction (SMRA) and the single-stage or two-stage Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) can be seen as simple heuristic algorithms to solve this problem. Such heuristics do not necessarily compute the optimal solution, even if bidders are truthful. We study the average efficiency loss that can be attributed to the simplicity of the auction algorithm with different levels of synergies. Our simulations are based on realistic instances of bidder valuations we inferred from bid data from the 2014 Canadian 700 MHz auction. The goal of the paper is not to reproduce the results of the Canadian auction but rather to perform “out-of-sample” counterfactuals comparing SMRA and CCA under different synergy conditions when bidders maximize payoff in each round. With “linear” synergies, a bidder's marginal value for a license grows linearly with the total number of licenses won, while with the “extreme national” synergies, this marginal value is independent of the number of licenses won unless the bidder wins all licenses in a national package. We find that with the extreme national synergy model, the CCA is indeed more efficient than SMRA. However, for the more realistic case of linear synergies, SMRA outperforms various versions of CCA that have been implemented in the field including the one used in the Canadian 700 MHz auction. Overall, the efficiency loss of all ascending auction algorithms is small even with high synergies, which is remarkable given the simplicity of the algorithms.