Weekend Effect, 'Reverse' Weekend Effect, and Investor Trading Activities

Abstract:   In this study, we document evidence of a 'reverse' weekend effect – whereby Monday returns are significantly positive and they are higher than the returns on other days of the week – over an extended period of eleven years (from 1988 to 1998). We also find that the 'traditional' weekend effect and the 'reverse' effect are related to firm size in that the 'traditional' weekend effect tends to be associated with small firms while the 'reverse' weekend effect tends to be associated with large firms. In addition, we find that during the period in which the 'reverse' weekend effect is observed, Monday returns for large firms tend to follow previous Friday returns when previous Friday returns are positive , but they do not follow the previous Friday returns when Friday returns are negative . Furthermore, we find that during the period in which the 'reverse' weekend effect is observed, Monday returns are positively related to the volume of medium‐size and block transactions, but negatively related to the volume of odd‐lot transactions.     

A Further Investigation of the Weekend Effect in Stock Returns

This study uses a longer time period and additional stocks to further investigate the weekend effect. We find consistently negative Monday returns (1) for the S & P Composite as early as 1928, (2) for Exchange-traded stocks of firms of all sizes, and (3) for actively traded over-the-counter (OTC) stocks. The OTC results are based on bid prices and therefore appear to reject specialist-related explanations. For the 30 individual stocks of the Dow Jones Industrial Index, the average correlation between Friday and Monday returns is positive and the highest of all pairs of successive days. The latter finding is inconsistent with fairly general measurement-error explanations.     

The “reverse” weekend effect: the U.S. market versus international markets

In this paper we find that the “reverse” weekend effect—where average Monday returns tend to be positive—is a unique feature of the U.S. market. During the time the U.S. market exhibits the reverse weekend effect, foreign markets still show the “traditional” weekend effect or no effect at all. The results persist even after we sort the data by week of the month and month of the year. We also find that in foreign markets negative Monday returns tend to follow negative Friday returns. However, in the U.S. market, positive Monday returns tend to follow positive Friday returns.     

Day-of-the-week and intraday effects in stock returns

This study examines day-of-the-week effects using hourly values of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. We find that over the 1963–1983 period the weekend effect has sifted from characterizing active trading on Monday to characterizing the non-trading weekend. Over the early part of our sample period negative returns characterize each hour of trading on Monday, while the return from Friday close to Monday open is positive. In the most recent subperiod, Monday average hourly returns after noon are all positive and the weekend effect is due to negative average returns from Friday close to Monday open.     

Short Selling and the Weekend Effect in Nasdaq Stock Returns

We examine daily short selling of Nasdaq stocks to explore whether speculative short selling causes a significant portion of the weekend effect in returns. We identify a weekend effect in speculative short selling whereby it constitutes a larger percentage of trading volume on Mondays versus Fridays. We find an opposite effect in dealer short selling, consistent with market makers adding liquidity and stability. Our main finding is that speculative short selling does not explain an economically meaningful portion of the weekend effect in returns, even among the firms most that are most actively shorted. This finding contradicts some prior studies.     

Short selling of ADRs and foreign market short-sale constraints

We examine the effect of home market short-sale constraints on securities that also trade in other countries that have more liberal short-sale rules. In particular, we focus on the case of ADRs traded in the US, as in some cases, the home markets of these ADRs prohibit short selling. We find that short sellers more heavily trade ADRs from countries where short selling is prohibited than from markets where short selling is allowed. Furthermore, we find that the greater levels of short selling in ADRs with binding home-market constraints is driven by stocks with greater dispersion of investors’ opinion, low fundamentals-to-price ratios, and recent price increases. Our results support the hypothesis that short sellers target ADRs with home market short-sale constraints because these ADRs are more often subject to temporary misvaluation.     

The Reversing Weekend Effect: Evidence from the U.S. Equity Markets

The well-known weekend effect has been reversing in Major U.S. indices from late 1980s to late 1990s. The correlation between Monday and Friday returns also exhibited a declining trend, and fluctuated around zero in the 1990s. A power ratio method is developed to measure consistently the relative contribution of Friday and Monday returns to the return of the week in each individual year. The revealed dynamics of the anomaly explains why previous researchers report different or conflicting findings. The anomaly may not be necessarily related to firm size.     

INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON WEEKEND ANOMALIES

Recent studies on the U.S. market find that the Monday effect is observed mainly when the return on the previous Friday is negative or when the Monday falls within the last two weeks of the month. I look for international evidence and examine whether such properties of the Monday effect are related to another anomalous phenomenon—high weekend correlation. By examining twenty‐three equity market indexes, I find that the negative Friday is, in general, important to the Monday effect. Furthermore, Monday returns tend to be lowest on the fourth week of the month. Although high weekend correlation is also common to these markets, it seems not related to the bad‐Friday factor and shows no seasonality across weeks of the month. JEL classification: G15, G10.     

Weekend gold returns in bull and bear markets

This study examines the weekend effect in gold returns during bull and bear markets over the period 1975 through 2011. It shows that gold returns from close on Friday to close on Monday are significantly lower than returns during the rest of the week. This result is due largely to gold returns during bear markets. During gold bull markets, gold weekend returns are not significantly different from weekday returns. The study shows that the effect has substantial economic implications for gold investors. The effect is shown to be related to a significantly negative skewness in the weekend returns.     

The Weekend Effect, 'Reverse' Weekend Effect, and Firm Size

In this paper, we find a 'reverse%rsquo; weekend effect — whereby returns for Monday are positive and significantly greater than returns for the preceding Friday — in recent data for major stock indexes. We also find that, while a weak weekend effect exists in portfolios of smaller firms, the effect begins to diminish and weak 'reverse' weekend effect begins to appear in medium size firms. The 'reverse' weekend effect becomes strong and statistically significant in portfolios of large firms. The detection of a 'reverse' weekend effect in portfolios of large firms is a new finding in the literature.     

The skinny on the 2008 naked short-sale restrictions

On July 15, 2008, the US Securities and Exchange Commission announced temporary restrictions on naked short sales of the stocks of 19 financial firms. The restrictions offer a unique empirical setting to test Miller’s (1977) conjecture that short-sale constraints result in overpriced securities and low subsequent returns. Consistent with Miller’s overpricing hypothesis, we find evidence of a positive (negative) market reaction to the announcement (expiration) of the short-sale restrictions. Announcement returns are higher for firms that appear to be subject to more naked short selling in the days immediately preceding the announcement of the restrictions. The restrictions are successful in eliminating naked short sales for the restricted stocks, but naked short sales increase dramatically for a closely matched sample of financial firms during the restricted period. We also find that the restrictions negatively impact various measures of liquidity, including bid-ask spreads and trading volume. From a public policy perspective, our findings suggest that, at a minimum, policymakers should pause when considering further short sale restrictions.     

Trading Returns for the Weekend Effect Using Intraday Data

The existence of the weekend effect has been documented as early as 1885. This paper examines whether the serial dependence in returns around weekends and the magnitude of negative Friday returns can be used to produce superior trading returns. We find some success for this endeavor after accounting for transaction costs (including the bid/ask spread), especially when trading is confined to weekends for which there are large negative Friday returns and to positions opened on Friday afternoons. The effect of stocks trading ex-dividend on Mondays does not appear to bias our results.     

Idiosyncratic risk and the cross-section of stock returns: Merton (1987) meets Miller (1977)

Merton [1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42, 483–510] predicts that idiosyncratic risk should be priced when investors hold sub-optimally diversified portfolios, and cross-sectional stock returns should be positively related to their idiosyncratic risk. However, the literature generally finds a negative relationship between returns and idiosyncratic risk, which is more consistent with Miller's [1977. Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion. Journal of Finance 32, 1151–1168] analysis of asset pricing under short-sale constraints. We examine the cross-sectional effects of idiosyncratic risk while explicitly recognizing the confounding effects that dispersion of beliefs and short-sale constraints produce in the Merton framework. We find strong support for Merton's [1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42, 483–510] model among stocks that have low levels of investor recognition and for which short selling is limited. For these stocks, the relation between idiosyncratic risk and expected returns is positive, as predicted by Merton [1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42, 483–510].     

DAY OF THE WEEK EFFECTS: A TEST OF THE INFORMATION TIMING HYPOTHESIS

Many explanations have been offered for the negative Monday effect. An obvious conjecture is that the negative return might be due to firms timing the release of information after the market closes on Friday. We test this conjecture on a sample of 233 firms for 1986. Using a firm's board meeting date as a proxy for high information days we find that a firm's Monday return near a board meeting date is more likely to be negative than other Monday returns. Also the remaining days of the week tend to be more positive than similar days further away from the board meeting. Our results appear to explain part of the negative Monday effect.     

Why do firm fundamentals predict returns? Evidence from short selling activity

This study uses short selling activity to test whether the relation between fundamentals and future returns is due to rational pricing or mispricing. We find that short sellers target firms with fundamental performance below market expectations. We also show that short selling activity reduces the return predictability of fundamentals by speeding up the price adjustments to negative fundamental signals. To further investigate whether the returns earned by short sellers reflect rational risk premia or mispricing, we exploit a natural experiment, namely Regulation of SHO, which creates exogenous shocks to short selling by temporarily relaxing short-sale constraints. Evidence from the experiment confirms that the superior returns to short sellers result from exploiting overpricing. Overall, our study suggests that the return predictability of fundamentals reflects mispricing rather than rational risk premia.     

Short-sale refinancing and price adjustment speed to bad news: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

Short selling may accelerate stock price adjustment to negative news. However, the literature provides mixed evidence for this prediction. Using short-sale refinancing and a staggered difference-in-differences (DID) model, this paper explores the effect of short selling on stock price adjustment. Our results show that (1) short-sale refinancing improves the speed of stock price adjustment to negative news. This result holds after we control for endogeneity. (2) The positive relationship between short-sale refinancing and stock price adjustment speed is significant in subsamples of stocks with higher earnings management or lower accuracy of analyst forecasts, indicating that firms with more opaque information are more likely to be targeted by short sellers. In subsamples of stocks with a higher ownership concentration or lower ownership by institutional investors, short selling is more likely to increase the speed of stock price adjustment, indicating that ownership structure may influence negative news mining. (3) As short-sale refinancing exacerbates the absorption of bad news by stock prices, it increases crash risk. This study enriches the research on the economic consequences of short selling and provides empirical evidence supporting regulations on short selling in China.     

Another New Look at the Monday Effect

We link up the findings of Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) and Wang, Li and Erickson (1997) by showing that negative Monday returns concentrate on days 18 to 26 of a month and they can be completely explained in the statistical sense by the negative returns on the previous Friday. More importantly, we observe a 'week–four effect'. Not only the returns on Mondays but also returns on other days are lower during the fourth week of a month. We suggest that liquidity selling by individual investors may be the reason.     

Migrate or not? The effects of regulation SHO on options trading activities

In this study, we investigate the effects of stock short-sale constraints on options trading by exploiting two US Securities and Exchange Commission rule changes under Regulation SHO: Rule 203 (locate and close-out requirements) and Rule 202T (temporary removal of short-sale price tests). We find that stock short selling activities decrease (increase) significantly after Rule 203 (Rule 202T) implementation, supporting the validity of Rule 203 (Rule 202T) as an exogenous increase (decrease) in short-sale constraints. Options volume increases significantly after Rule 203 went into effect and the result is more pronounced among firms with lower levels of institutional ownership and smaller options bid-ask spreads. Therefore, the evidence from Rule 203 suggests that investors may use options as substitutes for stock short sales when short selling is less feasible or more costly due to the locate and delivery requirements. In contrast, we find no significant change in the options trading volume of pilot stocks during the pilot program of Rule 202T. Overall, our results indicate that the impact of short-sale constraints on options trading varies with the types of constraints affected.     

Opinion Divergence Among Professional Investment Managers

Abstract:  We find that opinion divergence among professional investment managers is commonplace, using a large sample of transaction-level institutional trading data. When managers trade together, future returns are similar regardless if they are all buying or selling, inconsistent with the notion that professional investment managers possess stock picking ability or private information that is of investment value. However, when managers trade against each other, subsequent returns are low, especially for stocks that are difficult to short. This U-shaped disagreement-return relationship is consistent with Miller's (1977) hypothesis that, in the presence of short-sale constraints, opinion divergence can cause an upward bias in prices.     

THE DAY-OF-THE-WEEK ANOMALY: THE TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE EXPERIENCE

This paper studies the day-of-the-week effect employing Canadian stock returns from January 1, 1975 to June 30, 1989. The study finds that, as opposed to large capitalization stocks, low capitalization (thinly-traded) stocks tend to have a larger negative return on Tuesday rather than on Monday - possibly due to lags in the price adjustment of these stocks following the release of negative information. Two main issues are investigated in an attempt to explain the day-of-the-week effect and its persistence over time: (a) the role of dividends, and (b) the role of information flows. The study finds that firms are much more likely to go ex-dividend on Monday than on any other day of the week; however, after correcting for the dividend effect, Monday's returns are still significantly negative. With respect to information flows, we find evidence consistent with an information-flows-related explanation of the day-of-the-week effect, particularly with the idea that macro announcements cause negative Monday returns.