FINANCIAL DEREGULATION AND RELATIVE RISK OF AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY*

In the early 1980s the Australian economy underwent a period of rapid financial deregulation and liberalisation, the key symbol of this process being the floating of the exchange rate in December 1983. It has been suggested that one effect of such regulatory change is to alter the risk characteristics of economic units most directly impacted by the changes. In this vein, Brooks and Faff (1995) examined banking industry risk and found that deregulation coincided with a stabilising of the beta risk of banks. However, financial deregulation was expected to have widespread effects across the economy. Accordingly, in this paper we further test for possible effects by examining the level and stability of the beta risk of individual stocks and portfolios in other industries in both prederegulation and post-deregulation periods. From a comparison of the two periods we find that the effects on beta levels vary across industries. However in general post-deregulation betas have become stable across a large range of key industry classifications. This provides interesting insights into the effects of financial deregulation on relative risk and why different industries may have different experiences.     

BANK COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: LIQUIDITY RISK PERSPECTIVE

We study whether competition affects banks' liquidity risk‐taking, which was at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. We find that banks with greater market power take more liquidity risk, implying that decreased competition leads to financial fragility. During a financial crisis, however, the effect of market power on liquidity risk varies across bank size. Small banks with greater market power reduce liquidity risk while large banks with greater market power do not change their liquidity risk‐taking behavior. This suggests that enhanced charter values due to reduced competition lowers small banks' risk‐shifting incentives when their default risk significantly increases during a crisis. (JEL G21, G28)     

市场整合研究方法与传达的信息

本文从认识市场结构和运作效率的角度,分析和比较了近年市场整合研究文献中使用较多的两种方法——协整检验和状态转换模型,对市场的"完全整合"、"不完全整合"和"市场隔离"三种状况进行理论界定,并在此基础上系统比较两种方法在提供关于市场状况信息方面的功能。本文认为单纯的"价格整合"既不是"市场整合"的必要条件也非充分条件;状态转换模型有着全面考查市场效率所需的价格、交易成本和贸易量三方面信息的能力,但它在了解市场之间的相互影响及其调整过程等动态分析方面尚有一定局限。     

BANK INTEREST MARGINS AND BUSINESS START-UP COLLATERAL: TESTING FOR CONVEXITY

The paper investigates the relationship between bank interest rate margins and collateral for loans issued to new ventures. The analysis finds a convex U‐shaped relationship. The results indicate that while provision of collateral initially reduces bank exposure to risk (through security, more optimal levels of capital and lower moral hazard among entrepreneurs) that beyond a point, the positive risk‐wealth association gives rise to greater risk taking propensity among entrepreneurs and ultimately higher interest rates. This indicates that a lender's pricing policy may even somewhat help to level the competitive playing field between ventures launched by higher and moderately wealthy entrepreneurs.     

FINANCIAL RISK AND UNEMPLOYMENT

There is a strong correlation between corporate interest rates, their spreads relative to Treasuries, and the unemployment rate. We model how corporate interest rates affect equilibrium unemployment and vacancies, in a Diamond–Mortesen–Pissarides search and matching model. Our simple model permits the exploration of U.S. business cycle statistics through the lens of financial shocks. We calibrate the model using U.S. data without targeting business cycle statistics. Volatility in the corporate interest rate can explain a quantitatively meaningful portion of the labor market. Data on corporate firms support the hypothesis that firms facing more volatile financial conditions have more volatile employment.     

BANK PERFORMANCE,FINANCIAL STABILITY AND MARKET CONCENTRATION: EVIDENCE FROM COOPERATIVE AND NON‐COOPERATIVE BANKS

Relying upon highly territorially disaggregated data taken at labour market areas, the paper explores the relationship between bank performances and financial stability of the banking system taking into account the role of market concentration. The z‐score is used as financial stability indicator, while the performance of financial intermediaries is measured using a parametric method recently developed (Kumbhakar et al. 2014). The empirical evidence shows a positive relationship between bank performance and financial stability and supports the ‘concentration–stability’ view for non‐cooperative banks only when concentration is measured on the whole sample of banks. Differences in the performance–stability nexus seem to depend more on the type of banks rather than different levels of market concentration. Higher market concentration of cooperative banks affects systemic stability by reducing the z‐scores of non‐cooperative banks, supporting the hypothesis that the presence of non‐profit‐maximizing entities can pull down stability of other financial institutions.     

TESTING THE STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF A RISK AVERSION PARAMETER IN THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET*

This paper empirically investigates the structural stability of a risk aversion parameter in a model in which risk premia exist in forward foreign exchange. To maximize his or her lifetime utility, a representative investor invests in a riskless bond denominated in each major currency: dollar, DM and pound. We test the structural stability of the risk aversion parameter in Japanese data using Euler equations. The results show that the risk aversion parameter was invariant from 1973 to 1991.     

SPINOFFS AND THE MARKET FOR IDEAS*

We present a theory of entry through spinoffs where workers generate ideas and possess private information concerning their quality. Because quality is privately observed, adverse selection implies that the market can only offer a price that reflects the average quality of ideas sold. Only workers with good ideas decide to spin off, whereas workers with mediocre ideas sell them. Existing firms pay a price for ideas sold in the market that implies zero expected profits. Hence, firms’ project selection is independent of firm size, which can lead to scale‐independent growth. This mechanism results in invariant firm‐size distributions that resemble the data.     

CUSTOMER TYPE AND BANK EFFICIENCY IN POLAND: IMPLICATIONS FOR EMERGING MARKET BANKING

Bank efficiency studies on emerging markets tend to show that foreign banks are more cost-, profit-, and operationally efficient than statE-owned or domestic private banks. They also show that large banks are more efficient than small banks. Using a parametric approach to measuring efficiency, this article finds that foreign banks servicing foreign and business customers are more cost-efficient and less profit-efficient than other banks in Poland. Additionally, evidence of cost economies and profit diseconomies of scale are found. These results have implications for regulatory policies focused on promoting efficiency in the banking systems of emerging markets.     

经济政策不确定性、银行集中度与银行风险

本文基于2007—2018年30家上市商业银行季度面板数据,首次针对不同方面的银行风险,采用固定效应模型详细探讨经济政策不确定性、银行集中度与银行风险之间的关系。研究结果表明：（1）经济政策不确定性会加剧银行经营风险和信用风险,但会降低银行风险承担;（2）银行集中度的上升会导致银行经营风险和信用风险上升,但对银行风险承担的作用不显著;（3）集中度在经济政策不确定性对银行风险的影响中具有调节效应,随着银行集中度上升,经济政策不确定性会更加剧银行经营风险和信用风险,且会进一步减弱银行风险承担。本文采用不同的银行集中度变量并涵盖多种银行风险衡量指标的实证结果均稳健。进而笔者基于实证结果,在银行风险防控方面对政策制定者及监管部门提出一些建议。     

论中国金融风险管理的主要方法

新巴塞尔协议作为国际金融监管和金融风险管理的新标准,其意义不仅仅体现在指导银行的资本充足率水平和信用风险管理等方面,对中国金融风险管理的发展也有借鉴意义。对于中国金融风险管理而言,信息不对称和监管机制不完善是目前的主要问题。随着国际金融风险的加剧与潜在危机的扩散,长期处于封闭式管理的中国金融机构必须与国际接轨,参照先进国际金融系统的规则与标准,在借鉴新巴塞尔协议的风险防范机制和金融监管机制基础之上,制定中国特色的金融风险管理标准和监管体系。     

TREASURY NOTE AND BANK BILL RATES, THE RISK PREMIUM AND AUSTRALIAN MONETARY POLICY*

This paper examines a link in the Australian monetary transmission mechanism based on the risk structure of certain interest rates. Monthly data on the bank-accepted bill and Treasury note rates reveal a significant reduction in both the mean and variance of the risk premium linking the two rates towards the end of 1989. The two interest rates cointegrate in each of the periods January 1984 to September 1989 and October 1989 to December 1995, though less significantly so in the earlier period, and formal tests indicate that the risk premium was stationary for each of the sub-periods. Well defined error-correction mechanisms suggest that the burden of adjustment to shocks to the money market was shared by the two interest rates. A stationary risk premium, combined with evidence that the Treasury note rate Granger-caused the bank bill rate in both sub-periods, indicates that the Reserve Bank has been able to influence the bill rate by targeting the note rate.     

FINANCIAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND IRREGULAR GROWTH CYCLES

In this paper we analyze the generation of endogenous growth and irregular fluctuations in a simple New Keynesian model whose background assumptions are borrowed from a class of asymmetric information models popularized by Greenwald and Stiglitz. We extend the framework put forward by Greenwald and stiglitz taking explicitly into account technological progress as the engine of growth. We show how irregular endogenous fluctuations can arise around an endogenous trend: the traditional view of fluctuations as 'short run' phenomena must be abandoned in favour of models of fluctuating growth.     

MARKET VALUE ACCOUNTING AND THE BANK BALANCE SHEET

Market value accounting for depository institutions is frequently suggested as a means of limiting losses to the deposit insurance funds. But opponents argue that market value accounting is too costly to be worth the effort. This article examines each balance sheet category to determine the feasibility of marking bank portfolios to market. One can assume that almost two-thirds of the asset side and over half of the liability side already are at market. In addition, securities and loans to less-developed countries are traded in secondary markets. Thus, the major cost of market value accounting would be computing current values of commercial loans through discounted cash flow analysis. But efforts now are under way in the private sector to develop less costly ways to determine market values. If market value accounting is adopted, then it will likely have its greatest effect on institutions with large holdings of loans to less-developed countries.