On the Endogenous Choice between Protection and Promotion

In a model of strategic interaction between firms in lobbying activity, I show that capitalists might prefer tariffs (protection) to production subsidies (promotion). This is due to the congestion problem arising from the government's convex welfare costs of providing subsidies as opposed to both the free-rider problem and the congestion problem acting in opposite directions in the case of tariffs. If an industry association exists, coordination can be achieved when lobbying for tariffs, but not in the case of production subsidies.     

Issue costs and regulated returns: A general approach

This paper sets forth a general, unified procedure for the treatment of flotation costs for the regulated utility, a method which reduces to standard treatments as special cases. In this approach, the regulated return becomes a weighted average of the required rates on different portions of equity capital, portions that are distinguished by whether or not issue costs are incurred in their acquisition. In addition, the method provides solutions for a host of financial environments, including solutions where past flotation costs are to be recognized, and where merged utilities with different flotation-cost recovery patterns must be combined.     

Intertemporal Effects of Environmental Mandates

Environmental mandates can impose large costs on the businesses that must comply with them. Understanding the effects of those costs on production decisions may require a dynamic framework if environmental damages (and the costs of complying with mandates) depend on cumulative production or the passage of time. This paper focuses on the time dimension of general categories of fixed and variable costs arising from different types of mandates. The paper develops an optimal control model to predict how such costs may jointly affect current production rates, plant closure dates, and cumulative production. Theoretical results, derived from the comparative statics of the system of equations describing the solution to that model, identify circumstances in which the policy goals of greater production and greater environmental protection may not allways be at odds. Statements in this paper do not reflect the views or positions of the Congressional Budget Office     

One-way flow networks: the role of heterogeneity

I study a one-way flow connections model in which players are heterogeneous with respect to values and the costs of establishing a link. I show that values and costs heterogeneity are equally important in determining the level of connectedness and the architecture of equilibrium networks. I also show that when asymmetries are independent of the potential partner there are distributions of costs and values for which centrality is a distincitive feature of equilibrium networks. This sharply contrasts with the homogeneous case.I thank an anonymous referee for useful comments. The paper has benefited from discussion with Gabriella Conti, Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez, Fernando Vega-Redondo and Sanjeev Goyal.     

The circular road revisited: Uniqueness and supermodularity

The model of the circular road has proved to be a popular model of oligopolistic interaction, yet its theoretical properties are not fully explored. In this paper I extend the uniqueness result of price equilibrium in the circular road with equidistant locations from quadratic transportation costs, to a class of convex power transportation costs, i.e. I show uniqueness in oligopoly for a class of utility functions of the consumers. I show that the associated game is supermodular and dominance solvable. The paper also discusses possible extensions and limitations of the model.     

Family ownership,altruism and agency costs in Australian small- and medium-sized enterprises

Given the continuing uncertainty about whether family firms enjoy lower agency costs, this article hypothesizes that a combination of the effects of family ownership, altruism and self-control is instead at play. To begin with, family ownership can indeed reduce agency costs through better aligning the interests of owners and managers. This is a ‘determining’ effect in that it independently mitigates one source of agency problems. However, altruism combined with self-control problems arising from the highly concentrated ownership often found in family firms can also increase agency costs. This is an ‘embedding’ effect as it is rooted in the personal relationships within the family firm. Using the Business Longitudinal Database compiled by the Australian Bureau of Statistics on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we find that for larger SMEs (those with 20–200 employees), the gains in lower agency costs arising from family ownership are almost completely offset by the losses from altruism and the lack of self-control.     

Estimating the weight of opportunity costs in housing consumption

Behavioural economics suggests that people tend to neglect or underweight opportunity costs. However, strong empirical evidence for the size of the underweighting appears to be largely absent from the literature. What are the weights people attach to opportunity costs relative to out-of-pocket costs? In this article, I estimate the weight of opportunity costs in probably the largest economic decision that households make: buying a house. I show that homeowners attach approximately twice as much weight to out-of-pocket costs of their housing consumption than to the opportunity costs associated with this.     

Optimal regulation of lumpy investments

We study optimal timing of regulated investment in a real options setting, in which the regulated monopolist has private information on investment costs. In solving the ensuing agency problem, the regulator trades off investment timing inefficiency against the dead-weight loss arising from high price caps. We show that optimal regulation is implemented by a price cap that decreases as a function of the monopolist’s chosen investment time.     

Carry trades and US monetary policy

I document that Federal Reserve expansionary monetary policy has a positive impact on the excess returns arising from currency carry trades. I show that expansive monetary surprises are associated with an increase in future real interest differentials between high interest rate currencies and the US dollar, which leads to higher capital flows toward those currencies and an increase in their returns. Since this increase is not fully compensated by a decrease in the returns from the short position in low interest rate currencies, unexpected monetary expansions in the US result in higher carry trade returns.     

Informal home care and labor-force participation of household members

In Germany, informal home care is preferred to professional care services in the public discussion as well as in legal care regulations. However, only minor importance is ascribed to the opportunity costs caregivers face. Therefore, this article explores the influence home care has on the labor supply of caregivers who cohabitate with the care recipient. I use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel from 2001 to 2007, which allows researchers to merge the characteristics of both groups for the first time. Owing to diverging gender roles, I examine female and male caregivers separately. The results show that having an individual in need of care in the household does not decrease labor supply to an economically relevant quantity. As providing care might be endogenous to the labor-supply decision, I test for endogeneity by using characteristics of care recipients as instruments and I additionally test for sample attrition. Moreover, the panel structure allows me to control for unobserved heterogeneity.     

The interaction of investment and financing decisions under moral hazard

This paper examines how debt-induced risk shifting arising in the labor choice contributes to the interaction between investment and financing decisions. Due to equity's limited liability, increased use of debt leads to labor over-utilization compared with all-equity financing. In turn, increasing leverage to finance investment has no effect on the cost but, via labor, influences the expected benefit of marginal investment by affecting the size of shareholders' claim while reducing its likelihood. If the equity claim is reduced, investment and debt are inversely related; otherwise they could be positively related. The linkage between debt and investment exists because both are chosen anticipating the subsequent optimal labor choice, all three decisions are made before price uncertainty is resolved, and equity flotation costs exist.     

Stackelberg equilibrium with many leaders and followers. The case of zero fixed costs

I study a version of the Stackelberg game with many identical firms in which leaders and followers use a continuous cost function with no fixed cost. Using lattice theoretical methods I provide a set of conditions that guarantee that the game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. With convex costs the model shows the same properties as a quasi-competitive Cournot model. The same happens with concave costs, but only when the number of followers is small. When this number is large the leaders preempt entry. I study the comparative statics and the limit behavior of the equilibrium and I show how the main determinants of market structure interact. More competition between the leaders always displaces the followers. Instead, how a stronger threat of entry affects the equilibrium depends on the technology. With strictly convex costs it is the followers that eventually displace the leaders.     

Distributive politics of public goods networks through multistage voting

Public goods networks create conflict between districts needing the network and districts that pay the costs. Thus, it is difficult for pork barrel politicians to achieve logrolling with other districts. I show that logrolling is possible for such politicians if they set their agenda properly. To show this, I model the centralized decision‐making process as a multistage vote among representatives from different districts. I assume the districts are better off if and only if the public good “connects” them to the network. Public goods can be provided universally by setting the agenda properly, even when costs exceed the benefits.     

Are sunk costs in exporting country specific?

Abstract Previous studies have shown that there are significant sunk entry costs in exporting. However, the empirical literature has not addressed whether these costs are global or country specific. In this paper, I show that both are present and estimate that country‐specific costs are about three times the magnitude of global costs. Furthermore, I show that international standards harmonization has strong positive effects on imported variety in small and remote markets. Calibration of a modified Chaney (2008) model indicates that these markets will gain access to 3–4% more imported varieties when global costs increase by 10%, holding total entry costs constant.     

Why do similar firms export differently?

Eaton et al. (2011) underline that firms with similar production costs, entry costs and demand export to different countries. In this theoretical article, I provide a rationale for this feature of the data. I demonstrate that similar firms exporting differently can be explained by a baseline trade-off between attractiveness and competition that is present in any model with monopolistic competition. I then show that this trade-off also generates valuable theoretical features including distance-related mark-ups, third country effect and equivalence with random utility models.     

Why uncertainty matters: discounting under intertemporal risk aversion and ambiguity

Uncertainty has an almost negligible impact on project value in the standard economic model. I show that a comprehensive evaluation of uncertainty and uncertainty attitude changes this picture fundamentally. The illustration of this result relies on the discount rate, which is the crucial determinant in balancing immediate costs against future benefits, and the single most important determinant of optimal mitigation policies in the integrated assessment of climate change. First, the paper removes an implicit assumption of (intertemporal or intrinsic) risk neutrality from the standard economic model. Second, the paper introduces aversion to non-risk uncertainty (ambiguity). I show a close formal similarity between the model of intertemporal risk aversion, which is a reformulation of the widespread Epstein–Zin–Weil model, and a recent model of smooth ambiguity aversion. I merge the models, achieving a threefold disentanglement between risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and the propensity to smooth consumption over time.     

Auctioning incentive contracts: The common cost,independent types case

Laffont and Tirole (1987) analyzed the problem of a regulator that wants to select one ofn firms to carry out a single indivisible project when the firms have private and independent costs and have the possibility of an ex-post investment in (non-observable) effort to reduce the (observable) cost.This paper generalizes the analysis to a model of common costs, unknown at the bidding stage, while keeping the assumption of independent types. I show that the main characteristics of the private costs model are kept in a common cost framework. I provide two mechanisms that may be used to implement the optimal contract.This is a much revised version of a part of chapter one of my Ph.D. dissertation. I would like to thank Drew Fudenberg, Oliver Hart, and two anonymous referees for their comments. I am especially indebted to Jean Tirole, who suggested this problem to me. I have also benefited from presentations at MIT and the EARIE 93 Meeting. Financial support from INVOTAN (grant 3/88/PO) is gratefully acknowledged. Remaining errors are my own.     

Market process(es) and (un)knowledge

By extending an underdeveloped idea of Lachmann, I show that the Austrian theory of the market process à la Kirzner is unable to explain the diversity of market processes because it neglects the imperfect inter-market mobility of factors of production. I show that by taking into account the imperfect mobility of capital equipment and the associated reshuffling costs, it is possible to formulate a set of empirically testable implications about the unfolding of the market process. Furthermore, I show that reshuffling costs shape the context in which the learning process takes place and that the epistemic assumption of structural opacity on which the Austrian theory of the market process relies is not incompatible with the epistemics assumption of structural transparency of neoclassical economics. These epistemic assumptions can be seen as the two poles of a “knowledge spectrum”, from potential omniscience to sheer ignorance.     

Public education expenditures and private school enrollment

In this paper, I investigate whether increases in public education expenditures lead to reductions in private school enrollment. In order to deal with the endogeneity of public expenditures, I use as a natural experiment the 1998 FUNDEF reform in Brazil that caused exogenous variations in local public school funding. Using data from Brazilian School and Population censuses, I show that public education expenditures increases are associated with reductions in the share of private school enrollment for grade 1. However, the effect is smaller for grades 2 to 4, which is consistent with the existence of costs associated with switching schools.     

On financial deepening and long-run growth

I develop a stylized model of endogenous growth in which the level of financial depth influences an economy’s long-run growth. Financial depth is defined within the model as the ease with which investors can issue equity in the market on new units of capital. I assume that agents differ in the cost of undertaking investment projects and that there is a fixed distribution of such costs across the population. I theoretically identify channels through which financial depth influences growth, both positively and negatively. When considering a specific distribution of costs, I show that the net effect of financial depth on growth is non-monotonic. It depends on the shape of the distribution, as well as the level or stage of financial depth. The results of this paper help to rationalize some findings in the recent empirical literature on the non-monotonic effect of financial depth on long-run growth. The model is even capable of obtaining a negative effect of excessive financial depth on growth, a result that is also found in the empirical literature.