Contribution-based vs. earnings-related retirement pension systems: some policy proposals for Italy

This paper analyses the relationship between contributions paid and benefits received within the current old age pension scheme, evaluating the implications of reinforcing the link between individual contributions and benefits, in a framework where welfare assistance and social security are kept separate. Section 2 describes the theoretical model, adopted to examine the factors affecting the contribution-based and the earnings-related annual pension or the total pension benefits over the entire retirement period. The consequences that different levels of relevant parameters have on the ratio between the two yearly pensions are, then, analysed. Section 3 illustrates the longitudinal sample of private employees belonging to the National Institute for Social Security (INPS–FPLD), in particular of those who will retire between 1995–96 and 2001: it is used to calculate the annual earnings-related and contribution-based pension. In aceteris paribussituation, allowing for all intragenerational redistribution transfers currently provided by the pension system (through a supplement to an established minimum pension, through ceilings and reversory rights), the annual contribution-based pension appears to be in 1995 about two thirds of the annual earnings-related one. This implies that the State could currently save one third of its expenditure for new FPLD pensioners, by simply switching to a criterion of social security fairness (giving each to his own in actuarial terms) without relinquishing any of the distributive corrections currently enacted within the pension system. Through this potential reform, in the next 7 years total State savings at constant prices would reach 14 000 billion lire, or 2·2% of the stock value of pensions in the same time interval.     

Social security incentives,human capital investment and mobility of labor

Migration between countries with earnings-related and flat-rate pay-as-you-go social security systems may change human capital investments in both countries. The possibility of emigration boosts investments in human capital in the country with flat-rate benefits. Correspondingly, those expecting to migrate from the country with earnings-related benefits to a country with flat-rate benefits may reduce their investment in education. Allowing for migration may generate an intertemporal Pareto-improvement with cross-border transfers, and the contribution rates satisfying certain conditions. However, these conditions are not satisfied with those contribution rates that would arise if the governments maximize the welfare of their citizens without migration.     

On myopia as rationale for social security

It has been argued that “paternalistically motivated forced savings constitutes an important, and to some the most important, rationale for social security retirement systems.” This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security in dynamically efficient economies. If the competing asset is linear storage and myopic agents are allowed to borrow against future pension benefits, there is no welfare-rationale for PAYG pensions. Sufficiently strong myopia may justify such pensions only if agents cannot borrow against their future pension, but then they are at a zero-saving corner. With enough myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the return to saving declines with saving, as in a model with a neoclassical technology.     

Health Status Risks and the Efficiency of Social Security Systems

We studied the allocative efficiency of a social security system with earning tests focusing on the leisure–work choices of older men. Given empirical findings that health status and social security benefits are the most important determinants of such choices, we incorporated risks with respect to health status into an overlapping–generations model, and analysed how allocative efficiency was changed by the introduction of social security systems. It was found that the effects of a social security system can be broken down into particular categories and that a social security system improves efficiency when the pension system is small. JEL Classification Numbers: H55, I10, E40.     

Collective Annuities and Redistribution

This paper studies the role of alternative pension systems that offer collective annuities. The defining characteristic of collective annuities is that they do not depend on an individual's survival probabilities. We show that such a system may be welfare improving (with a utilitarian social welfare function) even when private annuity markets are perfect and when life expectancy and earning abilities are positively correlated (i.e., in a setting that is  a priori  biased against collective annuities). We first concentrate on linear pension systems and contrast two schemes: a pure contributory (Bismarckian) pension and a flat rate (Beveridgean) pension. We show that the case for collective annuities is stronger when they are associated with a flat pension system. Then we analyze nonlinear pension schemes. We show that the solution can be implemented by a pension scheme associated with annuities that reflect some degree of "collectiveness." Unlike under pure collective annuities, benefits do depend on life expectancy but to a lesser degree than with actuarially fair private annuities. In other words, the impact of survival probabilities is mitigated rather than completely neutralized.     

Designing social security - a portfolio choice approach

Public social security systems may provide diversification of risks to individuals’ life-time income. Capturing that a pay-as-you-go system (paygo) may be considered as a “quasi-asset”, we study the optimal size of the paygo system as well as the optimal split between funded and unfunded pension saving by means of a theoretical portfolio choice framework. A low-yielding paygo system can benefit individuals if it contributes to hedge other risks to their lifetime resources. Numerical calculations indicate that optimal social security systems should be at least partly paygo financed in many economies. The optimal magnitude of the paygo system depends on the specified risk concept as well as the stochastic properties of stock market returns and implicit paygo-returns.     

Expectations,uncertainty and institutions. An application to the analysis of social security reforms

The aging process that many developed economies will face in the medium-term is leading to reforms in the public pensions systems in order to solve the potential financial unsustainability generated by the foreseeable increase in the expenditure in pension benefits (assuming that the current social security contributions and the eligibility conditions will remain unchanged). Neoclassical economics defends a radical reform of these systems, substituting the current pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) systems by funded systems. In this paper, using the Post-Keynesian theory as a theoretical framework, we provide an alternative reflection to that proposed by the neoclassical economics about the choice between the alternative pension systems. The focus of the paper is the advantages of the PAYGO pension systems to stabilize the expectations of future income.     

IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK,AGGREGATE RISK,AND THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY

We ask whether a pay‐as‐you‐go financed social security system is welfare improving in an economy with idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. We show that the whole welfare benefit from insurance against both risks is greater than the sum of benefits from insurance against the isolated risks. One reason is the convexity of the welfare gain. The other reason is a direct risk interaction amplifying the utility losses from risk. Our quantitative evaluation shows that introducing a minimum pension leads to sizeable welfare gains, despite substantial crowding out. About 60% of these gains would be missing from summing up the isolated benefits.     

The extension of social security coverage in developing countries

We study the dynamic general equilibrium effects of introducing a social pension program to elderly informal sector workers in developing countries who lack formal risk sharing mechanisms against income and longevity risks. To this end, we formulate a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates defining features of developing countries: a large informal sector, private transfers as an informal safety net, and a non-universal social security system. We find that the extension of retirement benefits to informal sector workers results in efficiency losses due to adverse effects on capital accumulation and the allocation of resources across formal and informal sectors. Despite these losses recipients of social pensions experience welfare gains as the positive insurance effects attributed to the extension of a social insurance system dominate. The welfare gains crucially depend on the skill distribution, private intra-family transfers and the specific tax used to finance the expansion.     

VOTING ON SOCIAL SECURITY WHEN LABOR SUPPLY IS ENDOGENOUS†

One of the puzzles in the political economic theory of unfunded pension systems is that middle-aged voters do not seem to advocate unlimited increases in the level of contributions and benefits if they take this decision to be valid forever. While the previous literature answered this question by pointing at borrowing restrictions, a more convincing explanation rests on the voters’understanding that future social security taxes will adversely affect future labor supply and thus the source from which their own pensions must be financed. This paper analyzes the validity of this explanation for two different types of pension systems, (a) the lump-sum benefits case, and (b) the case of fairness within cohorts.     

Pay-as-you-go public pensions with endogenous fertility

A 1986 "model of public pensions is generalized to allow for endogenous fertility. We show that gifts to the old, which can be viewed as social security contributions, are always positive in the steady state. An optimal stationary allocation is sustainable if savings are zero and fertility is exogenous. However, the optimal allocation is in general not sustainable. In particular, if a government enforces a social security plan setting the pension level at the optimal gifts and individuals optimize under the pension constraint, the resulting sustainable outcome is in general different from either the optimal or Nash outcome." The geographical focus is on developed countries.     

Reinforcing the Link Between Contributions and Pensions: The Effect of the Population Aging

In this paper, we analyze a majority voting process on the earnings-related part of pension benefits in a Social Security system with flexible retirement. We show that the aging of the population may make it easier to implement one of the proposed reforms to achieve a delay in the average retirement age of workers, to reinforce the link between contributions and pensions.     

中国传统文化信念、人力资本积累与家庭养老保障机制

本文首先构建一个人力资本积累模型,考察传统文化信念驱动下的家庭养老保障机制以及社会养老保障制度对家庭养老和人力资本投资行为进而对经济增长的影响。分析表明,传统文化信念将后代人力资本积累与父代养老保障有机地联系起来,提供了一种很好的家庭养老保障和人力资本内生积累机制;现收现付型社会养老保障制度不利于人力资本积累和经济增长。其次,本文以我国现实数据为基础进行实证研究,得到结论是社会养老保障制度对我国人力资本积累和经济增长具有明显的抑制作用,而家庭养老保障机制的良好运转则有助于更好地促进人力资本积累和经济增长。因此,我国在致力于完善社会养老保障制度的同时,决不能忽视家庭养老保障机制的作用与培育。     

Occupation pension for public employees in the People's Republic of China: A new approach with defined benefit underpin pension plan

The State Council of the People's Republic of China announced a reformed pension plan for public employees with the occupation pension plan in January 2015, officially disclosing that the social pension systems for private and public employees will be unified. Our proposed occupation pension plan for public employees is one of the important components in transiting from a dual‐track pension system to a sustainable and unified system. We aim at providing a pension design, that is, the defined benefit (DB ) underpin pension with estimates of the costs and benefits. We have used a financial engineering approach to calculate the hedge contribution for a DB underpin hybrid pension plan benefit. We also treat pension benefit and salaries in aggregate. Therefore, we propose a stochastic and exogenous salary model. Employees’ total benefits can be determined by multiple factors, such as inflation, economic environment, and employer's preference. However, the expectation of employees’ total benefits should not be affected by the change of salary and pension benefits. Our results could facilitate the ongoing pension reform in the People's Republic of China, providing a rigorous benchmark with public policy implications as to plan design, cost estimation, as well as risk management approach.     

SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE INTRAGENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF LIFETIME INCOME IN JAPAN*

We investigate how social security redistributes lifetime income within the same generation in Japan, based on data from the micro data. The progressivity of Japan's state pension programme appears to be much more limited on a lifetime basis than on an annual basis. Given an ageing population, replacing the current Pay As You Go system with a simple one that consists of a flat benefit and a wage‐proportional premium, and has no maximum contribution, can be desirable in terms of both efficiency and intragenerational equity. The redistributive effects of income tax and consumption tax to finance the benefit are also examined.     

Public pensions as optimal social contracts

A simple overlapping generations model is modified to allow for an externality experienced by the young from consumption by the elderly. This sets up a game between generations in which one generation's strategy may be to save too little and rely on gifts from the young (e.g. public assistance) for retirement income. Social security can therefore be viewed as a Pareto-optimal contract to restore efficient intertemporal allocation. A funded public pension plan corresponds to forced saving but is vulnerable in that the next young generation may stop contributing, rely on its children for retirement assistance and meanwhile reap the consumption externality from the current elderly's social security benefits. This suggests a forced-giving or pay-as-you-go type of compulsory pension plan (such as exists in most nations) which also has the advantage of aiding the initial old generation and therefore generating an immediate consumption externality for the initial young. The approach can also be used to explain other aspects of existing social security.     

Taxes,Retirement Transfers,and Annuities*

In most countries, retirement benefits from pension saving must be taken as an annuity. By contrast, Australia allows benefits to be taken as a lump sum, and instead has recently introduced various tax incentives to encourage annuity purchase. This paper investigates the effectiveness of these tax concessions, and concludes that they do little to achieve this objective This is because they are nullified by the provisions of the broader tax and social security framework within which Australian private pension policy is set     

Risk Sharing and Efficiency Implications of Progressive Pension Arrangements*

This paper aims to quantify the welfare effects of progressive pension arrangements in Germany. Starting from a purely contribution‐related benefit system, we introduce basic allowances for contributions and a flat benefit fraction. Since our overlapping‐generations model takes into account variable labor supply, borrowing constraints as well as stochastic income risk, we can compare the labor supply, the liquidity and the insurance effects of the policy reform. Our simulations indicate that it would be optimal to introduce a flat benefit share of 50 percent and a basic allowance that amounts to 30 percent of average income. Such a reform would yield an aggregate efficiency gain of 3.3 percent of resources.     

Economic efficiency and social insurance reforms in China

This study discusses efficiency issues related to social insurance provisions and their implications for the newly established three-pillar pension system and three-tier health insurance system in China. It shows that these new systems can be improved substantially through some restructuring to reduce efficiency losses. The discussion of efficiency consequences focuses on correction for market failure and alternative mechanisms for financing and providing social insurance benefits. Alternative methods for financing the transition are also discussed.     

Public or Private Orientation of Pension Systems in the Light of the Recent Financial Crisis

This paper studies the appropriateness of a public or private orientation of pension systems in the light of the recent financial crisis, which has underscored the difficulties and contradictions associated with each system. The different institutional arrangements, in which public or private pension systems are embedded, are key components when assessing their responses to the crisis. Particularly, private pension systems are intertwined with financial markets, while social insurance-based pension systems are linked to the labour market mechanisms. This paper compares the British and French pension systems, as “archetypes” of private-oriented and public-oriented systems, respectively, the first relying on the market and private pension schemes, and the second on mandatory social insurance. This paper shows that the crisis has upheld the founding principles of the public (French) and private (British) pension systems to maintain the existing institutional configurations. At the same time, both systems have strengthened the role played by means-tested benefits and minimum pensions for low-income groups to offset the weaknesses of one or the other system, as emphasised by the crisis.