The effective annual rate on cash discounts: a clarification

Conceptually, cash discounts offered but not taken represent interest expense to the buyer and interest revenue to the seller. This paper identifies inconsistencies among seven intermediate accounting textbooks regarding how to express the cost of cash discounts as an effective annual rate. A correct formula for computing the effective annual rate on cash discounts is derived and compared with textbook formulas. Appendix A generalizes the correct formula to noninterest-bearing notes and notes receivable discounted at a bank.     

Sample Selection Approaches to Estimating House Price Cash Differentials

We extend the literature on house price cash differentials in important ways. First, our paper is the first to employ methods to correct for sample selection bias, using both switching regression and propensity score matching of cash vs. non-cash transactions. We use selection models to produce price counterfactuals for cash and noncash buyers. We also include both average treatment effect and a propensity score weighted selection models. From the selection models, we find that previous studies likely overstate the cash discount. Results from counterfactual tests examining cash discounts suggest amplified cash discounts in areas with close proximity to an environmental hazard; and also a pricing differential based on CBG level income, with purchasers in high income areas more likely to pay a cash premium compared to market participants in areas with comparably lower income, where a cash discount is detected. These results provide useful insights for market participants including real estate appraisers, brokers, and buyers and sellers of real estate.     

Cash and Distressed House Sales Price Discounts: Dual Sample Selection Spatial Interdependence Approaches

Beginning with a hedonic price model, and then progressing to a method accounting for dual sample selectivity biases and spatial interdependence; we document (and correct for) these potential confounding biases, and produce price counterfactuals for (1) all-cash financed property, (2) distressed property, and (3) all-cash and distressed property transactions. Results provide evidence of self- selection biases with all-cash purchasers, distressed properties, and distressed and all-cash properties. Significant disparities in observed cash (?13% and ?6.5%) and distressed property discounts (?1% and ?6%) are documented in pre-and post-recessionary environments, Further, cash discounts are consistent for non-distressed transactions (?11%) during both periods; however cash discounts associated with non-distressed transactions are significantly reduced post-recession (?23.3% to ?3.7%. This attenuation is attributed to a significant increase in the relative frequency of cash purchased distressed properties post-recession, i.e., larger percentage of cash buyers. Sub-sample counterfactual tests confirm prior results, and expand our understanding of all-cash and distressed discount determinants. These results provide insight into observed time variant all-cash, and distressed property discount affect sizes.     

Difference Systems in Financial Futures Markets

Many financial futures markets allow substitutions for the par grade of security at delivery. Substitutes are deliverable at premiums or discounts—“differences” in commodities parlance—to the futures price. The rule that establishes these differences is called a difference system. This paper characterizes financial futures market equilibrium with yield-based difference systems and investigates particular systems in use. The major finding is that currently used difference systems effectively limit deliverable supply in the futures markets and lead to futures prices which understate the cash market price of the par security.     

Do corporate governance mechanisms matter for cash holdings and firm value?

This paper examines the relationships between firm-level corporate governance mechanisms and cash holdings; along with their combined effects on firm value for a sample of firms listed in Singapore and Malaysia. Firms with less effective governance attributes are found to be more inclined to accumulate cash than those with more effective governance. The results support the flexibility hypothesis in that an increase in agency conflicts between managers and minority shareholders leads to entrenched managers having more discretion to hoard cash reserves. In addition, the incremental value of holding excess cash is shown to be negative for firms with a single leadership structure, firms with a pyramidal ownership structure, as well as family-controlled firms. The discounts associated with these firms may reflect investors’ recognition of the possibility of managerial entrenchment.     

Bought deals: The value of underwriter certification in seasoned equity offerings

The bought deal is the predominant method of underwriting SEOs in Canada. Offer prices are set and underwriters commit to purchase offerings several days earlier for bought deals than for firm commitment issues, implying stronger underwriter certification for bought deal issues. Consistent with the certification hypothesis, this study finds a significantly smaller negative stock price reaction around the announcement of bought deals compared to firm commitment issues. Bought deals are further shown to have smaller offer price discounts and smaller underwriting fees, implying superior pricing and thus, higher quality offerings. These findings suggest that investment banks’ underwriting method of choice is informative of issue quality.     

TESTING PRICE TAKING IN LOAN AND DEPOSIT MARKETS BY FINANCIAL FIRMS

This paper tests for the failure of price taking in the markets for financial and nonfinancial services. A firm that can purchase or sell an unlimited quantity at the prevailing price is a price taker. This hypothesis is tested using historical data on a sample of eighteen banks, considering financial services, demand deposits, time deposits, labor, cash, materials, and capital. The empirical results indicate little flexibility in the financial technology, whether price taking is imposed on all markets or only on the labor market.     

Why do firms issue private equity repeatedly? On the motives and information content of multiple PIPE offerings

This study examines why private equity issues tend to be a repeated source of financing for public firms. We test the recent operational needs theory of public equity issuance within the context of repeated private equity issues. We find that repeated PIPE issuers burn through cash quickly and do not reach the standards of information transparency or profitability needed for a successful public equity offering. This has implications for investor composition and the market response to a PIPE. Initial PIPE offerings are characterized by substantial diversity in investor type. In successive transactions firms increasingly rely upon hedge funds, who extract greater price discounts and more often require cash flow rights as opposed to control rights. As firms select a path of repeated PIPEs to raise funds, successive issues become uninformative to the market. We conclude that, for small public firms, the same motive underlies public equity offerings and repeated private equity offerings—an acute need for cash.     

Competition in the presence of individual demand uncertainty

This article offers a tractable model of (oligopolistic) competition in differentiated product markets characterized by individual demand uncertainty. The main result shows that, in equilibrium, firms offer advance purchase discounts and that these discounts are larger than in the monopolistic benchmark. Competition reduces welfare by increasing the fraction of consumers who purchase in advance, that is, without (full) knowledge of their preferences.     

An Option-Theoretic Approach to the Valuation of Dividend Reinvestment and Voluntary Purchase Plans

Many firms with dividend reinvestment plans also allow their shareholders to voluntarily invest supplemental funds to purchase additional shares. The purchase price for newly-issued shares often is determined by the average stock price over a prespecified time period preceding the investment date. This gives the firm's shareholders an option to invest in additional shares only when the stock price exceeds the computed average. This paper uses both theoretical and numerical methods to analyze the value of these voluntary purchase options in theory and practice.     

Does the law of one price hold better under a flexible exchange rate system?

Using China's recent exchange rate system reform as a special event, we investigate two issues pertinent to the change in the exchange rate system: how the documented price discounts on Chinese foreign shares (B- and H-shares) changed after China shifted to a more flexible exchange rate system; and what potential factors contributed to such changes. We find significant increases in foreign share discounts after the reform and these increases cannot be explained by the changes in stock risk, information asymmetry or market liquidity. Our results provide evidence that investor expectation on long-run RMB appreciation and investor attitude toward exchange rate risk under a more flexible exchange rate system contribute to the observed increases in foreign share discounts following the reform.     

The Impact of Mispricing and Asymmetric Information on the Price Discount of Private Placements of Common Stock

The price discount on privately placed stock is large and can vary substantially among firms. While earlier studies attribute price discounts on privately placed stock to illiquidity and costs of gathering information, we offer a more complete explanation. We find that firms exhibiting higher overvaluation have significantly larger price discounts in private stock sales. We also find that higher levels of asymmetric information about the issuing firm and about the stock market environment at the time of the private placement cause more pronounced discounts in the offer price. Our analysis also shows that post-issue abnormal returns following private placements are higher when discounts are less pronounced.     

Managing price, gaining profit

The fastest and most effective way for a company to realize maximum profit is to get its pricing right. The right price can boost profit faster than increasing volume will; the wrong price can shrink it just as quickly. Yet many otherwise tough-minded managers miss out on significant profits because they shy away from pricing decisions for fear that they will alienate their customers. Worse, if management isn't controlling its pricing policies, there's a good chance that the company's clients are manipulating them to their own advantage. McKinsey & Company's Michael Marn and Robert Rosiello show managers how to gain control of the pricing puzzle and capture untapped profit potential by using two basic concepts: the pocket price waterfall and the pocket price band. The pocket price waterfall reveals how price erodes between a company's invoice figure and the actual amount paid by the customer--the transaction price. It tracks the volume purchase discounts, early payment bonuses, and frequent customer incentives that squeeze a company's profits. The pocket price band plots the range of pocket prices over which any given unit volume of a single product sells. Wide price bands are commonplace: some manufacturers' transaction prices for a given product range 60%; one fastener supplier's price band ranged up to 500%. Managers who study their pocket price waterfalls and bands can identify unnecessary discounting at the transaction level, low-performance accounts, and misplaced marketing efforts. The problems, once identified, are typically easy and inexpensive to remedy.     

FOUNDING FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND CASH HOLDINGS

I investigate the relation between founding family ownership and firm cash holdings. I find that cash holdings are significantly lower at family firms than nonfamily firms. I also examine the marginal value of cash and report a smaller value of cash for family firms. Combined, the findings are consistent with the spending hypothesis that family firms tend to deploy cash quickly and the market discounts the quality of their spending.     

Price Elasticity of Demand and an Optimal Cash Discount Rate in Credit Policy

While the provision of a cash discount is equivalent to a reduction in price, the role of price elasticity of demand in determining credit terms has been neglected in the extant literature. In this paper, this role is investigated and it is shown that the optimal cash discount rate is affected by the price elasticity of demand for the firm's product. The comparative effects on the optimal cash discount rate with respect to exogenous changes in the fraction of credit sales paid after taking cash discount, the cost of short-term funds and the bad debt loss ratio are investigated. A trade-off between the time value gain and the price elasticity of demand is established. We find that firms which sell in locations having different price elasticities for their products, and/or which face various costs of short-term funds in different locations, should vary their cash discount terms accordingly.     

The Effect of Demand for Shares on the Timing and Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offers

Despite high levels of asymmetry of information, firms that issue seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) within a year of their initial public offering (IPO) (follow‐on SEOs) are able to offer shares at a lower discount as compared to more mature firms. We provide evidence that this seeming contradiction can be explained by a very high degree of demand for the follow‐on offering. We find that the likelihood of issuing a follow‐on SEO is significantly related to the level of institutional demand and that discounts are lower for follow‐on SEOs in which institutional demand is high. We also consider the joint effect of cash holdings and follow‐on SEOs on discounts since firms that have recently gone public tend to hold high levels of cash. Underpricing is higher for firms with elevated preoffer levels of cash, which is consistent with market timing predictions. However, this relation is mitigated for both follow‐on SEOs and issues that also have high share demand.     

保险市场结构与非规范竞争

本文运用产业组织理论和简单的博弈论原理证明,保险企业采用给予折扣等非规范竞争是保险企业经营者的一种理性选择。而具体的非规范竞争行为又与市场需求弹性、保险企业管理水平、承保企业的所有制性质相关。根据对保险市场折扣行为的分析,笔者的结论是监管机构除了对相关行为进行有效监管以外,还要逐步放开费率厘定权、鼓励保险企业进行险种创新并进一步开放保险市场。     

Initial Offer Precision and M&A Outcomes

Building on recent research in social psychology, this paper analyzes the link between the precision of initial cash offers and mergers and acquisition (M&A) outcomes. About one‐half of the offers are made at the precision of one or five dollars per share, while an additional one‐third are made at the precision of a half dollar or one quarter. The practice of making offers at round price‐per‐share levels is associated with a higher purchase price for target shares and a lower probability of deal completion.     

Goodwill or “No-will”: Hubris in the tone at the top

In this study, we examine the effect of hubris in the “tone at the top” on goodwill accounting, specifically the proportion of the purchase price allocated to goodwill following a business combination, and subsequent decisions to write down goodwill. Using a sample of CEO letters to shareholders from firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, we carry out textual analysis of CEO letters to identify hubristic language markers. Regression analyses show that hubristic tone is positively and significantly associated with the purchase price allocation to goodwill. Furthermore, we predict that hubristic managers are more likely to overestimate future cash inflows related to goodwill and are less likely to perceive the need for a potential write-down. Consistent with this prediction, we find that hubristic tone in the CEO letters is associated with less timely goodwill write-downs. This study contributes to the literature on goodwill accounting, the role of CEO attributes on corporate decision making, and to research on CEO-speak, by providing evidence that a hubristic tone at the top can explain strategic choices by management and accounting outcomes.     

CEO Compensation and Fair Value Accounting: Evidence from Purchase Price Allocation

This study investigates the impact of CEO compensation structure on post‐acquisition purchase price allocation, an accounting procedure that involves fair value estimation of various assets and liabilities. We find that CEOs whose compensation packages rely more on earnings‐based bonuses are more likely to overallocate the purchase price to goodwill, the largest asset recorded post‐acquisition. Because goodwill is not amortized, the overallocation likely increases post‐acquisition earnings and bonuses. We also find that, when the acquirer's CEO bonus plan includes performance measures that are not affected, or are less affected, by the overstatement of goodwill, such as cash flows, sales, or earnings growth, the overallocation to goodwill motivated by bonus plans diminishes.