放松卖空管制与债务融资成本——基于融资融券制度的准自然实验

本文利用我国证券市场推出融资融券制度这一准自然实验,基于放松卖空管制的经济后果这一研究基础,进一步研究放松卖空管制如何影响企业的债务融资成本。从卖空机制对公司信息披露质量、公司现金价值及对公司会计稳健性的治理作用来看,放松卖空管制通过这一系列治理作用降低了公司的债务融资成本。进一步在不同产权性质条件下,对其进行分组回归,发现卖空机制在民营企业中对债务融资成本的降低作用更为显著,并且在股权集中度高的样本中,债务融资成本的降低作用更为显著。     

融券卖空、企业社会责任与企业价值

本文基于2010—2021年沪深A股上市公司数据,以我国融资融券制度和转融券制度为准自然实验,从卖空的事前威慑和事后惩罚视角,系统考察了卖空机制对企业社会责任的影响效应、传导机制及经济后果。研究发现,卖空机制引入、卖空进一步放松和实际的融券交易量均显著促进了企业社会责任。机制检验发现,卖空机制引入和实际的融券交易通过提高股价信息效率(信息效应)和降低盈余管理程度(治理效应)对企业社会责任发挥促进作用。进一步研究发现,卖空机制引入和实际的融券交易对企业社会责任的促进作用提升了长期的企业价值。研究结果表明,卖空机制对企业社会责任具有外部治理效应,支持了企业社会责任的“股东主义”观点。本文为卖空的外部治理效应提供了新证据,并对资本市场改革助力经济高质量发展具有重要的政策启示。     

卖空机制对上市公司资本配置效率的影响——基于融资融券制度的准自然实验研究

卖空机制对于上市公司来说是一种来自外部证券市场的治理机制,本文从这一视角出发,基于我国融资融券试点启动并分步扩容这一准自然实验,以2008—2018年沪深A股中763家上市公司为样本,运用双重差分模型研究卖空机制对于上市公司资本配置效率的影响。在资本配置效率的度量上,本文从投资效率和融资约束两个角度进行衡量。研究发现,卖空机制的引入使得上市公司的投资效率提高、融资约束降低,说明公司获取外部融资、进行外部投资这一资本配置过程更为有效,因而从整体上提高了上市公司的资本配置效率;基于产权性质异质性的研究发现,相比国有控制上市公司,卖空机制对非国有控制上市公司的资本配置效率的正向促进作用更大。     

卖空威胁、公司融资扩张战略与违规行为

利用中国推出融资融券业务的准自然实验机会,本文以2010—2016年中国A股上市公司为样本,使用双重差分模型研究放松卖空限制对企业违规行为的影响。研究发现,融券业务允许市场中的知情投资者挖掘企业负面信息进行卖空,形成有效的卖空威胁,从而震慑企业,显著降低其发生违规行为的概率。具体而言,卖空交易行为跟企业违规行为的严重程度正相关;卖空交易行为能显著降低企业的超额收益率;当企业有进一步融资需求或并购扩张战略需求时,卖空威胁对企业的震慑作用更为显著。研究表明,融券业务带来的卖空威胁是企业外部监管的重要机制。     

融资融券对我国股市影响的实证分析——基于上证A股指数

本文选取了2012年4月5日至2014年3月31日时段的481个日数据,讨论了上海证券市场A股数据来实证研究融资融券对股市流动性的影响,利用协整检验和Granger因果关系检验等计量方法,得出结论:融资融券与上证A股流动性之间不存在长期稳定的协整关系,融资融券是股市流动性的Granger原因,而股市流动性不是融资融券的Granger原因,且融资融券对股市影响并不显著。     

卖空机制对股票定价效率影响的实证研究——基于创业板股票融资融券和股指期货交易

本文选取了2014年9月第四次融资融券扩容的23只创业板股票,结合2015年4月中证500股指期货的推出,实证研究了不同市场状态下,卖空机制对股票定价效率的影响,研究发现:无论牛市或熊市,引入卖空机制都能够显著改善股票的定价效率,样本加入融券卖空名单后再次引入股指期货这一卖空机制时,定价效率得到了进一步的提升;相较于熊市,牛市中卖空机制反而导致了定价效率的降低.     

融资融券对股票定价效率的影响

在国外成熟的市场中,融资融券已有百年悠久历史。我国经过精心筹备,于2010年3月31日正式宣布启动融资融券试点。利用2013年1月至2015年12月中国A股市场的数据,引入虚拟变量并建立三个模型进行实证分析,分别对比了融资融券标的股票和非融资融券标的股票定价效率的差异、融券卖空量的差异对定价效率的影响,以及同一股票加入融资融券交易前后的定价效率差异,结果表明,融资融券可以提高股票的定价效率,并以此为根据对证券监管部门提出了相关建议。     

海外股指期货与卖空摊雌出时间比较分析

在缺乏股票卖空机制的情况下，能否推出股指朔货？本文着重分析全球主要市场推出股指期货和建立股票卖空机制的时间关系，认为不应夸大股票卖空机制的实际作用，强调股票卖空机制不是推出股指期货的前提条件，并且可以考虑先推出股指期货再建立股票卖空机制。     

Short Selling: The Impact of SEC Rule 201 of 2010

Despite its sizeable compliance costs, we are unable to document any clear benefits of SEC Rule 201 in ensuring fair valuations and price stability, promoting higher liquidity and execution quality, or preventing a sudden flash crash or prolonged market crises. Our daily and intraday analysis of data both before and after Rule 201 finds that short sellers are naturally more active before the occurrence of negative returns, not after significant price declines. Our simulation results show that Rule 201 further curtails short selling during normal periods, but is not binding on short sellers during the volatile period of the 2008 financial crisis.     

关于建立融券卖空机制对股市影响的分析

通过对股价涨跌、波动幅度和成交量的对比分析,可以发现融券卖空机制的引入有利于完善证券市场的价格发现机制,增强证券公司的盈利能力,丰富投资者的投资选择。在进一步增强证券的可融性,降低中国股市的系统性风险和控制监管漏洞与异常交易的基础上,中国股市建立融券卖空机制的现实条件已基本具备。     

中小企业融资方式对企业治理结构影响的思考

公司治理结构是现代企业制度建设过程中的一个重大问题,而融资结构对公司治理具有决定作用。股权融资和债权融资均对企业形成控制权,两者有着不同的控制形式,在公司治理中发挥着不同的作用。本文通过对中小企业融资方式的分析,提出中小企业经营者在融资时应充分考虑公司治理结构,使公司价值最大化。     

Short Selling Pressure,Stock Price Behavior,and Management Forecast Precision: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO), we show that short selling pressure and consequent stock price behavior have a causal effect on managers’ voluntary disclosure choices. Specifically, we find that managers respond to a positive exogenous shock to short selling pressure and price sensitivity to bad news by reducing the precision of bad news forecasts. This finding on management forecasts appears to be generalizable to other corporate disclosures. In particular, we find that, in response to increased short selling pressure, managers also reduce the readability (or increase the fuzziness) of bad news annual reports. Overall, our results suggest that maintaining the current level of stock prices is an important consideration in managers’ strategic disclosure decisions.     

Earnings quality and short selling: Evidence from real earnings management in the United States

Prior research provides evidence consistent with managers using real earnings management (REM) to increase earnings. This study examines whether short sellers exploit the overvaluation of firms employing REM. I find that firms with more REM have higher subsequent short interest. The positive relation between REM and short interest is more pronounced in settings where the costs associated with accrual‐based earnings management are high, such as when a firm has low accounting flexibility or faces greater scrutiny from a high quality auditor. I also find some evidence that short sellers respond to REM more than to other fundamental signals of firm overvaluation. My inferences are robust to the use of propensity score matching. Collectively, my evidence suggests that short sellers not only trade on REM information, but they also trade as if they understand the substitutive nature of alternative earnings management methods. This study provides additional insight into the important role that short sellers play in monitoring managerial operating decisions and overall earnings quality.     

The Information Content of Short Selling Around Close Supply Chain Relationships

Close supply chain relationships are sometimes detrimental to the partnering firms, and short sellers recognize this before the rest of the market. Suppliers and customers that are in linked, close supply chain relationships have higher short interest on average. Further, higher short interest increases the likelihood of large, linked customers reporting negative earnings surprises, whereas suppliers with high short interest are more likely to report negative earnings surprises, irrespective of the supply chain structure. Short selling is informative to capital markets because these suboptimal relationships eventually lead to dependent suppliers being delisted from a stock exchange for financial distress reasons.     

Short selling and the independence of business-related analysts: Evidence from an emerging market

This paper investigates whether short-sale deregulation improves analysts' independence in an emerging market where conventional mechanisms mitigating conflicts of interest are either ineffective or absent. Short selling reduces the effectiveness of analysts' favourable opinions in creating or sustaining overvalued stock prices, thus decreasing the incentives of institutional clients of brokerages to exert pressure on related analysts to initiate coverage and issue biased opinions. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find strong evidence that stocks that are eligible for short sales experience a greater reduction in coverage by related analysts than stocks that are ineligible for short sales. When covered firms become eligible for short sales, the quality of forecasts and recommendations issued by related analysts improves considerably. Further analyses show that shortable firms with a significant reduction in related analysts' coverage are more likely to underperform and to experience stock price crashes in the future. Altogether, our results are consistent with short selling effectively restoring related analysts' independence in emerging markets.     

基于征信视角的中小企业融资研究

本文归纳分析了我国中小企业融资难的原因主要为中小企业内外部信息不对称,提出发展中小企业征信体系能有效缓解中小企业融资困境。提出完善我国中小企业征信体系建设路径：完善中小企业征信数据库、发展规范化的中小企业征信机构、强化中小企业征信行业监管、建立中小企业内部信用管理制度等。