Split Bond Ratings and Information Opacity Premiums

This paper examines the relationship between split bond ratings and bond yields at the notch level for newly issued corporate bonds. We find that split rated bonds average a 7-basis-point yield premium over nonsplit rated bonds of similar credit risk. The yield premium increases from 5 basis points for one-notch splits to 15 (20) basis points for two-notch (three-notch) splits. These findings indicate that investors demand higher yields for split rated bonds to compensate for the information opacity of such bonds. In addition, the yield premium for split rated bonds is higher during economic recessions, indicating investors are more risk averse during economic downturns. Consequently, split ratings impose higher borrowing costs for firms, especially during economic downturns.     

环境信息透明度与企业信用评级——基于债券评级市场的经验证据

基于2008至2015年期间公司债券发行主体的信用评级数据和手工收集的上市公司环境信息数据,本文研究了环境信息透明度对企业信用评级的影响。研究结果显示,公司获得高信用评级的概率与其环境信息透明度显著正相关;环境信息传递出公司的特质风险、盈余持续性以及盈余质量等信息,从而影响评级决策。进一步研究发现,环境信息透明度与企业信用评级之间的正相关关系在内部控制质量高、具有高质量外部审计的公司中更显著。采用工具变量两阶段回归方法、公司固定效应模型以及倾向得分配对方法控制内生性后,上述结论依然成立。此外,本文发现环境信息透明度可通过影响企业信用评级降低公司的债券融资成本,环境信息透明度对企业信用评级和债券融资成本的影响在污染行业中显著更强。上述研究发现有助于拓展环境信息披露对市场中介行为影响的相关研究,对认识非财务信息在资本市场中的作用和推进节能减排提供了重要参考。     

The Long-Run Stock Returns Following Bond Ratings Changes

Using essentially all Moody's bond ratings changes between 1970 and 1997, we find no reliable abnormal returns following upgrades. However, we find negative abnormal returns on the magnitude of 10 to 14 percent in the first year following downgrades. Additional results reveal that this underperformance is especially pronounced for small, low-credit-quality firms. Also, downgrades underperform in nearly all years in the sample, and a large part of the abnormal returns occur at subsequent earnings announcements. Thus, the evidence suggests that the poor returns result from an underreaction to the announcement of downgrades, rather than from lower systematic risk.     

Earnings Predictability,Bond Ratings,and Bond Yields

We examine the role that earnings predictability plays in establishing a firm’s cost of debt capital by measuring its influence on establishing a new issue’s bond rating. In addition, we also examine the effects of earnings predictability on the initial pricing of the firm’s debt. Using new corporate bond issues from the period 1990–2000, our results indicate that the degree of predictability of a firm’s earnings is positively associated with a firm’s bond rating. Moreover, earnings predictability is also documented to be negatively associated with the offering yield. Importantly, bond rating classification accuracy is improved when specific measures of a firm’s earnings predictability are added to a robust model.JEL Classification:     

Asset Opaqueness and Split Bond Ratings

We examine the relation between asset opaqueness and split ratings. We find that firms with asset opaqueness problems are more likely to receive split bond ratings from Moody s and S&P rating agencies. Our results suggest that there is a causal link between asset opaqueness and split ratings.     

The Effect of Solicitation and Independence on Corporate Bond Ratings

Abstract:   This comparison of solicited and independent bond rating agencies performance reveals that the ratings assigned by Moody's and Standard & Poor's are consistently lower than those assigned by Duff and Phelps and Fitch IBCA and are consistently higher than those assigned by MCM. While Moody's and S&P generally downgrade bond ratings sooner than Duff and Phelps and Fitch IBCA, the four major agencies upgrade at the same time. Moody's tends to have a higher upgrade magnitude than Duff and Phelps, but the downgrade magnitudes do not differ. MCM upgrades its ratings more quickly than either Moody's or S&P. The results give support to the timeliness and accuracy of ratings provided by the independent agencies.     

Bond Yields, Ratings, and Financial Information: Evidence from Public Utility Issues

This study investigates the relative roles of bond ratings and financial information in the setting of bond yields. Structural equation modeling techniques are used to learn whether ratings determine yields or whether both ratings and yields are determined by a concurrent set of economic and financial factors. Tests of alternative structural model configurations provide evidence regarding the associations between bond ratings, financial information, and bond yields. Both ratings and financial information are found to play an important role in determining bond yields. In addition, yields are consistent with the higher rating in cases of split ratings.     

The Information Content of Australian Managed Fund Ratings

Abstract:  We examine the information content of managed fund ratings for Australian retail investors. Because fund ratings, premised on a quantitative-qualitative model, are highly transitory, we question whether investors formulate their investment decisions with respect to changes in ratings and whether ratings, in turn, react to fund flows. We find that information regarding fund flows can be obtained from ratings, and that rating changes can have far-reaching effects. Investors flock to newly upgraded funds while they penalize those that have been downgraded by withdrawing funds. Investors are constantly anticipating ratings revisions, particularly downgrades, and we attribute this phenomenon to the role of qualitative factors in the ratings.     

The Effect of Bond Rating Changes and New Ratings on UK Stock Returns

This is the first study to use daily data from a major capital market outside of the US to examine the role of corporate bond and commercial paper rating changes on common stock returns. Using data published by Standard and Poors' credit rating agency between 1984 and 1992, we examine the impact of new credit ratings, credit rating changes and Credit Watch announcements on UK common stock returns. We find significant negative excess returns around the date of a downgrade and positive returns close to the date of a positive CreditWatch announcement. Hence, the financial markets would appear to place some importance on rating agency pronouncements in the UK. New ratings, whether short or long-term, have no significant impact on returns. We also attempt to quantify the impact of a new credit rating upon firm cost of capital through measures of conditional volatility and systematic risk. However, we find only weak evidence to suggest that a stock's cost of capital is reduced after a long-term credit rating is awarded for the first time.     

Deferred Taxes and Bond Ratings: A Canadian Case

This paper explores the usefulness of the current Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants standard on accounting for income taxes in bond rating decisions by credit analysts. Bond rating prediction models using accounting variables generated with alternate treatment of income taxes, have been developed. The analysis indicates that additional information presented by the above standard has not contributed significantly to the bond raters' decision making process.     

Unsolicited Versus Solicited: Credit Ratings and Bond Yields

This paper is the first attempt to analyze Standard & Poor’s unsolicited and solicited ratings by using bond-yield data in Japan. Our findings show that there are differences in firm characteristics between firms seeking solicited ratings and those that receive unsolicited ratings. Firms with solicited ratings have less information asymmetry and are more likely to be owned by foreign investors, generate more revenue from exports, be cross-listed in the US, and have higher firm quality. But, firms with unsolicited ratings pay higher costs for debt, and their bond prices react more strongly to credit-rating changes. Yield spreads for new bonds with unsolicited ratings are higher than those with solicited ratings, because unsolicited ratings have higher information asymmetry, and investors therefore demand higher yields. We find that bond-price reactions to the announcements of unsolicited rating downgrades (upgrades) are negative (positive) and significant, while bond prices do not react significantly to solicited rating downgrades or upgrades.     

债券评级分析师任期、债项评级和信用利差

基于2008-2019年长期信用债数据,本文实证研究发现:评级分析师任期越长,信用评级越低;较长的分析师任期能够影响评级准确性,降低"未能预测违约"的第Ⅰ类错误,增加"错误违约预警"的第Ⅱ类错误;相比于短分析师任期,长分析师任期能够增强信用评级对信用利差的降低作用.本文还发现,相比于未被投资者付费评级机构评级的债券,投...     

Predicting Bond Ratings Using Neural Networks: A Comparison with Logistic Regression

Bond rating agencies examine the financial outlook of a company and the characteristics of a bond issue and assign a rating that indicates an independent assessment of the degree of default risk associated with the firm’s bonds. Predicting this bond rating has been of interest to potential investors as well as to the firm. Prior research in this area has primarily relied upon traditional statistical methods to develop models with reasonably good prediction accuracy. This article utilizes a neural network approach to modeling the bond rating process in an attempt to increase the overall prediction accuracy of the models. A comparison is made to a more traditional logistic regression approach to classification prediction. The results indicate that the neural networks-based model performs significantly better than the logistic regression model for classifying a holdout sample of newly issued bonds in the 1990–92 period. A potential drawback to a neural network approach is a tendency to overfit the data which could negatively affect the model’s generalizability. This study carefully controls for overfitting and obtains significant improvement in bond rating prediction compared to the logistic regression approach. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dual Bond Ratings: A Test of the Certification Function of Rating Agencies

Bond researchers have recently observed that issues with split ratings have yields more closely resembling the yields on bonds with the lower of the two ratings. This evidence could lead researchers to question why an issuer ever obtains more than one rating in an environment where two ratings, when split, can never reduce yields, whereas two ratings, when split, can increase yields. This paper explores the rating function in a certification framework and concludes that investors value a second rating. Bond issues with two identical ratings have yields significantly less than issues receiving that rating from only one rating agency.     

A Comparison of Bond Ratings from Moody's S&P and Fitch IBCA

Previous research has found that the bond market values the ratings of Moody's and Standard & Poor's. This paper extends earlier research by comparing the ratings of Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch IBCA. The authors examine a very large database with monthly observations of bonds and bond ratings over a five‐year time period. The analysis focuses on comparing rating levels, rating changes, and the impact of ratings on bond yields. The results show that firms with publicly available Fitch IBCA ratings have higher ratings from Moody's and S&P than firms without Fitch IBCA ratings. The typical firm releasing a Fitch IBCA rating has a lower yield (controlling for Moody's and S&P rating), a more stable rating, and is more likely to receive an upgrade. For split‐rated bonds (Moody's vs. S&P), Fitch IBCA serves as a tiebreaker. This evidence is consistent with the bond market valuing the ratings of all three raters—Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch IBCA.     

Testing for Opaqueness in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Bond Credit Ratings

The question of whether banks are relatively more opaque than non-banking firms is empirically investigated by analyzing the disagreement between rating agencies (split ratings) on 2,473 bonds issued by European firms during the 1993–2003 period. Four main results emerge from the empirical analysis. First, fewer bank issues have split ratings overall, but the predicted probability of a split rating is higher for banks after controlling for risk and other issue characteristics. Second, subordinated bonds are subject to more disagreement between rating agencies. Third, bank opaqueness increases with financial assets and decreases with bank fixed assets. Fourth, bank opaqueness increases with bank size and capital ratio. The implications of these findings for regulatory policy are also discussed. All errors remain those of the author. This paper was prepared while the author was visiting the Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate at the Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Florida.     

The Information Content of Ratings: An Analysis of Australian Credit Default Swap Spreads

We examine the information content of Australian credit rating announcements by measuring the abnormal changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads. CDS spreads provide a direct view of credit quality and thus should impound information quickly when investors receive new credit risk related information via a rating event. Using an event study methodology, we show that watch downs and rating upgrades contain valuable information even after controlling for sources of contamination. We find that watch downs elicit statistically significant market reactions, while subsequent downgrades are anticipated. Upgrades are associated with a significant but small abnormal reduction in CDS spreads, whereas watch ups appear to contain no new information.     

The Credit Ratings Game

The collapse of AAA‐rated structured finance products in 2007 to 2008 has brought renewed attention to conflicts of interest in credit rating agencies (CRAs). We model competition among CRAs with three sources of conflicts: (1) CRAs conflict of understating risk to attract business, (2) issuers' ability to purchase only the most favorable ratings, and (3) the trusting nature of some investor clienteles. These conflicts create two distortions. First, competition can reduce efficiency, as it facilitates ratings shopping. Second, ratings are more likely to be inflated during booms and when investors are more trusting. We also discuss efficiency‐enhancing regulatory interventions.