共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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William Forbes 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》1994,21(6):763-790
This paper presents an analysis of the policy of the UK's Monopolies and Mergers Commission using stock market data. Stock price reactions to regula-tory intervention by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission might be expected to reflect two sorts of factors. Firstly, the impact of the intervention on the possibility of bidders extracting monopoly profits from consumers. Secondly, the possibility that the subsequent investigation of the bid by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission will raise the cost of a bid, which may not necessarily be in the shareholder's interests, and so cause such bids to be abandoned. Studying a sample of some 53 bids, investigated by the Commission in the period 1976–90, little evidence was found that the Commission halts bids that are likely to result in monopoly profits to the bidder but there was some weak evidence that non-shareholder wealth maximising bids are abandoned as a result of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission intervention. 相似文献
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Ronald C. Rutherford 《Review of Financial Economics》1992,2(1):75-80
Prior research has shown that a sale and leaseback transaction (SLBT) results in positive average abnormal returns to the lessee's common stockholders. Researchers have conjectured that this could be due to SLBT tax benefits or due to a wealth transfer from bondholders (since after the SLBT it is possible that fewer assets remain as collateral). This study shows that bondholders do not lose in SLBT's and confirms previous results showing that stockholders gain from sale leaseback transactions. The results are consistent with the position that bondholders write provisions to protect their rights to the underlying assets, resulting in no wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders when the firm sells off assets and leases them back. 相似文献
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In this study, the abnormal return dynamics of firms undertaking premium targeted block share repurchases are examined empirically. The positive returns accruing to nonparticipating shareholders for the period encompassing the buy-in and repurchase announcements are attributable to the expectation of subsequent acquisition activity. Firms that are not acquired realize, on average, a zero abnormal return. The probability of subsequent acquisition is not related to the targeted repurchase. Managers who engage in targeted block share repurchases frequently are expelled from corporate ranks. Firms that are acquired exhibit abnormal returns only similar to those of other merger and tender offer targets. 相似文献
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Shareholder activism can help to protect shareholder value by promoting sound corporate governance practices. As an active institutional investor, CalPERS takes its role in the corporate governance process very seriously. In addition to many other initiatives, CalPERS publishes each year a list of six to twelve public companies with poor corporate governance principles and poor financial performance—its well-known "Focus List"—in the hope that the managements of these companies will be motivated to improve their performance and increase shareholder value for CalPERS and their other equity owners.
In an attempt to assess the effectiveness of CalPERS' governance program, the authors examine the market impact of the Focus List and find that companies on the list experience positive excess stock returns of about 12% over the three months following release of the list. Moreover, this wealth effect is even greater for companies with a large, widely dispersed shareholder base, as might be expected given the relative inability of such shareholders to act collectively. 相似文献
In an attempt to assess the effectiveness of CalPERS' governance program, the authors examine the market impact of the Focus List and find that companies on the list experience positive excess stock returns of about 12% over the three months following release of the list. Moreover, this wealth effect is even greater for companies with a large, widely dispersed shareholder base, as might be expected given the relative inability of such shareholders to act collectively. 相似文献
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Several authors suggest that the opening of a market in traded options constitutes a “feasibility-expanding” change. In this paper evidence on changes in the price of underlying stocks at the time of option listing is examined to determine whether option listing constitutes such a change. Evidence supports the hypothesis that call option listing is feasibility expanding, that put option listing is not feasibility expanding, and that call listings closer to the initiation of organized option trading have a larger impact relative to later listings. 相似文献
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Pamela P. Peterson 《The Financial Review》1988,23(2):151-160
This study provides evidence on the wealth effects of reincorporation and the association of these wealth effects with motives to change the state of incorporation. There are no wealth effects observed on the announcement of the change for shareholders of corporations that change as part of a set of measures to defend against a pending or possible hostile takeover. However, for corporations that reincorporate without stated antitakeover intentions, a positive reaction is observed at the announcement of the change. These results indicate that the defensive posture assumed by reincorporating may offset other positive effects of the change in corporate charters. 相似文献
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The market reaction to state antitakeover legislation is examined case by case and in aggregate for six bills from four influential states that passed second-generation antitakeover statutes. Prior research offers mixed conclusions concerning the effect. In contrast to the reactions in some earlier studies, negative market reactions in this study are weak, producing little evidence of any permanent harm to shareholder wealth. 相似文献
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This paper analyzes the direction and magnitude of changes in stock prices resulting from the announcement of various types of changes in senior corporate management over a twelve-year period. We find support for the view that instability resulting from executive succession adversely affects organizational performance. Furthermore, our results imply a clear preference by the market for a change in composition of the previous management team over its further entrenchment and a perception by the market that senior corporate executives and the board of directors may not be solely motivated by considerations of shareholder wealth maximization. 相似文献
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This paper presents an analysis of the shareholder wealth effect of voluntary corporate liquidation, the extreme form of corporate divestiture classified as a “selloff.” For a sample of 37 firms that liquidated during the 1970–1982 period, the liquidation announcement is associated with statistically and economically significant stock price increases. 相似文献
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In this paper the proposition is tested that stock market reaction to a dividend change is a function of its information content. A multiple regression model is formulated to identify the factors that contribute significantly to the capital loss suffered by shareholders when firms decide to cut/omit dividends. Results indicate that, in conformity with the information content hypothesis, the announcement period capital loss induced by a dividend deduction significantly depends on the percentage change in dividends, the size and risk of the firm, and the price performance of the firm's stock in the immediately preceding period. The results further reveal that (1) simultaneous announcements of poor earnings cause larger capital losses; (2) prior announcements of loss/lower earnings, strikes, etc. attenuate the negative impact of dividend cuts; (3) managerial reassurances that the dividend reduction is growth-motivated produces a weakly favorable effect, and (4) institution of stock dividends concurrently with the dividend cut significantly reduces the negative valuation effect. It is concluded from the evidence that stock market reaction to managerial signals is a function of the perceived costs associated with these signals. 相似文献
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Henry T. C. Hu 《实用企业财务杂志》1996,9(3):39-52
The article begins by setting out three alternative conceptions of the corporate objective function. Relying on this framework, it shows that legal analyses tend to neglect conflicts between the interests of the corporate entity and the interests of shareholders over the amount of corporate risk-taking. Financial analyses tend to ignore both constraints on managerial discretion imposed by law and a fundamental ambiguity the author identifies in the “shareholder wealth maximization” assumption that underlies such analyses. This ambiguity arises in part from market “frictions”–particularly, the investor uncertainty and heightened price volatility that stem from informational “asymmetry.” Such an information gap between management and outside investors (along with market “irrationality”) can cause material disparities between the actual trading price and the intrinsic value (or what the author calls the “blissful price”) of a company's shares. As a consequence, corporate hedging that maximizes actual share values may not maximize intrinsic values (and vice versa), thus giving rise to a managerial dilemma. Previous analyses have also failed to give adequate consideration to the expectations of shareholders. If, for example, the shareholders of a natural resource company are seeking a relatively “pure play” on that resource–in part because they believe the company's management has no comparative advantage in managing price risks–corporate hedging that increases shareholder wealth may re-duceshareholder welfare. In this sense, the usual “shareholder wealth maximization” directive is not only ambiguous, but also incomplete. These problems stem not only from informational asymmetry, but from other institutional realities (such as the “political” taint associated with reported derivative losses of any kind) that raise the information costs of using derivatives. The article concludes with some suggestions for improving disclosure of corporate risk management “philosophy.” Better disclosure may not only help reduce such information costs, but could also encourage corporations to find–and stick to–their derivatives niche. 相似文献
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Jack W. Trifts Neil W. Sicherman Rodney L. Roenfeldt Francisco de Cossio 《The Journal of Financial Research》1990,13(2):167-172
The impact on shareholder wealth from selling units to management is examined. The two-day announcement period average abnormal return for parent firms divesting units to managers of those units is positive (0.80 percent) and significant. On average, the impact on shareholder wealth of parent firms divesting assets to managers of the unit is similar to the shareholder wealth effect for divestiture to third parties. 相似文献
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W. Bruce Johnson 《The Financial Review》1988,23(1):1-23
This study examines the impact of debt refunding on common stock prices for a sample of 48 exchange offers announced from 1970 through 1981. Exchange offer announcements do not have a significant impact on average common stock returns but appear to produce idiosyncratic share price effects. Refunding-induced price effects were unrelated to several exchange offer characteristics including tax shield increases, exchange offer premia, and transaction costs of refunding. Common stock excess returns were negatively related to reductions in debt service payments and relaxation of dividend payment constraints. Thus, the evidence is consistent with theories predicting that certain debt refundings generate negative information-signaling price effects. 相似文献
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