Patents and Early‐Stage Financing: Matching versus Signaling

This paper investigates the role of patents on early‐stage financing. We consider two questions: are patents signals of quality and why do patents relate to venture capital (VC) financing but not angel financing? Analyzing data from 468 Canadian early‐stage ventures, we show that patents are not signals of quality. Instead, the data support a match‐on‐financing need hypothesis: ventures match with VCs, who have financial capacity to support their patent protection strategies.     

Broadening versus reinforcing investor portfolios: Social structure and the search for venture capital investors

This paper highlights the venture capital investor (VC) portfolios of startups, and explores how the portfolios evolve. We emphasize the important trade-off between broadening and reinforcing VC portfolios (i.e., expanding to new VCs versus relying on existing VCs). This is because, to startups, new and existing VCs generate very different opportunities and constraints. Focusing on the social structure of existing VCs, we argue that startups are more likely to opt for new VCs when the internal networks of existing VCs are denser, when the external networks of existing VCs are smaller, and when the status of existing VCs is lower. Additionally, we not only focus on whether new VCs are on board, but also pay attention to which new VCs are introduced, by analyzing the ex-ante embeddedness between existing and newly-introduced VCs. We stress that when new VCs are highly embedded with existing VCs, their involvement makes only a limited contribution to broadening a startup's portfolio and network. We test the hypotheses using a sample of VC financing rounds in the U.S. and find broad support.     

The Relationship Between Top Management Team–Outside Board Conflict and Outside Board Service Involvement in High‐Tech Start‐Ups

Corporate governance research has extensively studied the relationship between outside board characteristics and outside board involvement. We add to this literature by investigating the extent to which interactions between outside board members and the top management team (TMT) affect the functioning of the outside board. Building on conflict theory, our study shows that conflict between TMT and outside board is an important antecedent for outside board service involvement. Specifically, drawing from a hand‐collected data set of 70 high‐tech start‐ups in Belgium, we find that TMT–outside board task conflict is both directly and indirectly, that is, through TMT–outside board relationship conflict, related to outside board service involvement.     

International entrepreneurship, venture capital networks, and reinvestment decisions

Prior research has established that venture capitalists (VCs) may face significant obstacles in financing ventures from emerging or transition economies. Such hurdles are usually attributed to the weaknesses of host countries’ institutional systems, especially regulatory. These institutional pitfalls may thwart VCs’ ability to exit a portfolio company leading to lower returns than expected. Developing this approach, we argue that exit strategies may also be difficult to execute when VCs expand into advanced economies although for different reasons. Thus, we show that both necessity entrepreneurship prevalent in emerging economies and opportunity entrepreneurship prevalent in advanced economies are positively associated with the number of investment rounds received by portfolio companies. In contrast, we establish that VC firm capital and network density are negatively associated with the number of rounds provided to portfolio companies across distinct institutional environments. This suggests that VCs may improve their performance by choosing an appropriate strategy to navigate unfamiliar institutional environments to minimize their liability of foreignness. Finally, we find that the interaction of VC capital and network density is positively related to the number of VCs’ investment rounds. Apparently, resource-rich VC firms may not fully realize the informational benefits of their dense “knowledge networks” due to insufficient collaboration with partners. At the same time, such VCs may no longer enjoy access to free information flows from prospective allies. Hence, network density and superior resources combined may lead to a greater number of investment rounds.     

The Impact of Relational Capital on the Success of New Business Start‐Ups

This study seeks to highlight the key role played by relational capital in new business start‐ups. Following a review of previous research examining the success factors of new ventures and the role played by intellectual capital, our study sets out to achieve this objective by analyzing the impact of a set of intangible relational assets on the initial success of new business start‐ups. Based on a study of 130 firms, we analyzed six hypotheses regarding the possible positive relationship between the relational capital of a start‐up company and its success in its first few years of business.     

Dynamic capabilities and venture performance: The effects of venture capitalists

After going through the initial public offering (IPO), new ventures face increased competition, greater public examination, and increased government scrutiny. Resource base weaknesses and external forces pose severe threats to the survival and success of new ventures. Building from resource-based theory, we first examine and delineate dynamic capabilities from entrepreneurial capabilities in entrepreneurship. We then develop theory to explain how venture capitalists (VCs) endue their ventures with greater dynamic capabilities in order to address these weaknesses and threats. We test our hypotheses on a match-pair sample of VC-backed and non-VC-backed new ventures and find that VC-backed ventures demonstrate greater dynamic capabilities as they relate to product and management development but do not display any greater dynamic capabilities as they relate to legal and government regulation threats. Further analysis also revealed that VC experience and VC reputation were positively related to 1-year stock price returns.     

Internationalization of business angel investments: The role of investor experience

In this study, we examine business angels (BAs)’ appetite for investing abroad and the role played by investment and entrepreneurial experience. To investigate BAs’ propensity to internationalize their investments, we study cross-border deals and culturally distant investments. Using an international sample of US and European BA deals, we find that both individual investment and entrepreneurial experience foster the internationalization of BAs’ investments, consistent with the predictions based upon the local bias theory. When splitting experience into domestic and foreign, we find that the former increases while the latter decreases local bias. When we separate US and European BAs, we find that the experiential background of BAs does not matter in the same way in Europe and in the US: while the general results are confirmed in Europe, both investment and entrepreneurial experience have a reduced impact in the US. We interpret these results in light of the reduced risk aversion of US BAs that lowers transaction costs.     

Following the Crowd—Does Crowdfunding Affect Venture Capitalists’ Selection of Entrepreneurial Ventures?

Given the increasing popularity of crowdfunding as a new means to finance entrepreneurial ventures, we assess whether and how crowdfunding campaign‐specific signals that affect campaign success influence venture capitalists’ selection decisions in ventures’ follow‐up funding process. Our study relies on cross‐referencing a proprietary data set of 56,000 crowdfunding campaigns that ran on Kickstarter between 2009 and 2016 with 100,000 investments in the same period from the Crunchbase data set. Drawing on signaling theory and the microfinance literature, our empirical findings reveal that a successful crowdfunding campaign leads to a higher likelihood to receive follow‐up venture capital (VC) financing, and that there exists an inverted U‐shaped relationship between the funding‐ratio and the probability to receive VC funding. Further, we find statistical evidence that an endorsement by the platform provider has a likewise positive impact on the receipt of VC. Contrary to our expectations, word‐of‐mouth volume seems to be a negligible factor when it comes to follow‐up VC financing. Our results support the view that crowdfunding signals are factored into the VC’s funding decision in order to evaluate the potential of entrepreneurial ventures.     

The Importance of Proximity for the Start‐Ups' Knowledge Acquisition and Exploitation

This paper intends to verify the impact of geographical proximity on the processes of knowledge acquisition and exploitation by high‐tech start‐ups considering at the same time the role of both the social and cognitive dimensions of proximity. Our basic assumption is that proximity means a lot more than just geography. The findings from this research broaden our understanding of how start‐ups located inside an industrial cluster acquire knowledge from their customers and exploit it in an innovative way, underscoring the need to reconsider assumptions regarding the importance of geographical proximity between business partners during knowledge management.     

Catch‐up through Collaborative Innovation: Evidence from China

Collaborative innovation has received the attention of management scholars for decades. The primary focus of our research is to explore the mechanisms that drive innovation catch‐up of latecomers in an emerging economy through research and development collaborations (i.e., academic and industrial collaborations). Using a sample of 1,066 firms in a high‐tech cluster in China, we find that collaborative innovation strategy has an inverse U–shaped effect on a firm's innovation performance. In addition, the relationship between collaborative innovation strategy and innovation performance is positively moderated by absorptive capacity © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The nature of information and overconfidence on venture capitalists' decision making

Venture capitalists (VCs) are considered experts in identifying high potential new ventures—gazelles. Thus, the VC decision process has received tremendous attention within the entrepreneurship literature. Yet, most studies on VC decision-making focus on which decision criteria are central to selecting gazelles. Although informative, the majority of these studies has neglected cognitive differences in how VCs make decisions. This is surprising considering the influence cognitive differences are likely to have on the exploitation of an opportunity as well as its influence on likely success. The current study investigates whether VCs are overconfident, as well as the factors surrounding the decision that lead to overconfidence.Overconfidence describes the tendency to overestimate the likely occurrence of a set of events. Overconfident people make probability judgments that are more extreme than they should, given the evidence and their knowledge. In the case of the new venture investment decision, overconfident VCs may overestimate the likelihood that a funded company will succeed.The results of the current study indicate that VCs are indeed overconfident (96% of the 51 participating VCs exhibited significant overconfidence) and that overconfidence negatively affects VC decision accuracy (the correlation between overconfidence and accuracy was 0.70). The level of overconfidence depended upon the amount of information, the type of information, and whether the VC strongly believes the venture will succeed or fail.As more information becomes available, people tend to believe they will make better decisions; they are making a “more informed decision.” More information ideally should enable the VCs to assess any potential pitfalls. However, additional information makes the decision more complex. Information factors may contradict and relate to other information in unexpected ways. Even if more information is available, people usually don't analyze all of it (even though they believe they do). Thus, more information creates greater confidence, but it also leads to lower decision accuracy.The type of information that is available also impacts overconfidence and decision accuracy. VCs are intuitive decision makers. When people are familiar with a decision and the structure of the information surrounding that decision, they resort to automatic information processing. On the other hand, if information surrounding the decision is structured in an unfamiliar way, people need to decipher what each piece of information means and how that impacts their overall accuracy. In the case of expert VCs, that means they must deviate from their intuitive style. It seems that forcing them outside their “comfort zone” has a negative effect on their confidence and has an even greater effect (negative) on their accuracy.There is evidence of an “availability bias” in VC decision-making; VCs rely on how well the current decision matches past successful or failed investments. VCs are overconfident in their prediction of venture success when they predict a very high level of success. VCs are also overconfident in their prediction of venture failure when they predict a very low likelihood of success. This high level of overconfidence in success predictions (or failure predictions) may encourage the VC to limit information search and fund a lower potential investment (or prematurely reject a stronger potential investment).Although overconfidence in itself does not necessarily lead to a wrong decision, the bias is likely to inhibit learning and improving the decision process. Overconfident VCs may not fully consider all relevant information, nor search for additional information to improve their decision. Moreover, the natural tendency for people to recall past successes rather than failures may mean that VCs will make the same mistakes again. VCs can take simple steps to reduce the effect of overconfidence, including counterfactual thinking (i.e., imaging scenarios where current assumptions might not hold), formally recording how past decisions were made at the time of the decision (versus trying to recall how that decision was made from memory), and using actuarial decision aids that decompose decisions into core components. Reducing overconfidence may lead to stronger decisions. It is hoped that this study illustrates the power of cognitive theories for understanding VC decision-making.     

How useful is venture capital prestige? Evidence from IPO survivability

This study examines the effect of venture capitalist (VC) prestige on the post-issue survivability of IPOs and how VC characteristics influence the effect. We find that IPOs backed by prestigious VCs are less likely to delist for performance failure and have longer listing duration relative to those without VC backing; however, IPOs backed by ordinary VCs are as likely to delist as IPOs without VC backing. The finding is robust for Internet and high-tech firms. We further examine heterogeneous VC characteristics and find that the ability of prestigious VCs to improve IPO survival is a function of their investment experience and managerial ability. VC prestige characterized by industry specialization and syndication networks is not related to IPO survival. Overall, the results suggest that the VC characteristics that produce prestige, rather than the prestige itself, drive the long-term survival of IPOs.     

Cross-border venture capital investments in Asia: Selection and exit performance

We investigate the investment behavior and exit performance of VCs that have pursued expansion outside their home locations, specifically, in Asia. Our findings indicate that, in the Asian VC markets, foreign VCs have relative advantages over local VCs in terms of size and experience while they are at a disadvantage in information collection and monitoring due to both geographic and cultural distances. When investing alone, foreign VCs are more likely to invest in more information-transparent ventures. Partnership with local VCs helps alleviate information asymmetry and monitoring problem and has positive implication for the exit performance of local entrepreneurial firms. Specifically, we find that after controlling for the endogeneity of selection, firms with both foreign and local VC partnership are about 5% more likely to successfully exit.     

When do venture capitalists collaborate? Evidence on the driving forces of venture capital syndication

Using a sample of 2,373 unique capital contributions from 437 venture capitalists (VCs) over subsequent rounds into 961 start-ups during the period 1995–2005 in Germany we disentangle the circumstances under which lead VCs engage in syndicate relationships with partner VCs. The results indicate that syndication is more pronounced when VCs face higher risks that need to be diversified and capital burdens are larger. Moreover, we document that industry investment experience lends legitimacy to lead VCs, allowing them to enter syndicate relationships to enhance their network positions. In general, greater industry experience is associated with more syndication. Lastly, the results show that lead VCs involve new/additional partners in subsequent financing rounds to leverage their idiosyncratic skills and knowledge to improve deal selection and/or provide a better quality of managerial advice.     

Building service businesses in Africa: Introducing the business builder model

The success of Silicon Valley has served as a driving force for entrepreneurs and investors worldwide. Many have attempted to create their own version in developing markets by setting up Silicon Valley‐style tech incubators. In recent years, Africa has seen an influx of these start‐up incubators, which has resulted in an emergence of major tech hubs in different parts of the continent. These areas have taken on names synonymous with the booming tech industry: Cape Town in South Africa is known as the Silicon Cape, Nairobi in Kenya as the Silicon Savannah, and Lagos, Nigeria as the Silicon Lagoon. Despite the influx and success of some of these incubators, there is also a multitude of examples where success and longevity are rare. The lifespan of these start‐ups are short and they seldom realize any profit. Limited access to capital markets, poor infrastructure, and weak regulatory environment are just a few reasons cited for this. Although there is a multitude of articles and publications that feature success cases and reasons behind propelling success, there are far fewer that focus on failures. As such, with this article we aim to shed light on the various reasons why these businesses fail by analyzing the literature and demonstrating them with real‐world examples of both successes and failures in the market. Using the information analyzed, we then propose a solution for successfully investing in tech startups in the developing world, the business builder model.     

The Big Family: Informal Financing of Small‐ and Medium‐Sized Businesses by Guanxi

Guanxi facilitates interaction between companies and people in Confucian societies. Does this type of social construct still play the key role, when the entrepreneurs live in Western societies? The objective of this article is to verify the impact of Guanxi on the capacity of small and medium‐sized businesses accessing financial resources informally. To this end, data collected from small Chinese entrepreneurs active in the principal business center of Brazil were used. From nonparametric tests, the results suggest that: (1) different levels of Guanxi allow small and medium‐sized businesses to access informal financial resources; (2) different types of informal financing are mostly used, or judged to be more significant, depending on the level of Guanxi of the entrepreneur in terms of parental and nonfamily ties; and (3) unlike the Western literature on the financial cycles of start‐ups, this type of informal financing can extend beyond the initial stage of the business. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Venture capitalist governance and value added in four countries

The rapid internationalization of markets for venture capital is expanding the funding alternatives available to entrepreneurs. For venture capital firms, this trend spells intensified competition in markets already at or past saturation. At issue for both entrepreneurs and venture capital firms is how and when venture capitalists (VCs) can provide meaningful oversight and add value to their portfolio companies beyond the provision of capital. An important way VCs add value beyond the money they provide is through their close relationships with the managers of their portfolio companies. Whereas some VCs take a very hands-off approach to oversight, others become deeply involved in the development of their portfolio companies.Utilizing surveys of VCs in the United States and the three largest markets in Europe (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France), we examined the determinants of interaction between VCs and CEOs, the roles VCs assume, and VCs' perceptions of how much value they add through these roles. We examined the strategic, interpersonal, and networking roles through which VCs are involved in their portfolio companies, and we analyzed how successful such efforts were. By so doing we were able to shed light on how and when VCs in four major markets expend their greatest effort to provide oversight and value-added assistance to their investment companies.Consistent with prior empirical work, we found that VCs saw strategic involvement as their most important role, i.e., providing financial and business advice and functioning as a sounding board. They rated their interpersonal roles (as mentor and confidant to CEOs) as next in value.Finally, they rated their networking roles (i.e., as contacts to other firms and professionals) as third most important. These ratings were consistent across all four markets. VCs in the United States and the United Kingdom were the most involved in their ventures, and they added the most value. VCs in France were the least involved and added the least value; VCs in France appeared to be least like others in terms of what factors drove their efforts. Our theoretical models explained a greater proportion of variance in governance and value added in the United States than elsewhere. Clear patterns of behavior emerged that reflect the manner in which different markets operate. Among the European markets, practices in the United Kingdom appear to be most like that in the United States.Determinants of Governance (Face-to-Face Interaction)We operationalized VC governance or monitoring of ventures as the amount of face-to-face interaction VCs had with venture CEOs. We found some evidence that VCs increase monitoring in response to agency risks, but the results were mixed. Lack of experience on the part of CEOs did not prompt significant additional monitoring as had been predicted. A more potent determinant was how long the VC-CEO pairs worked together; longer relationships mitigated agency concerns and reduced monitoring. Contrary to expectations, perceived business risk in the form of VCs' satisfaction with recent venture performance had little impact on face-to-face interaction. Monitoring was greatest in early stage ventures, indicating that VCs respond to high uncertainty by increased information exchange with CEOs. We measured two types of VC experience and found different patterns for the two. Generally speaking, VCs with greater experience in the venture capital industry required less interaction with CEOs, whereas VCs with greater experience in the portfolio company's industry interacted more frequently with CEOs than did VCs without such experience.Determinants of Value AddedWe argued that VCs would most add value to ventures when the venture lacked resources or faced perceived business risks, when the task environment was highly uncertain, and when VCs had great investing and operating experience. Contrary to expectations, VCs added most value to those ventures already performing well. As we had predicted, VCs did add relatively more value when uncertainty was high: e.g., for ventures in the earliest stages and for ventures pursuing innovation strategies. Finally, we found that VCs with operating experience in the venture's focal industry added significantly more value than those with less industry-specific experience. These results are consistent with anecdotal evidence that entrepreneurs have a strong preference for VCs with similar backgrounds as their own. We found no evidence that experience in the venture capital industry contributed significantly to value added. Together, these results suggest that investigations of the social as well as economic dimensions of venture building may prove a fruitful avenue for future study. Overall, the results showed that value-added is strongly related to the amount of face-to-face interaction between VC-CEO pairs and to the number of hours VCs put in on each individual venture.Implications for Venture CapitalistsThe competition for attractive investments is heating up as economies become more globalized. Thus, the pressure on venture capital firms to operate both efficiently and effectively is also likely to build. It is as yet unclear whether the recent trend toward later stage, safer investments will continue, and how those venture capital firms following this path can differentiate themselves from other sources of capital. Venture capital firms that are able to choose the appropriate bases for determining governance effort and the appropriate roles for delivering added value to their portfolio companies will be those most likely to survive.In the largest, most robust markets (i.e., the United States and the United Kingdom), more effort is expended by venture capitalists to deliver something of value beyond the money. This suggests that the tradeoff preferred by those succeeding is to be more rather than less involved in their investments. Our results indicate that VCs clearly economize on the time they devote to involvement in their portfolio companies. However, our results also indicate that they do this at the great peril of producing value insufficient to justify the cost of their product.Implications for EntrepreneursOur findings provide two important insights for entrepreneurs. First, they show that where and when they obtain venture capital is likely to have an impact on the extent and nature of effort delivered by their venture capital investors. It appears that on average entrepreneurs receiving venture capital in the United States and the United Kingdom will be more closely monitored and will receive more value-adding effort from their VCs than will those in France or the Netherlands. Needless to say, entrepreneurs should consider their preferences for level and type of involvement from their investors as they consider their choice of partners. In France, for example, VCs put great emphasis on their financial role in comparison with other roles, but they contribute much less than VCs elswhere via other strategic, interpersonal, and networking roles.The second key implication of our findings is that entrepreneurs may be able to gauge what roles VCs will see as most important, when VCs are more or less apt to become involved in their companies, and when they believe they can most add value. Such knowledge may help CEOs anticipate VC activity, be aware of the parameters of VCs' preferences, communicate their own preferences, and negotiate the timing and extent of interaction. For example, although our results indicate that geographic distance significantly limits face-to-face interaction, it appears to have less impact on the amount of value added.Implications for ResearchersMuch more can be learned about the relative efficiency and effectiveness of alternative governance arrangements. Little is known about how formal structures such as contract covenants and board control work in conjunction with informal oversight and interaction. Even less is known about how value is added and how it is best measured. Although this study took a step toward developing a model of the circumstances under which value is added, the theory and its operationalization await further development.     

Joining forces: Top management team and board chair characteristics as antecedents of board service involvement

Boards in early stage high tech firms have an important role to play through their involvement in service tasks. Building on the attention based view of the firm and self-efficacy theory, we investigate the role of top management team (TMT) and board chair characteristics as antecedents of board service involvement (BSI). Studying a sample of 117 Norwegian early stage high tech firms, we find that TMT diversity positively affects BSI, whereas CEO duality negatively affects BSI. We further find that the industry experience of the board chair positively moderates the relationship between TMT size and BSI whereas CEO duality reinforces the TMT diversity-BSI relationship.     

The Interdependence of R&D Activity and Debt Financing of Young Firms

We investigate the interdependence of debt financing and R&D activities of young firms. Applying a bivariate Tobit model, we find that there is a positive interdependent relationship between the share of loan financing and R&D intensity. A higher share of loan financing allows for more R&D in young firms and, at the same time, a higher R&D intensity allows for a higher loan share. This result is mainly driven by start‐ups exhibiting high values of R&D intensity or leverage. Another remarkable result of our study is that the positive relationship between R&D and loan financing can only be detected if we consider that, first, the decisions on R&D and on loan financing are made simultaneously and, second, the decision on R&D impacts the decision on loan financing and vice versa.     

The potential of actuarial decision models: Can they improve the venture capital investment decision?

Venture capitalists (VCs) are considered experts in identifying high-potential new ventures—gazelles. VC-backed ventures survive at a much higher rate than those ventures backed by other sources Kunkel and Hofer 1991, Sandberg 1986, Timmons 1994. Thus, the VC decision process has received tremendous attention within the entrepreneurship literature. Nonetheless, VC-backed firms still fail at a surprisingly high rate (20%). Moreover, another 20% of the VC's portfolio fails to provide any return to the VC. Therefore, there is room for improvement in the VC investment process.The three staged investment process often begins with venture screening. First, VCs screen the hundreds of proposals they receive to assess which deserve further consideration. Those ventures that survive the initial stage are then subjected to extensive due diligence. Finally, the VC and entrepreneur negotiate terms of the investment. Considering the amount of time that due diligence and negotiation of terms may take, it is imperative that VCs minimize their efforts during screening so that only those ventures with the most potential proceed to the next stage. Yet, at the same time, the screening process should also be careful not to eliminate gazelles prematurely. VCs are in a quandary. How can they efficiently screen venture proposals without unduly rejecting high potential investments? The answer may be to use actuarial decision aides to assist in the screening process.Actuarial decision aides are models that decompose a decision into component parts (or cues) and recombine those cues to predict the potential outcome. For example, an actuarial model about the VC decision might decompose a venture proposal into decisions about the entrepreneurial team, the product, the market, etc. The sub-component decisions are than recombined to reach an overall assessment of the venture's potential. Such models have been developed in a number of decision domains (e.g., bank lending, psychological evaluations, etc.) and been found to be very robust. Specifically, these models often outperform the very experts that they are meant to mimic.The current study had 53 practicing VCs participate in a policy capturing experiment. The participants examined 50 ventures and judged each venture's success potential; would the venture ultimately succeed or fail. Likewise, identical information about each venture was input into two different types of actuarial models. One actuarial model—a bootstrap model—used information factors that VCs had identified as being most important to making a good investment decision. The second actuarial model was derived by Roure and Keeley (1990). The Roure and Keeley model best distinguished between success and failure in a study of 36 high-technology ventures. The bootstrap model outperformed all but one participating VC (he achieved the same accuracy rate as the bootstrap model). The Roure and Keely model, although less successful than the bootstrap model, outperformed over half of the participating VCs.The implications of this study are that properly developed actuarial models may be successful screening decision aides. The success of the actuarial models may be attributed to their consistency across different proposals and time. The models always weight the information cues the same. VCs, as are all human decision makers, may often be biased by differing salient information cues that cause them to misinterpret or ignore other important cues. For example, a VC may overlook product weaknesses if (s)he is familiar with the entrepreneur putting forth a particular proposal. Although the current study developed a generalized actuarial model, each VC firm could create screening models that fit it's particular decision criteria. The models could then be used by junior associates or lower level employees to perform an initial screen of received venture proposals thereby freeing senior associates' time.