Economic depression in the world

We create a dataset of country experience with economic depression around the world. We define a depression episode as a period of cumulative decline in per capita output of 20% or more lasting at least four years. We find depressions are surprisingly common. We describe their incidence and onset over decades, regions, and levels of development. We identify economic, political, financial, and cultural variables that are associated with depressions. Probit analysis reveals that the probability of entering or exiting a depression is influenced by domestic and international shocks.     

Mixed Duopoly with Product Differentiation: Sequential Choice of Location

We investigate the sequential choice of location in a mixed duopoly, where a welfare–maximising public firm competes against a profit–maximising private firm. We examine the desirable role of the public firm in a mixed market. We also consider the effect of price regulation. We find that the public firm should become the follower (leader) if a price regulation is (is not) imposed. We also find that neither price regulation nor privatisation of the public firm improves welfare.     

Confidence in Keynes and Hayek: Reply to Burczak

We agree with Burczak's identification of the crucial issues. We disagree with his interpretation of them. We expand our defense of the claim that Keynes was a rationalist. We introduce the "horizon principle" to critize Keynes' dichotomy between short-term and long-term expectations. We question the statistical simile guiding some Post Keynesian dsiscussions of uncertainty. We point to the role of evolution in shaping conventions that fit the economic environment in a world with novel events. We think the evidence favors our view over Burczak's. Finally, we put in a plea for framing the issues in a way that facilitates empirical testing.     

Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor

We investigate Stackelberg mixed duopoly models where a state‐owned public firm and a foreign private firm compete. We examine a desirable role (either leader or follower) of the public firm. We also consider endogenous roles by adopting the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). We find that, in contrast to Pal (1998) discussing a case of domestic competitors, the public firm should be the leader and that it becomes the leader in the endogenous role game. We also find that in contrast to Ono (1990) eliminating a foreign firm does not improve domestic welfare in mixed oligopolies.     

Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort

Summary. We provide a characterization of participants' behavior in a contest or tournament where the marginal productivity of effort varies across contestants and individual productivity is private information. We then consider the optimal design of such a contest. We first analyze contestant behavior for the usual type of contest, where the highest output wins. Abilities need not be independently distributed. We demonstrate that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium output function, that output is increasing in ability, and that marginal effort is increasing in ability, while effort decreases when the cost of effort increases. Next we consider the case where the highest output need not win, with independently distributed abilities. We analyze the contest designer's decisions in choosing contest rules optimal from her perspective. We show that the output produced, probability of winning, and contest designer's expected revenue are generally increasing in contestants' ability. We examine the relationship between the marginal cost of producing output and marginal utility per dollar of the net award for winning. Received: July 30, 1998; revised version: August 7, 2000     

Capital control reconsidered: financialisation and economic policy

We consider capital controls and their impact on selected countries, providing a critique of IMF policy. We show how the warning signs of the 1970s were ignored and the consequences became apparent during the ensuing period of neoliberal hegemony. We contend that promoting increased capital mobility is counterproductive as it reduces macroeconomic ‘policy space’. We introduce a development of the international policy ‘trilemma’ in the form of a variant of the idea of the ‘quadrilemma’. We suggest that, in most cases, the key policy driving economic growth is fiscal policy but it may be that its unconstrained use (and that of monetary policy) is not possible either under fixed exchange rates or when free capital mobility exists; a nation may face a ‘demi-quadrilemma’. We contend that, in practice, a country can only adopt ‘two from four’; if it chooses to retain free use of monetary and fiscal policy, it must sacrifice both fixed exchange rates and capital mobility. We advocate the rejection of fixed exchange rates and free capital mobility allowing the retention of requisite monetary and fiscal policy space, and that a multinational approach to the capital control policy would effectively contribute to a growth and development strategy.     

A two-country dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin model with physical and human capital accumulation

We study a two-country endogenous growth model in which the long-run growth is propelled by the accumulation of physical and human capital. We show that in the integrated world economy, there exists a unique and locally saddlepoint stable balanced growth equilibrium. We also show that the incorporation of adjustment costs in the process of human capital accumulation leads to a lower long-run growth rate. We then show that, in the 2-country world economy with international trade, balanced growth is possible. Finally, we present a dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin theorem concerning the pattern of international trade. We appreciate the constructive comments from an anonymous referee which have improved this paper significantly. We acknowledge also with gratitude the valuable comments of Hideyuki Adachi, Kosuke Aoki, Daniel Bernhofen, Eric Bond, Koichi Futagami, Ronald Jones, Tamotsu Nakamura and Raymond Riezman on earlier versions. We appreciate also the beneficial comments from the participants of the GEP conference on New Directions in International Trade Theory held in the University of Nottingham and of the Adachi OB Workshop in Kobe University.     

The U-shape of happiness in Scotland

We examine well-being in Scotland using micro data from the Scottish Health Survey and the UK Annual Population Surveys. We find evidence of a midlife nadir or zenith in Scotland in well-being at around age 50 using a variety of measures of both happiness and unhappiness. We confirm that higher consumption of fruit and vegetables is associated with higher levels of happiness in Scotland. We compare this with evidence for England from the Health Survey of England. The decline in well-being between youth and midlife is comparable in size to the loss of a spouse or of a job and around half of the fall in well-being in the COVID-19 lockdown. We also find a midlife peak in suicides in Scotland. Despite higher mortality and suicide rates in Scotland than in England, paradoxically we find that the Scots are happier than the English. Northern Ireland is the happiest of the four home countries. We also find evidence of U-shapes in England, Wales and Northern Ireland in the mid to late forties.     

Consistent representative democracy

We study axioms which define “representative democracy” in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We call these rules “partial priority rules.” A partial priority rule can be interpreted as a rule in which each agent can “veto” certain alternatives. We investigate the implications of imposing other axioms to the list specified above. We also study the partial priority rules in the context of specific economic models.     

Nonparametric identification of regression models containing a misclassified dichotomous regressor without instruments

We observe a dependent variable and some regressors, including a mismeasured binary regressor. We provide identification of the nonparametric regression model containing this misclassified dichotomous regressor. We obtain identification without parameterizations or instruments, by assuming the model error isn't skewed.     

ESTIMATION WITH CENSORED REGRESSORS: BASIC ISSUES*

We study issues that arise for estimation of a linear model when a regressor is censored. We discuss the efficiency losses from dropping censored observations, and illustrate the losses for bound censoring. We show that the common practice of introducing a dummy variable to “correct for” censoring does not correct bias or improve estimation. We show how censored observations generally have zero semiparametric information, and we discuss implications for estimation. We derive the likelihood function for a parametric model of mixed bound‐independent censoring, and apply that model to the estimation of wealth effects on consumption.     

Effects of a holiday trip on health and quality of life: evidence from a natural experiment in South Korea

We examine whether having a holiday trip affects an individual’s well-being, namely quality of life, health status, stress level and health behaviours. We use the two-stage estimation method to control for endogeneity of a travel experience, exploiting a natural experiment of distributing Travel Vouchers at random among qualified applicants in South Korea in 2012. We find that, for applicants whose decision to travel is influenced by receiving a voucher, a travel experience has no significant effects on the traveller’s well-being measured 3–12 months later. We also find that the OLS estimates overstate benefits of a travel.     

Generalized assignment models: with an applicationto technology transfer

Summary.  We consider a generalized assignment model where the payoffs depend on the number of matchings that take place. We formulate a simple non-cooperative game and look for subgame perfect equilibrium of this model. Existence is established for a wide class of games. We also look at a refinement criterion which, for the standard assignment model, selects the -optimal outcome as the unique equilibrium. We then apply these concepts to a model of technology transfer between domestic and foreign firms. Received: June 24, 1994; revised version October 12, 1995     

Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation

We analyze a tractable class of multitask principal-agent problems, such as the one faced by a firm with a manager overseeing several projects. We allow for tasks to be complements or substitutes. We avoid the problems associated with the first-order approach by directly characterizing the shape of the agent's indirect utility function, which exhibits a convex then concave shape in effort. We identify a new source of allocational inefficiency across tasks: excessive concentration, and its consequence, insufficient risk taking. Optimal incentive schemes in our environment are generally “fragile”: small changes in fundamentals can cause the agent's effort to collapse.     

The effect of the liberalization of the Chinese stock market on returns

We examine the short-term effects of the liberalization of the Chinese stock market on returns. We find a positive and significant abnormal return associated with the announcement of the liberalization of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Exploiting features of the reform, we are able to compare stocks directly and indirectly affected by the liberalization. We find that all stock prices reflect this announcement premium equally, suggesting that the premium does not reflect an increase in expected liquidity. We further find that observed liquidity, as measured by volume and price impact, did not increase following the liberalization. We conclude that the observed premium reflects a diversification benefit for Chinese investors.     

Pricing schemes and market efficiency in private retirement systems

We study the effects of different pricing schemes on the overall surplus in a privately managed retirement system with multiple service providers and switching costs. We develop a theoretical model based on the Chilean retirement system and consider a repeated auction for monopoly rights over new enrollees. We consider a dynamic model solved by pension fund administrators and by consumers. We compare three different pricing schemes: (a) fees on contributions, (b) fees on returns, and (c) a two‐part tariff including an auction over a guaranteed rate of return and allowing the firm to keep a portion of returns generated above this guaranteed rate. We also consider heterogeneity across individuals where agents earn high or low wages and high‐wage customers have proportionally lower switching costs due to more cost‐effective access to financial planning services. We find that auction participants subsidize consumers. We also treat savings as a durable good. In this case, pricing over returns worsens the switching related inefficiencies just described relative to pricing over contributions, despite the better incentives it provides. These inefficiencies can be resolved by allowing firms to price discriminate.     

Valuation in infinite-horizon sequential markets with portfolio constraints

Summary. We develop a theory of valuation of assets in sequential markets over an infinite horizon and discuss implications of this theory for equilibrium under various portfolio constraints. We characterize a class of constraints under which sublinear valuation and a modified present value rule hold on the set of non-negative payoff streams in the absence of feasible arbitrage. We provide an example in which valuation is non-linear and the standard present value rule fails in incomplete markets. We show that linearity and countable additivity of valuation hold when markets are complete. We present a transversality constraint under which valuation is linear and countably additive on the set of all payoff streams regardless of whether markets are complete or incomplete. Received: March 9, 2000; revised version: February 13, 2001     

The design of monetary and fiscal policy: A global perspective

We study the emergence of multiple equilibria in models with capital and bonds under various monetary and fiscal policies. We show that the presence of capital is indeed another independent source of local and global multiplicities, even under active policies that yield local determinacy. We also show how a very similar mechanism generates multiplicities in models with bonds and distortionary taxation. We then explore the design of monetary policies that avoid multiple equilibria. We show that interest rate policies that respond to the output gap, while potentially a source of significant inefficiencies, may be effective in preventing multiple equilibria and costly oscillatory equilibrium dynamics.     

Learning,large deviations and rare events

We examine the role of generalized stochastic gradient constant gain (SGCG) learning in generating large deviations of an endogenous variable from its rational expectations value. We show analytically that these large deviations can occur with a frequency associated with a fat-tailed distribution even though the model is driven by thin-tailed exogenous stochastic processes. We characterize these large deviations, driven by sequences of consistently low or consistently high shocks and then apply our model to the canonical asset pricing framework. We demonstrate that the tails of the stationary distribution of the price–dividend ratio will follow a power law.     

What role should public enterprises play in free-entry markets?

We investigate a desirable role of public enterprise in mixed oligopoly in free-entry markets. We compare the following three cases: (a) a public firm produces before private firms (public leadership), (b) all firms produce simultaneously (Cournot), (c) a public firm produces after private firms (private leadership). We find that private leadership is best and public leadership is worst, in contrast to the cases without entries and exits of private firms. We also investigate the welfare implication of privatization. We find that some important results shown by existing works do not hold under private leadership.