SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION IN AGENCY CONTRACTS*

We study how a principal uses her subjective evaluation of the agent's performance in an incentive contract. It is shown that the subjective evaluation can be used either 1) when there is no other information about the agent's performance and the principal is able to discard money, or 2) when the principal chooses between wage payment based on subjective evaluation by foregoing objective evaluation, and the one based only on the objective evaluation and when the subjective evaluation is sufficiently accurate. The principal pays a high fixed wage when her rating at the subjective evaluation is above a certain level. On the other hand, when it is below that level, she either pays a low fixed wage or obtains objective evaluation and pays based on its outcome.     

Search and Knightian uncertainty

Suppose that “uncertainty” about labor market conditions has increased. Does this change induce an unemployed worker to search longer, or shorter? This paper shows that the answer is drastically different depending on whether an increase in “uncertainty” is an increase in risk or that in true uncertainty in the sense of Frank Knight. We show in a general framework that, while an increase in risk (the mean-preserving spread of the wage distribution that the worker thinks she faces) increases the reservation wage, an increase in Knightian uncertainty (a decrease in her confidence about the wage distribution) reduces it.     

The costs of hiring skilled workers

This paper analyzes the structure of hiring costs for skilled workers. We use novel Swiss administrative firm-level survey data that provide direct and detailed measures of hiring costs, including recruitment and adaptation. Results show that average hiring costs range, depending on firm size, from 10 to 17 weeks of wage payments. The structure of hiring costs is convex. Marginal hiring costs increase with the number of hires and reach up to 24 weeks of wage payments. We find no evidence for a fixed cost component. Hiring costs also increase with the hiring rate (the ratio of hires and skilled workers), confirming convexity. Hiring costs generally increase with skill requirements for job applicants, and depend on macroeconomic conditions: a 1% point increase in the unemployment rate reduces average hiring costs by more than 5%.     

Wage and price controls in the equilibrium sequential search model

In this paper, we study the effects of wage and price controls on employment, output, and welfare in a simplified version of the Bénabou (J. Econom. Theory 60 (1993) 140) equilibrium sequential search model with bilateral heterogeneity. We show that a price ceiling increases output but the change in welfare depends on three effects: the reduction in aggregate search costs, the increase in surplus due to increased output, and the transfer of production to the least efficient firm. The model is formally identical to a standard equilibrium search model of the labor market so analogous results hold for the minimum wage.     

Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information

We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) [20] that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes. We also extend the results of the single-agent model to the multi-agent model.     

The codetermined firm in a Cournot duopoly: A stability analysis

This paper aims to study the stability issue in a Cournot duopoly with codetermined firms. We show that when both firms codetermine employment together with decentralised employees' representatives, a rise in wages acts as an economic (de)stabiliser when the wage is fairly (high) low, while under profit maximisation a rise in wages always acts as a stabilising device because the parametric stability region monotonically increases with the wage in such a case. Moreover, a rise in the union's bargaining power has a de-stabilising effect, except when the wage is low and the firm power is already high. Therefore, under codetermination a change either in the wage or firm power in the Nash bargaining plays an ambiguous role on stability. We also show with numerical simulations that complex dynamics can also occur.     

UNIONS' RELATIVE CONCERNS AND STRIKES IN WAGE BARGAINING

We consider a model of wage determination with private information in an oligopoly. We investigate the effects of unions having relative concerns on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. We show that an increase of unions’ relative concerns has an ambiguous effect on the strike activity.     

IMMIGRANT RELATIVE WAGES AT THE GREAT RECESSION: EVIDENCE WITH MATCHED EMPLOYER‐EMPLOYEE DATA FOR SPAIN

The article examines relative wages of immigrants in Spain, with a particular focus on the impact of the Great Recession. The empirical analysis is restricted to men and is based on matched employer‐employee microdata and the decomposition techniques of Juhn et al. (1991, 1993) and Fortin et al. (2011). Our results show that the significant native‐immigrant wage gap that exists both in terms of average wages and of differentials along the wage distribution is essentially explained by differences in the endowments of observed characteristics so that, in general, immigrants tend to receive a similar wage treatment than Spaniards with analogous observed attributes. On the other hand, the Great Recession has had a noticeable impact on the relative wages of immigrants, given that the significant increase of the native‐immigrant wage gap observed during the previous expansionary period was mitigated during the economic downturn due to composition effects arising from the severe employment destruction pattern.     

A numerical simulation analysis of (Hukou) labour mobility restrictions in China

We use numerical simulation methods to analyze the Hukou system of permanent registration in China which many believe has supported growing relative inequality over the last 20 years by restraining labour migration both between the countryside and urban areas and between regions and cities. Our aim is to inject economic modelling into the debate on sources of inequality in China which thus far has been largely statistical. We first use a model with homogeneous labour in which wage inequality across various geographical divides in China is supported solely by quantity based migration restrictions (urban–rural areas, rich–poor regions, eastern-central and western (non-coastal) zones, eastern and central-western development zones, eastern–central–western zones, more disaggregated 6 regional classifications, and an all 31 provincial classification). We calibrate this model to base case data and when we remove migration restrictions all wage and most income inequality disappears. Results from this model structure points to a significant role for Hukou restrictions in supporting inequality in China. We then present a further model extension in which urban house price rises retard rural–urban migration. The impacts of removing Hukou restrictions on migration are smaller, but are still significant. Finally, we modify the model to capture labour productivity differences across regions, calibrating the modified model to estimates of both national and regional Gini coefficients. Removal of migration barriers is again inequality improving but less so.     

Compensating Wage Differentials for Schooling Risk in Denmark*

In this paper we analyse the association between wage differentials and risk using detailed information on length and type of education as seen in Danish administrative registers. Our contribution to the literature is that we distinguish between transitory (time‐series) and permanent (cross‐sectional) income shocks, and estimate the compensation for both sorts of risk. We find that wage risk in a given education cell is associated with higher wages, while skewness is associated with lower wages. As a robustness check, we see that ad hoc risk measures based on earnings‐mobility indicators confirm these findings.     

von Thünen: Capital,Production Functions,Marginal Productivity Wages,and the Natural Wage

This paper puts seminal contributions to theory of production functions and maximization of explicit quantitative objective functions by Johann Heinrich von Thünen into a systematic historical perspective. We show that his comprehensive ‘Tableau Economiques’ do imply two exact parametric production functions. Moreover, the renowned ‘geometric mean wage’ formula is restated as an exact CES marginal labor productivity wage for σ = 2. We review four alternative modes of normative (natural) wage calculations without an explicit production function, and conclude that von Thünen's natural wage differentiation formulas are bona fide alternatives for deriving the natural wage formula.     

The impact of the informal economy on R&D,wage inequality and economic growth

We extend the existing research and development (R&D) growth literature by focusing on the short–medium–long run effects of the informal sector on R&D intensity, wage inequality and economic growth, and by considering 18 OECD countries between 1990 and 2008. We show that: the steady state is unique and stable; the share of informal economy (IE) in production affects negatively R&D intensity and wage equality; Nordic countries have the lowest share of IE in production, while Mediterranean countries have the highest share of IE, wage inequality and R&D intensity but R&D spillovers are lower.     

The minimum wage, employment, and the AS-IF methodology: A forecasting approach to evaluating the minimum wage

Out-of-sample employment forecasts for 33 U.S. industries which are likely to be sensitive to the federal minimum wage are, more often than not, more accurate when information about the minimum wage is not taken into account. This is true even in instances where this information improves wage forecasts. When employment forecasts conditional on the minimum wage are better, the improvement is typically small. These results are invariant to the number of workers previously making less than the new minimum wage, and to the value of the minimum wage relative to industry average wages. First version received: August 1999/Final version received: July 2000     

Wage/tenure contracts with heterogeneous firms

This paper investigates equilibria where firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk averse workers search for new job opportunities whether employed or unemployed. We generalize previous work by assuming firms have different productivities. Equilibrium implies more productive firms always offer more desirable contracts. Thus workers never quit from more productive firms for less productive firms. Nevertheless turnover is inefficient as employees with long tenures at low productivity firms may reject outside job offers from more productive firms. A worker who quits to a more productive firm may accept a wage cut. Such wage cuts are compensated by faster “promotion” rates to higher wage levels in the future. We also generalize previous arguments by showing equilibria exist where the distribution of offers contains interior mass points and find equilibrium wage/tenure contracts need not be smooth.     

Wages and productivity growth in a competitive industry

We describe the evolution of productivity growth in a competitive industry with free entry and exit. The exogenous wage rate determines the firms’ engagement in labor productivity enhancing process innovation. There is a unique steady state of the industry dynamics, which is globally asymptotically stable. In the steady state, the number of active firms, their unit labor cost and supply depend on the growth rate but not on the level of the wage rate. In addition to providing comparative statics of the steady state, the paper characterizes the industry's adjustment path.     

The heterogeneous regional effects of minimum wages in Poland

We evaluate the impact of large minimum wage hikes on employment and wage growth in Poland between 2004 and 2018. We estimate panel data models utilizing the considerable variation in wage levels, and in minimum wage bites, across 73 Polish NUTS 3 regions. We find that minimum wage hikes had a significant positive effect on wage growth and a significant negative effect on employment growth only in regions of Poland that were in the first tercile of the regional wage distribution in 2007. These effects were moderate in size, and appear to be more relevant for wages. Specifically, if the ratio of minimum wage to average wage had remained constant after 2007, by 2018, the average wages in these regions would have been 3.2% lower, while employment would have been 1.2% higher. In the remaining two-thirds of Polish regions, we find no significant effects of minimum wage hikes on average wages or on employment.     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

Does downward nominal wage rigidity dampen wage increases?

Focusing on the compression of wage cuts, many empirical studies find a high degree of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR). However, the resulting macroeconomic effects seem to be surprisingly weak. This contradiction can be explained within an intertemporal framework in which DNWR not only prevents nominal wage cuts but also induces firms to compress wage increases. We analyze whether a compression of wage increases occurs when DNWR is binding by applying Unconditional Quantile Regression and Seemingly Unrelated Regression to a dataset comprising more than 169 million wage changes. We find evidence of a compression of wage increases and only very small effects of DNWR on average real wage growth. The results indicate that DNWR does not provide a strong argument against low inflation targets.     

Average cost pricing versus marginal cost pricing under moral hazard

This paper presents a general framework for analyzing shadow wages in LDCs. We focus on (i) the differences between the domestic and international prices, (ii) the equilibrating mechanisms in the economy, (iii) the endogeneity of earnings in industry and agriculture, (iv) the consequences of industrial employment creation on agriculture, and (v) the nature of migration and unemployment.We identify those reduced form relationships which are central in determining the shadow wage, and use them to obtain general formulae for the shadow wage. These formulae can be specialized to alternative technological, behavioral, and institutional settings. This yields many new results concerning the relationship between the shadow wage and the market wage. Also, earlier results on shadow wages are derived as special cases of our formulae.     

Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing

This paper introduces wage bargaining in the framework of Milgrom and Roberts (Econometrica 50(2):443–459, 1982) where the workers’ reservation wage is the private information parameter critical for entry. We show that entry threat significantly distorts the wage, which in some cases adversely affects the firm’s ability to signal through price. Consequently, the separating equilibrium (in price) does not always exist. If, however, wage agreements are made public, signalling occurs with or without distortions in wage depending on whether the union’s bargaining power is high or low. Pooling equilibrium also exists and it features similar distortions. We also examine which signal, wage or price, generates greater social welfare. We would like to thank two referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. This paper is partially based on a chapter of Pal’s PhD thesis done at Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR), India. For remaining errors we are solely responsible.