Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.     

Monetary policy under a fiscal theory of sovereign default

This paper examines equilibrium determination under different monetary policy regimes when the government might default on its debt. We apply a cash-in-advance model where the government does not have access to non-distortionary taxation and does not account for initial outstanding debt when it sets the income tax rate. Solvency is then not guaranteed and sovereign default can affect the return on public debt. If the central bank sets the interest rate in a conventional way, the equilibrium allocation cannot be determined. If, instead, money supply is controlled, the equilibrium allocation can uniquely be determined.     

A risk-driven approach to exchange rate modelling

The paper presents a new approach to exchange rate modelling that augments the CHEER model with a sovereign credit default risk as perceived by financial investors making their decisions. In the cointegrated VAR system with nine variables comprised of the short- and long-term interest rates in Poland and the euro area, inflation rates, CDS indices and the zloty/euro exchange rate, four long-run relationships were found. Two of them link term spreads with inflation rates, the third one describes the exchange rate and the fourth one explains the inflation rate in Poland. Transmission of shocks was analysed by common stochastic trends. The estimation results were used to calculate the zloty/euro equilibrium exchange rate.     

Optimal monetary policy for a small open economy

This paper focuses on the design of monetary policy rules for a small open economy. The model features optimizing behavior, general equilibrium and price stickiness. The real exchange rate is shown to affect the firm's real marginal cost, aggregate supply and aggregate demand. The welfare objective depends on the openness of the economy, and the optimal policy rule differs from that which obtains in a closed economy. The inflation versus output gap stabilization trade-off is caused by the real exchange rate. The implied optimal monetary policy regime is domestic inflation target coupled with controlled floating of the real exchange rate.     

Sovereign default risk and volatility

In a model of sovereign debt with endogenous default, we find a non-monotonic relationship between default risk and volatility, reflecting a trade-off between prudence and the insurance value of default. We show that this feature also holds in the data.     

Dollarization and financial integration

How does a country's exchange rate regime impact its ability to borrow from abroad? We build a small open economy model in which the government responds to shocks by adjusting monetary policy and foreign borrowing. Sovereign borrowing is subject to endogenous limits, which ensure repayment when the default punishment corresponds to financial autarky. Dollarizing implies renouncing monetary policy, but can make access to international debt markets more valuable, thereby loosening borrowing constraints. This mechanism linking dollarization to financial integration is consistent with observed declines in spreads on foreign-currency debt in countries adopting the dollar or the euro.     

Do central banks respond to exchange rate movements? Some new evidence from structural estimation

This paper investigates the impact of exchange rate movements on the conduct of monetary policy in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. We develop and estimate a structural general equilibrium model, in which monetary policy is represented as a simple rule and exchange rate pass‐through is incomplete due to the presence of local currency pricing and distribution services. We find that the Bank of Canada, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and the Bank of England have not adjusted interest rates in response to exchange rate movements since the adoption of inflation targeting, while our model selection results for Australia are less clear.     

European policy and markets: Did policy initiatives stem the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area?

We investigate how European policy initiatives influenced market assessments of sovereign default risk and banking sector fragility during the sovereign debt crisis in four adversely affected countries — Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy. We focus on three broad groups of policies: (a) ECB policy actions (monetary and financial support), (b) EU programs (financial and fiscal rules as well as financial support in crisis countries), and (c) domestic austerity programs. We measure immediate market impact effects: what policies changed risk perceptions, using CDS spreads on sovereign bonds and banks in this assessment. We employ dynamic panel and event study methodologies in the empirical work. We find that a number of programs initially stabilized sovereign and bank bond markets (e.g. Outright Monetary Transactions program), although announcement and implementation impacts on markets differed in some cases (e.g. second Covered Market Bond Program). Actions designed to shore up sovereign markets often lowered risk assessments in bank bond markets and policies designed to ensure safety and soundness of the European banking system in some cases significantly impacted sovereign debt markets. Finally, a number of policies designed to stabilize markets had surprisingly little immediate impact on either sovereign or bank bond market risk assessments.     

Fiscal limits and monetary policy: default vs. inflation

This paper studies the monetary policy trade-off between low inflation and low sovereign risk in the environment where fiscal authorities fail to fully ensure the sustainability of government debt. Building on the Fiscal Theory of Price Level (FTPL) and the Fiscal Theory of Sovereign Risk (FTSR), this paper differs in its baseline assumption about the monetary policy objective, which is neither to rule out defaults regardless of inflation costs (as in FTPL), nor to follow inflation targeting regardless of associated sovereign risk (as in FTSR). Instead, we study the case in which the central bank controls the risky interest rate to minimize the probability of default while ruling out large inflation hikes. We show that this policy regime can mitigate default risks only when the central bank is expected to allow sufficient increases in inflation. When agents believe that the central bank's tolerance toward inflation hikes has increased, equilibrium risk premium goes down, suggesting that information concerning changes in the central bank's preferences over inflation directly impacts default risks.     

Exchange rate movements and monetary policy in Brazil: Econometric and simulation evidence

The literature on monetary economy has aroused growing interest in macroeconomics. Due to computational advancements, models have become increasingly more complex and accurate, allowing for an in-depth analysis of the relationships between real economic variables and nominal variables. Therefore, using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, based on Gali and Monacelli (2005), we propose and estimate a model for the Brazilian economy by employing Bayesian methods so as to assess whether the Central Bank of Brazil takes exchange rate fluctuations into account in the conduct of monetary policy. The most striking result of the present study is that the Central Bank of Brazil does not directly change the interest rate path due to exchange rate movements. A simulation exercise is also used. Our conclusion is that the economy quickly accommodates shocks induced separately on the exchange rate, on the terms of trade, interest rate, and global inflation.     

NOMINAL SOVEREIGN DEBT

I show that reputation alone can sustain nominal sovereign debt, which is subject to both the risks of default and opportunistic devaluations. Nominal debt combined with a countercyclical exchange rate policy allows more hedging against shocks than real savings if markets are incomplete. Thus, the loss of either repayment or monetary reputation severely affects the government's ability to smooth consumption. The model offers a simple explanation for the Bulow and Rogoff critique, while simultaneously helping explain the issuance of nominal sovereign bonds by emerging economies. The model also helps explain why many governments borrow and save at the same time.     

Financial Instability under a Flexible Exchange Rate*

Many governments in developing countries contemplate the possibility of increasing the flexibility of their exchange rates despite having accumulated substantial dollar‐denominated debt. Using a model of corporate dollar debt in which the future exchange rate is uncertain, this paper studies the financial risks that might arise as a consequence of increased exchange rate flexibility. Since a firm may default on its debt either because its dollar income is too low or because investors refuse to roll over its debt, the measure of the overall risk of default should take into account both factors, as well as their interaction. Solving the model for the no‐default rational expectations equilibrium, we find that a small risk of insolvency may bring about a substantial risk of illiquidity.     

On the relevance of exchange rate regimes for stabilization policy

This paper assesses the relevance of the exchange rate regime for stabilization policy. Using both fiscal and monetary policy, we conclude that the exchange rate regime is irrelevant. This is the case independently of the severity of price rigidities, independently of asymmetries across countries in shocks and transmission mechanisms. The only relevant conditions are on the mobility of labor and financial assets. The results can be summarized with the claim that every currency area is an optimal currency area. However, with labor mobility or tradable state-contingent assets, additional policy instruments would be required to establish the irrelevance result.     

Currency Crises, Monetary Policy and Corporate Balance Sheets

Abstract. This paper studies how the exposure of a country's corporate sector to interest rate and exchange rate changes affects the probability of a currency crisis. To analyze this question, we present a model that defines currency crises as situations in which the costs of maintaining a fixed exchange rate exceed the costs of abandonment. The results show that a higher exposure to interest rate changes increases the probability of crisis through an increased need for output loss compensation and an increased efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output. A higher exposure to exchange rate changes also increases the need for output loss compensation. However, it lowers the efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output through the adverse balance sheet effects of exchange rate depreciation. As a result, its effect on the probability of crisis is ambiguous.     

External debt sustainability and policy rules in a small globalized economy

The paper develops a Post Keynesian macroeconomic model which discusses the conditions that lead to an external debt crisis in a small developing economy fully integrated to global goods and financial markets. The focus is on how policy rules affect the stability of the economy. Two kinds of policy rules are discussed, namely inflation target and real exchange rate target, implemented through an interest rate operation procedure (IROP). It is argued that in both cases the evolution of the real exchange rate should be closely monitored to avoid external instability. It is also suggested that a real exchange rate target may be more effective to stabilize the economy if there is a strong tendency towards the equality of the foreign and domestic real interest rates.     

On the credit and exchange rate channels of central bank asset purchases in a monetary union

Throughout the euro area crisis, financial fragmentation across jurisdictions became a prime concern for the single monetary policy. The ECB broadened the scope of its instruments and enacted a series of non-standard measures to engineer an appropriate degree of policy accommodation. The transmission of these measures through the currency union remained highly dependent on the financial structure and conditions prevailing in various regions. This paper explores the country-specific macroeconomic transmission of selected non-standard measures from the ECB using a global DSGE model with a rich financial sector: we extend the six-region multi-country model of Darracq Pariès et al. (2016), introducing credit and exchange rate channels for central bank asset purchases. The portfolio rebalancing frictions are calibrated to match the sovereign yield and exchange rate responses after ECB's Asset Purchase Programme (APP) first announcement. The domestic transmission of the APP through the credit intermediation chain is significant and quite heterogenous across the largest euro area countries. The introduction of global portfolio frictions on euro area government bond holdings by international investors opens up for a larger depreciation of the euro. The interaction between international and domestic channels affect the magnitude and the cross-country distribution of the APP impact.     

Monetary shocks,exchange rates and trade balances: Evidence from inflation targeting countries

This paper investigates the relationship among monetary policy shocks, exchange rates and trade balances in five Inflation Targeting Countries (ITCs). The investigation is based on Structural Vector Error Correction Models (SVECMs) with long run and short run restrictions. The findings reveal that a contractionary monetary policy shock leads to a decrease in price level, a decrease in output, an appreciation in exchange rate, and an improvement in trade balance in the very short run. Our findings contradict the findings of price, output, exchange rate and trade puzzles that have been found in many empirical studies. Furthermore they are consistent with the theoretical expectations regarding the effect of a contractionary policy. The only long run restriction that we imposed on our models is that money does not affect real macroeconomic variables in the long run, which is consistent with both Keynesian and monetarist approaches.     

Sovereign debt spread and default in a model with self-fulfilling prophecies and asymmetric information

The euro area sovereign debt crisis has renewed interest in government credibility and the risk of default. Recent empirical evidence has shown that the sharp increase in government bond yields cannot be attributed entirely to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals. Contagion effects can occur, and self-fulfilling speculation may arise. In this paper, we develop a theoretical model in the spirit of the second-generation currency crisis models developed by Obstfled (1996). The model describes a strategic game between governments and private investors. Euro area countries face a trade-off as governments may either commit to and implement restrictive fiscal policies or default on debt. The commitment strategy may not be optimal if the fundamentals deteriorate. The policy maker lose part of their credibility, and governments are forced to default. In addition, we introduce uncertainty about the cost of default in the model, which is then able to account for a greater variety of equilibrium. Thus, when the evaluation of the cost of default is asymmetric, prophecies are not always realized and default does not occur. Simulations of the model then show that it offers insights, and can help to account for the situations of Greece and Italy during the sovereign debt crisis.     

Macroeconomic dynamics in Macedonia and Slovakia: Structural estimation and comparison

This paper estimates a structural macroeconomic model using data for Macedonia and Slovakia to characterize possible challenges Macedonia can face concerning macroeconomic stabilization during its transition process. A comparison of the estimated model parameters suggests that, in Slovakia, the output gap is less sensitive to real interest rate movements and prices experience greater inertia. The estimated monetary policy reaction functions show Macedonia and Slovakia as inflation targeters, with Macedonia as the more conservative one, despite its officially applied exchange rate targeting regime. The differences in the estimated parameters imply differing transmission mechanisms for Macedonia and Slovakia. Consequently, the variance of domestic variables in Slovakia is most influenced by monetary policy shocks, while there is no single dominating shock explaining the volatility of Macedonia's macroeconomic variables. The exchange rate shock, the monetary policy shock and the demand shock are jointly important in determining the volatility of Macedonia's variables. The model simulations indicate that Macedonia experiences lower output gap and inflation volatility than Slovakia. This comes, nevertheless, at the cost of higher interest rate and real exchange rate volatility in Macedonia, which could be an indication of more volatile financial markets with possible negative implications for financial stability.     

Wage rigidities and unemployment fluctuations in a small open economy

This study analyzes the implications of the monetary policy for the unemployment rate in a small open economy. We introduce nominal wage rigidities and unemployment into the small open economy version of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We derive three main findings. First, under nominal wage rigidities, the cyclical properties of the calibrated model, in response to a productivity shock, are consistent with the empirical evidence on a decrease in employment and an increase in real wages. Second, for all the variables considered, the Taylor rule tracks the optimal policy better than the simple rule with unemployment as an argument. Third, regardless of the output or unemployment gap being targeted, it is not optimal that central banks respond to nominal exchange rate variations.