Too much of a good thing? Why altruism can harm the environment?

Success of eco-labeling schemes, broadly defined, varies among products and across countries. Based on a simple theoretical framework, we show that the nature of environmental attributes among products (i.e., private versus public) and the consumer type (i.e., egoist versus altruist) shape the overall performance of such schemes. In addition, we demonstrate that altruistic consumers exhibiting a too high willingness to pay for the eco-labeled product can inadvertently prevent egoistic consumers from purchasing it, leading to a sub-optimal outcome in terms of environmental performance. Several policy and managerial implications are drawn.     

Product line pricing in a vertically differentiated oligopoly

Abstract This paper examines the joint pricing decision of products in a firm’s product line. When products are distinguished by a vertical characteristic, those with higher values of that characteristic will command higher prices. We investigate whether, holding the value of the characteristic constant, there is an additional price premium for products on the industry and/or the firm frontier, that is, for the products with the highest value of the characteristic in the market or in a firm’s product line. We also investigate the existence of price premia for lower‐ranked products and other product line pricing questions. Using personal computer price data, we show that prices decline with the distance from the industry and firm frontiers, even after holding absolute quality constant. We find evidence that consumer tastes for brands is stronger for the consumers of frontier products (and thus competition between firms weaker in the top end of the market). There is also evidence that a product’s price is higher if a firm offers products with the immediately faster and immediately slower computer chip (holding the total number of a firm’s offerings constant), possibly as an attempt to reduce cannibalization. Finally, a product’s price declines with the time it is offered by a firm, suggesting intertemporal price discrimination.     

Cost Signals under Uncertain R&D Outcomes

When it is difficult for firms to differentiate their products from those of their competitors, research and development (R&D) spending on process innovation to lower the cost of production is crucial for profitability. However, the information asymmetry in production costs that results from innovation reduces the efficiency of all firms in a market for a homogeneous good. We employ a signalling game to discuss the feasibility of utilising R&D spending and output levels as cost signals in an environment of quantity competition. The results show that a firm does not spend its money on R&D solely to signal the type of cost. Rather, R&D spending may be chosen as a cost signal over the output level only if expenditures on R&D can lead to a sufficiently high probability of reducing production costs.     

Process R&;D and Product Line Deletion by a Multiproduct Monopolist

Relative to single-product firms, a multiproduct monopolist can internalize the negative externalities of its R&D investments (the ``cannibalization effect') in two ways: (1) To lower R&D investment for each product; and (2) To delete some of its product lines so as to enlarge the market size for the remaining lines. It is shown that line deletion is profitable if products are close substitutes. If products are not close substitutes, the multiproduct monopolist keeps all product lines and invests less in cost-reducing R&D than single-product firms engaging in Cournot competition with product differentiation. However, it invests more in R&D than single-product firms if there are significant economies of scope in R&D, or if the oligopolistic firms can cooperate in their R&D decisions.      

Formation of buyer-seller trade networks in a quality-differentiated product market

Abstract .  We examine the formation of buyer-seller links when exchange can take place only if such a link exists. Sellers produce products of different qualities, and multiple sellers can form a sellers' association to pool their customers setting uniform prices. Buyers form trade links with individual sellers or sellers' associations. We show which buyer-seller links will form and find the set of links that are stable and show how these links influence prices. We also show that a trade network mismatch may occur where a high-quality good remains unsold even without an economy-wide excess supply of goods.     

Geographical separation of oligopolists can be very competitive

A given number of single, differentiated product oligopolists locate in one of two separate market-places, which consumers access at a cost. Firms set prices and the CES consumers choose purchases at one or both market-places. Firm agglomeration in one market-place produces positive profits because of product differentiation. But if consumer access costs are homogeneous and products are sufficiently good substitutes, geographical separation of firms produces prices analogous to homogeneous product Bertrand, and is “very competitive”, the reverse of textbook Hotelling. Hence a novel explanation emerges for the geographical agglomeration of firms producing very similar products.     

An evolutionary model of recycling and product lifetime extension

This paper presents a model-based analysis of the development and diffusion of so-called ‘green’ products, i.e. those which are easily recyclable and which have a long lifetime. We address this problem by developing an evolutionary simulation model to identify the impact of the environmental R&D strategies of business firms on the economy and the environment. The simulation results show that R&D investment both in product recyclability and in product lifetime extension can be positive for the firm. Adopting such a strategy means that the firm can then market green products, which provides it with a competitive advantage on firms investing mainly in product recyclability whatever consumers' preferences. From an environmental point of view, the diffusion of green products will reduce both waste flows in the economy and pressure on virgin resources. However, diversifying R&D investment to develop both product recyclability and lifetime can mean slowing down the flow of recycled materials and may lead to even greater quantities of unrecycled waste. Our results suggest introducing regulation policies aiming at encouraging firms to invest both in product recyclability and lifetime in order to benefit from their complementarities. Furthermore, simulations show that it should be better to direct environmental policies on firms' environmental innovation strategies than on demand attributes because significant changes in these strategies would provide much more radical environmental changes.     

Product customization

The advent of the Internet has revolutionized the way companies advertise, develop and distribute products. Firms can now customize their advertising messages and products to the particular characteristics and needs of customers. Customers themselves can create their own products. We investigate investments by firms in product-customization capabilities within a duopoly model of horizontal product differentiation. We find that (i) if brand name effects are not too strong, one firm emerges as a leader in product customization—firms make asymmetric investments in product-customization technologies in order to reduce price competition, (ii) if brand name effects are strong, both firms make extensive investments in product customization, and (iii) the possibility of product customization can raise industry profits if brand names are weak, but not when they are strong.     

Children as consumers: investigating child diary expenditure data

Abstract.  We investigate expenditure behaviour of school-aged children using child diary information contained in the British Family Expenditure Survey. The estimates from an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) for child expenditure suggest that drinks, sweets, books, and toys are 'normal' goods for children, but clothes, travel, leisure and vice products are 'luxury' items with income elasticities greater than one. Being a lone-parent child and having a working mother are important factors in determining child expenditure decisions. Importantly, a higher parental budget share on any given commodity is typically associated with an increased child budget share on the same commodity.     

Endogenous price leadership

We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which one will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose to wait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader.     

Limited liability effect on product safety

This paper analyses how limited liability and capital size affect a firm's investment for product safety. Firms become bankrupt when their products cause accidents and they cannot compensate for the damages incurred. Relatively small firms obtain greater expected profit because they do not need to pay full damage when their products cause accidents and they become bankrupt. Thus, smaller firms may have greater incentives than larger firms to participate in risky projects. But relatively small firms may invest more for product safety because increasing their investments is not costly in case of bankruptcy.     

Entry restrictions and the determination of quality

Entry restrictions are a common form of regulation in markets and occupations, either as a means of limiting the size of a market or affecting the quality of products or services provided by it. This paper analyzes demand, cost and informational characteristics that affect the impact of this type of policies on the quality mix of products provided by an industry and the welfare of its consumers. Selective increases in the costs of entry such as licensing requirements and direct restrictions with competitive bidding for entry rights are considered. We analyze the effects of these policies on entry decisions and also the additional selection effects that are obtained when exit is allowed for and the rights to participate in an industry can be freely traded.     

Platform intermediation in a market for differentiated products

We study a two-sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products. In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, the platform fully internalises the network externalities present in the market and firms and consumers all participate in the platform with probability one. The monopolist intermediary extracts all the economic rents generated in the market, except when firms and consumers can trade outside the platform, in which case consumers obtain a rent that corresponds to the utility they would get if they did trade outside the platform. The market allocation is constraint-efficient in the sense that the monopoly platform does not introduce distortions over and above those arising from the market power of the differentiated product sellers. An increase in the number of retailers increases the amount of variety in the platform but at the same time increases competition. As a result, the platform lowers the firm fees and raises the consumer charges. In contrast, an increase in the extent of product differentiation raises the value of the platform for the consumers but weakens competition. In this case, the platform raises both the charge to the consumers and the fee for the firms.     

Imperfect Competition and Growth with Entrepreneurial Risk

Abstract. This paper analyzes an overlapping generations endogenous growth model of occupational choice under risk in a two-sector economy with intermediate and final goods. Agents choose between business ownership in the monopolistically competitive intermediate goods industry or employment as a worker in this sector. Firm-specific profits are stochastic. Occupational choice under risk endogenizes the number of firms and products in the intermediate goods industry. The analysis shows that economic performance and growth both depend on the entrepreneurship rate and are inefficiently low compared with an economy with perfect markets for pooling risks. Monopolistic competition partly offsets the negative income effects from a too low level of entrepreneurial risk-taking.     

A note on undominated Bertrand equilibria

This note shows that the conventional outcome associated with Bertrand competition with homogenous products and different marginal costs is obtained in every Nash equilibrium in which firms use undominated strategies. This strengthens an existence result due to Blume (2003).     

Cross-bidding impact throughout the product life cycle

Two products at different points of the product life cycle have been chosen to analyse the effect of cross-bidding in competing auctions. The findings indicate that this strategy can have a different impact depending on the phase of the cycle.     

Product Choice and Market Competition: The Case of Multiproduct Electronic Plants in Taiwan*

We examine the strategies of multiproduct plants in the Taiwanese electronics sector by introducing two new measures of product dissimilarity to capture the technological gaps of product pairs within the plant. The plant‐level index is used to analyze product mix decisions of plants. We find that plants whose products have large technological gaps are more likely to give up product lines. The product‐level index is used to show that, with increased competition, multiproduct plants exit markets where production technologies are farthest away from their core products and they also perform better than plants that continue to produce a wider range of products.     

Price discrimination via information provision

We study price discrimination where different prices are offered as a bundle with different levels of information about a product. The seller’s price discrimination induces high valuation buyers to purchase a good without information and low valuation buyers to purchase with information. Our analysis highlights several interesting results about price discrimination: (i) the seller’s choice of information provision is the combination of full information and no information, (ii) products can be cheaper without information provision than with information provision, (iii) as a result of price discrimination, prices can be more dispersed as buyers’ valuations become largely similar, and (iv) the high valuation buyers purchase a damaged good and may earn negative surplus. Furthermore, we investigate under which circumstances price discrimination is more profitable than uniform pricing. We show that a decline in transportation costs which facilitate price discrimination can be welfare reducing.     

HOW TO MEASURE LIVING STANDARDS AND PRODUCTIVITY

I set out a general algorithm for calculating true cost‐of‐living indices when demand is not homothetic and when the number of products may be large. The non‐homothetic case is the important one empirically (Engel's Law). The algorithm can be applied in both time series and cross section. It can also be used to estimate true producer price indices and Total Factor Productivity in the presence of input‐biased economies of scale and technical change. The basic idea is to calculate a chain index of prices but with actual budget (cost) shares replaced by compensated shares, i.e. what the shares would have been if consumers (firms) faced actual prices but their utility (output) were held constant at some reference level. The compensated shares can be derived econometrically from the same data as are required for the construction of conventional index numbers. The algorithm is illustrated by applying it to estimating true PPPs for 141 countries and 100 products within household consumption, using data from the World Bank's latest International Comparison Program.     

Paradoxical price effects on insurance markets

In this paper we analyze a paradox phenomenon in certain insurance markets of some countries: in spite of there being strong competition, increasing prices can be found in some submarkets. As a reason for this, we need to note the special distribution of insurance products, a distribution primarily based on intermediaries — and, as a result, there is an increasing part for ‘intermediation’ costs within insurance products' cost structure due to competition for the intermediaries. We build an oligopolistic model assuming that the market is saturated, which is able to explain the overemployment of intermediaries and the high commissions involved. We analyze possible interventions and laws/regulations and suggest that the problem can be solved only with major regulation. Finally, we have come up with an empirical analysis to test the model.