Do liquidity constraints generate excess sensitivity in consumption? New evidence from a sample of post-bankruptcy households

Previous work linking liquidity constraints to excessive consumption sensitivity have used household level information on wealth and assets to split the sample into households that are likely to be constrained from those with access to credit and liquidity. In this paper, we use the sample splitting methods of previous authors but refine the criteria by using direct information on whether the household filed for bankruptcy in the last 10 years. Legally, a flag can appear on a bankruptcy filer’s credit report for up to 10 years after bankruptcy. This bankruptcy flag affects an individual’s credit score, and therefore the individual’s access to credit, which may make post-bankruptcy consumers liquidity constrained. Our results indicate that post-bankruptcy consumers exhibit excess sensitivity likely due to the bankruptcy flag. Consistency checks confirm that the source of sensitivity is due to liquidity constraints and not other observationally equivalent behavior.     

Optimal personal bankruptcy design under moral hazard

In this paper, we develop a normative theory of unsecured consumer credit and personal bankruptcy based on the optimal trade-off between incentives and insurance. First, in order to characterize this trade-off, we solve a dynamic moral hazard problem in which agents' private effort decisions influence the life-cycle profiles of their earnings. We then show how the optimal allocation of individual effort and consumption can be implemented in a market equilibrium in which (i) agents and intermediaries repeatedly trade secured and unsecured debt instruments, and (ii) agents obtain (restricted) discharge of their unsecured debts in bankruptcy. The structure of this equilibrium and the associated restrictions on debt discharge closely match the main qualitative features of personal credit markets and bankruptcy law that actually exist in the United States.     

Information and credit access: using bankruptcy as a signal

Legally, a bankruptcy flag can appear on an individual's credit report for up to 10 years after the filing. The flag affects an individual's credit score, and in turn, an individual's access to credit. In this article, we investigate how the bankruptcy flag affects access to credit along three dimensions–loan acceptance, the price of the loan as is determined by the interest rate, and the amount of credit the household receives. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Survey of Consumer Finances, we estimate a series of two-stage models corrected for sample selection and adjusted to account for the household's level of creditworthiness. We find that the bankruptcy flag increases the probability of being denied access to a loan. The flag also increases interest rates for unsecured loans and lowers the credit limits available to households. The findings have important implications with respect to current bankruptcy code and the impact that information, such as the bankruptcy flag, can have on the efficiency of the credit markets.     

Disasters,Household Decisions,and Insurance Mechanisms: A Review of Evidence and a Case Study from a Developing Country in Asia

This article investigates whether and how Asian people's exposure to a variety of disasters undermine their decisions and welfare. Our case study from Vietnam, based on household panel data, shows that households adopt a variety of coping strategies against the damages caused by disasters especially through credit and labor markets. While the consumption risk sharing networks function effectively at the commune level, market and non‐market insurance mechanisms are not sufficient, especially at the regional, national, and international levels. Hence, it is imperative to strengthen market, government, and community based insurance mechanisms to diversify aggregate disaster risks at the individual, national, and regional levels in Asia.     

IDIOSYNCRATIC AND AGGREGATE RISKS,INEQUALITY AND GROWTH

The paper disaggregates productivity shocks at a firm level into idiosyncratic and aggregate risks, and studies their impacts on inequality, growth and welfare. It develops a growth model with human capital and incomplete insurance and credit markets that provides a closed‐form solution for income inequality dynamics. We find that uninsured idiosyncratic risks are the most important determinants of inequality, growth and welfare. They are the source of nondegenerate wealth distribution. A lower weight of these shocks leads to lower steady‐state inequality, higher growth and welfare. A redistribution of income that serves as social insurance against such risks increases welfare and decreases inequality. But, it also decreases growth by distorting individual consumption and saving decisions.     

Financial expectations and the ‘left-right’ political value scale: Testing for the POUM hypothesis

Using a uniquely defined indicator of political ideology we test whether expectations of future financial well-being have an effect on an individual’s position on the political ‘left-right’ spectrum. We find evidence of a significant “prospect of upward mobility” effect.     

Self-insurance vs. self-financing: A welfare analysis of the persistence of shocks

We study the welfare cost of market incompleteness in a generalized Bewley model where idiosyncratic risk takes the form of entrepreneurial productivity shocks. Market incompleteness in our framework has two dimensions. First, in the Bewley tradition, only a limited set of instruments for consumption smoothing is available. Second, entrepreneurs? capital rental is subject to collateral constraints. As is well known, it is harder to self-insure against more persistent shocks, and the welfare cost of missing consumption insurance increases with shock persistence. On the other hand, with collateral constraints, an increase in shock persistence leads to better allocation of production factors through entrepreneurs? self-financing, and the welfare cost of imperfect capital rental markets decreases with shock persistence. The overall welfare cost of market incompleteness can be increasing, decreasing, or even non-monotone in shock persistence, depending on the relative strengths of its two components—the cost of missing insurance and the cost of imperfect capital markets.     

INCOMPLETE FINANCIAL MARKETS,IRREVERSIBILITY OF INVESTMENTS AND FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY INSTRUMENTS*

In this paper, we analyse the use of fiscal and monetary instruments to improve long‐run welfare when productive investment is irreversible and uncollateralizable and there is no insurance. Only fiat money or government issued bonds provide self‐insurance. We demonstrate that an increase in precautionary savings reduces irreversible productive investment. Hence, subsidies to promote productive but irreversible investment should be financed in such a way that they do not reduce insurance capability. When lump‐sum subsidies are high, a consumption tax is likely to be more redistributive and thus more consumption smoothing than are the other sets of instruments analysed in our model.     

CREDIT CRUNCH AND HOUSEHOLD WELFARE,THE CASE OF THE KOREAN FINANCIAL CRISIS*

We examine how the credit crunch in Korea in the late 1990s affected household behaviour and welfare. Using 1996–1998 household panel data, we estimate a consumption Euler equation, augmented by endogenous credit constraints. Korean households coped with the negative shocks of the 1997 credit crunch by reducing consumption of luxury items while maintaining food, education and health related expenditures. Our results show that, in 1997–1998, during the crisis, the probability of facing credit constraints and the resulting expected welfare loss from the binding constraints increased significantly, suggesting the gravity of the credit crunch at the household level.     

Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition

We study the impact of competition on banks’ risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of information. While financial opening increases banks’ riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financial information, are likely to mitigate this effect. Moreover, the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors, and risk-based full deposit insurance, yield the same equilibrium risk level. Although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk, financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases.     

个人信用与个人破产制度法律关系的分析——兼论我国建立个人破产制度的现实意义

目前,我国个人信用市场存在大量支付不能的债务无法通过现行法律妥善清理,导致个人信用风险难以得到有效控制和化解.本文从分析个人信用的法律保护入手,重点从内在逻辑联系以及个人破产制度的规则安排与个人信用的动态维护两方面,对个人信用和个人破产的法律关系进行了深入探讨,进而论证当前我国建立个人破产制度、推动个人信用风险管理的现实意义.     

Working under pressure: Evidence from the impacts of soccer fans on players’ performance

In this paper we study how pressure affects individual’s behavior. For this purpose we use sports data, where the attendance is a proxy for pressure, to investigate if the number of fans in the stadium affects the performance of the players. We overcome the reverse causality problem by proposing an instrument variable: a promotion in Brazil during which low cost tickets were assigned to random soccer matches. In contrast to previous literature, our results suggest that pressure does not significantly affect players’ behavior.     

Risk insurance in a transition economy

The hypothesis of Pareto‐optimal risk‐sharing is tested in a transition economy using a new dataset of a representative sample of 364 rural households from Romania. Income shocks are identified as instances of adverse weather, crop failure, animal diseases, illness, and unemployment spells. Despite limited participation of Romanian rural households in formal insurance and credit markets, we fail to reject the hypothesis of full insurance of total non‐durable consumption and its components. Survey responses indicate that the main channels of consumption smoothing are self‐insurance (for adverse weather, crop failure and animal diseases), public transfers (for unemployment spells, maternity and childcare), and to a lesser extent, family ties. We find that adverse weather is associated with higher growth rates of non‐food expenditures. Furthermore, richer households are better able to cope with crop failure than poorer households. An alternative explanation to our not rejecting the hypothesis of full insurance is that some shocks to consumption (such as illness) play the role of preference shifters of the utility function.     

Time inconsistency and retirement planning

We quantify the welfare gains from better retirement planning using a model in which retirement planning is time inconsistent. A modest increase in a household’s planning horizon by just a few years generates large aggregate and individual welfare gains.     

Evaluating international financial integration under leverage constraints

The global financial crisis has undermined many economists' views about the benefits of open financial markets. Anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that financial linkages may propagate shocks during crises. This paper develops a simple two-country model in which financial liberalisation across countries takes place in the presence of credit market distortions within countries. Countries may be subject to macro risk coming from productivity shocks and direct shocks to the credit system (‘financial shocks’). Three different degrees of financial linkages between countries are examined. It is shown that the type of financial integration is critical for both macroeconomic outcomes and welfare. In particular, financial integration in bond markets alone may increase aggregate consumption volatility and reduce welfare. Financial integration in both bond and equity markets generates high positive co-movement across countries, but is welfare-improving.     

Consumption risk, technology adoption and poverty traps: Evidence from Ethiopia

Much has been written on the determinants of technology adoption in agriculture, with issues such as input availability, knowledge and education, risk preferences, profitability, and credit constraints receiving much attention. This paper focuses on a factor that has been less well documented: the differential ability of households to take on risky production technologies for fear of the welfare consequences if shocks result in poor harvests. Building on an explicit model, this is explored in panel data from Ethiopia. Historical rainfall distributions are used to identify consumption risk. Controlling for unobserved household and time-varying village characteristics, it emerges that not just ex ante credit constraints, but also the possibly low consumption outcomes when harvests fail, discourage the application of fertilizer. The lack of insurance or alternative means of keeping consumption smooth leaves some trapped in low return, lower risk agriculture, one of the mechanisms through which poverty perpetuates itself in agrarian settings.     

The desire for land: Strategic lending with adverse selection

This paper deals with a setting in which borrowers and lenders place different values on an asset that can be used as collateral. Under adverse selection, lenders may rationally choose credit contracts with the object of attracting a relatively risky group of clients, so raising their chances of gaining possession of the asset through default. Contracts of differing attractiveness to borrowers can also coexist in equilibrium. When an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ lender compete, the latter placing a lower value on the collateral, and their loanable funds are sufficiently limited, a separating equilibrium may exist in which the insider offers a contract which attracts risky borrowers, whereas the outsider's contract is aimed at a safer group. If loanable funds are ample, the only equilibrium will involve pooling contracts, but the insider may still offer more attractive contracts in an entry game.     

ON THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS

This article studies the welfare effects of credit arrangements and how these effects depend on the trading mechanism and inflation. In a competitive market, credit arrangements can be welfare reducing, because high consumption by credit users drives up the price level, reducing consumption by money users who are subject to a binding liquidity constraint. By adopting an optimal trading mechanism, however, these welfare implications can be overturned. Both price discrimination and nonlinear pricing are essential features of an optimal mechanism.     

Corporate insurance with optimal financial contracting

Summary. This paper attemps to rationalize the use of insurance covenants in financial contracts, and shows how external financing generates a demand for insurance by risk-neutral entrepreneurs. In our model, the entrepreneur needs external financing for a risky project that can be affected by an accident during its realization. Accident losses and final returns are private information to the firm, but they can be evaluated by two costly auditing technologies. We derive the optimal financial contract: it is a bundle of a standard debt contract and an insurance contract with franchise, trading off bankruptcy costs vs auditing costs. We then analyze how this optimal contract can be achieved by decentralized trading on competitive markets when insurance and credit activities are exogenously separated. With additive risks, the insurance contract involves full coverage above a straight deductible. We interpret this result by showing how our results imply induced risk aversion for risk-neutral firms. Received: December 14, 1998; revised version: August 11, 1999     

A finite-life private-information theory of unsecured consumer debt

We present a theory of unsecured consumer debt that does not rely on utility costs of default or on enforcement mechanisms that arise in repeated-interaction settings. The theory is based on private information about a person's type and on a person's incentive to signal his type to entities other than creditors. Specifically, debtors signal their low-risk status to insurers by avoiding default in credit markets. The signal is credible because in equilibrium people who repay are more likely to be the low-risk type and so receive better insurance terms. We explore two different mechanisms through which repayment behavior in the credit market can be positively correlated with low-risk status in the insurance market. Our theory is motivated in part by some facts regarding the role of credit scores in consumer credit and auto insurance markets.