How reasonable are assumptions used in theoretical models? Computational evidence on the likelihood of trade pattern changes

Abstract .  In theoretical literature it is common to make the assumption that in a multi-country, multi-good world, the direction of trade (import and export by commodity) is predetermined and fixed for each good for each country. We consider a simple three-country, three-good, pure-exchange model with CES preferences. We compute free trade competitive equilibria, three-country non-cooperative Nash equilibria, and customs union equilibria for randomised parameterizations, and find that trade pattern changes between free trade and customs union equilibria in around 35% of cases.     

A new estimator for trade costs and its small sample properties

This paper discusses the estimation of parameters of a traditional transportation model, as it is typically present in so-called Takayama–Judge type spatial price equilibrium models. In contrast to previously used estimation methods, observations of regional prices as well as of trade costs are used in a direct estimation of the first order conditions. The proposed method uses bi-level programming techniques to minimize a weighted least squares criterion under the restriction that the estimated parameters satisfy the Kuhn–Tucker conditions for an optimal solution of the transport model. A penalty function and a smooth reformulation are used to iteratively approximate the complementary slackness conditions. Monte-Carlo simulations are used to trace out some properties of the estimator and compare it with a traditional calibration method. The analysis shows that the proposed technique estimates prices as well as trade costs more precisely than the traditional calibration method. It is suggested to apply the same method to a range of linear and quadratic models.     

Evaluating the Relative Efficacy of the Marketing Function in the Construction Complex of Ukraine

The break up of the USSR pushed 15 constituent states into a transition phase from a regulated economy to a free market style one. Partially, this involved the wholesale importation of a variety of theories, strategies, and operational plans. This paper seeks to examine the efficiency of the use of the marketing communications mix in medium and large firms in the Ukraine’s construction complex during the transition period to a market oriented economy. In order to do so, a survey of the most significant, privately owned firms in the industry was conducted. A variety of quantitative measures were employed, including econometric estimates and certain elasticity coefficients that allowed us to asses existing tendencies in the industry, identify problems, and to make tentative recommendations.     

"PROTECTION AND REAL WAGES": THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA

Few economics articles have achieved the celebrity that still attaches to the paper, "Protection and Real Wages", by Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson in (1941). In this paper I discuss how the Stolper-Samuelson theorem has been re-interpreted over subsequent decades, and how attempts to generalize the theorem to higher dimensions have met with qualified results. The theorem leads to a simple proposition in political economy: in competitive models any productive factor can have its real return increased by a non-transparent policy whereby relative commodity prices are altered if there are enough commodities and joint production, is not too severe.     

Marginal likelihood calculation for the Gelfand-Dey and Chib methods

A trade-off exists between the Gelfand and Dey (1994) and Chib (1995) methods to calculate the marginal likelihood in Bayesian estimation. Using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method, we demonstrate that the performance of the two methods is fairly close.     

The sources of protectionist drift in representative democracies

We analyze a two country-two good model of international trade in which citizens in each country differ by their specific factor endowments. The trade policy in each country is set by the politician who has been elected by the citizens in a previous stage. Due to a delegation effect citizens generally favor candidates who are more protectionist than they are. The one-candidate-per-country equilibria exhibit a “protectionist drift” owing to this delegation effect. In addition, we find an additional source of protectionist drift that we call the “abstention effect”. Not only do candidates wish to delegate to more protectionist colleagues, but these more protectionist colleagues who can win election, prefer still more protectionist candidates than themselves. Therefore, they have an incentive to abstain, that is, not run for election. We show that because of this abstention effect there exists a range of electable citizens all of whom are more protectionist than the median voter's most preferred candidate. We extend the analysis allowing two-candidate equilibria and the possibility that there are costs and benefits of holding office.     

The role of importers and exporters in the determination of the U.S. tariff preferences granted to Latin America

This paper investigates the role played by domestic importers and foreign exporters in improving preferential access to the domestic market. To this end, the framework used in this paper extends the protection for sale analysis to explicitly model the role of domestic importers and foreign exporters in the determination of preferential trade treatment. The predictions of the model are tested using data on preferential trade between the United States and Latin American countries. The results suggest that Latin American exporters and US importers' lobbying efforts have a significant and important role in determining the extent of preferential access granted by the United States. More interestingly, these findings also show that U.S. importers capture a very substantial share of the rents generated by tariff preferences. These results therefore shed a pessimistic view on preferential trade schemes as a reliable source of gains for developing countries.     

On the emergence of an MFN club: equal treatment in an unequal world

Abstract .  Motivated by GATT, we endogenize the formation of a club whose members have to abide by the MFN principle of non-discrimination. The underlying model is that of oligopolistic intraindustry trade. While an MFN club does not alter average tariff levels across countries, it increases aggregate world welfare; makes non-members worse off; and can immiserize its high cost members. These results imply that (i) core WTO rules such as MFN are valuable even if multilateral negotiations deliver limited trade liberalization and (ii) the distributional effects of MFN maybe one reason why developing countries have been granted Special and Differential treatment at the WTO.     

Long-run purchasing power parity with asymmetric adjustment: Further evidence from nine transition countries

In this study, we applied a threshold cointegration test to investigate the properties of asymmetric adjustment on long-run purchasing power parity (PPP) in nine transition countries between January 1995 and December 2008. Although there was strong evidence of long-run PPP for these nine transition countries (i.e., Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Russia), the adjustment mechanism was asymmetric. These results have important policy implications for the nine transition countries included in the study.     

The political economy of tariff protection in China: evidence from the WTO accession

We analyze China's tariff rates at WTO accession using a political economy approach. A model drawing on Branstetter and Feenstra ( 2002 ) is used to derive an optimal tariff rate for each industry. The model predicts that a government would set a high tariff rate if an industry is of large state‐owned enterprise (SOE) share, multinational share, or small foreign import share. From the model we reveal the Chinese government's preference towards different interest groups under the binding tariff constraint from the WTO commitments. The estimated structural parameters imply that the political weights on both the SOE profits and consumer income diminish with the economic opening. More important, the government still favours SOEs over consumer income. Our findings are consistent with the special features of China's economy.     

The MFN clause,welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size

This paper analyzes MFN in a “competing exporters” model of trade between three countries with unequal endowments and shows that MFN yields higher aggregate welfare than tariff discrimination even as it makes low income countries worse off. Furthermore, in a repeated game of tariff cooperation, multilateral free trade is easier to sustain under MFN punishments relative to discriminatory ones. This conclusion holds even when tariff discrimination takes the form of bilateral trade agreements. Overall, the analysis shows that from the viewpoint of low income countries, MFN and multilateral tariff cooperation are complementary in nature.     

South African trade policy mattersTrade performance and trade policy*

South African trade policy has exerted a major influence on the composition and aggregate growth of trade. In the Apartheid period, South Africa developed a comparative advantage in capital‐intensive primary and manufactured commodities partly because of its natural resource endowments, but also because the pattern of protection was particularly detrimental to exports of non‐commodity manufactured goods. By contrast, trade liberalization from 1990 not only increased imports, but by reducing both input costs and the relative profitability of domestic sales also boosted exports. This evidence suggests that additional trade liberalization and policies that afford South African firms access to inputs at world prices could well be part of the strategy to enhance export diversification.     

The impact of trade costs on exports: An empirical modeling

Studies, which have discussed some of the important issues concerning the measurement of trade costs, have conceded that the literature is still in the early stages of understanding and measuring what the real costs are. It is in this context, decomposing trade costs into ‘natural’ costs, ‘behind the border’ costs, ‘explicit beyond the border’ costs, and ‘implicit beyond the border’ costs, this paper suggests a method to measure the impacts of these components on changes in exports between countries in the absence of complete information on all the components of trade costs in home and partner countries. Empirical measurement has been demonstrated using 1999 and 2004 trade data from Pakistan. The results show that Pakistan's export growth between 1999 and 2004 came mainly from the reduction in both ‘explicit and implicit beyond the border’ trade costs in partner countries.     

Neckties in the tropics: a model of international trade and cultural diversity

Abstract .  Some cultural goods are consumed socially and are characterized by the same consumption network externalities as languages. Also, producers of new cultural goods in any one country draw on the stock of ideas generated by previous cultural production in all countries. For such goods, costless trade and communication tend to lead to the dominance of one cultural style, increasing utility in the short run but reducing quality and welfare in the long run. Increasing protection while keeping communication costs low may stimulate production of cultural goods that are 'compatible' with the dominant style, adding little to the stock of usable ideas.     

How do transport costs affect firms’ exports? Evidence from a vanishing bridge

In this paper we provide estimates of the effects of international transport costs on firms’ exports and disentangle the channels of these effects. In so doing, we use a unique dataset consisting of highly disaggregated transaction-level trade and transport cost data and, in order to account for endogeneity, we exploit the exogenous variation in these costs associated with the non-trade related closure of the main bridge connecting two countries.     

The effect of subsidy policies on the product quality improvement

This paper analyzes the effect of government subsidy policies on creating an incentive for domestic firms to improve their product quality before exporting to an outside market. The goal of the government is to minimize the time it takes to reach the appropriate product quality level at low costs. We simulate a dynamic profit maximization problem of the firm and derive the optimal path of the product quality development, then test the efficiency of the three types of subsidy methods: Constant Subsidy, Quality Matching Subsidy and Time-limited Subsidy methods. Our model yields a number of intriguing results: (i) not every subsidy methods guarantee product quality development, although the same amount is subsidized. (ii) the matching fund style subsidy is more efficient than providing constant amount of subsidy. (iii) Time-limited Subsidy improves product quality faster than the unlimited subsidy method. (iv) Time-limited Subsidy improves quality much faster than other methods with less subsidy cost. (v) there is an optimal combination between the subsidy and the time limits.     

Welfare effects of competitive lobbying efforts in international oligopoly markets

Conventionally, rent-seeking activities have been considered to deteriorate social welfare and to distort resource allocation. This paper examines whether rent-seeking behavior can improve social welfare by focusing on the welfare effects of firms’ competitive lobbying efforts when governments can impose market entry regulation against foreign firms. We demonstrate that competitive lobbying efforts can improve social welfare when such lobbying efforts are directed to reduce market entry barriers. In addition, social welfare can be maximized when the government shows the maximum sensitivity to the foreign firm's political contributions while maintaining competitive market structure. Moreover, it is shown that the dominant strategy for a domestic firm is to allocate more resources to R&D sectors while it is optimal for foreign firms is to exert more efforts in lobbying to reduce the market entry barriers when a government makes political economic approach in market entry regulations.     

Maximum likelihood estimation of search costs

In a recent paper Hong and Shum [2006. Using price distributions to estimate search costs. Rand Journal of Economics 37, 257-275] present a structural method to estimate search cost distributions. We extend their approach to the case of oligopoly and present a new maximum likelihood method to estimate search costs. We apply our method to a data set of online prices for different computer memory chips. The estimates suggest that the consumer population can be roughly split into two groups which either have quite high or quite low search costs. Search frictions confer a significant amount of market power to the firms: Despite more than 20 firms operating in each of the markets, we estimate price-cost margins to be around 25%. The paper also illustrates how the structural method can be employed to simulate the effects of the introduction of a sales tax.     

The trade creation effect of immigrants: evidence from the remarkable case of Spain

Abstract This paper investigates the immigration‐trade link using data on individual exporting transactions and immigrants in Spanish provinces between 1995 and 2008. We quantify the impact of new immigrants on the extensive margin (number of transactions) and intensive margin (average value per transaction) of exports. We find that immigrants significantly increase exports and that the effect is almost entirely due to an increase in the extensive margin. Consistent with the idea that immigrants reduce the fixed cost of exporting, we find stronger effects for differentiated goods and for countries that are culturally distant from Spain.