Inattentive Producers

I present and solve the problem of a producer who faces costs of acquiring, absorbing, and processing information. I establish a series of theoretical results describing the producer's behaviour. First, I find the conditions under which the producer prefers to set a plan for the price he or she charges, or instead prefers to set a plan for the quantity he or she sells. Second, I show that the agent rationally chooses to be inattentive to news, only sporadically updating his or her information. I solve for the optimal length of inattentiveness and characterize its determinants. Third, I explicitly aggregate the behaviour of many such producers. I apply these results to a model of inflation. I find that the model can fit the quantitative facts on post-war inflation remarkably well, that it is a good forecaster of future inflation, and that it survives the Lucas critique by fitting also the pre-war facts on inflation moderately well.     

Year Twelve Economics Examination: Five Answers to Macroeconomic Questions

In preparing these essays, I sat before a keyboard on a single (long) day, and made a selection under examination conditions of the essays I would prepare, then allocated some 45 minutes each, checking only the word count as I went, aiming for about 1000 words for each essay. I had no notes, texts, tables or other information with me, but I did take breaks between essays. I have done no editing for expression, dates or data since my time expired, but I have added (most of the) endnotes since then, and fixed some terrible typing errors caused by the pressures to which most candidates should easily be able to relate. I tried to write as an advanced teenager with good knowledge of the subject. The essays were selected not merely to maximise my 'marks' in any sense, but to cover a wide range of macroeconomic principles and their application to Australia.     

Evaluating the joint efficiency of German trade forecasts - a nonparametric multivariate approach

ABSTRACT

I analyse the joint efficiency of export and import forecasts by leading economic research institutes for the years 1970 to 2017 for Germany in a multivariate setting. To this end, I compute, in a first step, multivariate random forests in order to model links between forecast errors and a forecaster’s information set, consisting of several trade and other macroeconomic predictor variables. I use the Mahalanobis distance as performance criterion and, in a second step, permutation tests to check whether the Mahalanobis distance between the predicted forecast errors for the trade forecasts and actual forecast errors is significantly smaller than under the null hypothesis of forecast efficiency. I find evidence for joint forecast inefficiency for two forecasters, however, for one forecaster I cannot reject joint forecast efficiency. For the other forecasters, joint forecast efficiency depends on the examined forecast horizon. I find evidence that real macroeconomic variables as opposed to trade variables are inefficiently included in the analysed trade forecasts. Finally, I compile a joint efficiency ranking of the forecasters.     

Moving Toward Greener Societies: Moral Motivation and Green Behaviour

I provide an alternative explanation for why societies exhibit varied environmental behaviours. I use a Kantian moral approach at a microeconomic level. I show that two identical societies (in terms of income level and political system) might follow different paths with respect to their “green” behaviour. Additionally, I identify tipping points that could nudge a society from a polluting behaviour to a green one. I find that the perception of environment within the society can be an important factor in this shift.     

THE INADEQUACY OF UNIT VALUE INDEXES AS PROXIES FOR CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL SELLING PRICE INDEXES*

This paper considers the adequacy of unit value indexes as proxies for industrial selling price indexes in Canada, in light of the considerations raised in the Searle report for the United States (summarized elsewhere in this issue). Some 3,237 regressions are run using the industrial selling price index for a commodity group as the dependent variable and the corresponding unit value index as the independent variable. The unit value indexes perform poorly as predictors of the I.S.P.I.; the overall tendency is for the unit value index to overestimate changes in the I.S.P.I.; and to explain on average only about 30 percent of the total variance of the I.S.P.I.     

First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case

I consider the first price auction when the bidders' valuations may be differently distributed. I show that every Bayesian equilibrium is an 'essentially' pure equilibrium formed by bid functions whose inverses are solutions of a system of differential equations with boundary conditions. I then prove the existence of an equilibrium. I prove its uniqueness when the valuation distributions have a mass point at the lower extremity of the support. I give sufficient conditions for uniqueness when every valuation distribution is one of two atomless distributions. I establish inequalities between equilibrium strategies when relations of stochastic dominance exist between valuation distributions.     

Valuation of environmental improvements in continuous time with mortality and morbidity effects

We present a model for valuing environmental improvements in continuous time, for individuals that can be either healthy (H) or ill (I), with constant transition between the states and constant mortality rates in each state, when environmental quality affects welfare, mortality and morbidity. The values in states H and I, VSL(H) and VSL(I), are derived from two Bellman dynamic programming equations. The individual's valuation of (small) instantaneous environmental changes, and of permanent environmental changes (“environmental investments”), are shown to depend on both VSL(H) and VSL(I), for each of the states H and I. We show that VSL(I) may exceed VSL(H), and the value of environmental improvements in the ill state may exceed those in the healthy state, in particular for short-lasting illness and when the marginal value of consumption is lower in state I than in state H.     

Animal spirits and monetary policy

I develop a behavioral macroeconomic model in which agents have cognitive limitations. As a result, they use simple but biased rules (heuristics) to forecast future output and inflation. Although the rules are biased, agents learn from their mistakes in an adaptive way. This model produces endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism (??animal spirits??) that are generated by the correlation of biased beliefs. I identify the conditions under which animal spirits arise. I contrast the dynamics of this model with a stylized DSGE-version of the model and I study the implications for monetary policies. I find that strict inflation targeting is suboptimal because it gives more scope for waves of optimism and pessimism to emerge thereby destabilizing output and inflation.     

Competition Between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages

This paper estimates the importance of network effects in the market for Yellow Pages. I estimate three simultaneous equations: consumer demand for usage of a directory, advertiser demand for advertising and a publisher's first-order condition (derived from profit-maximizing behaviour). Estimation shows that advertisers value consumer usage and that consumers value advertising, implying a network effect. I find that internalizing network effects would significantly increase surplus. As an application, I consider whether the market benefits from monopoly (which takes advantage of network effects) or oligopoly (which reduces market power). I find that a more competitive market is preferable.     

A STUDY OF PARTICIPATION IN DYNAMIC AUCTIONS

This article studies repeated entry and bidding decisions in construction procurement auctions. I find evidence in the data that suggests the presence of significant cost savings from entering contracts of the same type. I estimate a dynamic auction model to measure the gains to experience for bidders. I allow for endogenous entry, synergies in entry, and unobserved auction heterogeneity. I find that a bidder can halve entry costs by focusing on specific contract types. An auctioneer can increase competition by awarding contracts of the same type in sequence. As a result, procurement costs for each contract can be lowered by 7%, a saving of $110,000.     

REPLY: THE CONCEPT OF CAPITAL

Edward Denison and I agree that the correct theoretical concept of capital is to consider two capital goods equivalent if they generate the same real net revenue, defined as gross revenue minus variable operating costs measured at a fixed set of output and input prices. Although I showed in my book that the correct concept could be fully implemented for commercial aircraft and electric generating equipment, for other products I was able only partially to take operating costs into account. As a result, both Denison and I agree that my radical revision to the official capital goods deflators does not go far enough and is biased toward understating improvements in quality. Our disagreement comes down to research strategy: I believe that I have progressed partway toward the ultimate goal of implementing the correct concept, while he views such a full implementation as infeasible. As a result, he advocates a return to the traditional criterion of base-period production cost, even though this yields price deflators that ignore improvements in performance (as for computers) and improvements in operating efficiency (as for successive generations of jet aircraft) made possible by technological advances that reduct the cost of production.     

Regulation of Mobile Telephony across the European Union: An Empirical Analysis

In this paper I analyze the impact of regulatory policy on prices and demand for mobile telecommunications services across the European Union. I estimate a reduced form model of the mobile industry using panel data for the EU countries from 1998 to 2002. Among others, I find the following effects: liberalization of fixed telephone lines has a negative impact on prices and a positive impact on the demand for mobile services, and the introduction of mobile number portability has a negative impact on prices.*I am grateful to Toker Doganoglu, Gerd Hansen, Eric Kodjo Ralph, Guido Friebel, participants at the 30th EARIE Conference 2003, the 2nd International Industrial Organization Conference 2004 and the 19th Annual Congress of the EEA 2004, and anonymous referees for valuable comments. I would like to acknowledge the generous financial support from the Volkswagen Stiftung and the Munich Graduate School of Economics which made this research possible. All errors are mine.1 Source: European Commission (1994).     

Differing trade elasticities for intra‐ and international distances: A gravity approach

Using the gravity model of trade, I estimate the impact that within‐country transportation distance has on international trade levels. Combining multiple data sets, I create a measure for the distance U.S. agricultural goods travel before leaving the country. In order to account for endogeneity in production location choice, I use potential agricultural production as an instrument for actual agricultural production. I find that internal distance is statistically significant and large in magnitude. A 10% reduction in the distance a good travels within the exporting country increases trade by roughly 3%.     

Nash implementation with a private good

Summary. I construct a general model of social planning problems, including mixed production economies and regulatory problems with negative externalities as special cases, and I give simple mechanisms for Nash implementation under three increasingly general sets of assumptions. I first construct a continuous mechanism to implement the (constrained) Lindahl allocations of an economy, and I then extend this to arbitrary social choice rules based on prices. I end with a mechani sm to implement any monotonic social choice rule, assuming only the existence of a private (not necessarily transferable) good. In that general case, each agent simply reports an upper contour set, an outcome, and I need two agents to make binary numerical announcements. I do not require the usual no-veto-power condition. Received: February 19, 1998; revised version: January 30, 2002     

An Agency Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Privatization

This paper proposes a unified theoretical framework to discuss the costs and benefits of privatization using the recent advances of Incentive Theory. I begin by presenting a simple model in which the State (the principal) delegates a task (e.g., the production of a public good) to the private sector (the agent). I give and discuss conditions for the “Irrelevance Theorem” due to Sappington and Stiglitz [Sappington, D., & Stiglitz, J. (1987) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 6, 567–582] to hold under complete contracting. I then show how various contract incompletenesses can make either public or private ownership optimal. Finally, I provide critical assessments of these results. I thank Patrick Rey and Wilfried Zantman for useful comments on an earlier draft. The excellent comments of two referees have also improved substantially the presentation and organization of the paper. I am deeply indebted to Denis Gromb for his extremely detailed comments.     

Cutting through the smoke: separating the effect of price on smoking initiation,relapse and cessation

I employ a large national representative dataset (Current Population Survey-Tobacco Use Supplements) to investigate how cigarette prices affect smoking decisions. A standard econometric approach is to estimate the relationship between cigarette prices and smoking participation at a point in time. I extend this approach to model past-year decisions to start, resume or quit smoking. Considering reverse causality, I apply an instrumental variable (excise taxes) for cigarette prices. I include an index of state-level anti-smoking sentiment to control for omitted variable bias. After estimating separate models for smoking initiation, relapse and cessation and for different age groups, I find no evidence that increasing taxes on cigarettes can prevent the onset of youth smoking. Neither does it effectively induce young smokers to quit. However, cigarette prices do play an important role to prevent relapse and encourage quitting at older ages.     

An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems

We consider the problem of selecting alternatives from a set of feasible alternatives over which each agent is endowed with a strict preference. We show that there is one and only one rule that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, efficiency, tops-only, and reinforcement. The rule is known as plurality rule, which selects the alternative(s) most preferred by the largest number of agents. I would like to thank William Thomson for helpful suggestions and discussions. I am grateful to Biung-Ghi Ju, Hyungjun Kim, and Yan-An Hwang for detailed comments. I am also indebted to the Editor and an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions. As usual, I am responsible for any remaining deficiency.     

Societal benefits of illiquid bonds

In this paper, I provide a possible explanation of why nominally risk-free bonds are essential in monetary economies. I argue that the role of nominal bonds is to enable agents to engage in intertemporal exchanges of money. I show that bonds can only serve this role if they are illiquid (costly to exchange for goods). Finally, I argue that in economies in which nominal bonds are essential, it is optimal for monetary policy to respond to changes in the distribution of liquidity needs.     

Judicial error and cooperation

Cooperation can be induced by an authority with the power to mete out sanctions for free riders, but law enforcement is prone to error. This paper experimentally analyzes preferences for and consequences of errors in formal sanctions against free riders in a public goods game. With type I errors, even full contributors to the public good may be punished. With type II errors, free riders may go unpunished. We find that judicial error undermines cooperation and that the effects of type I and II errors are symmetric. To investigate their relative (dis-)like for error, we let subjects choose what type of error to prevent. We find that subjects prefer type II over type I errors. However, the strength of preferences for preventing type I errors is fully in line with a motive to maximize income and does not indicate any additional psychological or fairness bias against type I errors.