预算软约束与资产价格理性泡沫

文章将预算软约束引入资产价格理性泡沫的分析之中,在给出一个预算软约束情形下资产均衡价格决定模型的基础上,得出了资产价格理性泡沫的表达式.模型分析表明,当存在预算软约束时风险资产的理性泡沫为正;同时,风险资产对应企业面临的预算软约束越大,该风险资产价格中的理性泡沫越大.     

Political budget cycles revisited: Testing the signalling process

A widespread view in the ‘political budget cycles’ literature is that incumbent politicians seek to influence voters’ perceptions of their competence and/or preferences by using the composition of the fiscal budget as a signalling tool. However, little is known about whether voters actually receive and perceive the signal in that way. To empirically assess the relevance of the signalling channel at the municipal level, we conducted a survey among 2000 representative German citizens in 2018. Only a small fraction of voters feel well-informed about the fiscal budget signal and use the information it contains to decide whether to vote for the incumbent politician. Persons paying more attention to the signal sent by local politicians live in smaller municipalities, are more satisfied with their economic situation, are more educated, and do not feel that they are being electorally manipulated. Our analysis raises doubt about the relevance of budget composition as a signalling mechanism for voters at the local level.     

Investment and the soft budget constraint in China

This paper examines the incentive effects of the soft budget constraint on the investment behavior of firms in general and on the investment-cash flow sensitivity in particular. To this end, we develop a simple model of moral hazard that takes the soft budget constraint into account. Within this moral hazard environment, we show that investment is positively related to the amount of internal funds. We further show that the presence of the soft budget constraint deteriorates the moral hazard problem, thereby making the investment level less sensitive to the amount of internal funds. This is the case irrespective of whether the soft budget constraint renders the firm more or less liquidity constrained. To test the model's empirical implications, we employ data of China's listed companies for the period from 1997 to 2003. We use the share of state ownership as a proxy for the severity of the soft budget constraint. We find strong evidence that firms with larger shares of state ownership exhibit lower investment-cash flow sensitivities than firms with smaller shares of state ownership.     

Fiscal imbalances and asymmetric adjustment under Labour and Conservative governments in the UK

This paper examines whether the political colour of an incumbent government affects the speed at which fiscal imbalances are corrected in the case of the UK. Using quarterly data, we examine whether Conservative or Labour governments are more prone to operate under a soft budget constraint and vis-à-vis i.e. to adhere to a hard budget strategy. The tests, using quarterly data, cover the period 1961–2011 and the results reported herein reveal differences in the speed at which fiscal imbalances are corrected by Labour and Conservative governments. The former are more inclined to operate under a soft budget constraint whereas the latter under a hard budget constraint.     

Political budget cycles,incumbency advantage,and propaganda

This paper combines incumbency advantage and political budget cycle theory. An opportunistic politician is given two instruments: deficit‐financed transfers and propaganda. Unlike earlier analytical models, but in accordance with the empirical literature, government manipulations do actually improve re‐election chances. However, the optimal level of government manipulation depends on country characteristics, in particular the competence dispersion among potential candidates. This may explain why it is easier to detect political budget cycles in, for instance, developing countries or new democracies. Results are robust to alternative competence distribution and propaganda cost assumptions.     

The Two Kornai Effects

Kornai's theories of a “soft budget constraint” study a firm that receives state assistance when expenses exceed revenues. Such assistance is characteristic of classical socialism. It is well known that Kornai contended that a soft budget constraint increases input demands. He also predicted a second effect that has received less attention: input demands exhibit lower price responsiveness. The Second Kornai Effect may be defined in terms of slopes of input demands as Kornai did, or in terms of elasticities. A simple soft budget constraint model is used to review the First Kornai Effect and to examine the two versions of the Second Kornai Effect.     

Do China's State-Owned Enterprises Maximize Profit?

China's state enterprise reform is often believed to have made profit the most important goal of SOEs. Nonetheless the poor performance of SOEs relative to other forms of enterprises remains puzzling. We offer an explanation based on the incentive aspect of the reform, which complements the theory based on a soft budget constraint. Under certainty, the incentives of enterprise managers to maximize their own compensation are consistent with profit maximization with or without a soft budget constraint. Under uncertainty, however, the managers' incentives generally deviate from expected profit maximization. This deviation is dampened by, but still exists even without a soft budget constraint.     

Determinants and consequences of soft budget constraintsAn empirical analysis using enterprise‐level data in transition countries1

This paper presents empirical work grounded in the soft budget constraint (SBC) literature. A loan is soft when a bank cannot commit the enterprise to hold to a fixed initial budget and/or the timing of repayment. Using data collected by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), 2002) in 26 transition economies, we analyze the determinants of managers’ expectations of having a soft loan. In particular, we find that managers’ expectations are lower when the initial financing requires collateral, and higher for larger firms and when firms had recently experienced financial distress. We also provide evidence that managers’ expectations influence their price responsiveness.     

转轨经济、软预算约束与财政分权

我国正处在经济转轨时期,软预算约束问题仍然存在。财政分权能够通过增强制度约束来缓解动态过程中因事前事后承诺不一致而导致的软预算约束问题,同时,也可以通过促进地方上及地方间的竞争来在一定程度上缓解软预算约束问题。     

Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market

This paper surveys the theoretical literature on the effect of soft budget constraints on economies in transition from centralization to capitalism; it also reviews our understanding of soft budget constraints in general. It focuses on the conception of the soft budget constraint syndrome as a commitment problem. We show that the two features of soft budget constraints in centralized economies – ex post renegotiation of firms' financial plans and a close administrative relationship between firms and the centre – are intrinsically related. We examine a series of theories (based on the commitment-problem approach) that explain shortage, lack of innovation in centralized economies, devolution, and banking reform in transition economies. Moreover, we argue that soft budget constraints also have an influence on major issues in economics, such as the determination of the boundaries and capital structure of a firm. Finally, we show that soft budget constraints theory sheds light on financial crises and economic growth.     

企业、银行和政府三方还贷博弈研究

预算软约束已成为国有企业改革的阻碍因素,并影响经济转型期的政企、银企关系,而政府对于债务的软预算约束是企业信贷违约的原因之一,根据企业还贷过程中相关利益者的相互博弈,建立一个企业、银行、政府之间三方博弈模型来分析它们之间的行为及其目标差异对企业信贷违约的影响。模型分析表明：政府出于政治和经济利益的考虑,通过补贴银行和企业来实施对企业还贷的软预算约束,而银行在衡量了政府补贴和清算得失之后有可能对企业再贷款。解决预算软约束和企业信贷违约的关键在于＂政府、银行、企业＂之间的关系处理,企业完全按市场化运作,建立科学的法人治理结构,让政府从企业中逐步退出,硬化企业的预算约束环境,从而降低企业的信贷违约的概率。     

软预算约束制度成因研究的现状与逻辑

本文试图总结关于软预算约束制度成因的既有研究,并就研究逻辑、基本思想提出建设性批评意见.指出,这些研究在如何理解软预算约束,什么是制度成因,以及研究的方法论这三个问题上有着较大的分歧,今后的研究既要充分发展软预算约束概念,又要充分探讨制度作用的因果逻辑.在此基础上作者给出了一个全面研究软预算约束的综合性研究框架.     

Aid and the Soft Budget Constraint

The author applies the theory of the soft budget constraint to explain some stylized facts regarding the outcomes and practice of international aid, including ineffectiveness, white elephants, and volatility. The soft budget constraint can also make aid counterproductive. Nonetheless, actual aid institutions may be constrained optimal responses to soft budgets and commonly suggested reforms such as improved donor coordination in aid, focus on fewer countries and projects, and less volatility of aid may lower the effectiveness of aid. The soft budget is also consistent with conservative project selection and the recent focus on "ownership."     

中国企业管理软国际竞争力评价和分析

中国企业管理软国际竞争力评价体系,应包括企业治理结构、管理制度、雇员管理及企业伦理四要素等15项测度指标。综合评价结果表明欧洲企业管理软国际竞争力水平是处于强势,亚洲一些国家和地区在逐渐增强。统计数据分析还表明,企业软国际竞争力要素及具体指标之间的相关性较大,竞争力的系统性能力比较强。中国企业在管理软国际竞争力方面被世界认可的程度比较低下,与发展中国家如巴西、印度等国相比也有比较大的差距。这些严重影响了中国产业国际竞争力的提升。     

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future. We show that, maybe somewhat surprisingly, dictators who are less likely to lose power, are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support.     

BAILOUTS IN FEDERATIONS: IS A HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINT ALWAYS BEST?*

This article analyses hard and soft budget constraints in a federation, where there is a moral hazard problem between the central and the regional governments. Regional governments can avoid a bailout from the center by exerting costly effort. In this setting, a hard budget constraint is not always optimal because it can provide excessive incentives for high effort, and thus discourage investment that is socially efficient. Thus, a hard budget constraint can imply the opposite kind of inefficiency that emerges under a soft budget constraint, where the common pool problem can give rise to inefficiently low effort and overinvestment.     

Investment decisions and the soft budget constraint

This paper investigates the investment behaviour of a large panel of Hungarian firms in the period 1989–99, in order to assess the impact of institutional and regulatory changes on the efficiency of credit allocation. We find that the role of financial factors for investment decisions has changed significantly after the introduction of major financial reforms, and that firms were affected differently depending on their ownership type. Reforms have hardened the budget constraint of private domestic firms, particularly small ones, and reduced informational problems for foreign‐owned firms. State‐owned firms remained subject to a soft budget constraint. In particular, small state firms became more sensitive to financial conditions, whereas large state firms were unaffected and kept operating under a soft budget constraint.     

报酬方案、棘轮效应和预算责任人业绩关系研究

为了抑制代理人的机会主义行为,委托人在设计激励机制时采用了报酬方案和棘轮效应。对实验数据进行分析发现：在预算目标能完成时,松驰诱导报酬方案下的业绩与真实诱导报酬方案下的业绩无显著差异;除了合约开始和结束这两个期间之外,预算合约中,在松驰诱导报酬方案下,棘轮效应对预算责任人的实际业绩有负面影响;在低估自己的能力时,真实诱导报酬方案下,棘轮效应会对实际业绩有积极作用。     

预算软约束视角下私营企业成长分析

随着社会市场经济体制的不断完善私营企业成长的环境在不断优化。但在快速发展的背后,私营企业面临着多种形式的预算软约束问题,虽在一定条件下有助于经济增长,但大多数对企业成长影响是负面的,并严重损害了社会经济效率。有必要采取各种市场与非市场措施对进行预算软约束硬化,同时要坚持适度原则,在特定条件下保证适度的预算软约束,以加快"十二五"时期私营企业的转型进程。     

论预算软约束下相关影响因素变化所导致资本结构理论的变化

预算软约束是影响企业融资行为异化的重要因素之一。预算软约束存在于各种经济体中,并影响着不同制度背景下的公司融资模式。本文在回顾已有资本结构理论及其相关经验证据的基础上,试图构建预算软约束对资本结构作用机理的理论模型与可验证的假设。为此,首先提出预算软约束的分析框架;然后通过放宽预算硬约束假设来分析已有资本结构理论,重点关注了在预算软约束环境下资本结构不同影响因素的变化及其导致的资本结构理论变化;最后总结了预算软约束和资本结构的相互作用及其理论假设,并提出了进一步研究的建议。