股权结构、动态内生性与公司代理成本

本文以716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的系统GMM估计方法,同时考虑了三种内生性,以动态性的视角,不仅研究了当期股权结构对当期代理成本的影响,还研究了股权结构与代理成本间的跨时期相互作用。通过研究,我们发现：（1）不仅当期股权结构对当期代理成本有影响,而且前期股权结构也对当期代理成本有影响,股权结构对代理成本的影响有持续期;（2）前期代理成本对当期股权结构有反馈效应;（3）股权结构与代理成本间存在动态内生性。     

外部审计对缓解控股股东代理冲突的价值分析

通过股权的集中,控股股东代理冲突日益严重。本文从外部审计的视角,基于2007-2010年中国A股非金融类上市公司财务资料,分析企业对外部审计的需求随控股权集中的变化过程,并分析外部审计在缓解控股股东代理冲突与保护中小股东利益方面所发挥的作用。     

外部审计对缓解控股股东代理冲突的价值分析

通过股权的集中,控股股东代理冲突日益严重。本文从外部审计的视角,基于2007-2010年中国A股非金融类上市公司财务资料,分析企业对外部审计的需求随控股权集中的变化过程,并分析外部审计在缓解控股股东代理冲突与保护中小股东利益方面所发挥的作用。     

股权结构与代理理论文献综述

目前,我国上市公司国有股"一股独大"的现象依然严重,在这种股权结构下,企业所面临的主要代理问题并非所有者与管理层之间的利益冲突,而是大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突。本文结合中国上市公司的现状,分析当前股权结构存在的问题及由此产生的代理问题,及其对公司价值的影响,提出优化股权结构,降低代理成本的建议,并就其对我国上市公司的借鉴意义做一个说明。     

股权结构与代理理论文献综述

目前,我国上市公司国有股"一股独大"的现象依然严重,在这种股权结构下,企业所面临的主要代理问题并非所有者与管理层之间的利益冲突,而是大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突。本文结合中国上市公司的现状,分析当前股权结构存在的问题及由此产生的代理问题,及其对公司价值的影响,提出优化股权结构,降低代理成本的建议,并就其对我国上市公司的借鉴意义做一个说明。     

股权结构与审计质量的文献综述

对国内外学者关于股权结构对于审计质量影响的研究,按照股权结构对公司会计行为、审计需求以及对审计独立性的影响这三方面进行分类,并选取代表性的文献加以归纳与介绍,为完善公司股权结构来提高审计质量提供了理论依据     

股权结构与代理成本关系的实证研究—基于2011年我国主板上市公司数据的研究

实证研究结果发现管理层持股和股权集中度分别有助于降低第一类代理成本和第二类代理成本;股权制衡度在降低第二类代理成本的同时会一定程度上提高第一类代理成本;机构投资者对降低两类代理成本并没有起到应有的作用;当用管理费用率衡量代理成本时,国有控股公司的第一类代理成本高于其他公司,而第二类代理成本低于其他公司,适度的负债也有助于降低两类代理成本。     

代理冲突与公司的内部控制审计需求

本文以沪市A股2007—2009年自愿披露内部控制审计报告的上市公司为样本,从委托代理理论出发,探讨公司产生内部控制审计需求的动因。研究结果表明,管理层持股比例越低,对内部控制审计的需求越高;第一大股东为绝对控股股东、公司规模、净资产收益率、国有股权性质与内部控制审计需求正相关。随着第二到第十大股东持股比例的增加,内部控制审计需求出现先上升后下降的趋势,支持了内部控制审计需求的代理假说。     

外部审计和现金股利的公司治理角色:替代抑或互补

本文借鉴La Portal et al.(2000)提出的两个竞争性理论:结果理论与替代理论,利用Logistic和Tobit回归方法检验了外部审计和现金股利在公司治理中扮演的是替代还是互补角色。结果表明,注册会计师的外部审计与现金股利之间呈显著负相关关系,外部审计在降低管理层与股东之间的代理冲突方面是现金股利的一种可替代治理机制,从而支持股利支付的替代理论,后续的一系列稳健性检验也支持这一观点。     

家族企业特征、代理成本与审计费用

本文以2016-2020年上市家族企业的数据为研究样本,从代理成本角度出发,实证检验我国家族企业特征对审计费用的影响。研究发现：家族成员在最高管理团队中的比例和家族实际控制人持有股份的比例越高,支付的审计费用越低,且代理成本在其中发挥中介效应;家族成员在监事会中比例与审计费用呈显著的正相关关系,且代理成本在其中也发挥中介效应。本文为家族企业的治理以及审计师确定审计收费提供了经验证据。     

Agency Costs,Mispricing, and Ownership Structure

Standard theories of ownership assume insiders ultimately bear all agency costs and therefore act to minimize conflicts of interest. However, overvalued equity can offset these costs and induce listings associated with higher agency costs. We explore this possibility by examining a sample of public listings of Japanese subsidiaries. Subsidiaries in which the parent sells a larger stake and subsidiaries with greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm are more overpriced at listing, and minority shareholders fare poorly after listing as mispricing corrects. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive abnormal returns when repurchases are announced.     

Agency Costs and Ownership Structure

We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) zero agency-cost firm, where the manager is the firm's sole shareholder. We utilize a sample of 1,708 small corporations from the FRB/NSSBF database and find that agency costs (i) are significantly higher when an outsider rather than an insider manages the firm; (ii) are inversely related to the manager's ownership share; (iii) increase with the number of nonmanager shareholders, and (iv) to a lesser extent, are lower with greater monitoring by banks.     

Australian Proprietary Companies' Demand for External Auditing

The recently introduced size test for proprieta ry companies could mean that some companies that were exempt would now be required to have annual audits, while some non-exempt companies would no longer be required to have annual audits. This paper considers the reasonableness of the size test and evaluates the proposition that proprietary company audits are not all legislation-driven.     

机构投资者、所有权性质与权益资本成本

本文考察机构投资者与所有权性质如何影响公司的资本成本。我们发现,第一,机构投资者参与显著降低了公司的资本成本,且长期投资者发挥的作用更为明显;第二,相对于民营企业而言,机构投资者的作用在国有企业中更为明显;第三,机构投资者降低企业权益资本成本的作用机制主要体现在公司治理与信息解读两个方面,并在不同产权性质企业中存在一定差异。总体而言,机构投资者能够通过监督公司的治理行为以及提高公司的信息披露降低公司的资本成本。本文为机构投资者在我国资本市场上所扮演的角色提供了新的证据,同时建议监管部门应注重管理机构投资者参股交易行为中的规范性。     

Agency Problems,Equity Ownership,and Corporate Diversification

We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification. We find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outside blockholders. In addition, we report that decreases in diversification are associated with external corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover. These findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies and that the recent trend toward increased corporate focus is attributable to market disciplinary forces.     

Corporate Capital Structure,Agency Costs,and Ownership Control: The Case of All-Equity Firms

This paper provides evidence that all-equity firms exhibit greater levels of managerial stockholdings, more extensive family relationships among top management, and higher liquidity positions than a matched sample of levered firms. Further, top managers of all-equity firms with family involvement in corporate operations have greater control of corporate voting rights than managers of all-equity firms without family involvement. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that managerial control of voting rights and family relationships among senior managers are important factors in the decision to eliminate leverage.     

Market Valuation and Equity Ownership Structure: The Case of Agency Conflict Regimes

This paper provides further evidence on the link between the firm's performance and the distribution of the common shares between insiders, blockholders and institutions. We endogenize the functional form of the market valuecommon equity structure relationship by using a switching regression methodology. This allows us to observe four distinct ownership structure types that constitute different agency conflict regimes. We provide evidence that supports the notion that investors recognize the existence of such regimes and assess market values differently depending on the type of agency regime the firm operates in. We find that firms with low insider stakes and low blockholder stakes and firms with high insider stakes and high blockholder stakes have the highest agency costs of free cash flow. We also find that the effect of the ownership variables on market values differs across regimes and that there are differences in the monitoring effectiveness of institutional holders and blockholders.     

国外资本结构代理成本理论综述

企业不同的融资方式形成不同的利益格局,不同的利益格局势必导致不同的利益冲突,不同的利益冲突导致了不同的融资方式的代理成本.围绕着融资方式的代理成本的研究形成了蔚为壮观的现代资本结构的代理成本理论.     

代理成本、内部控制与企业腐败

腐败侵蚀社会财富、阻碍经济增长、破坏民主政治,必须坚决予以打击.反腐已成为目前理论界和实务界关注的焦点.利用我国上市公司2007-2012年企业腐败和财务数据为样本,研究了代理成本、内部控制和企业腐败的关系.实证发现:代理成本与企业腐败正相关、内部控制能削减代理成本,对企业腐败具有抑制作用.进而为抑制企业腐败,提供新的思路和政策依据.