Public- and Private-Sector Wage Differentials in Canada Revisited

Using a variety of techniques, we estimate the wage premium for federal, provincial, and municipal public-sector employees in Canada. We find that females in the public sector are paid a wage premium, with federal government workers enjoying the highest rents, followed by local and provincial public-sector employees. Estimates for males suggest that rent payments are comparably less, but results are inconclusive.     

Gender, Race, and Promotions within a Private-Sector Firm

This article empirically tests the proposition that the gender-race composition of an employee's occupation significantly affects the likelihood of promotion. Using data obtained from the personnel files of a financial services firm, we find that a high concentration of white females in an occupation adversely affects the probability of promotion, but only for white females and minorities in that occupation. A similar, attenuated pattern exists in occupations with either high concentrations of minority females or high concentrations of minority males. Additional empirical evidence suggests that the system of rules governing the promotion of white males differs significantly from that of the other three gender-race groups.     

Incentive and Redistributive Effects of Private-Sector Union Pension Plans in Canada

Using data for pension plans in the private sector for males in Canada, this paper examines flat benefit plans, which predominate in the union sector, documenting their work and retirement incentives, the extent to which retroactive enrichments redistribute wealth within union membership, and the impact of anticipated enrichments on the timing of early retirement decisions     

Ownership and Pay in Britain

Drawing on principal–agent perspectives on corporate governance, the article examines whether employees’ hourly pay is related to ownership dispersion. Using linked employee‐workplace data from the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2011, and using a variety of techniques including interval regression and propensity score matching, average hourly pay is found to be higher in dispersed ownership workplaces. The premium is broadly constant across most of the wage distribution, but falls at the 95th percentile to become statistically non‐significant. This contrasts with earlier papers which indicate that higher level employees are the primary beneficiaries of higher pay from dispersed ownership. The dispersed ownership pay premium is not readily explained by efficiency wage perspectives but is consistent with a managerial desire for a ‘quiet life’.     

Performance Pay and Applicant Screening

Using German establishment data, we show that the relationship between intensity of individual‐based performance pay and intensity of applicant screening depends on the nature of production. In establishments with increased multitasking, performance pay is positively associated with applicant screening. By contrast, in establishments without increased multitasking, performance pay is negatively associated with applicant screening. We do not find a similar pattern of results for group‐based performance pay or profit‐sharing. Our findings fit the hypothesis that individual‐based performance pay induces a positive self‐sorting of employees if jobs are less multifaceted. In this case, employers with a high intensity of performance pay do not need intensive applicant screening to ensure a high quality of matches between workers and jobs. However, if jobs are more multifaceted, individual‐based performance pay can entail problems of adverse self‐sorting. In order to mitigate or overcome these problems, employers making intensive use of performance pay also screen applicants more intensively.     

Using Incentive Pay and Providing Pay Supplements in U.S. Job Markets

This article investigates whether the earnings premium found with use of incentive pay is offset by lower supplemental pay. More comprehensive measures of employer costs for employee compensation are used to test the hypothesis. These data indicate that bonuses, overtime work, pension provision, and shift differentials can be less common in jobs with incentive pay, but the lower incidence of these forms of compensation does not offset the higher earnings associated with incentive pay.     

High-Involvement Management and Pay in Britain

High‐involvement management practices have well‐established benefits for employers, but what do they do for employees? Using a nationally‐representative survey of British private‐sector workplaces, high‐involvement management is shown to be associated with higher pay. The wage premium is little affected by the choice of employee involvement practices (e.g., teams versus quality circles), but it appears only where employee involvement practices are supported by job security guarantees. Powerful trade unions increase the premium.     

Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later: Alternative Mortgage Products and the Mortgage Crisis

Mortgage contract design has been identified as a contributory factor in the recent market crisis. Here we examine alternative mortgage products (including interest‐only and other deferred amortization structures) and develop a game theoretic model of contract choice given uncertain future income and house prices across different types of borrowers. Results imply that deferred amortization contracts are more likely to be selected in housing markets with greater expected price appreciation and by households with greater risk tolerance; moreover, such products necessarily entail greater default risk, especially among lower‐income households who are aggressive in housing consumption levels. Empirical tests of model predictions generally provide support for the theory.     

注重原创实现新蜕变 访中国纺织机械器材行业协会理事长高勇

纺织机械器材是纺织的技术基础,与纺织相比技术性更强,纺织要发展必须靠纺机这个物质、技术基础.如今随着纺织行业的快速发展,纺机面临的市场已经今非昔比,市场的变化需要纺机行业与时俱进.     

Pay for Performance and Corporate Governance Reform

Directors’ pay and corporate governance continue to generate public outrage and calls for reform. Our meta‐regression analysis of all comparable UK pay‐for‐performance estimates finds little, if any, meaningful association between directors’ pay and corporate performance. However, there is evidence of the effectiveness of past “comply‐or‐explain” rules, especially the Cadbury Report. Unfortunately, the effects of past reform efforts tend to erode over time. This study also explores differences between pay–performance estimates, finding that these are largely explained by how pay and performance are measured by a given study.     

Managerial Pay and Governance in American Nonprofits

This article examines the compensation of top managers of nonprofits in the United States using panel data from tax returns of the organizations from 1992 to 1996. Studying managers in nonprofits is particularly interesting given the difficulty in measuring performance. The article examines many areas commonly studied in the executive pay (within for-profit firms) literature. It explores pay differences between for-profit and nonprofit firms,pay variability within and across nonprofit industries, managerial pay and performance (including organization size and fund raising) in nonprofits, the effect of government grants on managerial pay, and the relationship between boards of directors and managerial pay in nonprofits.     

The Legitimacy of Pay and Performance Comparisons: An Analysis of UK University Vice Chancellors Pay Awards

This article examines UK University Vice Chancellors (VC) pay awards. The empirical analysis, covering the period 1997–2002, evaluates the impact upon VC pay awards of university performance measures, internal pay comparisons and two external pay comparisons, that is, the pay of other VCs and the pay of chief executive officers (CEOs) leading comparable‐sized UK firms. For the total sample, we find no evidence that VC pay awards are related to any of the performance measures, although for the pre‐ and post‐1992 subsamples there is some evidence that pay awards are related to some ‘mission‐relevant’ performance measures. All the analyses show a positive relationship between changes in the proportion of other highly paid employees and VC pay awards, which suggests that internal pay comparisons play an important role in remuneration committee decision making. As anticipated, the two external pay benchmarks have very different effects upon VC pay awards; the pay received by other VCs produces a marked ‘mean reversion’ in pay levels while the pay of CEOs running comparable‐sized UK firms had a highly significant positive impact upon VC pay awards. Following the insights of institutional theory, we interpret this conservatism by university remuneration committees as stemming primarily from legitimation concerns rather than financial constraints.     

Antitrust Sanctions and a Firm's Ability to Pay

Review of Industrial Organization - Gallo et al. (1994) analyze the sanctions imposed on firms convicted of criminal price-fixing under the antitrust laws. An element not included explicitly in...     

Athlete Pay and Competitive Balance in College Athletics

In this paper we analyze the argument—which has been used by both the National Labor Relations Board and the National Collegiate Athletic Association—that unionization and/or player pay will hurt competitive balance in college sports. We present a theoretical analysis of universities that recruit athletes and examine the assumptions that are needed for player compensation to decrease competitive balance. We also empirically illustrate the differences in balance between professional and college sports. Given the theoretical and empirical analysis, we argue that unionization and/or player pay is unlikely to hurt competitive balance.