Is Tinkering with Institutional Quality a Panacea for Firm Performance? Insights from a Semiparametric Approach to Modeling Firm Performance

There is a large and growing literature on the impact of institutional quality on economic performance and the broad consensus is that “good” institutions facilitate better economic performance. The literature that provides micro‐level support for the policy discourse about institutional quality does not, however, account for significant intra‐country variation in reactions of firms to changes in business environments, even within the same industry, and it generally ignores the possibility that the impact of institutional quality on firm performance may not be neutral. In this paper, we analyze the impact of institutions on firm performance using an approach that enables us to overcome these problems with the stylized approach. Using cross‐country firm‐level data, we demonstrate that not only does the marginal impact of institutional quality vary significantly within countries, but also that the impact is economically significant only at the two extremes of the distribution. We view this as prima facie evidence that policies that tinker with institutional quality on the basis of the popular wisdom about the impact of these institutions on the average firm may not have the desired or expected impact, at least at the micro level.     

An Alternative Approach to the Institutional Economics of the Eurozone Crisis

I argue that the Eurozone crisis is neither a crisis of European sovereigns in the sense of governmental over-borrowing, nor a crisis of sovereign debt market over-lending. Rather, it is a function of the “sovereign debt market” institution itself. Crisis, I argue, is not an occurrence, but an element fulfilling a precise technical function within this institution. It ensures the possibility of designating — in the market’s day-to-day mechanisms rather than analytical hindsight — normal (tranquil, undisturbed) market functioning. To show this, I propose an alternative view on the institutional economics of sovereign debt markets. First, I engage literature on the emergent qualities of the institutions “market” and “firm” in product markets, concluding that the point of coalescence for markets is the approximation of an optimal observation of consumer tastes. I then examine the specific institution “financial markets,” where the optimal observation of economic fundamentals is decisive. For the specific sub-institution “sovereign debt market,” I conclude that the fundamentals in question — country fundamentals — oscillate between a status of observable fundamentals outside of markets and operationalized fundamentals influenced by market movements. This, in turn, allows me to argue that the specific case of the Eurozone crisis is due to neither of the two causes mentioned above. Rather, the notion of “crisis” takes on a technical sense within the market structure, guaranteeing the separation of herd behavior and isomorphic behavior on European sovereign debt markets. By the same token, the so-called Eurozone crisis ceases to be a crisis in the conventional sense.     

The end of a 400-year boom

The Great Discoveries, which began with Columbus, created a frontier that both eased European population pressures and poured enormous wealth into the Metropolis (Western Europe). A feudalistic, authoritarian society gradually gave way to a more open democratic set of nations. Familiar institutions were born: representative democracy and private-enterprise capitalism. Individualism flowered. During the twentieth century, that 400-year “boom” has come to an end. Population pressures on resources are now roughly similar, or worse, than those of pre-Columbian times. Humankind thus faces a “climacteric”—a coalescence of crises. The “ecological trap”, which imprisoned humans prior to the Great Discoveries, is once more closing. The questions this developed include: 1) is another frontier of comparable significance to the Great Discoveries in the offing? and 2) do the familiar politico-economic institutions of the era of the “400-year boom” require reexamination? The answers given are: 1) science and technology provide the only hope for a new frontier; but while advancing technology has brought many material benefits, it alone cannot do the necessary job; 2) the institutions of the American constitutional order should be reexamined to determine if they are suitable for the time of troubles that lies dead ahead. Several constitutional changes are suggested, to be brought about by a constitutional convention. In sum, a new social paradigm is required.     

A constitutional paradigm is not enough—would sovereign citizens really agree to manipulative nudges?—A reply to Christian Schubert

In this short note I reply to a comment made by Christian Schubert, who argues that my criticism of libertarian paternalism cannot be upheld under a constitutional economics paradigm. I disagree: it is implausible to assume that sovereign individuals behind a veil of ignorance would actually agree on manipulative nudges from the public sector. Resorting to a constitutional economics paradigm does not diminish the force of the manipulation objection—libertarian paternalism remains morally objectionable. Moreover, where sovereign citizens would agree on permissible (morally legitimate) nudges behind a veil of ignorance, these would no longer constitute “paternalism” under its commonly agreed definition. More constructively, the only morally defensible paternalistic nudges would be those that improve welfare while respecting or, better yet, improving individual autonomy. These are not the typical nudges defended by libertarian paternalists.     

European influence and economic development

The development accounting literature identifies political institutions as fundamental development determinants. Forms of government or executive constraints are thought to shape economic institutions (e.g., property rights) that provide necessary incentives for economic growth. One strand of the literature suggests that European influence is a crucial economic development determinant, presumably through the adoption of European institutions. But how exactly did European influence in the distant past induce positive economic outcomes today? Previous approaches rely on “language,” “settler mortality,” “legal origins” or the “number of European settlers” as indirect proxies of European influence. We propose a direct and quantifiable mechanism: the adoption of European constitutional features. We construct a dataset of all constitutional dimensions from 1800–2008 for all countries and find that nations experience growth accelerations after adopting features of European constitutions. The growth effects are influenced (negatively) by periods of political turmoil, but they are independent of colonial backgrounds. These results show how European influence may have fostered growth, and they imply that countries were able to overcome adverse initial conditions over the last 200 years by adopting European constitutional features. Our constitutional dataset is sufficiently detailed to identify the specific dimensions of European constitutions that matter most for development: legislative rules and specific provisions that curtail executive powers.     

What economic agents do: How cognition and interaction lead to emergence and complexity

Kohn (The Cato Journal, 24(3):303–339, 2004) has argued that the neoclassical conception of economics—what he terms the “value paradigm”—has experienced diminishing marginal returns for some time. He suggests a new perspective is emerging—one that gives more import to economic processes and less to end states, one that bases behavior less on axioms and more on laboratory experiments. He calls this the “exchange paradigm”. He further asserts that it is the mathematization of economics that is partially at fault for leading the profession down a methodological path that has become something of a dead end. Here I suggest that the nascent research program Kohn has rightly spotted is better understood as distinct from its precursors because it is intrinsically dynamic, permits agent actions out of equilibrium, and treats such actions as occurring within networks. Analyzing economic processes having these characteristics is mathematically very difficult and I concur with Kohn’s appeal to computational approaches. However, I claim it is so-called multi-agent systems and agent-based models that are the way forward within the “exchange paradigm,” and not the cellular automata (Wolfram, A new kind of science, 2002) that Kohn seems to promote. Agent systems are generalizations of cellular automata and support the natural abstraction of individual economic agents as software agents.     

Toward Generalized Evolutionism: Beyond “Generalized Darwinism” and Its Critics

This article seeks to transcend the debate regarding “generalized Darwinism” or “universal Darwinism” for the social sciences. Highlighting recent discoveries in evolutionary biology, the article argues that it is no longer tenable to insist that (neo-)Darwinism is the only proper doctrine for understanding biological evolution. Moreover, social evolution is much more than purely (neo-)Darwinian or (neo-)Lamarckian. As such, the debate on whether we deploy only (neo-)Darwinism or (neo-)Lamarckism — generalized or not — to understand social evolution is a red herring. Instead, social scientists should embrace “generalized evolutionism,” a more accommodating and versatile doctrine that subsumes “(generalized) Darwinism” or “(generalized) Lamarckism.” Empirical inquiries that deploy “generalized evolutionism” have shed important new light on some critical puzzles in human society: from institutional change to the foundation of economic development before 1500 AD, through the coming of the industrial revolution, to the evolution of the international system. More empirical efforts along this line of theorizing are needed.     

Bribery and firm survival in Vietnam: Moderating effects of market competition,credit, and institutional constraints

This paper examines the relationship between bribery and firm survival when facing different levels of market competition, credit constraints, and other institutional limitations. Using panel data from surveys of small- and medium-sized enterprises in Vietnam over a 10-year period and a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards model approach, we provide empirical support for the “greasing-the-wheels” hypothesis of firm survival. Effects are found to be more pronounced for formally registered and larger firms, explained by their greater bargaining power vis-à-vis public officials. Moreover, bribery as a “risk-of-exit” reducing strategy is found only for firms not institutionally or financially constrained and for firms operating in sectors with low levels of competition.     

Post-Crisis Experiments in Development Finance Architectures: A Hirschmanian Perspective On ‘Productive Incoherence’

Abstract

The Asian and especially the global crisis of 2008 have catalyzed decentralization of the developing world’s financial governance architecture. I understand this state of affairs via the concept of “productive incoherence” which is apparent in a denser, multilayered development financial architecture that is emerging as a consequence of heterogeneous practical adjustments to changing circumstances rather than as the embodiment of a coherent doctrine. Drawing on Albert Hirschman, I argue that the absence of an encompassing theoretical blueprint for a new economic system—i.e. a new “ism” to replace neoliberalism—is in fact a vitally important virtue. If we cannot live without a new “ism,” I propose “Hirschmanian Possibilism” as a new doctrine—one that rejects an overarching theoretical framework from which to deduce the singly appropriate institutional structure of the economy. Hirschmanian Possibilism asserts instead the value of productive incoherence as a framework for pursuing democratic, ethically viable development institutions.     

New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity

Despite the EU Stability & Growth Pact and existing constitutional limits on public deficit/debt at the (sub)national level in many EU member countries, in the wake of the 2010 Greek bailout, many politicians and policy advisors have proposed new constitutional “debt brakes” to prevent future fiscal crises and bailouts. This paper puts a question mark behind this popular policy recommendation. Public choice scholars and other critical observers have repeatedly emphasised that constitutional deficit/debt limits are not per se credible commitments to run a sound fiscal policy in the future. To demonstrate this, design defects of such fiscal constraints are usually pointed out (no politically independent control, no sanctions, etc.). Going beyond this standard approach of credibility assessment, this paper argues for taking the issue of institutional complementarity seriously. To assess its credibility, one has to not only examine the design of a deficit/debt limit but also the institutional environment (tax/expenditure policy, capital market, etc.) in which such a constitutional commitment is embedded.     

Value and exchange in law and economics: Buchanan versus posner

Meir Kohn’s Exchange and Value claims that economics can be organised around two opposed paradigms, the exchange and the value paradigms. In this paper, we apply this dichotomy to characterize the analyses proposed by economists in the field known as “law and economics”. We compare and contrasts the perspectives proposed by two prominent scholars—James Buchanan and Richard Posner—and argue that they, respectively, represent the exchange and the value paradigm in law and economics. More precisely, we show that Buchanan sticks to a definition of economics based on the exchange paradigm, and this leads him to define law and economics in a rather specific, different, narrower than Posner’s way to define law and economics—a definition that corresponds to a conception of economics based on the value paradigm.     

Political Learning: The Neglected Precondition of Constitutional Reform

This paper analyses the claim of constitutional economics that liberal economic policy requires far-reaching constitutional reform. The paper starts with a restatement of this claim and reinforces the rationale of the currently most influential variants of constitutional economics as represented by contractarian constitutional economics (Brennan, Buchanan), on the one hand, and Hayek s evolutionary theory, on the other. However, these constitutional proposals have shortcomings because the institutional preconditions of constitutional reform are not sufficiently reflected. Instead, I argue that, in face of economic crisis, a revision of in-period politics requires no more collective rationality than constitutional reform does. As a consequence, the introduction of new constitutional rules depends on political learning. The article concludes that constitutional rules in the sense of CPE can stabilise political learning but they cannot replace it.     

专用性、专有性与企业制度

本文认为 ,虽然剩余索取权和控制权安排是企业制度的重要内容 ,但企业制度的本质却是如何创造和分配组织租金。现有文献往往含混地将“专用性”视为当事人获得组织租金的法理甚至经济基础 ,然而事实上 ,“专用性”不但不是当事人获得组织租金的谈判力基础 ,反而削弱了这一基础。基于此 ,我们提出当事人获得企业组织租金的谈判力基础应该是“专有性” ,并且这一变量极大地影响着企业制度的选择和演变。总之 ,我们认为现实中的企业制度安排并非是社会福利最大化或交易费用最小化的产物 ,而是理性的当事人相互博弈的结果。     

分工、协作与企业合作剩余创造——马克思企业理论分析框架的一般化

马克思企业理论有着科学的方法论基础和开放性的理论体系.但由于其企业理论揭示资本主义剥削本质的特殊使命,使其具有一定的特殊性.本文在遵循马克思企业理论科学的逻辑框架基础上,通过引入经济、制度环境和政府权力的相机介入而尝试构建了马克思企业理论的一般化分析框架--分工、协作与企业合作刺余创造范式.该范式内生地解释了企业的产生.融合了企业内效率与公平问题.突出了企业生产性本质和追求合作剩余最大化的目标.     

Origin of FDI and Intra‐Industry Domestic Spillovers: The Case of Greek and European FDI in Bulgaria

This paper uses firm‐level data to assess the horizontal impact of foreign firm ownership on domestic productivity in Bulgaria. We identify a theoretical tradeoff between technological distance (of domestic versus foreign firms) and internalization capacity (of spillovers) and examine the extent to which this is reflected in the impact on the domestic economy of different types and origins of FDI. Emphasis is placed upon the effects of Greek FDI, which is known to be of a distinctively “regional” character. We find that Greek FDI produces significantly larger positive spillovers, which appear more suitable for the Bulgarian context of transition and economic restructuring. We also unveil some notable “hysteresis” and “technology bias” effects for FDI spillovers of all origins, as well as some country‐specific ownership‐structure and threshold effects.     

人民币汇率的非均衡分析与汇率制度的宏观效率

在现行制度背景下 ,本文从我国外汇市场经济主体微观行为出发 ,建立了我国的外汇需求和供给函数 ;进而分析了市场的均衡和非均衡态势 ,讨论了人民币汇率稳定运行态势后面的微观行为原因。分析发现 :1 .人民币汇率的非均衡是必然的和经常的 ,不能形成市场均衡汇率。在此背景下形成的现实汇率势必是扭曲的汇率 ,由此导致外汇资源的配置扭曲以及相应的真实资源配置扭曲。 2 .在汇率的稳定和调节机制上 ,当前汇率制度类似于“可调整的盯住汇率制” ,我国汇率制度因此具有固定汇率制的特征 ,但不具备固定汇率制的汇率稳定机制———稳定的汇率预期。 3 .现行汇率制度构成对汇率政策的严重制约 ,调节国际收支不得不倚重于直接管制政策的运用 ;货币政策丧失了独立性 ,加剧宏观经济的波动。这种低效率表明 ,我国当前汇率制度及其微观市场安排急待改革。     

Home bias in divestment decisions of multinational corporations in the EU

We empirically investigate the claim that multinational corporations (MNCs) suffer from a “home bias” in divestment decisions: MNCs prefer to divest from foreign subsidiaries because the “emotional involvement” and the commitment in divesting from domestic subsidiaries is larger. This issue has not been yet empirically explored in the economic literature, although it is quite recurrent in the political debate on MNCs and FDI. Using detailed company‐level data on the EU corporate groups during the economic crisis (2008–2014), we show that, in spite of prima facie empirical evidence of a home bias, the bias disappears when firm‐, country‐, and sector‐specific factors are accounted for.     

Strategic Second Sourcing by Multinationals*

Multinationals often serve foreign markets by exporting as well as by investing directly in foreign production facilities. We argue that if the multinational competes in an oligopolistic market characterized by strategic complements then there are strategic reasons to use two production facilities—committing to a second source allows the firm to keep average cost low while increasing its marginal cost. The increase in marginal cost softens product market competition resulting in higher profits. We argue that this theory also has implications for the “make or buy” literature in production management and the literature on second sourcing in industrial organization.     

异质机构、企业性质与关联交易

基于2007-2009年3618家A股上市公司数据,本文从关联交易密度和关联交易频率两个维度对机构持股、企业性质和关联交易之间的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现：机构持股对企业关联交易的抑制作用并不显著,这种不显著性主要归因于证券投资基金;不同性质的机构对企业关联交易的抑制作用不同,其中证券投资基金对企业关联交易基本不存在抑制作用,而险资和合格的境外机构投资者则相反;企业性质对异质机构和关联交易间的关系有显著的调节作用,民营上市公司中机构投资者的抑制作用要强于国有上市公司。