How Control System Design Influences Performance Misreporting

This paper investigates reporting honesty when managers have monetary incentives to overstate their performance. We argue that managers who report about their performance will take into account how their report affects their peers (i.e., other managers at the same hierarchical level). This effect depends on the design of the organization's control system, in particular, on the reward structure and the information policy regarding individual performance reports. The reward structure determines if peers’ monetary payoff is increased or decreased when managers claim a higher level of performance. The information policy determines if managers will be able to link individual peers to their reports and affects the nonmonetary costs of breaking social norms. We present the results of a laboratory experiment. As predicted, we find that participants are more likely to overstate their performance if this increases the monetary payoff of others than if their reported performance decreases others’ monetary gains. In addition, overstatements are lower under an open information policy, where each individual's reported performance is made public, compared to a closed information policy, where participants only learn the average performance of the other participants. Our findings have several important implications for management accounting research and practice.     

The price of reputation: Executive compensation of sin companies

This study examines how and why managers receive pay premiums when vulnerable to social reputation loss. We define sin companies as those operating in the alcohol, gambling and tobacco industries. We show that company managers receive a higher asymmetric pay-for-performance sensitivity in their pay in addition to receiving higher total compensation. In other words, their pay increases with firm performance at a faster rate than that of their non-sin company peers. This finding is consistent with our prediction that sin companies provide greater rewards to their managers upon satisfactory performance, generating a pay premium. We propose two explanations for the reputation pay premium associated with sin-industry managers: the limited future career opportunities and the difficulty of reconciling managers’ self-identity with the employer's social identity. We find stronger support for the latter explanation. The sin-industry pay premium is larger when managers have pro-social and religious tendencies. However, we do not find a smaller pay premium when managers are close to their retirement. Since the career concern should be reduced for managers who are near retirement, this finding is inconsistent with the career opportunity explanation. Overall, our findings are consistent with the notion that managers associate their self-image with employers’ social identities.     

Experimental research in financial accounting

This paper uses recent experimental studies of financial accounting to illustrate our view of how such experiments can be conducted successfully. Rather than provide an exhaustive review of the literature, we focus on how particular examples illustrate successful use of experiments to determine how, when and (ultimately) why important features of financial accounting settings influence behavior. We first describe how changes in views of market efficiency, reliance on the experimentalist’s comparative advantage, new theories, and a focus on key institutional features have allowed researchers to overcome the criticisms of earlier financial accounting experiments. We then describe how specific streams of experimental financial accounting research have addressed questions about financial communication between managers, auditors, information intermediaries, and investors, and indicate how future research can extend those streams. We focus particularly on (1) how managers and auditors report information; (2) how users of financial information interpret those reports; (3) how individual decisions affect market behavior; and (4) how strategic interactions between information reporters and users can affect market outcomes. Our examples include and integrate experiments that fall into both the “behavioral” and “experimental economics” literatures in accounting. Finally, we discuss how experiments can be designed to be both effective and efficient.     

相对绩效评价的绩效形式研究

本文针对以往相对绩效评价实证研究中单一指标度量企业绩效的不足,选取了13个指标,采用因子分析的方式构建了企业绩效指标体系,并选取774家A股上市公司1999-2006年的年报数据计算出各公司的综合绩效指数。相对于单一指标,基于绩效指标体系计算的综合绩效评价指数不仅能全面衡量企业绩效,为相对绩效评价的验证提供新视角,还能帮助公司经营者了解公司的优劣势,找出公司的相对竞争优势所在,取长补短,发挥企业的优势,提高公司的综合竞争力。     

The joint impact of accountability and transparency on managers’ reporting choices and owners’ reaction to those choices

We report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the fundamental conflict of interest between managers and owners in a financial reporting setting. In our setting, owners seek accurate reports of financial performance whereas managers have incentives to distort performance reports in a self-serving fashion. Regulatory responses to such conflicts often call for improved disclosure, including more accountability and transparency (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Dodd-Frank Act). We use the term accountability to imply answerability—wherein managers are required to reconcile the difference between reported and actual performance. We predict and find that when managers’ incentives are transparently disclosed, accountability does not rein in managers’ opportunistic reporting. By comparison, when managers’ incentives are less transparently disclosed (opaque), accountability dampens managers’ propensity to misreport. However, this reduction in opportunistic reporting due to accountability comes about because managers offset higher reporting bias in compensation periods with lower reporting bias in other periods. Therefore, not only are the benefits of accountability restricted to the setting where managers’ incentives are opaque, but the reduced reporting bias might arise due to window-dressing. Although managers seem to care enough about accountability to engage in window-dressing, financial incentives seem to dominate accountability, at least in our setting. We also find that managers’ payoffs are higher when their incentives are opaque, but owners’ payoffs are invariant regardless of whether incentives are transparent or opaque. Our analyses suggest that owners may be relying on accountability to curb opportunistic reporting by managers—a reliance that may be misplaced. Our findings have implications for regulatory responses aimed at addressing conflicts of interest.     

Developing first-level leaders

Oil and energy corporation BP was well aware of the importance of its work group managers on the front lines. Their decisions, in aggregate, make an enormous difference in BP's turnover, costs, quality control, safety, innovation, and environmental performance. There were about 10,000 such supervisors, working in every part of the company-from solar plants in Spain, to drilling platforms in the North Sea, to marketing teams in Chicago. Some 70% to 80% of BP employees reported directly to these lower-level managers. Yet, until recently, the corporation didn't have a comprehensive training program--let alone an official name--for them. For their part, the frontline managers felt disconnected; it was often hard for them to understand how their individual decisions contributed to the growth and reputation of BP as a whole. In this article, BP executive Andreas Priestland and Dialogos VP Robert Hanig describe how BP in the past five years has learned to connect with this population of managers. After one and a half years of design and development, there is now a companywide name--"first-level leaders"--and a comprehensive training program for this cohort. The authors describe the collaborative effort they led to create the program's four components: Supervisory Essentials, Context and Connections, the Leadership Event, and Peer Partnerships. The design team surveyed those it had deemed first-level leaders and others throughout BP; extensively benchmarked other companies' training efforts for lower-level managers; and conducted a series of pilot programs that involved dozens of advisers. The training sessions were first offered early in 2002, and since then, more than 8000 of BP's first-level leaders have attended. The managers who've been through training are consistently ranked higher in performance than those who haven't, both by their bosses and by the employees who report to them, the authors say.     

Why do pro forma and Street earnings not reflect changes in GAAP? Evidence from SFAS 123R

This study examines how key market participants??managers and analysts??responded to SFAS 123R??s controversial requirement that firms recognize stock-based compensation expense. Despite mandated recognition of the expense, some firms?? managers exclude it from pro forma earnings and some firms?? analysts exclude it from Street earnings. We find evidence consistent with managers opportunistically excluding the expense to increase earnings, smooth earnings, and meet earnings benchmarks but no evidence that these exclusions result in an earnings measure that better predicts future firm performance. In contrast, we find that analysts exclude the expense from earnings forecasts when exclusion increases earnings?? predictive ability for future performance and that opportunism generally does not explain exclusion by analysts incremental to exclusion by managers. Thus our findings indicate that opportunism is the primary explanation for exclusion of the expense from pro forma earnings and predictive ability is the primary explanation for exclusion from Street earnings. Our findings suggest the controversy surrounding the recognition of stock-based compensation expense may be attributable to cross-sectional variation in the relevance of the expense for equity valuation, as well as to differing incentives of market participants.     

Sustainability reporting: The role of “Search”, “Experience” and “Credence” information

Corporate sustainability reporting quality has been frequently criticised as being unbalanced, presenting an overly positive view or failing to address material issues. The purpose of this article is to provide a fresh explanation for poor quality sustainability reporting and to propose how quality issues may be addressed. The theoretical framework combines the legitimacy and accountability perspectives using Akerlof's (1970) Market for Lemons theory. Akerlof's approach is extended by differentiating between three types of information in sustainability reports namely search, experience and credence. The article concludes that the type of information must be considered when determining measures to improve report quality.     

Board independence,internal information environment and voluntary disclosure of auditors’ reports on internal controls

When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers, independent directors do not have enough information to perform their functions. Only when faced with a good internal information environment can such directors acquire enough information to provide advice and monitor managers, and only under these conditions can increasing their proportion on the board effectively reduce agency problems, such as driving managers to disclose information to investors. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms that voluntarily disclose their auditors’ reports on internal controls from 2007 to 2009, this study explores how the information acquisition costs of independent directors affect their monitoring effectiveness by investigating the disclosure decisions of their internal control audits. We find that when the information asymmetry between insiders and outside directors is low and the proportion of independent directors on a board is high, a firm is more likely to voluntarily disclose its internal control audit report.     

Market competition,management accounting systems and business unit performance

Increasing competition in the market, due to the application of modern manufacturing technology, deregulation of economies, and privatization or corporatization of government owned enterprises, makes decision makers use of management accounting systems more important (Bromwich, 1990). There have been calls for research into the use of management accounting systems under the changing circumstances (Kaplan, 1983; Shank and Govindarajan, 1989; Bromwich, 1990; Bromwich and Bhimani, 1994).This paper reports the results of a study which offers an explanation for the relationship between intensity of market competition and business unit performance, by incorporating into the model managers use of the information provided by the management accounting system (MAS). To assess the relationship, data were collected from 61 business unit managers by way of personal interviews. The results indicate that the intensity of market competition is a determinant of the use of the information which, in turn, is a determinant of business unit performance. In other words, managers use of the information plays a mediating role in the relationship between the intensity of market competition and business unit (BU) performance. An interpretation of the results is that those organizations which use the information can effectively face competition in the market and thereby improve performance.     

The Predictability of Managerial Heterogeneities in Mutual Funds

Using a sample of Chinese mutual funds, we empirically assess how managerial heterogeneity affects mutual fund performance. We find that funds with higher manager fixed effects outperform those with lower manager fixed effects by 2% per year. We also note that fund performance improves after managers with higher fixed effects are hired. The results are consistent with the notion that manager fixed effects are associated with managerial innate ability. Finally, we find that investors pay attention to managerial attributes beyond the traditional performance measures, providing supporting evidence for the rational explanation of convex flow‐performance sensitivity in the literature.     

The effect of CEO reputation and explanations for poor performance on investors’ judgments about the company’s future performance and management

Two experiments are conducted in which MBA students make judgments about a company’s future performance and management’s reputation after the company reports poor financial results. Information about the CEO’s pre-existing reputation is manipulated at three levels (favorable, unfavorable, or none) and the plausibility of management’s explanation is manipulated at two levels (plausible or implausible). Generally, the results indicate that management’s explanations influence investors’ judgments of the company’s future performance and that judgments about management were jointly influenced by both manipulated factors. Specifically, our results indicate that a pre-existing favorable management reputation is an enduring trait that is not damaged even when management offers an implausible explanation. Our results are consistent with Mercer (2004) but inconsistent with other research (40 and 53) suggesting that a good reputation is easily lost. Our results also indicate that offering a plausible explanation improves the reputation of managers with an unfavorable reputation. We also find that judgments about management’s intentions for explaining poor performance represent a partial mediator for judgments about management’s reputation. Finally, we provide evidence that judgments about the company’s future performance and management’s reputation are consequential in that they are associated with investors’ equity judgments.     

中外企业社会责任报告信息披露比较

本文通过对中国石油和壳牌石油2006~2009年度社会责任报告在形式和内容上的比较,分析了中外企业社会责任报告披露的异同之处,然后对改进我国企业社会责任报告披露提出了一些重要启示:统一社会责任报告的编制框架;完善利益相关方的参与和信息反馈机制;开展社会责任报告第三方审验;社会责任报告内容要体现平衡原则;选择适当的社会责任报告披露形式以提高披露的效果。     

Enabling control and the problem of incomplete performance indicators

To which extent do managers care about the design characteristics of performance indicators and other control systems? The paper examines this question with the help of the framework of enabling and coercive control. Drawing upon data from a longitudinal field study in a manufacturing organisation, we study operational managers’ attitudes towards the incompleteness of performance indicators. Managers are likely to perceive performance indicators as enabling if the latter facilitate their actions without unduly constraining them. This is true even for incomplete performance indicators as long as managers can handle these indicators in a flexible way, treating them as means rather than ends when carrying out their work. Our case also shows, however, how a flexible use of indicators becomes more difficult to sustain once top management signals an increased importance of the indicators. Incompleteness then becomes a more pressing concern for managers. We illuminate the various forms of top management sense-giving through which such tightening of control is achieved and we show how they translate into managers’ perception of the control system as being a coercive rather than enabling one. Taken together, the findings of the present paper add to our understanding of enabling and coercive forms of control and also extend previous studies that have addressed the problem of incomplete accounting information.     

Financial Disclosure Management by Charitable Organisations: A Conceptual and Operational Framework

We present a conceptual and operational framework for analysing financial disclosure management by charitable organisations. We paint an overall picture of the issue and apply various theories to explain this management practice. The framework lists the many motivations and contextual factors that impel managers of charitable organisations to manage financial information and explains how they weight and prioritise items in light of considerations such as incentive bonuses, social performance, resource dependence and monitoring mechanisms. The framework also sums up the strategies and techniques that undergird financial disclosure management and describes the monitoring mechanisms that mitigate this opportunistic practice and its consequences. The paper concludes by presenting several research avenues.     

Rules- versus judgement-based accounting disclosure in the UK

In the wake of recent corporate debacles, considerable debate has ensued on the relative merits of rules-based versus judgement-based accounting disclosure. This note contributes to the debate by examining disclosure practices in the UK where a well-established regulatory framework nevertheless upholds the right of corporate managers to exercise discretion.A specific template is developed to examine simultaneously the content of the segment report and the operating and financial review (OFR) to detect disclosure patterns. The findings indicate that companies which provide the fullest and most relevant segment reports provide less voluntary additional disclosure in the OFR than those companies that, superficially, provide less extensive disclosure in their segment reports. It is unclear, therefore, that changes to more rules-based disclosure regimes will automatically lead to an increase in the level of overall disclosure.     

The Effects of Fraud Risk and Management Representation on Auditors' Hypothesis Generation

Hypothesis generation is considered to be critical to the effectiveness and efficiency of diagnostic processes in auditing. Using a between-subjects experimental design, this work examines the impact of fraud risk and the availability of a non-misstatement management explanation on auditors' hypothesis generation performance. The context is when managers undertake analytical procedures at the planning stage of the audit. The results indicate that auditors are sensitive to increased fraud risk by generating more fraud hypotheses, while the number of misstatement hypotheses generated is not affected by fraud risk. The availability of a non-misstatement management explanation was found not to interfere with auditors' hypothesis generation performance, but facilitated the generation of proportionately more misstatement and fraud hypotheses from the same transaction cycle as that indicated by the management explanation. Together, these findings provide some insights on the sensitivity of auditors' hypothesis generation to fraud risk and whether this sensitivity could be undermined by the availability of management representations.     

Do managers time the market? Evidence from open-market share repurchases

A contentious debate exists over whether executives possess market timing skills when announcing certain corporate transactions. Pseudo-market timing, however, has recently emerged as an important alternative hypothesis as to why the appearance of timing might be evident when, in fact, none exists. We reconsider this debate in the context of share repurchases. Consistent with prior studies, we also report evidence of abnormal stock performance following buyback announcements. Pseudo-market timing, however, does not appear to be a viable explanation. Our results are more consistent with the notion that managers possess timing ability, at least in the context of share repurchases.     

公司动机、审计师声誉和自愿性内部控制鉴证报告——基于A股公司2008—2009年年报的经验研究

上市公司是否自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告,不仅取决于公司自身的披露动机,而且取决于审计师是否愿意出具内部控制鉴证报告。本文利用沪深两市上市公司在2008—2009年年报中自愿披露内部控制鉴证信息所带来的研究机会,实证考察了内部控制鉴证报告这一特殊的自愿信息披露行为的决定因素。研究发现,降低代理冲突和传递信号不仅是上市公司自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告的主要动机,而且是其自愿提高鉴证信息披露质量(扩大鉴证范围和提高保证程度)的主要动机;审计师声誉越高,越不愿意出具内部控制鉴证报告和为公司的内部控制提供高程度保证;大股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突以及内部控制质量会显著影响审计师对鉴证风险水平的评估,进而影响内部控制鉴证报告的鉴证范围和保证程度。     

McClelland's trichotomy of needs theory and the job satisfaction and work performance of CPA firm professionals

This paper examines the ability of McClelland's trichotomy of needs theory (need for affiliation, need for power, need for achievement) to provide a conceptual explanation of the job satisfaction and work performance of CPA firm professionals. Seventy-seven of the 89 professionals at an office of a large international CPA firm participated in the study. For partners and managers, need for affiliation correlated negatively with job satisfaction. For partners and managers, junior-level audit/tax specialists and junior-level management consultants, need for power correlated positively with job satisfaction. Job satisfaction correlated positively with the intent to remain with their current firm for all three categories. Need for achievement correlated positively with hours devoted to work for junior-level audit/tax specialists, and with the firm's work performance ratings for partners and managers and junior-level audit/tax specialists. The results suggest that McClelland's theory, which has not been previously applied to examine job satisfaction, might provide a conceptual explanation of why some individuals experience relatively high job satisfaction in an environment where their contemporaries experience relatively low job satisfaction.