Regulatory risk, market uncertainties, and firm financing choices: Evidence from U.S. Electricity Market Restructuring

Based on the universe of rate-regulated electric utilities in the U.S., we examine why firms alter their financing decisions when transitioning from a regulated to a competitive market regime. We find that the significant increase in regulatory risk after the passage of the Energy Policy Act, state-level restructuring legislations, and divestiture policies have reduced leverage by 15 percent. Policies that encouraged competition, and hence increased market uncertainty, lowered leverage by another 13 percent on average. The ability to exercise market power allowed some firms to counter this competitive threat. In aggregate, regulatory risk and market uncertainty variables reduce leverage between 24.6 and 26.7 percent. We also confirm findings in the literature that firms with higher profitability and higher asset growth have lower leverage, and those with more tangible assets are more levered. Firms with greater access to internal capital markets and those with a footloose customer segment use less debt, while those actively involved in trading power in the wholesale market use more debt.     

Financial Distress and Optimal Capital Structure Adjustments

We show that asymmetric information may prevent firms with pure discount bonds from renegotiating their capital structure prior to the maturity of the debt, although this would increase the value of the firm when its prospects are poor. This inefficiency can be reduced if the firm issues debt with a risky intermediate debt payment, such as a coupon or a sinking fund payment. We also demonstrate that bankruptcy institutions leading to deviations from absolute priority can improve the timing of recapitalizations by financially distressed firms. Finally, we show that, under certain conditions, the optimal capital structure adjustment during financial distress consists of a convertible debt-for-straight debt swap.     

Economic policy uncertainty and cost of debt financing: International evidence

Prior research shows that economic policy uncertainty affects a wide range of corporate financial decisions; however, there is little research on the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and cost of debt financing across countries. In this paper, we argue that economic policy uncertainty affects cost of debt financing through two mechanisms including information asymmetry and default risk. With a sample of 163,243 firm-years across 17 countries from 2003 to 2016, we find that economic policy uncertainty positively affects cost of debt financing and this effect is stronger during the global financial crisis from 2008 to 2009. Moreover, our research findings show that large firms’ debt financing cost is less affected by economic policy uncertainty.     

Cournot outcomes under Bertrand–Edgeworth competition with demand uncertainty

We provide new results for two-stage games in which firms make capacity investments when demand is uncertain, then, when demand is realized, compete in prices. We consider games with demand rationing schemes ranging from efficient to proportional rationing. In all cases, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome coinciding with the outcome of the Cournot game with demand uncertainty if and only if (i) the fluctuation in absolute market size is small relative to the cost of capacity, or (ii) uncertainty is such that with high probability the market demand is very large and with the remaining probability the market demand is extremely small. Otherwise, equilibria involve mixed strategies. Further, we show under efficient rationing that condition (i) is sufficient for the unique equilibrium outcome to be an equilibrium outcome of the Cournot game with demand uncertainty.     

Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization

Whether vertical integration between a downstream oligopolist and an upstream oligopolist is profitable for an integrated pair of firms is shown to depend on whether one means by this that profits increase no matter what other firms do, that all integrated firms are better off when all firms are integrated than when none are, or simply that no downstream-upstream pair of firms has an incentive to deviate from a situation where all firms are integrated. It is also shown to depend on the number of firms in each oligopoly and on the type of interaction that is assumed between firms that are integrated and firms that are not. In particular, it is shown that if no restriction is put on trade between integrated and nonintegrated firms, integrated firms may continue to purchase inputs from the nonintegrated upstream firms, with the goal of raising their downstream rivals' costs. Furthermore, even though firms are identical, asymmetric equilibria, where integrated and nonintegrated firms coexist, may actually arise as an outcome of the integration game.     

Strategic real options under asymmetric information

This paper studies the effect of private information on the capital allocation decisions of firms who operate under imperfect competition. I analyze two interactive firms, one with private information and the other without, who must decide when to undertake an irreversible and uncertain investment decision. Traditional non-strategic models of irreversible investment under uncertainty involve a single decision maker and result in an optimal period of delay before the investment is undertaken. In a strategic setting, firms must balance their desire to delay against competitive advantages from early investment. I find that an equilibrium may not exist within the standard continuous framework when the private information is over revenues. Moreover, when an equilibrium does exist the competitive pressures from the uninformed firm are weak. This is in contrast to existing models with asymmetric information over costs, where an equilibrium always exists and the competitive pressures remain strong (Hsu and Lambrecht, 2007). This work shows that the investment timing decision, and thus the value of the private information, is highly sensitive to the nature of incomplete information.     

Debt financing,first-mover advantage,and vertical product differentiation

This paper examines the impact of the strategic use of debt financing as a commitment device, in a vertically differentiated duopoly with demand uncertainty. We consider various possible game sequences for two firms with asymmetric financial structures to enter the market. The results show that (i) having access to external debt does not necessarily promote the firm to provide a higher quality product; (ii) strategic debt improves the degree of product differentiation and benefits both firms; and (iii) a firm's optimal debt level is positively related to the first-mover advantage of introducing its product to the market.     

负债来源、会计信息质量与企业投资

本文以中国上市公司为研究对象,考察了在高风险项目企业中会计信息质量对企业新增投资支出的影响,揭示了会计信息质量在债权人保护中的作用。实证结果表明:高质量的会计信息能够抑制高风险项目企业的新增投资支出,这样的抑制效果在高风险项目企业的主要负债来源为非商业银行时表现的更加显著。     

Private debt, unused credit lines, and seasoned equity offerings

We study a sample of SEOs to examine the impact of private debt and unused credit lines on SEO underpricing and long-run stock and operating performance. We do not find significant effects of private debt financing on SEO underpricing and long-run stock underperformance. However, firms with more bank debt and unused lines of credit exhibit significantly better pre-issue operating performance. Changes in operating performance from the pre-issue year to the post-issue period are negatively related to the size of unused credit lines. Capital spending decreases with the size of unused credit lines in the year prior to SEOs, but increases following SEOs. Our overall evidence suggests that the post-issue operating performance we observed may be a result of overinvestment, which is enhanced by unused credit lines.     

Consumer Cognition and Pricing in the Nines in Oligopolistic Markets

The paper fully characterizes the Bertrand equilibria of oligopolistic markets where consumers may ignore the last (i.e., the right-most) digits of prices. Consumers, in this model, do not do this reflexively or out of irrationality, but only when they expect the time cost of acquiring full cognizance of the exact price to exceed the expected loss caused by the slightly erroneous amounts that are likely to be purchased or the slightly higher price that may be paid by virtue of ignoring the information concerning the last digits of prices. It is shown that in this setting there will always exist firms that set prices that end in nine though there may also be some (nonstrict) equilibria where a non-nine price ending occurs. It is shown that all firms earn positive profits even in Bertrand equilibria. The model helps us understand in what kinds of markets we are most likely to encounter pricing in the nines.     

SUCCESS IN DECISION MAKING: DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS, DIFFERING REASONS FOR SUCCESS

In an attempt to elucidate some possible conditions for success in managerial decision making, data were analysed from 53 cases of decisions in eight British organizations, five business firms and three non-business organizations (two universities and a District of the National Health Service). No clear relationships between features of the processes of making the decisions, and their successfulness were found until the business firms and the non-business organizations were separated. Clear differences then showed up, relatively speaking, in the conditions conductive to success. In the business firms, a successful decision was more likely to result from a decision-making process in which resources were available. In other words, in business a successful decision is most likely when sufficient information and sufficient means of implementation are to hand. By contrast, in the universities and the Health District, a successful decision was associated more with the social qualities of the decision-making process itself. In other words, in non-business organizations a successful decision is most likely when the right people participate and the people at the very top do not interfere too much.     

Corporate commitment to climate change action,carbon risk exposure,and a firm's debt financing policy

Motivated by the rising consensus that corporate engagement in climate change actions holds the key for society's transition into environmentally resilient economy, the study examines whether a firm's commitment to climate change action and its carbon risk exposure shape the firm's debt financing policy. Based on insights drawn from signaling, corporate reputation, and agency theories, we develop models that link corporate commitment to climate change actions and a firm's carbon risk exposure with its debt financing decisions. Using data drawn from S&P 500 companies, for years 2015 to 2019, we find a robust evidence that firms that engage in higher levels of commitment to climate change actions issue a higher proportion of debt with longer terms to maturity, even after controlling for their carbon risk exposure. However, we do not find a robust evidence corroborating an association between firms' carbon risk exposure and their debt financing policy. These findings are consistent with arguments that high-commitment firms enjoy positive reputation, better credit rating, and reduced agency and information asymmetry costs, allowing them to gain easier access to long-term debt markets.     

Spatial competition under uniform delivered pricing

A Hotelling-type model of spatial competition is considered, in which two firms compete in uniform delivered prices. First, it is shown that there exists no uniform delivered price–location equilibrium when the product sold by the firms is perfectly homogeneous andwhen consumers buy from the firm quoting the lower delivered price. Second, when the product is heterogeneous and when preferences are identically, independently Weibull-distributed with standard deviation μ, we prove that there exists a single uniform delivered price–location equilibrium iff μ≧1/8 times the transportation rate times the size of the market. In equilibrium, firms are located at the center of the market and charge the same uniform delivered price, which equals their average transportation cost, plus a mark-up of 2μ. Finally, we discuss how our result extends to the case of n firms and proceed to a comparison of equilibria under uniform mill and delivered pricing.     

Rational asset pricing bubbles and debt constraints

Rational price bubble arises when the price of an asset exceeds the asset’s fundamental value, that is, the present value of future dividend payments. The important result of Santos and Woodford (1997) says that price bubbles cannot exist in equilibrium in the standard dynamic asset pricing model with rational agents facing borrowing constraints as long as assets are in strictly positive supply and the present value of total future resources is finite. This paper explores the possibility of asset price bubbles under endogenous debt constraints induced by limited enforcement of debt repayment. Equilibria with endogenous debt constraints are prone to have infinite present value of total resources. We show that asset price bubbles are likely to exist in such equilibria. Further, we demonstrate that there always exist equilibria with price bubbles on assets in zero supply.     

Information Frictions in Uncertain Regulatory Environments: Evidence from U.S. Commercial Banks

Information frictions between firms and regulators are typically seen as a means by which firms evade enforcement. In contrast, we argue that information frictions between firms and regulators can reduce the efficiency of firms’ compliance efforts when the interpretation of regulatory standards is uncertain. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in distance between firms and their regulators to demonstrate this for a panel of community banks in the US. We find that banks located at greater distance from regulatory field offices face significantly higher administrative costs, at a rate of 20% of administrative costs per hour of travel time. These differences do not come with reduced compliance, are not driven by endogenous regulator choice, and are stable over time. Further, the costs borne by distant firms are negatively related to the scale of the jurisdiction in which they operate, suggesting that information spillovers between firms limit uncertainty about regulatory expectations.     

Relative information asymmetry as a determinant of the market reaction to corporate financing announcements

Information-asymmetry-based models predict that the market should react negatively to unanticipated external financing. Previous empirical studies lend limited support to these conjectures. This study examines the anticipation issue using financial analysts' earnings-forecast errors as a proxy for information available prior to the external-financing announcement. The conjecture is that external financing would be less anticipated for firms which financial analysts cannot accurately predict their earnings. Event study results indicate that high-prediction-error firms exhibit significantly lower announcement period returns than lowprediction-error firms for non-convertible debt, convertible debt, and common stock offerings.     

Investment decisions and debt financing under information uncertainty

This study examines how information uncertainty influences investment decisions. In contrast to prior studies, which assume no information uncertainty, our model includes a discrepancy in valuing debt between shareholders and debtholders at the time of debt issuance. We derive the values of corporate securities and the optimal investment threshold and coupon under information uncertainty. We show that compared with the absence of information uncertainty, debtholders value debt less than shareholders do, and hence, shareholders should contribute more investment funds. Debt financing restraints due to information uncertainty lead to delayed investment. We find that information uncertainty plays a mitigating role in shareholder-debtholder conflicts over investment policy. Moreover, the information uncertainty costs that shareholders incur increase sharply with the level of information uncertainty.     

Second‐Mover Advantages with Asymmetric Costs and Information Updates: A Product Life Cycle Perspective

Two firms with asymmetric costs engage in a Stackelberg game under multiple levels of uncertainty with information updating. A product life cycle perspective is employed to reveal when and why a second‐mover may have an advantage. At early stages in the product life cycle, when uncertainty is the dominating factor, the impact of uncertainty may be either positive or negative. As a result, the Stackelberg leader faces the possibility of either overshooting or losing its market leadership position to the second‐mover. In later market stages, when cost is more important, a process‐innovating second‐mover may accrue higher profits. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

International Financial Reporting Standards and Private Firms’ Access to Bank Loans

Prior research has focused on publicly listed firms when examining the economic consequences of adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). This study extends the literature by examining the ability of private firms to attract bank loans through the use of IFRS. Based on firm-level data from 25 countries, we show that private firms that voluntarily use IFRS are associated with a higher propensity to attract debt from foreign banks. We find no such association when examining their relationships with domestic banks. Supplementary analyses show that the results are mainly driven by private firms operating in countries with strong regulatory enforcement. The findings suggest that, conditional on adequate enforcement, the use of IFRS provides useful information for foreign non-relationship banks.     

Inefficiency of credible strategies in oligopolistic resource markets with uncertainty

The implications of different information patterns for firms in oligopolistic resource markets are considered. The traditional open-loop Nash equilibrium with static information sets is one of many possible Nash equilibria and is not suitable for stochastic environments. When shocks to resource growth are serially uncorrelated, there are no gains from conditioning the harvest on past stock levels and the feedback or credible Nash equilibrium is the appropriate Nash equilibrium concept. This credible equilibrium assumes that firms have knowledge of current stocks of reserves, which typically leads to more rapid extraction of the resource and possibly extinction. Since the open-loop Nash equilibrium is efficient when demand is iso-elastic and extraction costs are zero, it is clear that an increase in information can be detrimental to firms in the industry.