In Old Chicago: Simons,Friedman, and the Development of Monetary‐Policy Rules

This paper examines the different policy rules proposed by Henry Simons, who, beginning in the mid‐1930s, advocated a price‐level stabilization rule, and by Milton Friedman, who, beginning in the late‐1950s, advocated a rule that targeted a constant growth rate of the money supply. Although both rules shared the objective of eliminating the policy uncertainty emanating from discretion, they differed because of the different views of Simons and Friedman about the stability of secular relationships. Simons’ rule relates to modern rules that emphasize the pursuit of price stability as representing optimal monetary policy.     

Money and Output: Friedman and Schwartz Revisited

More than 50 years ago, Friedman and Schwartz examined historical data for the United States and found evidence of procyclical movements in the money stock, which led corresponding movements in output. We find similar correlations in more recent data; these appear most clearly when Divisia monetary aggregates are used in place of the Federal Reserve's official, simple‐sum measures. When we use information in Divisia money to estimate a structural vector autoregression, identified monetary policy shocks appear to have large and persistent effects on output and prices, with a lag that has lengthened considerably since the early 1980s.     

Optimal Structure of Fiscal and Monetary Authorities

Why are monetary authorities not elected like fiscal authorities are? Advanced economies pair an elected fiscal authority with an independent monetary authority. Replicating the advanced economies' structure with authorities microfounded by a political economy model shows that this structure is the solution to a constrained mechanism design problem that overcomes time inconsistency and results in the highest possible welfare. Goal and instrument independence, singly and in combination, are insufficient to minimize time inconsistency, though their combination is necessary.     

The Bullionist Controversy: Theory and New Evidence

The Bullionist Controversy in the United Kingdom is one of the first debates about the determination of the price level and the exchange rate under a paper money standard. Despite the importance of the debate in the development of monetary theory, there remains little empirical evidence that uses modern, multivariate time series techniques. The evidence that does exist provides support for the Anti‐Bullionist position. The purpose of this paper is to review the debate and develop a dynamic general equilibrium model that is capable of capturing key features of the nineteenth‐century British financial system. The model is estimated using Bayesian procedures to test the competing hypotheses. The paper provides support for the Bullionist position.     

Monetary Policy and the Lost Decade: Lessons from Japan

I investigate how monetary policy can avoid a deflationary slump when policy rates are near zero by studying interest rate policy during Japan's “Lost Decade.” Estimation results suggest that the Bank of Japan's interest rate policy fits a conventional reaction function with an inflation target near 1%. The disapointing economic performance thus seems primarily due to adverse economic shocks rather than extraordinary policy errors. Also, counterfactual policy simulations suggest that simply raising the inflation target would not have substantially improved performance. However, price‐level targeting or combining a higher inflation target with an aggressive output response would have achieved superior stabilization results.     

Determinacy under Inflation Targeting Interest Rate Policy in a Sticky Price Model with Investment (and Labor Bargaining)

In a sticky price model with investment spending, recent research shows that inflation-forecast targeting interest rate policy makes determinacy of equilibrium essentially impossible. We examine a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy under interest rate policy that responds to a weighted average of an inflation forecast and current inflation. This condition demonstrates that the average-inflation targeting policy ensures determinacy as long as both the response to average inflation and the relative weight of current inflation are large enough. We also find that interest rate policy that responds solely to past inflation guarantees determinacy when its response satisfies the Taylor principle and is not large. These results still hold even when wages and hours worked are determined by Nash bargaining.     

Overaccumulation,Interest, and Prices

I use a financial accelerator model to study interest and prices under boom–busts driven by changes in expectations about total factor productivity (TFP) and credit. I show that inflation falls in the boom phase of the TFP episode and then recovers during the bust, yet rises in the boom phase of the credit episode and then falls during the bust. Furthermore, for both episodes, the overaccumulation of debt relative to capital during the boom is critical for the busts since it implies a fall in credit worthiness. Finally, I show that stricter inflation targeting reduces inefficiencies in all instances but the boom phase of the TFP episode.