Macroprudential Policies and Housing Prices: A New Database and Empirical Evidence for Central,Eastern, and Southeastern Europe

Several countries in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe used a rich set of prudential instruments during the recent credit and housing boom and bust cycles. We construct a comprehensive database of these policy measures covering 16 countries at a quarterly frequency. We use this database to investigate whether the policy measures had an impact on housing price inflation. The measures that appeared to be effective were capital measures (minimum capital adequacy ratio, maximum ratio of lending to households to share capital) and nonstandard liquidity measures (marginal reserve requirements (MRRs) on foreign funding, MRRs linked to credit growth).     

A General Theory (and Some Evidence) of Expectation Traps in Monetary Policy

I show that multiple equilibria are a general property of economies under full monetary policy discretion. Three simple conditions are sufficient to rule out, generically, a unique equilibrium in a static economy. The key departure from Barro and Gordon (1983) is to consider bounded welfare costs of inflation. I also show that in a two Markov equilibrium economy the inflation response to certain perturbations is, generically, qualitatively different in each equilibrium. Finally, I discuss some evidence on inflation dynamics that supports the hypothesis that U.S. monetary policy was caught in an expectation trap during the high inflation episode of the 1970s.     

Effects of monetary policy on the REIT returns: Evidence from the United Kingdom

In this paper, we analyze whether a monetary policy based on three main variables (inflation, money supply, and output gap) has a nonlinear impact on real estate investment trust (REIT) markets. In addition, we extend our analysis to examine whether these monetary policy components impact the possibility of boom and bust regimes occurring in the market. Empirically, we propose different Markov-switching model variants to determine the nonlinear time-varying impact of monetary policy on the REIT market. Our results show the monetary policy environment is supposed to affect, on one hand, the REIT returns and, on the other hand, the possibility of boom and bust markets. We prove that expansionary monetary policy has an impact only in the case of boom market. However, an increase in the inflation rate decreases the probability of remaining in the bust regime. As a consequence, we have already outlined several monetary transmission mechanisms that show house prices to have important effects on aggregate demand. Our results confirm that REIT markets are not efficient.     

Financial innovation,the discovery of risk,and the U.S. credit crisis

Financial innovation and overconfidence about the risk of new financial products were key factors behind the 2008 U.S. credit crisis. We show that a model with a collateral constraint in which learning about the risk of a new financial environment interacts with Fisherian amplification produces a boom–bust cycle in debt, asset prices and consumption. Early realizations of a high-borrowing-ability regime turn agents optimistic about the persistence probability of this regime. Conversely, the first realization of a low-borrowing-ability regime turns agents unduly pessimistic. The model predicts large increases in household debt, land prices and excess returns during 1998–2006 followed by a collapse.     

The ins and outs of mortgage debt during the housing boom and bust

From 1999 to 2013, U.S. mortgage debt doubled before contracting sharply. I estimate mortgage inflows and outflows that shed light on the sources of volatility. During the boom, inflows from real estate investors tripled, far outpacing other segments such as first-time homebuyers. During the bust, a collapse in inflows keyed the debt decline, while an expansion of outflows due to defaults played a more minor role. Inflow declines partly reflect a dramatic falloff in first-time homebuying, especially for low credit score individuals. Further analysis helps support the notion that the differential decline by credit score reflects markedly tightened credit supply.     

Explaining House Price Dynamics: Isolating the Role of Nonfundamentals

This paper examines the role of nonfundamentals‐based sentiment in house price dynamics, including the well‐documented volatility and persistence of house prices during booms and busts. To measure and isolate sentiment's effect, we employ survey‐based indicators that proxy for the sentiment of three major agents in housing markets: home buyers (demand side), home builders (supply side), and lenders (credit suppliers). After orthogonalizing each sentiment measure against a broad set of fundamental variables, we find strong and consistent evidence that the changing sentiment of all three sets of market participants predicts house price appreciation in subsequent quarters, above and beyond the impact of changes in lagged price changes, fundamentals, and market liquidity. More specifically, a one‐standard‐deviation shock to market sentiment is associated with a 32–57 basis point increase in real house price appreciation over the next two quarters. These price effects are large relative to the average real price appreciation of 71 basis points per quarter observed over the full sample period. Moreover, housing market sentiment and its effect on real house prices is highly persistent. The results also reveal that the dynamic relation between sentiment and house prices can create feedback effects that contribute to the persistence typically observed in house price movements during boom and bust cycles.     

The global credit boom: Challenges for macroeconomics and policy

The recent financial crisis has put the spotlight on the rapid rise in credit which preceded it. In this paper, we provide an empirical and theoretical analysis of the credit boom and the macroeconomic context in which it developed. We find that the boom was unusually long and associated with neither particularly strong growth nor rising inflation in the economies in which it took place. We show that this type of credit and financial cycle is hard to reconcile with existing economic theory and argue that, while the “global savings glut” may account for the cycle's initial phase, other factors – such as the conduct of monetary policy and perceptions of declining macroeconomic risk – were more important from the mid-2000s onwards. We conclude by identifying some of the challenges now facing macroeconomics and policy.     

Credit market imperfections and business cycle asymmetries in Turkey

The credit market imperfections have important consequences for aggregate cycles, especially for developing countries. The research on the relationship between imperfections and output dynamics at the macro-level is ample, but the lack of wide coverage micro-data sets for developing countries limits the study of aggregate implications of the micro-level capital market imperfections. This paper presents micro-evidence on the credit market imperfections in Turkey and connects these imperfections to macro-movements. The first part of the paper documents the aggregate boom–bust cycles in Turkey and shows that the non-tradable sector is more volatile over the business cycle than the tradable sector. Additionally, this sector based asymmetry is found to be strongly correlated with aggregate credit movements. To establish the connection between the sector based asymmetries and the credit markets further, the second part of the paper constructs two micro-data sets. Using structural estimation, we find that the non-tradable sector is financially more constrained than the tradable sector. With the non-tradable sector being more constrained, credit movements become an important determinant of boom–bust cycles. Therefore, we can establish that the asymmetry in the financial constraints of the different sectors at the micro-level can generate the observed asymmetrical aggregate response of sectors over the business cycle.     

Banking on the Boom,Tripped by the Bust: Banks and the World War I Agricultural Price Shock

How do banks respond to asset booms? This paper examines (i) how U.S. banks responded to the World War I farmland boom; (ii) the impact of regulation; and (iii) how bank closures exacerbated the postwar bust. The boom encouraged new bank formation and balance sheet expansion (especially by new banks). Deposit insurance amplified the impact of rising crop prices on bank portfolios, while higher minimum capital requirements dampened the effects. Banks that responded most aggressively to the asset boom had a higher probability of closing in the bust, and counties with more bank closures experienced larger declines in land prices.     

The Most Beautiful Variations on Fair Wages and the Phillips Curve

This paper explores the connection between inflation and unemployment in two different models with fair wages in both the short and the long runs. Under customary assumptions regarding the sign of the parameters of the effort function, more inflation lowers the unemployment rate, albeit to a declining extent. This is because firms respond to inflation—which spurs effort by decreasing the reference wage—by increasing employment, thus maintaining the effort level constant as implied by the Solow condition. A stronger short‐run effect of inflation on unemployment is produced under varying as opposed to fixed capital, given that in the former case the boom produced by a monetary expansion is reinforced by an increase in investment. Therefore, I provide a new theoretical foundation for recent empirical contributions that find negative long‐ and short‐run effects of inflation on unemployment.     

Effects of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies—Evidence from Four Inflation Targeting Economies

We examine the effects of monetary and macroprudential policies in the Asia‐Pacific region, where many inflation targeting economies have adopted macroprudential policies in order to safeguard financial stability. Using structural panel vector autoregressions that identify both monetary and macroprudential policy actions, we show that tighter macroprudential policies used to contain credit growth also have a significant negative impact on macroeconomic aggregates such as real GDP and the price level. The similar effects of monetary and macroprudential policies may suggest a complementary use of the two policies at normal times. However, they could also create challenges for policymakers, especially during times when low inflation coincides with buoyant credit growth.     

Inflation ambiguity and the term structure of U.S. Government bonds

Variations in trend inflation are the main driver for variations in the nominal yield curve. According to empirical data, investors observe a set of empirical models that could all have generated the time-series for trend inflation. This set has been large and volatile during the 1970s and early 1980s and small during the 1990s. I show that log utility together with Knightian uncertainty about trend inflation can explain the term premium in U.S. Treasury bonds. The equilibrium has two inflation premiums, an inflation risk premium and a Knightian inflation ambiguity premium.     

The “forward premium puzzle” and the sovereign default risk

Carry-trade strategies which consist of buying forward high-yield currencies tend to yield positive excess returns when global financial markets are booming, whereas they generate losses during crises. Firstly, we show that the sovereign default risk, which is taken on by investing in high-yield currencies, may increase the magnitude of the gains during the boom periods and the losses during crises. We empirically test for this hypothesis on a sample of 18 emerging currencies over the period from June 2005 to September 2010, the default risk being proxied by the sovereign credit default swap spread. Relying on smooth transition regression (STR) models, we show that default risk contributes to the carry-trade gains during booms, and worsens the losses during busts. Secondly, we turn to the “Fama regression” linking the exchange-rate depreciation to the interest-rate differential. We propose a nonlinear estimation of this equation, explaining the puzzling evolution of its coefficient by the change in the market volatility along the financial cycle. Then, we introduce the default risk into this equation and show that the “forward bias”, usually evidenced by a coefficient smaller than unity in this regression, is somewhat alleviated, as the default risk is significant to explain the exchange-rate change.     

A further contribution towards explaining why disinflation through currency pegging may cause a boom

We revisit the question of why exchange-rate-based (ERB) disinflation is often expansionary. We use an analytical DGE model in discrete time with staggered wages. If the policy is unanticipated, and if the currency is pegged at the level it would have reached under unchanged policies, then a boom occurs. For preannounced ERB disinflation, our model also predicts a boom. The explanation for both is that when wages are staggered, wage-setters have to be forward-looking. Anticipating lower future inflation, they reduce wages before the change in the exchange rate, causing a favourable supply-side effect on output.     

Booms, Busts, and Fraud

Firms sometimes commit fraud by altering publicly reported informationto be more favorable, and investors can monitor firms to obtainmore accurate information. We study equilibrium fraud and monitoringdecisions. Fraud is most likely to occur in relatively goodtimes, and the link between fraud and good times becomes strongeras monitoring costs decrease. Nevertheless, improving businessconditions may sometimes diminish fraud. We provide an explanationfor why fraud peaks towards the end of a boom and is then revealedin the ensuing bust. We also show that fraud can increase iffirms make more information available to the public.     

The Effect of Bank Credit on Asset Prices: Evidence from the Japanese Real Estate Boom during the 1980s

This paper studies whether bank credit fuels asset prices. Financial deregulation during the 1980s allowed keiretsus to obtain finance publicly and reduce their dependence on banks. Banks that lost these blue-chip customers increased their property lending, and serve as an instrument for the supply of real estate loans. Using this instrument, I find that a 0.01 increase in a prefecture's real estate loans as a share of total loans causes 14–20% higher land inflation compared with other prefectures over the 1981–91 period. The timing of losses of keiretsu customers also coincides with subsequent land inflation in a prefecture.     

Changing Supply Elasticities and Regional Housing Booms

Developments in U.S. house prices over the past decade mirror those of the 1996–2006 boom. Construction activity has, however, been weak. Using data for 254 U.S. metropolitan areas, we show that housing supply elasticities have fallen markedly in recent years. We find that housing supply elasticities have declined more in areas in which land-use regulation has tightened the most, and in areas that experienced the sharpest housing busts. Consistent with the declining housing supply elasticities, we find that monetary policy shocks have had a stronger effect on house prices during the past decade than during the previous boom. At the same time, building permits respond less.     

FOMC Forecasts as a Focal Point for Private Expectations

We explore empirically the theoretical prediction that public information acts as a focal point in the context of the U.S. monetary policy. We aim at establishing whether the publication of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) inflation forecasts affects the cross‐sectional dispersion of private inflation expectations. Our main finding is that publishing FOMC inflation forecasts has a negative effect on the cross‐sectional dispersion of private current‐year inflation forecasts. This effect is found to be robust to another survey data set and to various macroeconomic controls. Moreover, we find that the dispersion of private inflation forecasts is not affected by the dispersion of views among FOMC members.     

Credit Reallocation,Deleveraging, and Financial Crises

This paper studies how the process of reallocation of credit across firms behaves before and after financial crises. Applying the methodology typically used for measuring job reallocation, we track credit reallocation across Korean firms for over three decades (1980–2012). The credit boom preceding the 1997 crisis featured a slowdown of credit reallocation. After the crisis and the associated reforms, the creditless recovery (deleveraging) masked a dramatic intensification and increased procyclicality of credit reallocation. The findings suggest that the intensification of reallocation was efficiency‐enhancing.     

Learning by Disinflating

Disinflationary episodes are a valuable source of information for economic agents trying to learn about the economy. In this paper, we are particularly interested in how policymakers can themselves learn by disinflating. The approach differs from the existing literature, which typically focuses on the learning of private agents during a disinflation. We build a model where both the policymaker and private agents learn, and ask what happens if the policymaker has to disinflate to satisfy a new central bank mandate specifying greater emphasis on inflation stabilization. In this case, our results show that inflation may fall dramatically before it gradually rises to its new long‐run level. The potential for inflation to undershoot its long‐run level during a disinflationary episode suggests that caution should be exercised when assessing the success of any change in the policymaker's mandate.