劳动市场摩擦与机会主义货币政策

本文在存在劳动市场摩擦的DSGE模型框架下考察机会主义货币政策的合理性。研究发现,当经济中存在显著的工资粘性、雇佣成本和搜寻匹配摩擦时,实行灵活通胀目标的机会主义货币政策在社会福利效果上优于以稳定通胀和产出缺口为目标的标准泰勒规则,并接近无约束最优政策的福利效果。因此在这些条件下,机会主义货币政策是中央银行合理的政策选择。     

Equilibrium Unemployment, Job Flows, and Inflation Dynamics

In order to explain the joint fluctuations of output, inflation and the labor market, this paper develops and estimates a general equilibrium model that integrates a theory of equilibrium unemployment into a monetary model with nominal price rigidities. The estimated model accounts for the responses of employment, hours per worker, job creation, and job destruction to a monetary policy shock. Moreover, search frictions in the labor market generate a lower elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output. This helps to explain the sluggishness of inflation and the persistence of output that are observed in the data.     

Excess liquidity,bank pricing rules,and monetary policy

This paper studies the implications of excess bank liquidity for the effectiveness of monetary policy in a simple model with credit market imperfections. The demand for excess reserves is determined by precautionary factors and the opportunity cost of holding cash. It is argued that excess liquidity may impart greater stickiness to the deposit rate in response to a monetary contraction and induce an easing of collateral requirements on borrowers – which in turn may translate into a lower risk premium and lower lending rates. As a result, asymmetric bank pricing behavior under excess liquidity may hamper the ability of a contractionary monetary policy to lower inflation.     

Labor Selection,Turnover Costs,and Optimal Monetary Policy

We study optimal monetary policy and welfare properties of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a labor selection process, labor turnover costs, and Nash bargained wages. We show that our model implies inefficiencies that cannot be offset in a standard wage bargaining regime. We also show that the inefficiencies rise with the magnitude of firing costs. As a result, in the optimal Ramsey plan, the optimal inflation volatility deviates from zero and is an increasing function of firing costs.     

Optimal Monetary Policy with Labor Market Frictions: The Role of the Wage Channel

This paper introduces right‐to‐manage bargaining into a labor search model with sticky prices instead of standard efficient bargaining and examines the Ramsey‐optimal monetary policy. Without real wage rigidity, even when the steady state is inefficient, price stability is nearly optimal in response to technology or government shocks. Right‐to‐manage bargaining creates the wage channel to inflation, because there is a direct relationship between real wages and real marginal cost. In the presence of the wage channel, price markups consist of only real marginal cost, and real wages and hours per worker are determined such as in the Walrasian labor market.     

Non-Atomistic Wage Setters and Monetary Policy in a New Keynesian Framework

This paper extends an otherwise standard New Keynesian (NK) model to allow for the presence of large wage setters. Building on monetary models from an earlier generation, I contribute to the NK literature by adding some new insight. It is shown that once the presence of large wage setters is taken into account, the degree of wage setting centralization and the aggressiveness of the central bank in stabilizing inflation jointly affect steady state employment. Because of this interaction, the benefits associated with inflation stabilization increase in the centralization of the wage bargaining process.     

Unemployment as excess supply of labor: Implications for wage and price inflation

The introduction of both market-clearing wages and nominal rigidities on wage setting can be used to rationalize unemployment as excess supply of labor in the New Keynesian model. As a result, wage inflation dynamics are forward-looking and depend negatively on the rate of unemployment. Moreover, both price inflation and wage inflation evolve as indicated by equations equivalent to those obtained in Erceg et al. (2000), though with different slope coefficients. In an equal-volatility comparison, the model with unemployment conveys less price stickiness and more wage stickiness.     

Discretionary monetary policy and inflation persistence

Rational expectations models of staggered price/wage contracts have failed to replicate the observed persistence in inflation and unemployment during disinflationary periods. The current literature on this persistency puzzle has focused on augmenting the nominal contract model with imperfect credibility and learning. In this paper, I re-examine the persistency puzzle by focusing on the discretionary nature of monetary policy. I show that when the central bank is allowed to re-optimize a quadratic loss function each period, imperfect credibility and learning, even in the absence of staggered contracts, can generate a significant amount of inflation persistence and employment losses during a disinflationary period.     

Monetary policy and distribution

A segmented markets model of monetary policy is constructed, in which a novel feature is goods market segmentation, and its relationship to conventional asset market segmentation. The implications of the model for the response of prices, interest rates, consumption, labor supply, and output to monetary policy are determined. As well, optimal monetary policy is studied, as are the costs of inflation. The model features persistent nonneutralities of money, relative price effects of increases in the money supply, persistent liquidity effects, and a negative Fisher effect from a money supply increase. A Friedman rule is in general suboptimal.     

Ramsey monetary policy with labor market frictions

Traditional New Keynesian models prescribe that optimal monetary policy should aim at price stability. In the absence of a labor market frictions, the monetary authority faces no unemployment/inflation trade-off. The design of optimal monetary policy is analyzed here for a framework with sticky prices and matching frictions in the labor market. Optimal policy features deviations from price stability in response to both productivity and government expenditure shocks. When the Hosios [1990. On the efficiency of matching and related models of search and unemployment. Review of Economic Studies 57 (2), 279-298] condition is not met, search externalities make the flexible price allocation unfeasible. Optimal deviations from price stability increase with workers’ bargaining power, as firms incentives to post vacancies fall and unemployment fluctuates above the Pareto efficient one.     

Why Don’t Oil Shocks Cause Inflation? Evidence from Disaggregate Inflation Data

This paper uses disaggregate U.S. inflation data to evaluate explanations for the breakdown of the relationship between oil price shocks and consumer price inflation. A data set with measures of inflation, energy intensity, labor intensity, and sensitivity to monetary policy is constructed for 97 sectors that make up core CPI inflation. A comparison of the 1973–85 and 1986–2006 time periods reveals that substitution away from energy use in production and monetary policy were both important, with approximately two‐thirds of the change in response of inflation to oil shocks being due to reduced energy usage, and one‐third to monetary policy. We find no evidence that other factors, such as changes in wage rigidities or changes in the persistence of oil shocks, played a role.     

A Historical Analysis of the Taylor Curve

Taylor (1979) shows that there is a permanent trade‐off between the volatilities of the output gap and inflation. Although a number of papers argue that the so‐called Taylor curve is a policy menu, we use it as an efficiency locus to gauge the appropriateness of monetary policy. We examine the efficiency of U.S. monetary policy from 1875 onward by measuring the orthogonal distance between the observed volatilities of the output gap and inflation from the Taylor curve. We also identify time periods in which the variability of the U.S. economy changed by observing shifts in this efficiency frontier.     

The (ir)relevance of real wage rigidity in the New Keynesian model with search frictions

We develop a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the labor market. We show that the model generates counterfactual labor market dynamics. In particular, it fails to generate the negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment in the data, i.e., the Beveridge curve. Introducing real wage rigidity leads to a negative correlation, and increases the magnitude of labor market flows to more realistic values. However, inflation dynamics are only weakly affected by real wage rigidity. The reason is that labor market frictions give rise to long-run employment relationships. The measure of real marginal costs that is relevant for inflation in the Phillips curve contains a present value component that varies independently of the real wage.     

Downward Nominal Wage Rigidities Bend the Phillips Curve

We introduce a model of monetary policy with downward nominal wage rigidities and show that both the slope and curvature of the Phillips curve depend on the level of inflation and the extent of downward nominal wage rigidities. This is true for the both the long‐run and the short‐run Phillips curve. Comparing simulation results from the model with data on U.S. wage patterns, we show that downward nominal wage rigidities likely have played a role in shaping the dynamics of unemployment and wage growth during the last three recessions and subsequent recoveries.     

U.S. Monetary Regimes and Optimal Monetary Policy in the Euro Area

Monetary policy in the United States has been documented to have switched from reacting weakly to inflation fluctuations during the 1970s, to fighting inflation aggressively from the early 1980s onward. In this paper, I analyze the impact of the U.S. monetary policy regime switches on the Eurozone. I construct a New Keynesian two‐country model where foreign (U.S.) monetary policy switches regimes over time. I estimate the model for the U.S. and the Euro Area using quarterly data and find that the United States has switched between those two regimes, in line with existing evidence. I show that foreign regime switches affect home (Eurozone) inflation and output volatility and their responses to shocks, substantially, as long as the home central bank commits to a time‐invariant interest rate rule reacting to domestic conditions only. Optimal policy in the home country instead requires that the home central bank reacts strongly to domestic producer‐price inflation and to international variables, such as imported goods relative prices. In fact, I show that currency misalignments and relative prices play a crucial role in the transmission of foreign monetary policy regime switches internationally. Interestingly, I show that only marginal gains arise for the Euro Area when the European Central Bank (ECB) adjusts its policy according to the monetary regime in the United States. Thus, a simple time‐invariant monetary policy rule with a strong reaction to Producer Price Index (PPI) inflation and relative prices is enough to counteract the effects of monetary policy switches in the United States.     

Monetary Policy and Financial Markets at the Effective Lower Bound

I discuss what determines the effective lower bound (ELB) for the policy rate and argue that the ELB is not hard, but rather soft, and that it is probably slightly negative. I argue that, at the ELB, current output can be increased by (i) monetary policy that extends the period of credibly low policy rates and generates inflation expectations, (ii) financial‐stability policy—which is distinct from monetary policy—that reduces the spreads between market interest rates and the policy rate, and (iii) fiscal policy that increases the neutral real rate by reducing expected growth of government expenditure and increases potential output by increasing current government expenditure.     

Labor market participation,unemployment and monetary policy

Models of unemployment and monetary policy usually assume constant participation. Incorporating a participation decision into a standard New Keynesian model with matching frictions, we show that market tightness becomes endogenously more volatile because both the opportunity cost of home production and the reservation wage vary with participation. The model can simultaneously explain the low volatility of participation, the high volatility of unemployment, and a procyclical workers׳ outside option of working. A policy of strict inflation targeting is close to optimal, and increasing the response of the interest rate to inflation does not have a large impact on the volatility of unemployment because of the endogenous response of participation.     

Optimal monetary policy in a small open economy with staggered wage and price contracts

We study optimal monetary policy for a small open economy in a model where both domestic prices and wages are sticky due to staggered contracts. The simultaneous presence of the two forms of nominal rigidities introduces an additional trade-off between domestic inflation and the output gap. We derive a second-order approximation to the average welfare losses that can be expressed in terms of the unconditional variances of the output gap, domestic price inflation, and wage inflation. As a consequence, the optimal policy seeks to minimize a weighted average of these variances. We analyze welfare implications of several alternative simple policy rules, and find that domestic price inflation targeting generates relatively large welfare losses, whereas CPI inflation targeting performs nearly as well as the optimal rule.     

The Role of Real Wage Rigidity and Labor Market Frictions for Inflation Persistence

We analyze the transmission mechanism of wages to inflation within a New Keynesian business cycle model with wage rigidities and labor market frictions. Our main focus is on the channel of real wage rigidities on inflation persistence for which we find the specification of the wage bargaining process to be of crucial importance. Under the standard efficient Nash bargaining, the feedback of wage rigidities on inflation is ambiguous and depends on other labor market variables. However, under the alternative right‐to‐manage bargaining we find that more rigid wages translate directly into more persistent movements of aggregate inflation.